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# Daily Report

# Soviet Union

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# Daily Report
## Soviet Union

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## U.S.-Soviet Statement on Chemical Weapons

*LD1002144490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1405 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—We are transmitting the full text of the official joint Soviet-American statement on chemical weapons, released here today.

During the meeting held on 7-9 February in Moscow, E.A. Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and J. Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, reasserted that chemical weapons should be scrapped throughout the world. They agreed on the following overall framework for achieving that aim, which they regard as a task of the highest priority:

—The sides are fully resolved to work with the aim of concluding and bringing into force a multilateral and effectively monitorable convention on chemical weapons, banning the development, production, and use of chemical weapons, and providing for the scrapping of all stocks of them at a global level. For this they will work toward speeding up the Geneva talks with the aim of solving the principal remaining issues as fast as possible and completing the formulation of a draft convention in the very shortest time.

—Even while these multilateral talks are going on, the sides will draw up a bilateral agreement on mutual obligations before the international convention comes into force, including among other things the destruction of a considerable part of their chemical weapons stocks with the intention of reducing them to equally low levels.

They will continue to work towards completing and signing such an agreement during the summit meeting in June 1990.

—The agreement will provide for a program of cooperation in the field of technology and procedures for the safe and rapid destruction of chemical weapons. This destruction must also meet economic and ecological requirements.

—When the convention on chemical weapons comes into force, the sides will, for the first eight years of the convention's operation, continue to reduce their stocks of chemical weapons to equal levels, which will represent a very small part of their present stocks. All the remaining stocks of chemical weapons must be eliminated in the following two years. Needless to say, all states potentially capable of possessing chemical weapons must accede to the convention. During that time, the sides will cooperate closely between themselves and together with other states so as to ensure the accession to the convention of all states potentially capable of possessing chemical weapons. Efforts in that direction must start without delay. The sides share the view that both states must become original participants in the convention, the ratification of which will be essential to its coming into force.

—The multilateral convention will contain the provision that all production of chemical weapons will be halted by its coming into force.

—The sides will devise general principles by which they will be guided in their efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

## NATO Troop Proposals in Vienna Reported

*LD0802173590 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Vienna February 8 TASS—The NATO countries today tabled new proposals at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. The proposals were recently voiced by U.S. President George Bush.

The document provides for cutting U.S. and Soviet armed forces in Central Europe to 195,000 for each side.

Speaking at a news conference here, Ruediger Hartmann, head of the West German delegation at the talks, expressed satisfaction that the negotiating process had made substantial headwy in the past four weeks.

According to Hartmann, the issue of Soviet and American troops is the key political question of the presence of the two superpowers in Europe.

### 'Serious Talks' Needed

*LD1102103690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 11 Feb (TASS)—"The confrontation of states and blocs and the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, is fraught with unforetold consequences for Europe," declared Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the joint armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact. He gave an interview today to TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy before his departure for the North Atlantic assembly opening in Brussels on Tuesday.

General Lobov advocated holding consultations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with the aim of contrasting the military doctrines of these alliances, analyzing their nature, and jointly studying their further evolution. In his words, new points of contact of the two sides on the issues of reducing armed forces and arms control will be revealed in Brussels. "I think that we will be able to better understand each other's intentions, expressed in military doctrines, and determine the directions of their further development on strictly defensive principles," he remarked.

As General Lobov said, serious talks will be held on U.S. President George Bush's proposal on cutting Soviet and American troops in Central Europe to 195,000.

## Shevardnadze Briefs Pact Ministers in Ottawa

### Baker Talks

*LD1202094290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] In Ottawa, a meeting was held of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member-states, who have arrived to take part in the "Open Skies" conference. Those taking part in the meeting were foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR.

Comrade Shevardnadze, head of the Soviet foreign policy department, briefed the allies in detail on the results of his talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State Baker. Special stress was laid on progress attained in the sphere of disarmament, in matters concerning the reduction in strategic armaments, the banning and elimination of chemical weapons and the nuclear test limitation.

In light of the discussion held with the U.S. secretary of state about the problems of the Vienna talks, the ministers of the Warsaw Pact member-states spoke in favor of further efforts aimed at concluding as early as this year a treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

### FRG Talks

*LD1202100190 Moscow TASS in English 0946 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Ottawa February 12 TASS—The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member-states met here on Sunday after arriving to attend an international "Open Skies" conference.

The foreign ministers' meeting was attended by Boiko Dimitrov of Bulgaria, Gyula Horn of Germany, Oskar Fischer of the German Democratic Republic, Krzysztof Skubisewski of Poland, Sergiu Celac of Romania, Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union, and Jiri Dienstbier of Czechoslovakia.

Shevardnadze informed the allies in detail of the results of his talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. He laid special emphasis on the headway made in the disarmament sphere—over matters concerning strategic arms reduction, a ban on and elimination of chemical weapons, and curbs on nuclear tests.

The foreign ministers expressed satisfaction with the development of Soviet-American relations, which has a beneficial effect on the entire international political climate.

In the light of the discussion of the Vienna talks problems with the U.S. secretary of state, cuts in American and Soviet armed forces in Europe in particular, the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers exchanged views on the state of affairs at the talks and called for further efforts towards concluding a treaty on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe this year.

Shevardnadze gave a thorough account of president Mikhail Gorbachev's talks in Moscow on Sunday with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany and with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

In this connection the foreign ministers stressed that the German reunification issue required particular responsibility and a well thought-out approach.

Both an urgent necessity and new opportunities are now arising for an accelerated development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process.

The convocation of a meeting of the heads of European countries as well as of the United States and Canada in 1990 is becoming particularly topical in this respect, the meeting was told.

The Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers expressed confidence that the conference in Ottawa and the elaboration and implementation of an "open skies" policy will make an important contribution to building trust between nations.

## International Seminar on Naval Armaments Held

### Working Groups Formed

*LD0902043690 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—An international seminar on the reduction of naval armaments and limitation of naval activities in the world ocean split into working groups here today.

The forum's characteristic feature is active participation in discussions of military specialists, including naval officers from various countries still in active service.

They are lively discussing how to involve naval activities in the disarmament dialogue.

The first group, chaired by Ray Creery of Canada, vice-president of Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, concentrates on the limitation of the naval arms race.

Its participants believe that, to stop this race, it is necessary to develop a balanced approach and a constructive position of the sides at the talks on the reduction of armed forces and weapons and to create an atmosphere of confidence.

The second working group is headed by Serge Wourgaft of France, secretary-general of the World Veterans Federation. The group is discussing problems concerning the limitation of naval activities.

The meeting began with an interesting report by retired Rear Admiral James Lacy, deputy director of the U.S. Rand Corporation.

The third group headed by Dr. Anton Vratusa, Yugoslav Government adviser, centred on confidence-building measures in the naval sphere.

Speakers demanded that all countries, especially nuclear powers, strictly observe the rules of international law of the sea and respect for sovereignty of other states.

They proposed that world nations establish a reliable system of mutual guarantees and a mechanism of control over naval activities.

Despite various approaches to the questions under discussion, virtually all participants stated that talks on naval armaments are necessary.

U.S. retired Rear Admiral Robert James told TASS that the naval aspect plays a great role in the package of problems on control over armaments. The admiral said that this aspect would be a subject of serious negotiations at a governmental level during the next two years.

### Talks Continue

*LD1002022690 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—An international seminar on naval armaments and restriction of naval operations has now entered its fourth day here. Today the deliberations proceeded in three working groups.

The debate between U.S. Rear Admiral James Lesley (retired), who is now deputy director of Rand Corporation, and retired Admiral Nikolay Amelko, former assistant chief of the Soviet Naval General Staff, was in the spotlight of seminar participants who are seeking ways to reduce naval activities.

Rear Admiral Lesley believes the Soviet proposals in this domain are not sufficiently concrete and over politicised to be of major interest for the United States. Describing his view to a working group, he said that a maximum limit of 56 nuclear submarines for both sides would be an example of a concretely formulated proposal that could be received with understanding.

Nikolay Amelko disagreed with Lesley. He believes no component of naval forces should be picked out at random. As to the Soviet initiatives, announced in Murmansk, Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, they are perfectly sufficient, he believes, for a political decision to be taken on the need to cut naval forces. Amelko said there were now possibilities to reduce naval confrontation in some regions of our planet.

Problems of limiting and reducing naval operations are being discussed not only by military experts, but also by representatives of such public organisations as Greenpeace and the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). CND President Bruce Kent told TASS that reforms in the USSR and East Europe, if viewed from the ideological viewpoint, deprive right-wingers of all grounds to present the USSR as an enemy. Nevertheless, Britain is continuing its Trident submarine programme. "Unfortunately, we still have no evidence of radical changes in the political thinking of the military," Kent said. "This is why we have gathered here to carry on a joint dialogue on how to stop the further development of nuclear forces."

The seminar will end on Saturday.

### Batsanov Cited on Geneva Disarmament Conference

*PM0902[illegible]90 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Own correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy dispatch under the rubric "Geneva Conference": "Promoting the Development of Dialogue"]

[Text] Geneva—The regular session of the Disarmament Conference, which has opened at the Geneva Palais des Nations, has an extensive and full agenda. The most important items on this agenda include nuclear disarmament, banning nuclear tests, preventing an arms race in space, and chemical weapon negotiations.

In commenting on the opening of the session, international observers in Geneva are, once again, trying to assess how near completion is the multilateral convention on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and their destruction, which the conference participants are elaborating. When will the draft convention be ready?

Claims, which have been repeated for a number of years now, that the talks on chemical weapons will be completed at most in 12 or 18 months' time, should be interpreted rather as a political appeal and as what is desirable, S.B. Batsanov, Soviet representative at the Disarmament Conference, has said in reply to my question. However, since the end of last year and the beginning of the current year, such estimates are beginning to predominate among the majority of the conference participants who tend toward the view that a year or two will now be sufficient to complete the talks.

The convention could become an agreement of unprecedented importance, enabling mankind to rid itself of a whole class of extremely dangerous weapons at once. The draft convention (and that is more than 200 pages of text) can now be regarded as being ready on the whole.

In connection with the work on this document, the efforts undertaken by the USSR and the United States outside the framework of the Disarmament Conference with a view to the elaboration of a bilateral agreement in the sphere of chemical weapons cannot go unmentioned. Essentially, it is a question of steps taken by the Soviet Union and the United States to embark on bilateral chemical disarmament even before the talks on chemical weapons have been completed, thus setting an example to other states. These steps also envisage cooperation between the two states in the quest for optimum and ecologically safe forms of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. It is hoped that the bilateral agreement may be ready in time for the June Soviet-American summit.

Among the other questions of key importance which are to be discussed at the current session are, above all, efforts to forestall an arms race in space. Their success depends largely on the United States, which still has no intention not just of cutting back, but even limiting the work which it has begun under the "star wars" program. The Soviet side sees its task at the current session in promoting the development of a serious multilateral dialogue on space issues and is prepared to submit a number of specific confidence-building measures in this sphere.

And finally, another of the session's topical questions on which the Soviet delegation will lay stress in the current year is the problem of a total nuclear test ban. The interest focused on this issue in our country of late is by no means theoretical—a movement for banning tests is gaining ground. The Soviet stance on this complex question is highly constructive. Our delegation has in its portfolio a whole series of suggestions which will be submitted to the talks participants to accelerate the solution of this problem. They include a proposal on improved monitoring of nuclear test explosions and a proposal for the conversion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water into a treaty on a total ban. The success of the Soviet initiatives will, of course, depend largely on the stance of the other nuclear powers.

## Military Seminar Seen To Advance CSCE Talks

*LD1002093990 Moscow TASS in English 2123 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna February 9 TASS—A seminar on military doctrines with the participation of representatives of the top military command from 35 countries—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in the Austrian capital gave a strong impetus to talks on confidence- and security-building measures and security in Europe. A broad and constructive exchange of views on defence policies and military development brought to light problems requiring urgent solution. This idea was expressed at a regular plenary meeting of the talks held here today.

Local political observers believe that at the present stage of the talks it is especially important to bring closer the stands on issues where differences are especially serious. This refers, in the first place, to the spreading of confidence-building measures to naval activities.

"When supporting the spreading of these measures to naval activities, we do not intend to resolve this problem at the expense of sombody else's security," Ambassador Mikhailov, member of the Soviet delegation, said. He stressed the readiness to take into account the concern of the other side, but pointed out that it is possible to discuss other ways of tackling this complicated problem, but not avoiding it.

If one carefully analyses the initial stands of the sides, one can achieve progress even in tacking such a difficult problem as the spreading of confidence-building measures to air force activities, the Soviet diplomat added.

However, NATO representatives at the talks continue to pass in silence the problem of spreading confidence-building measures to naval and air force activities.

Joseph Small, head of the Irish delegation, praised the work of the seminar on military doctrines and pointed to close connection between talks on confidence- and security-building measures and talks on conventional armaments in Europe. He believes that their development and results should be in line with a new political situation on the continent. Arms reductions alone will not ensure stability, he stressed. They should go together with a new package of confidence-building measures expanding and developing the Stockholm accords.

John Maresca, head of the U.S. delegation, spoke in favour of attaining more effective results at the talks. The United States believes that the process started by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is playing an important part in the creation of united Europe, he said.

## Soviet Statement on Troop Withdrawals Reported

*PM1102202390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1*

["Soviet Government Statement"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Dynamic processes of a positive nature are taking place in Europe with regard to the restructuring of internal structures and interstate relations. The cold war period has ended. A transition has begun to a qualitatively new international order based on fundamentally different relations among European states. For the first time in the postwar period, a real opportunity has arisen for the gradual dismantling of the obsolete model of the European balance of forces which took shape during the cold war years and which was based, above all, on military confrontation. Accordingly, a new system of relations is to be erected in its place which will ensure stability and security on the European Continent.

In the situation which has taken shape, it is important not to miss a historic opportunity and to add military detente to political detente in a timely manner. This task is becoming increasingly urgent. Good preconditions exist for its fulfillment, chief among which is the successful progress at the Vienna talks on reducing conventional armed forces on the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals. At the same time, there are known fears that the results of the Vienna talks may lag behind the pace of the transformations in Europe. This cannot be permitted.

As is known, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states, without waiting for the Vienna accords to be concluded, are already taking steps to unilaterally reduce their armed forces and to make them structurally incapable of attack. The withdrawal of troops and the elimination of bases on foreign territories are also of fundamental importance for military detente. We confirm the Soviet Union's adherence to the earlier stated position—to withdraw all foreign troops from other people's territories in Europe by 1995-1996, and to eliminate all military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000.

Since only Soviet troops are stationed outside their own national territory in Warsaw Pact countries, the USSR is ready, by agreement with the allied countries, to withdraw or reduce these troops after discussing practical questions connected with this.

The Soviet Union has already begun talks with Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the withdrawal of its troops from those countries. There is every reason to reckon that these talks will end in an accord on all aspects of a troop withdrawal, including technical and social aspects, and Soviet soldiers and officers will return home from those countries as soon as possible.

In addition to these two countries, in Europe Soviet troops are now stationed also in Poland and the GDR. If the government of the Republic of Poland expresses a corresponding desire, we could discuss the question of the Soviet troops in that country with its representatives, too. As for the Western group of Soviet forces, stationed on GDR territory, the Soviet Union is already unilaterally reducing its troops stationed there. Further steps in this direction will be possible within the framework of the achievement of accords at the Vienna talks, where all aspects of the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe are being examined. In addition, the presence of foreign troops in both the GDR and the FRG is a special question connected with the commitments of the four powers stemming from the results of World War II, and it can be resolved only with due regard for the security interests of all the states concerned.

Of course, the said measures must be implemented with due regard for the established postwar realities in Europe, with due regard for the interests of all-European stability, in the broad context of the further evolution of the political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole.

## Shevardnadze Attends 'Open Skies' Conference

### Canadian Visit Announced

*LD1002221390 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a news briefing here today that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will go for a visit to Canada on February 11.

Shevardnadze will take part in the international "Open Skies" conference in Ottawa. The visit acquires special urgency because "in addition to serious problems which will be discussed at the forum, the Canadian capital can also become a venue for continuing a dialogue between Shevardnadze and his American and West German counterparts," he said.

### Departs for Canada

*LD1102150990 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 11 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has left Moscow and is on his way to an international conference on "open skies" in Ottawa.

After the conference, from February 14 to 15, Shevardnadze will be on an official visit to Canada. He has been invited by the Canadian Government.

### Arrives in Ottawa

*LD1102193690 Moscow TASS in English 1928 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Ottawa February 11 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Ottawa today for an international conference on an "open skies" policy of military surveillance. The conference will be held on Monday and Tuesday [12-13 February].

After the conference, Shevardnadze will remain in Canada for an official visit, at the invitation of the Canadian Government.

### Arrival Interview

*LD1202091790 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Ottawa, Canada, on Sunday. He will take part in the "Open Skies" international conference.

In an interview for newsmen, he expressed the determination of the Soviet Union to support steps aimed at signing a corresponding treaty. The Soviet minister also said that he hopes to discuss with his counterparts from the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries ways of making progress at the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe so as to conclude a corresponding agreement before the end of the year.

### Conference Opens 12 Feb

*LD1202094390 Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Ottawa February 12 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valentin Vasilets:

Foreign ministers from 23 Warsaw Treaty amd NATO member-countries have converged on Ottawa for an international "open skies" conference which opened here today to consolidate confidence between the East and the West through a new mechanism of unarmed aerial surveillance and other techniques for verification purposes.

The conference will discuss flight quotas for each country, the request procedure, time limits for surveillance and other details.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze believes that the conference will be a success because the idea of "open skies" is supported by all its participants.

The conference will also touch upon many aspects of East-West relations. This became evident after journalists here were told of the results of informal meetings of foreign ministers.

The ministers discussed the recent U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, which made progress on strategic arms reduction, the banning and elimination of chemical weapons and the limitation of nuclear tests.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner noted that NATO foreign ministers welcomed a breakthrough in arms control reached at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations. The ministers reaffirmed their readiness to hold this year a summit of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Woerner said.

The first two days of the forum will be devoted to speeches of foreign ministers and then experts will take their turn.

## Reportage on Gerasimov's 12 Feb Briefing

### Mandela Release

*LD1202121990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 12 Feb (TASS)—"Together with all other countries and peoples, we welcome the release of Nelson Mandela," declared Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, at a press briefing today.

He stressed that in the Soviet Union, the release of the African National Congress leader from the prison where he lived for more than 27 years is considered "a step that should have been taken a long time ago."

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman also expressed the hope that "nevertheless, at some time there will be an end to the policy of apartheid" in the Republic of South Africa.

### German Unification Stand

*LD1202134290 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today that the press and official comments on Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow last Saturday were "somewhat one-sided and euphoric."

He referred to a comment by the German Wave broadcast station, which claimed that "Moscow did not even mention its earlier doubts and has stated that Germans should decide themselves how and when reunification should take place."

"Yes, we said that the question of German national unity should be decided by Germans themselves. They should fix the time limits and terms" of the process, Gerasimov said. "But this is not all there is to it, because the German issue is not an isolated factor. It is part of a political, historical, geographical and even psychological situation."

Remembering "where the last war came from," Gerasimov noted, "we have not only mentioned our 'doubts,' but have also discussed with the West German side the German issue as a whole."

In solving the German problem it is necessary to reckon with the interests of Germany's neighbours and the interests of Europe, with East-West relations and stability in Europe, the spokesman said. He stressed, moreover, that the "reunification of any revision of post-war European borders" would meet these preconditions, which should "synchronise German-German unification with the development of the all-European process." He said that there was also the "responsibility of the four powers for German affairs and for West Berlin."

The decision reached in Moscow to "adhere to the achieved agreements and to address each other immediately when the necessity arises" is comformable to these terms, Gerasimov stressed.

### 'Korean Wall' Dismantling

*AU1202135890 Paris AFP in English 1320 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, Feb 12 (AFP)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov Monday reiterated Moscow's call for dismantling "the wall" separating the Korean peninsula, and expressed "regret" that South Korea had failed to respond to North Korea on this score.

"The destruction of the Berlin Wall has been welcomed, why not do the same with the Korean wall," Mr. Gerasimov told a press briefing here. His comments followed those of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze who Saturday told a press conference that Seoul should accede to North Korea's demand that the wall be torn down.

Seoul denies having a wall on the border with North Korea to block free passage, saying the only structure in place are a series of antitank barriers. The suggestion that the wall be removed was made by North Korean President Kim Il-song in his New Year's message.

Both North and South Korea have gone to great lengths to press their differing positions on the structure and its functions, each taking journalists to its side of the border.

### Soviet-U.S. Trade Talks

*LD1202141290 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—Soviet-U.S. Trade negotiations are starting in Washington today in a favourable atmosphere, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The United States and USSR have recently expressed readiness to overcome those obstacles that hinder bilateral trade and economic relations. This position was confirmed during U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Moscow last week, Gerasimov said.

The negotiations, Gerasimov said, will be conducted according to the agreement by the two countries' leaders during the Malta summit. They are aimed at preparing a trade agreement by the June Soviet-U.S. summit in Washinsgton. The agreement will normalise trade and economic relations between the two countries.

Jackson-Vanik's and Stevenson's amendments are the main obstacles to the agreement, as "they link the granting of most favoured nation status to the Soviet Union to political conditions, particularly to emigration issues," Gerasimov said.

### NATO Membership for Unified Germany Rejected

*AU1202100290 Paris AFP in English 0849 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[David Millikin report]

[Excerpt] Ottawa, Feb 12 (AFP)—The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners unanimously rejected Western demands that a reunified Germany remain in the North Atlantic alliance on the eve of an East-West conference here. Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, meeting here prior to the opening Monday of the so-called "Open Skies" conference, were in total agreement on the "inadmissibility of continued participation of a unified Germany in NATO," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin said. "There is unanimity on this," he told reporters late Sunday.

The unequivocal East bloc stand was diametrically opposed to statements by NATO officials—after a meeting here of that alliance's foreign ministers—in favor of full membership of a single Germany in NATO. NATO diplomats were clearly caught by surprise by the Warsaw Pact declaration.

As Mr. Churkin announced the Warsaw Pact position, NATO officials and senior diplomats from alliance member states were telling reporters that Moscow appeared to be softening its resistance to NATO membership for a new Germany. They said separate talks during the past few days between Soviet leaders, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had made headway in dissuading Moscow from pressing for a neutral Germany. "It's in everybody's interest in Europe that Germany remain committed to an alliance, and this argument began carrying weight with the Russians" during the recent talks, a British Foreign Office spokesman said after NATO delegations were briefed by Mr. Baker and West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher on their Moscow meetings.

"The general feeling (at the NATO ministerial) was that the talks in Moscow meant an important step forward toward the goal of our alliance which is to overcome the division of Europe and Germany," Secretary General Manfred Woerner said before the Warsaw Pact declaration. [passage omitted]

### 'International Situation' Program on E. Europe

*LD1002222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Kazbek Basiyev, All-Union Radio commentator, with Viktor Levin, commentator]

[Excerpts] [Basiyev] Greetings, comrades. Of late, our post has contained many letters whose writers ask about events in East Europe. In particular, Nikolay Grigoriyevich Yashnikov, a war veteran from the town of Kovrov, asks for an explanation of the recent rather rapid removal of the leaders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and asks what has actually happened to them. I will ask my colleague commentator Viktor Levin to give a more detailed reply to these questions.

[Levin] Comrade Yashnikov asks about the fate of particular individuals, but really this is a larger matter: the collapse of authoritarian, Stalinist regimes, and not only and not so much Zhivkov who ruled Bulgaria for over 20 years, Honecker who occupied the post of top leader for 18 years, and Jakes who occupied the seat of general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for a rather short time compared with the other two, but who represented a similar authoritarian regime.

The specific accusations against these individuals do not totally coincide. For example, to speak about Jakes in Czechoslovakia, particular stress is laid upon his incompetence which is a very widespread phenomenon among authoritarian figures. But when the subject is Honecker, one recalls the accusation of treason which has been officially made against him. His treason was manifested in his order to establish universal shadowing of all citizens of the GDR, which is a most crude violation of the Constitution. Zhivkov, it turns out, apart from his autocratic ways, was utterly dishonest. And, by the way, in authoritarian regimes the top leaders never make any distinction betwen their own pocket and the state's, and shamelessly dip their fingers into it.

It is even more important to stress that all the leaders who were overthrown—yes overthrown—by the people as a result of mass demonstrations—in Bulgaria the situation at first seemed to develop differently, and at first Zhivkov was sent off to a deserved retirement, but the waves of people's anger are rising increasingly higher there, too—the leaders who were overthrown by the people personified authoritarian regimes, regimes where the power was held by a narrow group of individuals, a regime which trampled the will of the people and which appropriated to itself the right to speak on behalf of the people, while not even listening to the people itself.

What has taken place in the countries of East Europe is the collapse of socialism in its Stalinist interpretation. A collapse of the Stalinist system has taken place. And, in so far as these leaders were leaders of the Stalinist type, in so far they embodied the principles and tenets which were embodied in the Stalinist structure, they have been cast onto the sidelines of history.

Let me note straight away that at present very much is being said that allegedly the socialist system is collapsing, socialism as such is collapsing. Yes, I have happened to see at some demonstrations in Berlin the slogans: No more socialist experiments. But you must agree that this slogan can be interpreted in various ways. Any concept needs to be discovered. Stalin was the first to declare the victory of socialism in our country. But we are well aware what sort of socialism that was. Perestroyka is called upon to give socialism back its true content. But in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, perestroyka was long delayed. In the GDR, the bombastic thesis—Socialism in the colors of the GDR—was put into circulation, and at the extraordinary congress of Communists last December, this was unequivocally described as Stalinism in the colors of the GDR.

But it is not easy for everyone to have a clear understanding. And as a result, the people became to a considerable extent disillusioned. In their eyes socialist ideas clearly now look very insipid—to put it no more strongly. The party continues to bear the socialist idea but for this it needs to be cleansed of dirt and accretions. Last Sunday, in order to dissociate itself from the past, they gave up part of the former name, Socialist Unity Party of Germanty [SED], and now call themselves only the Party of Democratic Socialism. The reason for this is that the name SED had become odious. It evokes very negative attitudes among the broad public.

The new party is taking a completely different course. It is decisively breaking away from Stalinism, its dogmas, and structure. But in order to win back trust and to prove this, it is not enough to change the name. I recall these figures: Six months ago the SED had 2.3 million members; in December, when the extraordinary party congress took place—it was extraordinary because it was necessary to carry out a radical renewal of the leadership, it was necessary to carry out a fundamental change in the party's program directives—1.7 million people remained in it. In a very short period, just over a month, 600,000 people left the party. Two weeks ago I saw the figure 1,000,200 [number as heard] remaining in the party. New party tickets will now be given out for the Party of Democratic Socialism and it is difficult to say how many people will take them. [passage omitted on people being SED members for career purposes]

On 18 March there will be parliamentary elections in the GDR, the first free elections in which very varied forces are struggling for the right to win the trust of the electorate. Even according to an incomplete count, there are now over 160 parties and movements in the GDR. Less than 20 of them participate in the roundtable but these are, it is true, the largest ones, and virtually all intend to take part in the forthcoming elections.

So far—I would very much like the situation to change—but so far the sitaution is such that all the opposition forces are united in only one thing, to inflict a defeat on the Party of Democratic Socialism. And that is happening along the whole front, as they say. The method that is used most actively is for party members to be accused of bringing the country to crisis. The accusation, if one speaks openly, is clearly demagogic. For, under an authoritarian regime, what could be done by those party members who were quite freely called the rank and file, when the party generals had in their hands such an all-powerful truncheon as the concept, which they distorted beyond all recognition, of party discipline, when the rank file, under the principle of democratic centralism which did not contain even a whiff of democracy, were ascribed the role of unquestioning implementation of orders from above. It only took someone to have their own opinions—and to the party's honor such people did exist—then merciless retribution rained down upon them. They were put into prison, sent abroad, or at best hastily retired.

The leaders asserted that the decisions were taken not by them, but by the party—so the party must pay. I would like to hope that in the time that remains, people's minds can still become somewhat clearer and people will understand that one should not equate the present Party of Democratic Socialism with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which was headed by Honecker, which was a purely apparatus party which did not take the members of the party into account. However, there is little time to prove this.

But when we think about what is happening, we come to the conclusion that we are faced with very important socio-political processes, which raise in a new way, questions of practice and questions of theory. We have always considered that Marxist-Leninist teachings give the answer to all questions, that the implementation of this teaching into practical activity always brings the optimal results. But now, when we, as they say, reckon up the results, it turns out that the Stalinist distortions of this teaching led the countries of East Europe into a deadend, and not just the countries of East Europe.

Our ills stem from the very same thing—from the operation of the Stalinist, admnistrative-command system. And, of course, ahead lies a very complicated and agonizing process of purification, a process of freeing ourselves from everything extraneous, a process of returning to the socialist idea as such—the bearers of which, as is known—were not only Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but also Kautsky, Bernstein, and Pelkhanov. In our days, too, the socialist idea is not standing still, either. So, by enriching itself from the whole treasury of socialist thought, the Party of Democratic Socialism in the GDR, the Bulgarian Communist Party—it has kept its former name although the question of changing it has already been raised at the congress—and the other friendly parties can, with time, regain prestige among the people and achieve the position of being able to play a prominent role in political and social life, to achieve this not by decree but by work, by their activity for the good of working people. But this is a complicated and difficult process and for now they are having to pick up the pieces, as the saying goes.

### 'Observers Roundtable' Discusses European Affairs

*LD1102184890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 11 Feb 90*

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Gennadiy Vedenyapin with Boris Andrianov, foreign political commentator, and Rudolf Kolchanov, TRUD deputy editor in chief]

[Excerpts] [Vedenyapin] Hello comrades. We are beginning the program "International Observers at the Roundtable." Gennadiy Vedenyapin, its presenter, is at the microphone. My colleague Boris Andrianov, foreign political commentator of the All-Union Radio, and Rudolf Kolchanov, deputy editor in chief of TRUD newspaper, are here with me.

Undoubtedly, the visit to Moscow by James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, was one of last week's major events. It confirmed once again that the Soviet-U.S. dialogue is gaining speed and is acquiring ever more substantial specific content. The visit did not only have an applied importance, as a stage in preparing the Soviet- U.S. summit scheduled for June; it had a political significance of its own which confirms that the Moscow-Washington dialogue continues, becomes deeper, and opens new vistas for mutual understanding and interaction.

[Andrianov] It hardly needs to be mentioned that the ongoing turbulent events in our world and especially in Europe have shown how timely the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations is and how important it is that two great powers should have an opportunity at this crucial stage of world development to speak confidingly with each other and have a chance to look for approaches which will meet their mutual interests and, at the same time, will be in harmony with the interests of the entire international community.

[Passage omitted in which Kolchanov quotes Baker's pronouncements at the news conference in Moscow; Vedenyapin sums up the agenda of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and some outstanding problems yet to be solved; Andrianov describes the results to date of the work of the special committee for chemical weapons; Vedenyapin notes that Washington has taken a positive attitude to holding an all-European conference within the framework of the Helsinki process this year; Andrianov sums up progress achieved at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow in various military areas; Vedenyapin and Kolchanov outline the way the German issue was tackled at the talks; both Baker and Gorbachev agreed that the German issue should be solved within the all-European context]

[Kolchanov] The interest in the German problem is quite understandable. Amid the turbulent political events currently taking place in Europe, German-German relatons are, perhaps, distinguished by the highest degree of dynamism. And the thing here is not only the many facts showing the rapidly developing contacts between the FRG and the GDR in practically all the spheres of any importance, primarily in political and economic life. It is a broader question, in my view, which bears upon rapid changes in the problem of German unity. After the well-known events in the GDR took place, influential politicians in Bonn stressed that the problem of German reunification was not on the agenda; they mentioned, however, that the restoration of Germany's state unity remains a political goal of the Federal Government. But now this question is not only being proposed for agenda but it is being accelerated and moved into the area of practical decisions.

[Passage omitted in which Vedenyapin and Kolchanov review foreign comments on prospects for a German monetary union]

[Kolchanov continues] One should mention that neither now nor in the past have we had any problem with the principle of self-determination of the two German states. This is a natural right of peoples to choose freely and to have an independent path of development. It is not the idea itself of German unity, but the alarming and tragic things which in the recent past were associated with the former united Germany and which, frankly speaking, have not been ultimately eradicated on German soil to this day. So the problem of German unity concerns not just the Germans alone, and it should be solved within the context of the already existing European and world realities, taking into account the interests of other countries and, of course, the tragic lessons of history.

[Andrianov] Of course, the current situation is absolutely different from the one in those tragic years when world wars originated twice on German soil. Nevertheless, the question arises: Where are the political, legal, and material guarantees of German unity not posing a threat to the national security of other states and to peace in Europe in the future?

[Veddenyapin] And I have another question: Will such a Germany be prepared to recongize the existing European borders and to give up any territorial claims?

[Kolchanov] This is an extremely important question. It is difficult to expect that the idea of Germany unity will not be opposed by many countries, for which this issue is not only acute but very often simply painful, without Germans pledging to unconditionally recognize and strictly observe the present-day borders in Europe, which took shape as a result of the war, and not make territorial claims to anyone. True, there are reassuring statements by FRG state officials, and quite recently Foreign Minister Genscher spoke about that in Potsdam; however, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court which confirmed the legality of the Reich's borders of 1937 has not been revised so far. And quite a few questions can be asked on this subject, on the whole. Take for example, such a question: What place will this national German unified formation occupy in the military and political structures that already exist on our continent? What will be the real potential of the new formation, its military doctrine, the structure of its armed forces if German unity emerges? Will it be prepared to opt for demilitarization? Will it be prepared to accept a status of neutrality?

[Passage omitted in which Andrianov quotes Modrow's concept of a united Germany]

[Vedenyapin] A final solution to the German issue can be achieved, evidently, only in the conditions of free self-determination of the Germans in both states in cooperation with the four powers and taking into account the interests of all the European states. It certainly should stimulate the all-European process, a process which would free our continent from military dangers once and for all. Nobody should regard the rapprochement between the German states as a threat.

[Kolchanov] It is very important that this process should take a predictable course, promote strengthening security and cooperation in Europe, and that its every step should fit within the all-European process which is in obvious need of holding a meeting of the highest leaders of member-countries of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe as soon as possible.

[Passage omitted in which Vedenyapin warns against the danger of neo-Nazis; Andrianov gives an example of the Republican Party and describes their recent activities; Vedenyapin takes up the subject; Kolchanov says that this party was recently outlawed in the GDR]

[Andrianov] Continuing the conversation on European affairs, it is evidently worth mentioning the fact that this week the latest plenum at the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms and armed forces on the continent has taken place. The seminar, which also took place in Vienna, on military doctrines, with the participation of representatives of the top military leadership of 35 states—the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—lent an important boost to these negotiations, especially those which concern confidence-and security-building measures.

[Passage omitted in which Andrianov says that this event was extraordinary; such a meeting has not yet had analogies in history; he enumerates the areas covered by it]

[Vedenyapin] It is true that the development of any actual accords or agreements was not envisaged at the seminar, but per se, in its uniqueness, the Viennese seminar could not fail to create a favorable backdrop for the whole negotiation process in the field of disarmament. The speech at the seminar by Army General Moiseyev, the head of our delegation, met with great interest.

He briefly put forward the content of our military-political doctrine, worked out—I remind you—in 1987. I would like to emphasize that this doctrine is of a purely defensive nature and consists of a system of fundamental views on the aversion of war, on military construction, on the preparation of the country's defense and its armed forces for repulsing aggression; and also on methods of conducting an armed struggle in defense of the fatherland.

Our doctrine functions in fact on the rights of the basic law of the Soviet state in the defense sphere, directed;

above all, not at preparation for war but at its prevention and at the consolidation of international security.

[Kolchanov] I think that it will not be superfluous to recall just its key premisses. We unconditionally reject war as a means of resolving international disputes and contradictions: economic, political, ideological, and, indeed, any other kinds. We are profoundly convinced that disputed international problems should be resolved only by peaceful means, only by political methods. War in present conditions has become absolutely unacceptable.

Considering the maintenance of peace to be a common human value, the Soviet Union will never first initiate military actions. It will not resort to such acts at all, so long as it does not itself become the object of armed attack. And we all, of course, well remember that our country has assumed the obligation of never making first use of nuclear weapons.

[Andrianov] It is no secret that the Soviet Union, the United States, the Warsaw Pact, and NATO deny that the threat of war can emanate from them. Nevetheless, the official spokesman of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are perpetually declaring that they nevertheless consider their military opponent to be none other than our country and that supposedly they should only deal with us from a position of strength.

Moreover, as you know, not only verbal declarations but also actual deeds are in progress; actual actions to increase military might in the future. And this strategy of nuclear deterrence and flexible response, which General Powell, chairman of the committee of chiefs of staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, expounded, grants completely the first use of nuclear weapons, and incidentally neither the United States nor its NATO allies to this day have not assumed the obligation of not initiating military acts at all.

[Passage omitted in which Vedenyapin placates Andrianov by reminding him that nevertheless the seminar was a positive event]

[Kolchanov] Mutual understanding is in evidence in a number of other current problems and here I went to return to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's talk with James Baker. There the issue of the operation of the not unknown Committee on the Control of Exports to Socialist Countries [Cocom] was touched upon. Mikhail Sergeyevich drew attention to the fact that, as before, Cocom is hindering the normal development of economic relations.

Nevertheless, here also favorable trends are in evidence. This week it became known that the Japanese Government has prepared a palliative draft for the operating rules of the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Exports, Cocom, with regard to the countries of East Europe. The basis of the document, which will be put before the next sitting of this organization in Paris for study, constitutes a proposal to present each Cocom member with the right, within certain frameworks, to choose for itself what goods it can export. Thus, a list of exceptions from the inventory of the so-called goods of strategic designation, whose delivery at present to the socialist countries is totally banned, is being drawn up.

[Vedenyapin] I will add that the Japanese consider that the export of that modern industrial equipment which could be used for the modernization of the economy should be permitted. They mean in particular machine tools for the production of semiconductors and electronic ray tubes. Initially, it is proposed that the rules under review should only be extended to the countries of East Europe and then to undertake analogous steps in relation to our country as well.

[Passage omitted in which Vedenyapin claims that this reflects the mood of Western business circles, who want to do away with artificial barriers to trade with the socialist countries; time and again in recent years Japanese firms have come up against the Cocom restrictions, and they have cost the Federal Republic of Germany alone almost 300 million Deutsche marks in relinquished orders; Kolchanov disagrees; he thinks that the West Germans have lost even more in forfeited orders because, personally, he has more often encountered other figures, nevertheless, the principle is the main thing]

[Kolchanov] Some people in the West, not without foundation, surmise that blacklists sometimes serve the United States as a rather effective instrument for constricting and oppressing its opponents and competitors on the world market.

[Andrianov] Now, when, as a result of perestroyka in our country and the countries of East Europe, both the West and Japan are aspiring to an ever greater degree to develop trade and economic relations with us, the calls to liberalize contacts in the East-West context are becoming stronger. Incidentally, such calls are being made ever more loudly in the United States themselves.

[Vedenyapin] One recalls Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's words in his speech during his recent visit to Finland. Talking there about the hope for a revolution in domestic and foreign state policy toward man, he remarked that such a turning point can only take place in the conditions of a period of peace, a period which presupposes the evanescence of phenomena incompatible with it such as the presence of foreign troops in other territories, military alliances, and of course the existence of that same infelicitous committee on export control.

Our transmission time has come to a close. This has been—I remind you—a conversation of international observers at the roundtable. It was conducted by Gennadiy Vedenyapin. Boris Andrianov, my colleague and foreign policy commentator of All-Union Radio, and Rudolf Kolchanov, deputy editor in chief of TRUD newspaper, have been taking part in the conversation. I thank our listeners for their attention and my colleagues for their participation in today's conversation. Goodbye comrades. All the best to you. Gerasimov said.

## United States & Canada

### Secretary of State Baker Concludes Moscow Visit

### Shevardnadze Talks Continue

*PM0902113090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[TASS report: "Soviet-American Talks"]

[Text] Talks continued in Moscow on 8 February between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker.

The ministers defined the organizational structure of their meeting, resolved procedural questions, and agreed on the formation of working parties of experts on disarmament and on regional, bilateral, humanitarian, transnational, and economic questions. The working parties embarked on the study of technical aspects of the problems on the agenda for the meeting.

During intimate [v uzkom sostave] talks the ministers dwelt in detail on problems of security and disarmament.

In the opinion of both sides, the results of M.S. Gorbachev's talks with President G. Bush in Malta uncovered real potential for reaching major accords on nuclear, conventional, and chemical arms in the near future.

The completion of preparatory work on a Soviet-American treaty on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and its signing this year is a priority.

To this end, it was noted, it is necessary to find mutually acceptable solutions to all the outstanding issues before the meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States in June, devoting the subsequent period to the final legal formulation of the text of the future treaty. The sides embarked on the discussion of concrete proposals aimed at resolving the problems on which agreement has not been reached.

In examining the course of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe the Soviet and American sides put forward new ideas on the reduction of armed forces personnel, as well as the limitation of combat aircraft in Europe. The exchange of opinions uncovered additional areas of rapprochement between their positions.

On the problem of ending nuclear tests, the sides agreed that the task facing them—to prepare protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties in time for signing during the forthcoming summit meeting—has virtually been fulfilled. The Soviet side came out in favor of continuing talks on the further limitation of underground nuclear explosions without unjustified interruptions.

The participants in the talks reaffirmed their commitment to the aim of concluding an international convention on the total banning and destruction of chemical weapons.

In connection with the "Open Skies" conference due to be held in Ottawa, the commitment of the USSR and the United States to its fruitful work was reaffirmed. At the same time the sides exchanged drafts of a bilateral agreement on reducing chemical weapons stockpiles and embarked on the detailed discussion of them.

The ministers noted the importance of the Soviet initiative on holding an all-European summit meeting in 1990, which has met with wide support among the leadership of the CSCE countries.

There was a productive and detailed exchange of opinions on regional situations. During the discussion of the situation in Central America the U.S. secretary of state was told that, whatever the motives for the American armed invasion of Panama, there is no justification for this act.

On Afghanistan, pursuing the discussions that took place in Wyoming and Malta, the sides exchanged ideas on possible ways of promoting the start of intra-Afghan dialogue with a view to achieving a just political settlement.

During the discussion of a Near East settlement the Soviet side stressed the productivity of the multiple option approach that combines active bilateral and multilateral efforts. In this context, mention was made of the importance of an international conference and the USSR's readiness to actively promote all forms of progress in the peace process in the region.

During the examination of the situation in the Asian and Pacific region, the ministers came out in favor of continuing collaboration with a view to a settlement in Cambodia and the normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Satisfaction was expressed with the results of collaboration on questions of a settlement in Southwest Africa. In both sides' opinion, efforts must be made to prevent a deterioration in the situation in Angola and bring the settlement process in that country back onto a peaceful footing.

The talks are to continue.

### Shevardnadze Sees 'Progress'

*LD0902113190 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The Soviet-American talks continued today morning with a one-to-one meeting between Foreign Minister

Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker. The two ministers replied to questions from the press before they met.

Replying to a TASS query, Eduard Shevardnadze said there were already grounds to speak of progress in the current negotiations, but final results would be summed up later today during the concluding round. Shevardnadze added that experts had to work hard last night to thrash out several problems.

As in previous days, Western journalists were interested to know more about the Soviet stand on the possibility of Germany's reunification. The Soviet foreign minister said this issue, which "is not easy to answer," would be preliminarily discussed today. He noted that the question of reunifying Germany had not yet been solved and that there were only different projects and proposals so far. "There is going to be a meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Hans Modrow, who have various ideas on this score," he pointed out. Shevardnadze also recalled that Kohl was to pay a visit to Moscow on February 10. The Soviet minister said, moreover, that when resolving this issue the Soviet side believes, "it is paramount to ensure Europe's stability."

Turning to the possibility of holding an all-European summit this year, Eduard Shevardnadze expressed the view that the American and Soviet sides "are in accord that such a meeting is necessary if an agreement on conventional armaments is elaborated before it. I think this is the main question," he added.

James Baker was asked whether there were any obstacles to a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. He answered affirmatively. Baker noted that there were, of course, several major problems that remained to be discussed at subsequent ministerial meetings. He said it was clear the sides could not resolve all major problems at the current meeting. Certain issues were being discussed now and he hoped agreement would be reached on some of them.

Baker added that he came to Moscow with a whole portfolio of proposals and prepared for a business-like dialogue. He said he believed the Soviet minister was in a similar mood, because a substantial reduction of certain types of destructive weapons met the interests of both the United States and the USSR, and of the world as a whole.

### Gorbachev Discusses Arms Cuts

*LD0902172390 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Mr. James Baker had almost four hours of talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Friday [9 February], as both sides spoke of progress in arms reduction negotiations. Officials gave no details of the talks, which ran two hours over schedule, forcing Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to begin a final round of arms control talks late in the afternoon and postpone a planned news conference.

Earlier officials said both sides had made concessions on a conventional forces in Europe treaty and a strategic arms reduction treaty.

President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev hope to have an agreement in principle on both treaties by mid-June, when they are planning to hold a summit in Washington.

Before meeting Baker, President Gorbachev told reporters he would respond to Bush's proposal to cut superpower troop levels in central Europe to 195,000 each. It merits very serious consideration, and I have something to say to the secretary as regards that proposal, he said.

In the conventional arms talks, the NATO alliance tabled new proposals in Vienna on Thursday relating to combat aircraft, tanks, and helicopters that appeared to move closer to the Soviet position.

I think we may speak of progress at the talks, said Eduard Shevardnadze before meeting Baker on Friday. On the strategic arms reduction treaty, expert teams worked through Thursday night on highly technical issues relating to the number of air launched nuclear missiles each side would be allowed to deploy on its warplanes and how to count nondeployed missiles, or spares, in the agreement.

James Baker said several problems remained and it was clear the current round of talks would not resolve them all.

He and Eduard Shevardnadnze plan two more rounds of talks before June.

### Further on Gorbachev Meeting

*PM1002215790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With J. Baker"]

[Text] On 9 February, M.S. Gorbachev met with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The talks lasted more than three hours, the second part of them being held within a narrow circle with E.A. Shevardnadze participating.

The meeting focused mainly on issues to be discussed at the Soviet-American summit in June of this year.

Gorbachev said that the current visit is not only of practical importance as a preparatory stage for the June meeting, but also of its own political significance as a confirmation of the fact that the Soviet-American dialogue has continued uninterrupted, and still is deepening and achieving new levels of mutual understanding and interaction.

Recent stormy developments around the world and especially in Europe have shown how timely the improvement of Soviet-American relations was. They have shown how it is important that the two great powers—at this turning point in world development—have an opportunity to compare their positions with frankness, trust and a far greater understanding of each other's views, while looking for approaches that would meet their mutual interests combined with the interests of the international community.

Despite all reservations that can be made in terms of some latest political actions, the understanding of their responsibility before the world and their adherence to the agreements reached by the leadership of the two states remains decisive.

Baker responded by saying that Soviet-American relations are indeed undergoing a test of time and are adequate to the course of events. Rivalry remains in some areas, but a shift towards cooperation is ever more visible, despite the fact that in both countries there are people who look at the USSR and the United States as opponents.

The two agreed that in this situation it is very important that an intensive search continues on the entire range of issues of Soviet-American relations and that the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrate their determination to move forward and sincerely strive to facilitate a drastic improvement of the international situation.

The change in the U.S. attitude toward the holding of an all-European meeting in 1990 within the Helsinki framework is important from this viewpoint. The meeting could become a preparatory stage for Helsinki 2 in 1992: It would be possible to sign an agreement on conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, if it is ready by that time. In any case, it could give a powerful impetus to the completion of the negotiations.

Baker suggested proclaiming at the meeting that free elections are a human right.

Gorbachev said that the need for such a meeting is prompted by the rapid and profound character of current developments. The very fact of preparations for the meeting in these conditions will help calm the international process, consolidate positive elements, maintain the level of responsibility of political forces concerned, and reiterate that Europe, both East and West, has a common fate and that it is necessary to shape a structure of all-European security as soon as possible.

Helsinki 2 will probably adopt a major document that will fully reflect new realities of the existence and development of world civilisation.

The 1990 meeting would make it possible to exchange ideas, thoughts, and concepts in connection with current developments and produce a brief communique upon completion.

If the agreement on conventional armaments and armed forces at the level of heads of state and government is signed, the meeting itself would become a major historic event.

Without going into specifics of the talks on arms reduction that started Thursday, Gorbachev and Baker considered the most essential elements within the context of the new proposals brought by the secretary of state.

According to Gorbachev's assessment, they make it possible to bring the positions closer on several items and inspire hope that the program of preparations for the summit in Washington will be successfully implemented.

It became possible already during Baker's stay in Moscow to achieve greater certainty on several matters and even reach specific agreements on some points.

Special attention was given to President George Bush's latest proposal on reducing armed forces in Europe.

Gorbachev told the secretary of state that the Soviet leadership does not insist on defining an overall level of the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces within the framework of the entire European region.

The USSR accepts the President's proposal to reduce the number of Soviet and American troops on foreign territories in Europe to 195,000—but not only in central Europe as suggested by Bush, but in the entire European zone outside the Soviet Union.

If this proposal does not suit you, we suggest the figure of 225,000 for the entire European region.

Baker promised to reply to this option even before his departure from Moscow.

The participants in the talks came close to resolving the issue of banning chemical weapons, an issue on which deliberations continue.

Raising the question about nuclear weapons tests, Gorbachev reiterated his recent statement at the Moscow ecological forum that the Soviet Union is prepared, as before, to stop all tests at any moment if others do likewise.

The statement was welcomed with enthusiasm by the forum's participants.

It is good, he said, that we are moving toward the signing of protocols on the verification mechanism for the 1974 and 1976 treaties. But it is very important to reaffirm that we do not miss the main objective, that of a total ban on nuclear weapons.

Baker confirmed that the U.S. Administration holds this objective as its long-term goal as well.

In the second part of the conversation Gorbachev, at Baker's request, described in detail the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and expressed his judgments about future developments in connection with the results of the February plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Baker said he understood the complexity of the situation and pointed to the immense scale of changes in the Soviet Union and their significance for the entire world.

He reaffirmed the President's and his own stance that they wish success to perestroyka and are prepared to help it as much as they can, above all in the field of arms reduction.

The German issue featured prominently in the talks.

The two sides exchanged views on developments connected with the issue of German unification and informed each other about contacts with the leaders of European countries, above all the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, about various initiatives regarding foreign policy mechanisms that would rule out destabilisation in Europe during and as a result of the rapprochement between the two German states.

Any Soviet-American arrangements on this matter were, naturally, out of the question. But the sides stated their mutual interest that the German issue be resolved within the all-European context and that all Europeans be confident that this will be a peaceful state capable of and striving to live in conditions of equitable cooperation with neighbors and all other countries and pose no threat to anyone.

The sides also touched upon issues of Afghan and Central American settlements.

Gorbachev drew attention to the fact that although Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] is continuing to hinder the normal development of economic ties, there are encouraging examples, including the talks on the use of the Baykal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railway mainlines for the transportation of cargo from Pacific countries to Europe, on an international fiber-optic communications line across all Soviet territory, and on other issues.

Gorbachev asked Baker to convey greetings and good wishes to President Bush and his consent to maintain regular contacts.

Present at the meeting were A.A. Bessmertnykh, A.S. Chernyayev, S.F. Akhromeyev, Yu.V. Dubinin, G.I. Gerasimov, and A.A Obukhov; J. Matlock, R. Gates, R. Bartholomew, F. Veliik [name as transliterated], R. Seitz, Margaret Tutwiler, and D. Ross.

### News Conferences Postponed

*LD0902184890 Moscow TASS in English 1840 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—The last round of Soviet-American talks in the Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion turned out to be unexpectedly long. It began at 15:00, Moscow time [1200 GMT], as planned, but did not finish at 21:00. Official spokesmen of the sides did not disclose the reason. Planned press conferences of Shevardnadze and Baker have been postponed three times already.

According to Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, press conferences of Shevardnadze and Baker will probably not be held at all.

Briefings will be held by Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov and Margaret Tutwiler, assistant to the secretary of state for public relations.

### Talks With Shevardnadze End

*LD0902200890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1905 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 9 Feb (TASS)—The talks between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker continued in Moscow today. As before, the talks centered on security issues.

The ministers agreed that it is necessary, in the near future, to resolve questions on which the two sides still have differences so that they can successfully prepare a treaty on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons within the planned time frame. An obvious and significant rapprochement has started on a number of those questions. The Soviet stance, as expounded by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev to U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, provides a good basis for coordinating positions and finding mutually acceptable decisions.

The talks included, in particular, a concrete discussion of the most important aspects of the positions on airborne cruise missiles, seaborne cruise missiles, banning chemical weapons, ending nuclear weapons tests, and cutting armed forces and arms in Europe.

In those areas that this round failed to bring to a conclusion, both sides expressed a mutual desire to continue seeking mutually acceptable solutions.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker expressed a conviction that their round of talks in Moscow was, on the whole, fruitful and productive. It is intended that the remaining problems will be resolved during subsequent talks planned for the period leading up to the official Soviet-U.S. summit in the United States.

Leaders of groups of experts on regional, economic, bilateral, transnational, and humanitarian issues reported to E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker on the results of their work, and, on the basis of this, E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker issued additional instructions to their delegations at the relevant bilateral and multilateral talks.

### TASS on News Conference

*LD0902225690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2200 GMT 9 Feb 90*

["Urgent: James Baker Press Conference"—TASS headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—In the course of the present visit to the USSR and the Soviet-American negotiations that have taken place within its framework, "It has been possible to achieve significant progress on all the points on the agenda" declared James Baker, U.S. secretary of state. Speaking at a press conference called for exactly midnight Moscow time [2100 GMT], he stressed that at the present time changes for the better are taking place in relations between the USSR and the United States.

Touching on problems of arms control, the U.S. secretary of state stated that the sides will issue a joint declaration on chemical weapons which includes, in his words, all the elements of the known initiative of George Bush on this issue. He evaluated the adoption of this declaration as an "important step forward", demonstrating the intention of the sides to achieve the banning of chemical weapons.

As far as the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe is concerned, he said, the positions of the USSR and United States have come closer together on the question of the numerical strength of the personnel of their forces. The secretary of state said also that he shares the opinion that the holding of a European summit (Helsinki 2) at which, inter alia, issues of the reduction of conventional armed fores will be discussed, will be an important event in Europe.

As a result of the present talks, James Baker noted, the Soviet Union and the United States have approached the aim set in Malta—to agree in principle on the most important elements of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms in time for the next summit in June of this year. The sides succeeded in agreeing in principle on the issue of undeployed missiles and the coding of telemetric information.

Concerning air-launched cruise missiles, all disagreements were resolved except one—the range of these missiles, the secretary of state said. On sea-based cruise missiles "I take it that we have achieved considerably greater progress than many of us expected before the beginning of this meeting of ministers," he said. [passage omitted]

### Baker 'Very Pleased'

*LD0902232290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2250 GMT 9 Feb 90*

["Urgent: James Baker's Press Conference—Answers to Questions"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—"I am very pleased with the two days of the talks that have passed. And speaking of their general evaluation, if in Wyoming I spoke about the transition from rivalry to dialogue, after Malta and this meeting this conviction has become even more correct," U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said today. He spoke about the results of the Moscow talks at the press conference which took place after midnight (Moscow time) at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On all the issues, he noted, "We have made fairly good progress." Our main purpose was to attain an accord on major unresolved issues before the summit, so as to conclude an agreement on strategic offensive weapons as soon as this year. "But another unplanned advance was made, too. And perhaps this has an even greater importance—drafting a joint statement on chemical weapons, and progress in the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles," the secretary of state added.

Speaking about the American side's response to the USSR proposal regarding reductions in the numerical strength of Soviet and U.S. armed forces in Europe, James Baker said that "this is a very interesting proposal and it is close to our President's proposal." He added, "I intend to consult with our allies on this issue, for this regards multipartite talks."

The German question was discussed with both Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, the secretary of state said. "I clarified the position of the United States, which is that unification or reunification of Germany has been the political objective of the United States for more than 40 years, and remains so. In our opinion, this process will take place more quickly than was thought even at the end of last year. In the opinion of the United States this process must take place while taking into account concern for questions of the security of Germany's neighbors," said James Baker.

Replying to a question on the progress of discussion at the talks on regional questions, the secretary of state said in part that on the problem of Afghanistan "we put forward a cautious proposal on the nature of the processes taking place there." As for the situation in Central America, the United States has urged that free elections should be held in Nicaragua and that the situation in El Salvador should be settled politically. We, he noted, agreed with the Soviet side on the need to continue efforts to establish a dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The question of the creation of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was discussed in general terms, and we expressed the view that this "is an obstacle to peace," said the secretary of state.

Speaking of the timing of the next meeting at minister level, James Baker said no precise date was fixed in Moscow, but in all probability it would be held in mid-March or April.

### Visit Enters Final Day

*LD1002073290 Moscow TASS in English 0725 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—Today is the fourth and concluding day of the official visit by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to the Soviet Union.

In the morning Baker will address the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for International Affairs, and is expected to leave the Soviet Union in the afternoon.

Friday morning Soviet-American talks continued with a one-to-one meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker.

A meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the U.S. secretary of state took place in the Kremlin in the first half of the day. The two sides focussed their attention mainly on matters that will be the subject of an official Soviet-U.S. summit in June of this year.

The importance of the change in the U.S. attitude, which was mentioned by Baker, towards holding an all-European meeting in 1990 within the framework of the Helsinki process was pointed out during the meeting.

The need for such a meeting, Gorbachev said, is prompted by the fluidity and profound nature of world developments.

Gorbachev and Baker considered the most essential aspects within the context of the new proposals that the U.S. secretary of state brought with him.

In the judgement of the Soviet president, the proposals will make it possible to draw the two countries' positions closer together on a number of points and inspire hope the programme of preparation of the meeting in Washington will be successfully implemented.

Special attention was devoted to the new proposal put forward by President George Bush on a reduction in the armed forces in Europe.

Gorbachev told the U.S. secretary of state that the Soviet leadership does not insist on determining an overall level for the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation within the framework of the entire European region.

The Soviet Union accepts the U.S. President's proposal to cut Soviet and American troops on foreign territories in Europe down to a level of 195,000, not in central Europe, though, as was suggested by Bush, but in the entire European zone outside the Soviet Union. If this is not suitable, the Soviet Union suggests a ceiling of 225,000 for the entire European region.

Issues concerning a settlement of the Afghan and Central American situations were also touched upon during the Gorbachev-Baker meeting.

The latest round of Soviet-American talks in the Foreign Ministry mansion turned out to be unexpectedly long. Discussions that began at 15.00 ended late at night.

The major aspects of positions concerning air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, a ban on chemical weapons and on nuclear weapon testing, and cuts in the armed forces and armaments in Europe were discussed in detail during the talks. The two sides expressed a mutual desire to continue the search for mutually acceptable solutions to problems on which no ways out were found.

Shevardnadze and Baker expressed the conviction that their round of talks in Moscow was on the whole constructive and resultative.

The remaining problems are expected to be solved during next scheduled rounds of talks in the run-up to the official Soviet-U.S. summit in the United States in June of this year.

### Foreign Affairs Panel Addressed

*LD1002125790 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] At the end of his visit to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Mr. James Baker has addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet parliament, the first time the body was addressed by an American politician.

[Begin Baker recording] Now is the time, if I might suggest it, to put the legacy of struggle behind us. Today we face a different struggle and we face it in a fast changing world. Together we must try to understand each other. Together we must try to agree where possible and to work together based on that agreement. And together we must search for opportunities to expand our cooperation. Now is the time for us to build a new legacy. Now it is time to move beyond the cold war. [end recording]

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, his visit to Moscow and talks with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are seen as opening a new stage in U.S.-Soviet political dialogue. According to Mr. Shevardnadze, who spoke at a news conference after the talks, the main goal of the ministerial meeting was to try and solve a number of specific issues in accordance with instructions received at the latest summit in Malta and pave the way for further constructive work to prepare Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington in June this year. The ministerial meeting was marked by progress in virtually all the issues discussed. Progress has been reported on the elimination of chemical weapons and on settling the issue of the numbers of Soviet and American troops in Europe. Some advance was also made on strategic offensive arms. At his meeting with the U.S. official on Friday, the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded to an American proposal on troop reductions in Europe with an initiative for even deeper cuts.

### Further on Address to Committee

*LD1002163490 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The essence of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is a search for points of mutual advantage that will lead to improvements in mutual relations, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet today.

Small wonder that the Sverdlovsk Hall of the USSR Council of Ministers' Building in the Kremlin, which hosted the meeting, was filled to capacity. Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, journalists and Baker's "team" have witnessed a symbolical event. It was the first time in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations that a U.S. Secretary of state addressed and answered numerous questions from Soviet MPs [Member of Parliament] on various aspects of American-Soviet relations, prospects for bilateral cooperation in solving urgent international issues.

Speaking about perestroyka processes in the USSR, the U.S. secretary of state expressed a hope that they will open a new era not only in Soviet politics, but also in Soviet-American relations. He noted that new Soviet foreign and defence policies is also in the interests of the American people.

Of course, Baker said, differences and conflicts will remain between the two countries. But "every dispute need not be turned into a crisis and every crisis need not raise the specter of war," he said.

Speaking about the areas where, as he said, the two countries can most productively find the points of mutual advantage, Baker singled out Europe. He said the United States would like to work with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the continent to end "the unnatural division of Europe." Baker highly assessed the Soviet position on "the peaceful revolutions of 1989" in many European countries and described it as "far-sighted." He expressed the hope that cooperation in the field of conventional forces cuts in Europe can create a more stable and predictable strategic relationship there. In this connection he noted a surprising closeness between Gorbachev's Friday proposal to cut Soviet and American troops in Europe and the recent initiative on the same issue by President Bush.

In regional problems, the U.S. secretary of state said, the USSR and United States are making progress on some disputes, for example, in southern Africa and South-eastern Asia.

Baker highly assessed a joint Soviet-U.S. statement on chemical weapons signed today, which shows the two countries' resolve to press for dramatic cuts in its stockpiles and, eventually, in its complete and universal elmination. He also said that the U.S. wanted to cooperate with the Soviet Government more effectively on the question of missile proliferation to third world countries and in solving environmental problems.

Winding up the meeting, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said it had confirmed mutual interest in a wider exchange of views on the entire range of Soviet-American relations and topical problems of our day. On behalf of the members of the Supreme Soviet he expressed satisfaction with the fact that preparations for the forthcoming meeting between Gorbachev and Bush in June were proceeding successfully.

"The meeting will mark a new important stage in the onward development of relations between the two countries," he stressed.

Taking part in today's meeting was Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

### Committee Questions Baker

*LD1002185990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Secretary of State Baker left the Soviet Union today. Prior to his departure, he visited our country's Supreme Soviet and met members of our parliament's International Affairs Commission. Our latest special correspondent, Aleksandr Korshunov, will give you more details about this:

[Korshunov] The ancient Sverdlovskiy Hall of the Moscow Kremlin has witnessed many ocasions, but its walls can recall nothing like today's event. It was the first time that so highly placed a representative of the United States Government had spoken in the Kremlin. At a request from the Chairman of the International Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Secretary of State Baker made a speech at lasted 20 minutes. He dwelt essentially on the most important problems of Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation as a whole, and spelled out the United States' position.

[Begin Baker Recording in English with superimposed Russian translation] I repeat what President Bush has already stressed and what I have said myself on many occasions: We support the transformation in the Soviet Union and wish the policy of perestroyka, glasnost, and especially democratization in your country success. Now, the secretary of state continued, we are entering an entirely new era of relations between East and West and between the United States and the USSR. It is defined by rapid and dramatic changes in the countries of Eastern Europe, which, as James Baker emphasized, can be called a real revolution, a revolution in relations between individuals, countries, and entire peoples. The secretary of state spelled out the essence of current U.S. policy with regard to the Soviet Union. This consists of seeking new ways of and opportunities for greater rapprochement.

In the area of international relations, it means working out common approaches to regional conflicts in the planet's trouble spots. Progress in the arms control sphere, including strategic, conventional, and chemical weapons and, finally, economic cooperation. [end recording]

After the secretary of state's speech, a dialogue took place between James Baker and the Soviet parliamentarians. Questions were asked about the possibilities for cooperation in freeing Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan and on the adequacy of changes in U.S. military policy in response to the major unilateral steps by the Soviet Union in the area of disarmament. Questions were addressed to the secretary of state in connection with the United States' unwillingness to even touch in principle the theme of cuts in conventional naval weapons. It must be said that the deputies' questions on military themes showed what we call pluralism of opinion. For example, Marshal Akhromeyev, Supreme Soviet deputy, brought attention to the fact that the United States is not changing the basis or the structure of its Armed Foces, is not giving up its main military programs, and is maintaining its bases throughout the whole world, including those surrounding the Soviet Union's perimeter.

Deputy Academician Arbatov, turning to James Baker, put greater stress on overcoming the enemy image, which remains the legacy from the time of the cold war.

Judging by the reactions of those present, the question of Germany aroused great interest.

[Begin Baker recording in English with superimposed Russian translation] First of all, Secretary of State Baker said, we support the reunification of Germany, which has been divided for 40 years. I discussed this issue with the Soviet leadership, and I consider that the processes leading toward the reunification of Germany are going very quickly, especially since December. I would not exclude, James Baker added, an ever greater acceleration after the elections in the GDR.

Of course, if Germany is to unite, James Baker added, then guarantees of security for its neighbors must be created. At the same time, we are against a future Germany being neutral. In our opinion, it must be part of the Western alliance and NATO. This is our position. the Soviet leadership has other views, but I have laid out the U.S. approach, the secretary of state said.

On the whole, the meeting's participants recognized such exchanges of opinions as valuable, despite differences and even contradictions.

## 'Text' of Joint Statement

*LD1002141490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1230 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—We are transmitting the official text of the Soviet-U.S. statement promulgated here today.

"Talks were held in Moscow on 7-9 February between E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, and J. Baker, U.S. secretary of state, within the framework of the preparations for the Soviet-U.S. summit in the United States this June. Proceeding from the common goal of cultivating more stable and constructive relations of cooperation, they considered a broad range of issues featuring on the agenda of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue. Secretary of State J. Baker was received by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and they held an open and broad exchange of views.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker discussed the way Soviet-U.S. relations have developed since the ministers' Wyoming meeting and M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush's Malta meeting. They examined the prospects for the Soviet-U.S. summit, concentrating particularly on achieving objectives and resolving immediate tasks set by the two countries' leaders during the Malta meeting.

The foreign minister and the secretary of state noted with satisfaction the progress in Soviet-U.S. relations.

Despite the fact that some considerable differences remain between the sides, the relations between them are increasingly being characterized by mutual understanding, cooperation, and the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state consider that frank dialogue and persistent efforts in seeking out practical and specific solutions will make it possible to develop even further the considerable progress which has been achieved to date.

In this regard, the ministers' Moscow meeting was a useful and important step in preparing the foundations for holding a productive meeting at summit level. The high-level discussions were supplemented by the efforts undertaken by working groups of experts on questions of arms limitation, regional problems, human rights, transnational problems, and questions of bilateral relations, and were within the framework of the unofficial working group on economic questions. Specific accords were reached on a number of agenda points.

### I.

The USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state conducted an in-depth exchange of opinion on questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

As for a treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms is concerned, the foreign minister and the secretary of state confirmed that their common aim was to resolve all major issues before the summit this June to ensure the possibility of signing a treaty before the end of this year.

To promote the attainment of this goal the two sides reached accords or exchanged proposals on a number of areas.

As far as air-launched cruise missiles are concerned, both sides made considerable progress, reaching agreement on the basis of a package approach on all the remaining issues with the exception of the question of the range level.

The two sides also achieved good progress on sea-launched cruise missiles. They agreed that the issue of such missiles will be tackled on the basis of parallel politically binding statements operating throughout the whole term of validity of the strategic offensive arms treaty. The ministers reached agreement that the remaining matters concerning sea-launched cruise missiles will be considered by their representatives at the talks in Geneva.

The sides agreed on the establishment of quantitative limits for undeployed ballistic missiles and their warheads applying to all those of an ICBM class which has been through flight trials from mobile launchers. Other undeployed ballistic missiles, undeployed cruise missiles, and undeployed heavy bomber armaments will not be subject to quantitative limitations. The sides also agreed on the conditions for the siting and transfer of all undeployed ballistic missiles.

The sides reached agreement on the main elements of the conditions ensuring unhindered access to telemetric data received during the flight testing of ballistic missiles subject to counting under the strategic offensive armaments treaty. The appropriate provisions will be included in the strategic offensive armaments treaty. However, they will be implemented at an early stage, on the signing of the treaty, by way of an exchange of letters.

The U.S. side submitted a new proposal regarding verification of mobile ICBM's, the period of validity of the treaty, and the phasing of the reductions and the number of warheads attributed to future types of ballistic missile. The Soviet side submitted a new proposal concerning noncircumvention. The minister of foreign affairs and secretary of state gave instructions to their representatives at the Geneva negotiations to discuss these new proposals and to step up efforts to eliminate the remaining differences in the text of the treaty and the documents connected with it.

The sides discussed the position at the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces reductions and again confirmed their determination to conclude an agreement as soon as possible in 1990.

The sides discussed President Bush's 31 January proposal regarding personnel numbers, which NATO submitted in Vienna on 8 February this year, and the NATO proposal on aircraft presented at the same time. The personnel positions came closer together as a result of the discussion held in Moscow. The sides agreed to continue their discussions in the context of the Vienna negotiations and at the meeting of ministers on the "Open Skies" in Ottawa.

The foreign affairs minister and secretary of state comprehensively discussed the issue of how to advance through the Geneva negotiations to the common goal of achieving a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their destruction. The Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva were given instructions to continue elaborating ways of cooperating practically in the field of eliminating chemical weapons. The sides adopted a separate, more detailed statement on chemical weapons.

In the discussion of matters of nuclear tests, the sides achieved progress in solving the remaining problems.

They consider that the task of completing work on the verification protocols of the 1974 and 1976 treaties on limiting the capacity of nuclear explosions, with the aim of signing them during the June summit, is totally realistic. The sides agreed on the right to simultaneous implementation of hydrodynamic and seismic measurments of capacity on the territory of the side being monitored. The sides also resolved a number of problems that have remained unresolved for a long time concerning the application of the hydrodynamic method of measuring capacity. The sides designated three seismic stations in each country to be used for seismic measurements of capacity on the territory of the side being monitored. The sides confirmed their adherence to the agreement reached in September 1987 concerning nuclear test talks.

The minister of foreign affairs and the secretary of state expressed the hope that the Ottawa conference on "Open Skies" in which they will participate will end in success and will lead to the early attainment of an agreement. They suppose that the "Open Skies" regime can make a real contribution to the achievement of openness and stability.

The minister of foreign affairs and the secretary of state noted that recently their experts have conducted consultations on the nonproliferation of chemical weapons, on the monitoring of the proliferation of missile technology, and on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They agreed to prepare a document for examination by the leaders of their countries that embraces both fundamental and specific steps to arrange cooperation in all spheres of nonproliferation of chemical weapons, missiles, and nuclear weapons.

The sides discussed the problem of the nonproliferation of missiles and of missile technology. They noted that they are both observing the guiding principles of exports within the framework of the existing regime regarding missiles, which applies to missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg at a distance of at least 300 km. They also agreed to continue the joint meeting of ministers.

## II.

A useful in-depth exchange of opinions took place between the ministers on regional problems. The sides confirmed their support for an all-embracing political settlement of regional conflicts on the principles of national reconciliation which would promote the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts throughout the world. They noted that differences of opinions still exist on some issues, but they agreed to continue work on these problems to bring their positions closer together. The sides noted the positive role the United Nations plays in settling a number of international conflicts and pointed out the necessity for further stepping up its activity in this sphere.

Touching on Central America, the foreign minister and the secretary of state again stressed the great importance of fulfilling all the provisions of the Esquipulas Treaty and subsequent agreements. The sides agreed that the settlement of regional conflicts within the framework of the Esquipulas process would facilitate lowering tension in the interests of all states. They confirmed that they are opposed to the use of any Central American state's territory for giving help to irregular forces and they support the Central American president's appeal for all states outside the region to cease giving military aid to such forces. The sides noted the importance of impartial and effective international observations of Nicaragua's electoral process. They undertook the obligation to respect the results of free and just elections in Nicaragua and to support respect by the elected government for democratic pluralism and human rights.

The sides emphasized their resolute support for a negotiated political settlement of the Salvadoran conflict, as envisioned in the San Isidro Declaration. They stated their support for the UN secretary general's efforts aimed at achieving a permanent cease-fire and a resumption of talks in El Salvador, and a more active and effective use of UN mechanisms to monitor compliance with existing and future agreements in Central America.

The sides held a constructive discussion on the conditions required for a political settlement in Afghanistan, including the need for a transitional period providing for an inter-Afghan dialogue to be held, self-determination for the Afghan people, and the creation of a broadly representative government that would ensure the peaceful, independent, and nonaligned status of Afghanistan. They agreed to continue discussing matters relating to an Afghan settlement in the very near future at the level of experts.

The foreign minister and the secretary of state discussed the situation in the Pacific region and northeast Asia. They agreed to hold Soviet-U.S. consultations on these matters in the very near future. They advocated a lowering of tension in the Korean peninsula and expressed support for a dialogue between North and South Korea. The Soviet side noted that the DPRK is close to concluding an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority on nuclear guarantees. The U.S. side spoke in favor of the prompt conclusion and strict observance of such an agreement.

The sides again expressed their readiness to assist the attainment of an all-embracing political settlement in Cambodia. They consider that guaranteeing the self-determination of the Cambodian people by means of holding free and fair elections, with UN monitoring, is the key to solving this problem. The foreign affairs minister and the secretary of state expressed support for an increased UN role in Cambodia. They agree that the representatives of the UN Security Council's five permanent members should continue consultations on the UN's role. They also expressed the necessity for intensified diplomatic efforts by all sides to transfer the center of gravity from the battlefield to talks and to prevent a return to power by the Khmer Rouge, including by means of supporting a moratorium on military help from outside to all Cambodian sides as a component in the all-embracing settlement. The ministers expressed hope for the success of the forthcoming, informal meeting in Jakarta, which would facilitate the search for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

The foreign affairs minister and the secretary of state confirmed the necessity for an active peace process in the Near East, including efforts undertaken for starting up a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, leading to the attainment of an all-embracing political settlement with the participation of all interested sides on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council. They have agreed to continue bilateral consultations on the topics in hand.

The sides confirmed their conviction in the necessity for the complete fulfillment of the al-Ta'if agreements and expressed support for the efforts of the trilateral committee of the League of Arab Nations. They declared their support for national unity and legally elected authorities in Lebanon.

The sides called again for a political settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict on the basis of full fulfillment of Resolution 598 of the UN Security Council and expressed their resolve to continue to give their support to the UN secretary general in carrying out the peacemaking mission he has been entrusted with.

The foreign minister and the secretary of state observed with satisfaction that events in Namibia are developing in the direction of the establishment of its complete independence in the conditions of democracy, peace, and stability and also noted the important role the United Nations played in this process. They expressed concern in connection with the lack progress in the peace process in Angola and called for a cessation of military operations and negotiations between the sides with a view to reaching a stable political settlement.

The sides expressed their anxiety over the threat of starvation in Ethiopia and called on the international community to again pool its efforts to resolve this most acute humanitarian problem. While recognizing at the same time that internal conflicts in Ethiopia cannot be resolved by military means, they reaffirmed their support for their political resolution within the framework of the negotiating process.

The foreign minister and the secretary of state welcomed the news of the situation that has started to come about in South Africa, particularly President F.W. de Klerk's statement on releasing political prisoners and lifting the ban on the activities of a number of political organizations. The year 1990 could become an important year for further dismantling apartheid and advancing toward the creation of a democratic and nonracial state. They call on all sides to enter into negotiations inasmuch as it is only in this way that genuine and irreversible changes can come about in South Africa.

## III.

The minister of foreign affairs and secretary of state discussed the development in Europe thoroughly. They confirmed that the CSCE process is playing a key role in the emergence of the new Europe. They agreed in principle with holding a meeting of leaders of the 35 states participating in the CSCE in 1990. An agreement on limiting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe could be signed in the course of such a meeting, and it would become a stage in preparations for a summit in Helsinki in 1992, an accord on which was reached earlier.

## IV.

The minister of foreign affairs and secretary of state and their experts conducted a thorough and very positive discussion of human rights issues and humanitarian problems. A broad exchange of views took place on matters of policy in the field of entry and exit and other forms of legal practice. The Soviet side confirmed its intention to adopt soon a law on entry to the USSR and exit from the USSR.

The sides examined with approval programs planned and being implemented that will promote better understanding of the activities of institutions, legislation, and practice in the field of human rights and humanitarian issues in each country.

The sides stressed the necessity of giving a really universal character to international agreements and standards in the field of human rights, as well as ensuring that national legislation and national practice correspond to them. They achieved an agreement that bilateral cooperation in the field of human rights and humanitarian issues can now be extended to cooperation in the framework of multilateral forums to help promote human rights all over the world. In connection with the forthcoming meeting on the human dimension in the framework of the CSCE in Copenhagen and subsequent measures, the sides also agreed to hold an exchange of views between themselves and with other participant-states on the steps to be taken to put the statements on human dimension contained in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and the final documents of the subsequent meetings into practice. The sides also discussed the policy that should be pursued to enhance the effectiveness of the UN system and of other international organizations in the field of human rights and humanitarian issues.

The minister of foreign affairs and the secretary of state noted with satisfaction the broadening Soviet-U.S. dialogue on transnational issues. The sides emphasized the importance of the UN conference on the environment and development which is to take place in 1992 and which opens a real possibility for considering a global program of actions in the field of environmental protection. The sides achieved an agreement regarding the importance of concluding an international 'framework' convention on global changes of the climate and of studying concrete proposals on large-scale ecological monitoring and on keeping a watch on pollution.

They discussed new approaches toward stepping up and broadening bilateral ecological cooperation, including high-level consultations between experts. They also examined questions of developing cooperation in the sphere of arctic and space research. They expressed readiness to expand cooperation in predicting natural disasters and alleviating their consequences and proposed holding in the near future consultations on questions of managing natural disasters and aid measures.

The foreign minister and the secretary of state reached agreement with regard to the importance of adopting specific practical measures in the struggle against terrorism. They also reached agreement on holding in March the next meeting of experts to continue the dialogue on the struggle against terrorism and to particularly examine questions of cooperation and prevention in the struggle against terrorist acts on air routes between the two countries.

The sides noted the mutual desirability of adopting measures against the illegal production and circulation of narcotics. They agreed to intensify their joint practical work to implement the 1989 memorandum on mutual understanding on the struggle against the illegal circulation of narcotics. They also examined directions for expanding cooperation in such spheres as preventive measures against drug abuse and treatment of it. The sides reached agreement on the expediency of implementing constructive cooperation at the United Nations on questions of narcotics and they intend to promote the success of the special session of the UN General Assembly on the problem of narcotics to be held at the end of February.

The sides recognized the importance of the efforts being undertaken by the UN Security Council permanent members for reaching agreement as soon as possible on mutually acceptable conditions with regard to the jurisdiction of the United Nations international court.

The ministers came out in favor of continuing on a regular basis Soviet-U.S. consultations on the subject of the United Nations in the interests of looking for ways to further enhance this universal international organization's efficiency.

**VI. [as received]**

In the sphere of bilateral relations, a broad and businesslike discussion took place on questions of commercial and economic cooperation. Both sides reaffirmed their support for the development of mutually advantageous commercial and economic relations. In this connection they pointed out the need to implement the initiatives approved during the meeting in Malta.

They confirmed their intention to conclude a trade agreement by the summit this June in fulfillment of the accord reached in Malta. The sides also comprehensively discussed plans for the start in the near future of negotiations regarding a bilateral treaty on capital investments and a treaty on taxation.

The sides also examined the state of affairs in the sphere of negotations on an agreement on maritime shipping, on an extended agreement on air links, and on an agreement on grain. They noted that provided there is further progress some of them can be prepared by the summit. The sides will encourage this work.

The ministers examined the state of affairs in the sphere of consultative projects, which were proposed during the meeting in Malta, and the progress achieved to date in implementing them.

They also discussed the question of granting the USSR observer status in GATT. The U.S. side confirmed again its stance on this issue expressed in Malta. The sides discussed prospects for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The USSR minister of foreign affairs and U.S. secretary of state discussed in detail matters on the agenda of Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations and analyzed the results of the qualitative transformations being implemented in that area of interaction.

Experts' reports on the implementation of the working programs of action agreed at the meeting in Wyoming and on the state of affairs at the negotiations and consultations being held on specific bilateral matters were heard.

Relevant experts on the two sides were given instructions to step up the negotiating process aimed at preparing news intergovernmental agreements on cooperation for the next Soviet-U.S. summit.

The foreign affairs minister and secretary of state expressed satisfaction regarding the progress reached in the course of the discussion of the subject of opening cultural and information in the two countries' capitals.

The sides confirmed their intention to implement during the current year the accord reached at summit level on setting up consulates general in New York and Kiev.

An accord was reached that the sides will continue discussing the initiatives in the field of expanding student exchanges and technical cooperation submitted in the course of the summit in Malta.

The minister of foreign affairs and secretary of state confirmed again the usefulness of a reglar dialogue between the USSR and the United States at all levels, including the ministerial level, to examine and tackle matters of Soviet-U.S. cooperation. In the context of preparations for the summit this June, they agreed to hold the next round of talks between the ministers in Washington."

## Shevardnadze Answers Questions

*LD1002154390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—Now we will convey the official text of the report on the press conference by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, which took place on 10 February in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center. E.A.Shevardnadze said:

"A new cycle in Soviet-American political dialogue began with the visit by Mr. James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State. A distinct feature of this cycle is its time frame. Both sides are trying to prepare for the next meeting of their higher leaders within six months.

"The first new sign of the times is the high degree of dynamism in the movement forward. We have never before had such an extensive agenda as at this stage, above all in the sphere of disarmament and, it would be more correct to say, in dismantling that huge structure of military confrontation which arose in the world during the 'cold war' years."

The second new feature is the volume of tasks which the sides propose to resolve. One can say that each of the five traditional baskets of talks—disarmament, regional problems, humanitarian cooperation, bilateral relations and transitional issues—was filled to the brim. According to the tradition which had formed, the discussions proceeded in working groups and subgroups involving the leaders of the delegations at the Soviet-American talks and experts.

The main goal of the meeting of the ministers was, in accordance with the instructions given in Malta, to undertake efforts and to resolve when possible a number of specific issues and thereby to open a front for further constructive work to prepare for the visit to Washington by M.S. Gorbachev, which, it is assumed, will take place in June this year. In the meantime, precise dates have not been fixed.

We should note that Mr. Baker came with certain interesting proposals and ideas directed toward the search for compromise solutions.

The Soviet side also advanced a number of new proposals and made constructive amendments to its attitudes concerning matters on our joint agenda.

1. Problems connected with the preparation of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons were central in the talks. Both sides concentrated efforts on reaching agreement on three issues:

—concerning air-launched cruise missiles;
—concerning the noncoding of telemetric information during test launches of missiles;
—on undeployed missiles.

On the last two issues, mutually acceptable variants were found. They can be considered resolved, although there is still a need to clarify certain technical details.

Both sides consider the achievement of a package agreement on air-launched long-range cruise missiles to be important. Such issues as the rule for counting were resolved. This is a very difficult element, and agreement on it is a major step. There is agreement on the problem of the outer distinguishing markings of nuclear and nonnuclear systems, and on verification methods. One element remained without agreement—the range level of such missiles. Further talks on this are to take place at the next meeting of ministers.

These questions now are moving from the category of the unsolved to the class of questions requiring additional work, a sort of polishing and a final "drawing together." This is a very substantial achievement in the central direction—the direction of preparing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

There has been an advancement concerning the matter of sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. There now exists a draft of the relevant statements and obligations.

A substantial measure of agreement has been reached over the counting of warheads on future types of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Some aspects of the interconnection between a strategic offensive weapons treaty and the ABM Treaty have also been made more precise.

The American side has given its consent to visits to U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain by Soviet specialists. It is proposed that American specialists also will visit similar installations in the USSR as part of the confidence-building measures.

2. Conventional weapons.

Here areas both of agreement and disagreement came to light. The sides agreed not to insist at present on the establishment of a common level of troop numbers for NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the framework of the whole European region. We proposed that a level of 700,000 to 750,000 men should be set for NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in central Europe. We accepted President Bush's well-known proposal with the modification that the USSR and the United States should each have 195,000 troops in the whole of Europe.

It was proposed as a variant that a limit of 225,000 also be established for each side, again for the whole of Eruope. The American side promised to give its response after consultations with its allies.

Serious differences on limiting aircraft in Europe still persist. However, the United States and NATO now agree, in general, on fixing a separate level for air-defense aircraft—admittedly, while giving a low ceiling of 500 aircraft. Unfortunately, the American side categorically objects to the non-consideration of naval aircraft permanently based on dry land.

3. Banning chemical weapons.

The United States proposed the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the USSR on reducing stocks of chemical weapons. We accepted that idea. As a result of the talks, we managed to reach a mutually acceptable draft of a possible agreement of a fundamental nature. It is planned to sign it in the course of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

4. Monitoring of underground tests.

We managed to overcome the differences which had remained on this matter. The sides reached agreement on combining hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring methods. Now, in essence, nothing prevents the completion of work on protocols on monitoring to the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on underground nuclear explosions. It is also planned to sign them at the summit meeting.

At our insistence, the United States confirmed the accord reached in 1987 on not breaking off the process of talks on further limiting the yield and number of nuclear explosions, having in mind the final aim of totally banning them. We consider this a very important aspect.

In summing up the result of this section, I would like to say that success was reached in finding a considerable number of solutions to security problems during the conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Mr. Baker, and also on the basis of those instructions which were given to the experts of the two delegations after the discussion of fundamental approaches which took place during the conversation.

5. Regional issues.

The ministers confirmed the positions of their countries in favor of the convening in 1990 of a conference of top leaders of the member states of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe, bearing in mind that it will not replace the convening of the Helsinki 2 conference in 1992. It is understood that an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe should be signed at the summit meeting. The full agenda for the forum will be drawn up in consultations with all its participants.

There was an intensive exchange of views on Afghanistan; Central America; the situation in the Korean peninsula and in the Asian-Pacific region in general; the Near East, including Lebanon; a Cambodian settlement; the situation in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa; and Cyprus. The situation developing in relations between the FRG and the GDR was, of course, discussed extensively.

6. Transnational problems and issues relating to bilateral relations were discussed mainly in working groups. Afterward the results were considered at a meeting of the ministers.

At Mr. Baker's request, we informed him about the work of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the decisions adopted at it. We shared our assessments of the progress of perestroyka in the country.

Quite good prospects are opening up in the bilateral sphere. Work has been completed on the drafts of the next new intergovernmental agreements, which may be signed at the Soviet-American summit meeting in the first half of this year, agreements on cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of atomic energy and exploration of the world's oceans on demarcating sea areas in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, and also in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. Work has been completed on the draft of an agreement on USSR and U.S. cultural and information centers in Washington and Moscow respectively.

Realistic prerequisites exist for the sides' experts to be able to prepare drafts for new intergovernmental accords on cooperation, in particular in the sphere of trade, reciprocal capital investment guarantees, taxation, power-engineering, the timber industry, protection and rational utilization of forests, global climatic changes, protection and preservation of the earth's ozone layer, the prediction of natural disasters and elimination of their consequences, maritime shipping, Arctic research, and protection of intellectual property rights. The task of drawing up the drafts for subsequent bilateral intergovernmental documents—a memorandum of understanding on the opening in 1991 of an international nature and ethnographical park in the Bering Strait area and a statement on the opening of USSR and U.S. consulates general in Kiev and New York respectively—is seen as fully capable of being achieved.

The conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the secretary of state, our talks and the discussion in the working groups, took place in an exceptionally businesslike and constructive spirit and were marked by a striving to broaden the spheres of agreement and build up elements of cooperation and interaction in Soviet-American relations.

[THE GUARDIAN correspondent] A week ago you spoke in favor of a neutral, united Germany, in favor of a united Germany being neutral. Do you still adhere to this position or do you agree to a united Germany remaining in NATO during the transitional period?

[Shevardnadze] The idea of neutralization is not a new one. It is a good, nice idea. It was advanced right after the war. Incidentally, I want to make another point for accuracy: From the very beginning, we were in favor of the unity of the German nation, the German people, but we were in favor of a neutral, demilitarized Germany. Herein lay our principle. How will we act from now on? Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher are arriving today, and there will be talks and a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. We will try to discuss all these problems, which are now very acute and topical for Europe, for the two German states and, I assume, for the whole world. As far as the continuation of Germany within NATO is concerned, I think that if we are talking seriously about the common interests of all peoples and about ensuring stability in Europe, it is necessary to take into account the interests both of those countries which make up the North Atlantic alliance and of those states which are members of the Warsaw Pact. Only on this basis can we provide guarantees to our peoples with regard to stability and peace in Europe.

[THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent] At the news conference here the day before yesterday, on the results of the plenum, A.N. Yakovlev, regarding the unification of Germany, spoke fairly emotionally about the feelings of Soviet people and about remembrances of the war. If one speaks of your experience and your knowledge, what enters into the understanding of the historical remembrance of World War II? Is there a danger that such a emotional reaction at the present time will affect the formulation of policy with respect to German unification?

[Shevardnadze] I think that the strongest displays of emotions by a representative of the Soviet leadership, by any Soviet person or in any Soviet family are quite understandable and fully justified.

If you noticed, I recently advocated an idea which some regard as naive, but it does not seem so to me. It was about the expediency of a European-wide referendum on the question of the unification of Germany and German unity. I was not, of course, proposing and am not proposing that the question of unification should or needs to be solved by means of a referendum. The question of the destinies of the two German states should be decided by the Germans themselves. This is their natural right. Each people is entitled to self- determination. However, to know the attitudes and views of the peoples of Europe is useful, and probably essential too, for the population of West Germany and for the population of the GDR. This knowledge would help them find a solution to the issue that would not be at variance with all-European interests and the interests of Europe's stability. I will not say that this is the only option. There are various options for ascertaining public opinion. It also seems to me that the plan put forward by Modrow, the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers—the plan for gradual progress and a gradual solution of this issue, beginning, I think, with the creation of a treaty-governed community between the two states—is the most rational and correct approach. It is precisely gradual movement within the framework of the all-European process that is needed.

[Soviet radio correspondent] It's quite clear that we are already on the threshold of German unification, you might say. It can be assumed that after some time there will be forces which will raise the question of the old borders. Didn't your discussion with the U.S. secretary of state deal with preventing a redrawing of European borders through their joint efforts? Do we at least have any machinery which would enable us to prevent this?

[Shevardnadze] We did talk about this. This problem was discussed both during the conversation with Comrade Gorbachev and at the ministerial level. It is one of the central issues. It must be seen in the context of the all-European process and of the principle of the inviolability of borders. European states must have a full guarantee concerning the inviolability of their borders as they were formed after the war. I stress, they must have a full guarantee.

I agree with you that there is a subject for discussion here. On the one hand, the idea of the need to respect currently existing borders is stressed in the utterances of individual political figures, but on the other hand—you probably recall—there still exists a clause in a decision of the FRG Federal Constitutional Court to the effect that the Third Reich continues to exist within its 1937 borders. Some people even believe that it exists within the 1938 borders. That means the interests of Austria and some other countries are already affected. This really is the question of questions. This problem will be a subject of serious discussion, of serious debate, with Mr. Kohl and Mr. Genscher in Moscow.

[Univision television correspondent] Mr. Baker spoke at yesterday's news conference about differences with regard to Cuba. Can you tell us specifically about supplies of MiG aircraft to the Castro government?

[Shevardnadze] There is nothing unusual in the supplies of these aircraft. It is being done in accordance with our obligations of cooperation with Cuba. As you know, MiG-23 aircraft have been supplied to Cuba until now. Like any equipment, this equipment is becoming obsolete. Cuba has to write off its MiG-23 aircraft. And the desire of a sovereign state to have new equipment is a natural one, especially in consideration of the complex situation which exists around that country. Of course, the United States doesn't welcome this act, but we have a legitimate right here. I believe that we must seek a way out in facilitating the confirmation of confidence-building measures in that region and the normalization of relations between the United States of America and Cuba. We said this with all frankness to the secretary of state. I shall further add that, even taking account of the supply of MiG-29's, Cuba represents no danger to the United States of America and the other states of that region.

[UPI correspondent] Is it proposed that GDR Prime Minister Modrow will visit Moscow in the coming days? Secondly, there have been reports that a summit meeting will take place during the period 11-17 June. Can you confirm or deny these dates? I would also like to know whether during the summit M.S. Gorbachev will visit other cities in the United States in addition to Washington?

[Shevardnadze] The issue of Hans Modrow coming here is not being discussed at the moment. He was here not long ago. There were talks and very detailed consultations on a very wide spectrum and problems and, in my opinion, there is no need now for a fresh visit. You probably know that in a few days time, literally, he is to meet the chancellor of the FRG. Secondly, specific dates for Comrade Gorbachev's visit have not yet been established. Probably June would be the most suitable month for us, but the first or the second half is another question. This must now be agreed on a concrete level. It is difficult to answer now whether there will be trips outside Washington because the program has not been drawn up yet.

[AP correspondent] I would like to know whether you have reached agreement on any issues related to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons or armed forces from the Korean peninsula. And what range of issues related to this did you discuss?

[Shevardnadze] The joint statement contains a section on the situation in the Korean peninsula. We spoke in general terms of promoting further stabilization of the situation in the Korean peninsula in order to overcome confrontation there. The Soviet Union has always favored cutting back the number of U.S. troops. In the end, we are in favor of there being no American miliary presence in the Korean peninsula. However, no doubt conditions are not yet ripe for such a wish to be fulfilled. I drew attention to one circumstance. It seems to me that a very interesting initiative from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to dismantle and break down the ferro-concrete wall in the demarcation zone which divides the two parts of the peninsula, and to provide for the free movement of citizens, has somehow not met with an appropriate reaction. How much emotion there has been over the Berlin Wall. It is good that that problem was ultimately solved. I think that if this wall too could be brought down, it would be a major event for both Asia and Europe. Let the journalists and commentators help us make public opinion favor putting this good idea into practice.

There is one particular concern of the U.S. side, and of others too, which is that at some stage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might acquire the capacity to develop [sozdaniye] a nuclear potential. I have briefed the secretary of state about the fact that the Korean leaders are very close to completing work on an agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority] regarding monitoring [kontrol] and placing their reactor under IAEA control [kontrol]. I think this is a very important detail.

[KUNA correspondent] Where can the progress be seen that was reached during the talks with James Baker in the course of discussion of the problems of a settlement of the Near East conflict? What efforts does the Soviet Union intend making to settle the matter of Jewish emigration now that an attempt to make a joint statement on the issue has fallen through?

[Shevardnadze] I won't say significant new elements emerged on this. We spoke in terms of our support for any efforts by the United States of America, Egypt, and other states, which aim at Israelis and Palestinians entering into direct dialogue and direct contact on all the problems of a settlement. As you know, things are getting off the ground with difficulty, but we are prepared to promote the initiative of Mr. Baker and the Egyptian president to facilitate the organization of dialogue between the sides in the conflict. That's the first thing.

Second, I reminded the secretary of state that we must step up our work in other directions and in particular must begin consulations on a Near East settlement between the permanent members of the Security Council, and heighten efforts to prepare an international conference on the Near East. I also recalled that it would be useful if a permanent representative of the UN secretary general, someone of authority and renown, a politician held in esteem by all sides of the conflict, were present the Near East. There you have the "packet" of ideas that were voiced at our talks. As for the matter of settling emigrants, we have noted the secretary of state's report that the United States of America has expressed its strongly negative attitude to settling Israelis in the occupied territories. On this basis, the U.S. side preferred not to record this position in the joint statement.

As for our own position, it is very familiar to you. An official statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been published today which reflects the view of the Soviet leadership. We have always opposed and still do oppose this practice. The Israeli leadership is aware of our line and we have also made direct appeals to them. Likewise, we believe it would be possible to make more efficient use of the opportunities of the United Nations Organization, and the Security Council in particular, since the Israeli leadership is ignoring the basic norms of international law and UN decisions.

[NIHON KEIZAI correspondent] The U.S. Government is showing growing interest in relations with Japan. The same can be said of the Soviet Union. It too is showing growing interest in improving relations with Tokyo. I would like to clarify whether you discussed the matter of the "Northern Territories" and whether you appealed to the United States for assistance regarding a solution to the problem of the "Northern Territories."

[Shevardnadze] You have omitted to mention something else: Japan is also showing an interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union. This is a very important point. As for the question of the "Northern Territories," I can confirm, that the secretary of state did raise this matter and was answered as follows: This problem is under discussion at the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty talks. The Soviet Union's position is well-known and we are not going to make any amendments to that position since there are no grounds for doing so.

[DIE ZEIT correspondent] Did you and James Baker discuss the problem of monetary union between the FRG and the GDR? What is your attitude toward this?

[Shevardnadze] I spoke in support of Hans Modrow's plan. I think this plan contains the necessary phases of German unification. These are a community by treaty, confederation, and federation. I think this is the correct approach to the problem.

[THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent] For a lengthy period of time, the two most complicated political problems preventing development of a strategic offensive weapons treaty being completed have been regarded as the problems of linking it to space and defense and the problem of sea-based missiles. Do you now think that after your meetings here and the meetings that were held previously with representatives of the U.S. Government that these have basically been solved? Are you convinced that you will be able to reach a solution to all the main issues within the framework of a new strategic agreement by the time of the June summit?

[Shevardnadze] Yes. Our position on the interconnections between the ABM treaty and an agreement on strategic offensive weapons was spelled out in Wyoming. It remains in force. As for sea-based missiles, I can confirm what the secretary of state said yesterday. There is definite progress, but the problem remains complex and difficult all the same. We shall have to do a great deal more work yet to untangle this complex knot.

[Greek television correspondent] You said Cyprus was one of the subjects of your talks with James Baker. Is there anything new on this? How do you visualize this issue?

[Shevardnadze] I would not say that there is anything new here. We discussed this problem, but made no new discoveries.

You know that there will soon be a meeting in New York of the UN secretary general with Mr. Denktash and Mr.

Vasiliou, the president of Cyprus, and we have agreed to contribute to the progress of precisely this meeting.

[NEW YORK TIMES correspondent] During your conversations did James Baker say that the United States was ready to agree to any form of free association of Germany with NATO in the framework of a process which will lead, in the final result, to the unification of the two Germanys?

[Shevardnadze] Various alternatives are being discussed. I think that after our meeting with the chancellor and Mr. Genscher, we could talk to you more specificially about all these questions.

[Novosti correspondent] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, what can be said about the development of Soviet-American relations now, after your talks with the secretary of state? Which is the most important achievement of those you noted in your introductory statement?

[Shevardnadze] There is a well-known formula—it was given in Wyoming—that we are now approaching the stage when the United States of America and the Soviet Union are passing more and more from a state of mutual understanding toward mutual action in tackling the complex problems facing our countries and the world. Perhaps that is in fact the most important thing, if we are talking about a principled approach.

From the point of view of the current state of Soviet-American relations, the main issue is overcoming the military confrontation, and a real cut in arms, not only Soviet-American ones, but correspondingly on the European Continent as well. I think that in this regard significant progress was achieved during the visit by Mr. Baker. I have spoken about this.

[EFE correspondent] Apart from Panama and MiG's for Cuba, did you and James Baker discuss any other problems to do with Central America, for example Nicaragua, and the situation in the region as a whole?

[Shevardnadze] The Central American issue was discussed in great detail, both at the meeting of the ministers, and in the conversation with M.S. Gorbachev. I think that a very interesting sphere of agreement on Central American problems is emerging with us; this applies, in particular, to questions connected with Nicaragua and El Salvador. All of this is reflected in the joint statement.

### Bessmertnykh Sees Baker Off

*LD1002131790 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker left the Soviet Union today. At the airport he was seen off by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and other officials. The seeing-off party also included U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock.

## Various Aspects of Baker's Visit Assessed

### Pasko Sees 'Productive' Meeting

*LD1102173890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] A joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the results of the talks between Comrade Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker has been published. The voluminous document, consisting of six sections, makes it possible to speak of the wide range of problems discussed and the active preparation by the sides for the June summit meeting.

Despite the remaining disagreements, Soviet-U.S. relations are distinguished to an increasing degree by mutual understanding, cooperation, and the search for mutually-acceptable solutions. Over to commentator Vladimir Pasko.

[Pasko] I would like to remind you that this was already the sixth meeting between Comrade Shevardnadze and State Secretary Baker—the sixth in less than a year. The dynamic Soviet-U.S. dialogue has been marked by specific agreements and progress in the sphere of improving the understanding of the two sides' positions.

The current meeting was, perhaps, the most productive in this sense. First and foremost, it goes without saying that one would like to note the agreement and the similarity in arms control matters. Of the three problems relating to the preparation of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons, a mutually acceptable solution has been found for two of them. For the third, relating to sea-based cruise-missiles, progress has been made.

Some aspects of the interrelationship between the treaty being elaborated and the ABM Treaty have been clarified. The proposals of the two countries with respect to the reduction of their troops in Europe are distinguished by a certain similarity. The search for mutually-acceptable solutions is a search for compromise.

The Soviet side accepted the well-known proposal by President Bush with the adjustment that the Soviet Union and the United States should each have 195,000 soldiers in Europe as a whole. It was proposed as an option to establish a limit of 225,000. The U.S. side promised to give an answer after consulting its allies.

The attainment of a mutually acceptable draft of a possible agreement in principle on chemical weapons was a substantial advance. Its essence lies in elaborating bilateral agreements on mutual obligations before an international convention comes into force. These obligations would include, in particular, the elimination of a significant part of the chemical weapons stocks of both countries down to equal, low levels. This would provide an incentive for the elaboration and signing of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The overcoming of the remaining disagreements in matters of monitoring [kontrol] undergound nuclear tests was also an indisputable success of the meeting. This removes the last barrier on the way to the ratification of the well-known treaties of 1974 and 1976. But what is no less important, especially in the light of the recent U.S. statements about having to put an end to this, the United States has confirmed the 1974 accord on the noninterruption of the process of talks toward the further limitation of nuclear explosions in terms of yield and number, keeping in mind the ultimate goal of their complete prohibition.

Perhaps never before have the sides had such an extensive agenda as now, first and foremost in the sphere of disarmament, or, as Comrade Shevardnadze noted, the dismantling of that enormous structure of military confrontation which arose in the world during the cold war years. On this path, many obstacles still remain to be overcome on this path. Nevertheless, both sides are increasingly moving from mutual-understanding to interaction in the resolution of existing problems.

And that is a very important result of the talks which have taken place.

### Baker's 'Didacticism' Noted

*PM1202092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
*11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4*

[A. Lyutyy report under the general heading: "Visit Over"]

[Text] This meeting lasted 90 minutes, and all the time I could not help thinking that something almost unreal was happening. The U.S. secretary of state was holding a dialogue with USSR people's deputies in the Kremlin's majestic white and blue Sverdlovsk Hall, with its stucco and gilding. He was answering their questions and exchanging rejoinders. If you disregard the external trappings, it was just like the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress, where it is customary to call the person addressing the legislators a "witness."

In fact, this is what J. Baker called himself at the start of his speech at an enlarged session of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee.

Not so long ago Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze also had a frank discussion with deputies here. Being given the opportunity yesterday to hear also the viewpoint of the head of the U.S. foreign policy department, the parliamentarians gained a great deal, I believe, in the sense of forming a more panoramic, all-embracing picture of our relationship. I agree with People's Deputy N.V. Neyland, who remarked in conversation that the secretary of state's visit attests to his respect for our new parliament.

There is no need to give a detailed account of J. Baker's speech or the exchange of opinions. Much that was said was reflected in the reports on the secretary of state's meetings with M.S. Gorbachev and E.A. Shevardnadze. J. Baker wished us success in perestroyka, gave his own very harsh characterization of the command-administrative system, and said that the new era in relations may not rule out conflicts entirely but will make it possible to resolve them on the basis of greater mutual understanding. Nor did he overlook the recent CPSU Central Committee Plenum, assessing the party's intention to abandon the legislative enshrinement of its leading role in society as a tremendous step on the path of democracy.

But I would be sinning against the truth if I did not say the following: In my view the guest did not avoid a certain didacticism when he spoke about the relationship between the executive and legislative branches back home and when he advised us on how to better organize the aid which the USSR gives to a number of countries, e.g. Cuba or Nicaragua. However, perhaps this was only how it seemed to me. Incidentally, Deputy Ye.M. Primakov asked whether the United States was prepared to adopt a public pledge not to use force in respect of those two states provided they did not threaten the security of Americans. The reply boiled down to the claim that both Cuba and Nicaragua are conducting subversive activity against neighboring democratic countries. The audience gave an ambivalent reception to the secretary of state's explanations with regard to the U.S. action in Panama. Although... J. Baker did propose that a group of our deputies travel to Panama.

Well, no one is claiming that all questions have been resolved between us. It is precisely in order to jointly seek mutually acceptable answers to them that such meetings are clearly necessary. The will to do so was displayed on both sides.

### Baker's Speech at Prague University Cited

*PM0902123590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*
*8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Unnamed own correspondent report: "Speech at University"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, on a visit to Czechoslovakia, has given a lecture at Charles University in Prague.

"The steps you take," J. Baker said, addressing the audience, "are not just your own. They are also steps forward for all states that have a stake in a legitimate European order, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Only through the legitimacy of democracy will we achieve a resilient and lasting stability." In the secretary of state's opinion, this is also understood by President M.S. Gorbachev. Quoting E.A. Shevardnadze's statement last month, J. Baker summed up: "As not only words but facts also show, the current Soviet leadership shares the view that the only way to ensure European stability is through legality and not, under any circumstances, through force.

J. Baker said that the United States is prepared to participate in a summit meeting of the 35 CSCE countries, which could be held this year, if its participants include the following point on the agenda: a commitment on the part of all participating countries to hold regular and free elections.

The U.S. secretary of state reported that the "way is opening up for most-favored-nation status" for Czechoslovakia in trade with the United States. The United States will support Czechoslovakia's recent request to join the IMF. The U.S. Government also supports the Czechoslovak proposal to site the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Prague. The United States is also proposing setting up a Fund for Independent Broadcasting and a Free Press to support a "free press in Czechoslovakia and the other countries of central and Eastern Europe."

At the end of the lecture J. Baker was presented with the Charles University Peace Medal.

## Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Pentagon

*LD0902105590 Moscow TASS in English 0855 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Washington February 9 TASS—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence and State Security, currently in the United States, visited the Pentagon and the National Military Command Centre on Thursday.

The delegation, headed by Vladimir Lapygin, chairman of the mentioned parliamentary committee, was received by U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and other American military leaders.

During talks between Soviet deputies and American military leaders, the sides touched on a broad range of problems linked with security and the adoption of decisions pertaining to military structure.

Cheney and Powell replied to questions put by the Soviet guests, who wished to know how the budget of the U.S. military establishment was formed, how it was approved in committees of both houses of the U.S. Congress.

Addressing the Soviet delegation, the U.S. defence secretary particularly noted the Pentagon-proposed reductions of conventional forces and armaments in the fiscal year of 1991. At the same time, Cheney stressed that the U.S. military did not plan to cut strategic nuclear forces in the coming fiscal year.

## President Hopes for New Bilateral Trade Deal

*LD0902142990 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Washington February 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

United States President George Bush said on Thursday he hopes to negotiate a new trade agreement with the Soviet Union by this summer's summit with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"This agreement will relax trade barriers between East and West, expanding markets for American exports," Bush said in remarks to a meeting of officials in Omaha, Nebraska, a major U.S. agricultural state.

"I feel strongly that selling our grain to the Soviet Union is in America's interest as well as in theirs," Bush said, commenting on U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union.

The White House has previously said that it is prepared to grant most favoured nation trade status to the Soviet Union after a new agreement is signed.

The Soviet Union and the United States are expected to start negotiating a new trade agreement in Washington on Monday.

The agreement will help expand U.S. trade and business in the Soviet Union, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills said Wednesday in Washington.

Annual trade between the Soviet Union and United States is now estimated at nearly five billion dollars, which is less than a third of the trade between the United States and China.

Soviet-American trade is lopsided, largely due to trade barriers to Soviet exports. According to the U.S. trade ministry, America delivers four billion dollars worth of goods to the Soviet Union annually and imports only 700 million dollars worth of Soviet products.

Before granting the Soviet Union most favoured nation trade status, the United States must waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment, linking trade with the Soviet Union with its emigration policies towards Jews and other ethnic groups. The amendment has been in effect since 1975.

Leading U.S. businessmen and many Jewish groups in the U.S. support the waiver.

## Abandonment of 'Confrontational' TV Marti Urged

*PM0502161990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[G. Deyev report: "Without Cuba's Consent"]

[Text] According to foreign news agency reports, the United States intends in the very near future to commission the "Marti Television" ("TV-Marti") station for direct television broadcasting to Cuba. Commenting on them at the request of IZVESTIYA's correspondent, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration said:

"This is the first instance of beamed foreign television in international practice, and without the consent of the country in whose regard it will be implemented.

"The Soviet Union notes the illegal, confrontational nature of the planned television action, which runs counter to modern trends in international politics. Such actions could not only cause a serious aggravation of relations between Cuba and the United States, but also have unfavorable consequences for the situation in the region as a whole.

"We proceed from the premise that the mass media are meant to serve the goals of mutual understanding among states, and we urge Washington to refrain from realizing the project, to display prudence, and not to reject the Cuban side's proposals aimed at arranging a broader mutual exchange of information, including television programs, between Cuba and the United States on the basis of respect for both sides' interests and noninterference in each other's internal affairs."

## Northeast Asia

### Japan Marks 'Northern Territories' Day

*LD0702203690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[From "Morning" program, presented by Oleg Blinov]

[Excerpts] [Blinov] Every year on 7 February, the so-called Northern Territories Day is marked in Japan. In Japan, that is what they call four of the Kurile Islands, which are legitimate possessions of the Soviet Union to which Tokyo lays claim. This day has been given official status; by decision of the Japanese Government, it is now being staged for the tenth time. Here is our Tokyo correspondent, Pavel Potapov.

[Potapov] [passage omitted] At the capital's Kudan Kaikan Hall, a central meeting is proceeding at the moment within the framework of Northern Territories Day, with members of the government and deputies from the ruling and opposition parties present. The aim of the event is to whip up the campaign for the return of the Kurile Islands to Japan.

In recent years, in the opinion of the participants themselves, the Movement for Territorial Claims Against the USSR has started to die down noticeably. There are several reasons for this. One is that the calls do not arise spontaneously among the population, but clearly are orchestrated from above. Another is that the younger generation, born in the post-war years, has a passive attitude toward the actions of their elders. It is precisely to young people that the arrangers of today's events are turning their gaze. Events are being staged not only in Tokyo, but also in other regions, including in the north of the country, in Sapporo, where the active collection of signatures on a petition demanding the return to Japan of the four Kurile Islands belonging to the Soviet Union is under way at the snow festival, which is popular with youngsters.

### Japanese Persistence in Kurile Claim Deplored

*PM0902153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[Own correspondent I. Latyshev dispatch: "In Vicious Circle"]

[Text] Tokyo, 7 Feb—The champions of Japan's groundless territorial claims again made their presence felt today. An opportunity was provided by their annual 7 February celebration of "Northern Territories Day," which was introduced in the country's political calendar by the Japanese Government 10 years ago. A rally of members of the so-called "Movement for Return of the Northern Territories" was held again, like last year, in the capital's Kudan Kaikan Hall. The official nature of this "movement," which is planned at the top and subsidized by the authorities, was evident in both the organization and the holding of the rally. Admission to the hall was strictly by invitation. Each party and public organization representative was allocated a specific seat.

The high point of the rally's program, following the example of past years, was a speech by the country's Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. Having expressed "regrets" that the four south Kurile Islands are to this day "occupied by the Soviet Union," the prime minister declared the Japanese Government's intention to maintain its pursuit of their return to Japan.

The Kudan Kaikan Hall rally proved again that the Japanese champions of territorial claims against the Soviet Union have drawn no conclusions at all in the last year—as they should have done bearing in mind the turn of international events everywhere in the direction of easing of tension, and the recognition by politicians that real opportunities exist to consolidate the spirit of good-neighborliness in mutual relations between countries in the world.

### Japanese Comment on CPSU Plenum Noted

*OW1002074890 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Report by station Tokyo correspondent Potapov]

[Text] Major international news developments from the Soviet Union are reaching Japan. Television stations are broadcasting reports from Moscow and interviews with Soviet citizens on their assessments of the proceedings and outcome of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Various Japanese newspapers also are carrying headlines on the plenum, pointing out that the plenum adopted, without change, a draft plaform presented by General Secretary Gorbachev and which is expected to be discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress. The draft platform was adopted with only one vote against and one abstention. TOKYO SHIMBUN reported that Deputy Yeltsin voted against the draft platform proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev, seeing it as inadequate. Prime Minister Kaifu assessed positively the outcome of the plenum and said he hopes it will have a favorable effect on the international situation. Kaifu also pointed out that the democratization process in the Soviet Union will facilitate U.S.-Soviet dialogue and will have a positive effect on peace and stability in the Asian and Pacific region.

Opposition parties in Japan also commented on the plenum. Secretary General Yamaguchi of the Japan Socialist Party, in his statement, highly appraised the significant reform being promoted by the CPSU and stressed that this will quicken the end of the cold war concept and give new stimulus to developing East-West cooperation. In the statement, he also said that Socialists in Japan welcome the Soviet Union's move toward building an open civil society. On the other hand, the Komeito [Clean Government Party] pointed out that the Soviet policy for deepening democratization will contribute to easing tensions in the world. Japanese business leaders termed the decisions reached at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum historic. While welcoming the plenum decisions, Hiroshi Andai, chairman of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee, expressed the hope that the Soviet economy will be developed further and said that he, as well as other business leaders, want to put Japanese-Soviet economic relations on track at the earliest possible date.

The following are among noteworthy commentaries by Japanese commentators on the plenum: The CPSU is going through a difficult period. Deliberations at the plenum were very tense, indicating the existence of differing views within the CPSU on the party and society. Despite this, General Secretary Gorbachev has reactivated reform within the CPSU and succeeded in making the party take a clear-cut stand toward perestroyka by creating the party's independent unified-front for perestroyka. The Japanese commentators also agreed that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum would give impetus to the democratization process in the Soviet Union and give vitality to other political forces in the country. On the whole, the latest plenum indicated that the CPSU, a ruling party, is resolved to formulate future policies and present programs for reforming Soviet society in various ways, taking the people's desires and views into consideration.

## Southeast Asia & Pacific

### Thai Prime Minister Previews Ryzhkov Visit

*LD1002230190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1038 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok, 9 Feb (TASS)—The political weather in our small world, known as Earth, is becoming warmer every day; the "cold war" is receding into the past; and the peoples have breathed more freely, declared Chatchai Chunhawan, the prime minister of Thailand. The great powers, and especially the Soviet Union, are to be credited with this in no small measure. That is why the people and Government of Thailand warmly welcome the upcoming visit to Bangkok by N.I. Ryzhkov, the head of the USSR Government, he stressed in an interview with TASS correspondent Boris Chekhonin.

"I'm not keen on grand phrases," said the Thai leader, "but the visit really is an historic one. It is the first of its kind throughout the years of Soviet-Thai relations and will enable all that has been done to develop our ties to be summed up. And quite a lot has been done." In the Thai leader's opinion, today's relations between the two countries may be termed cordial. They are marked by a tendency to become increasingly close, especially in trade.

Turning to the Cambodian problem, which is a topical one for Thailand, the prime minister welcomed the recent agreement of the five permanent members of the UN Secrity Council aimed at settling it peacefully, and noted the constructive position of the USSR and its understanding of the situation in Southeast Asia. Chatchai Chunhawan said that he was himself in favor of new approaches to confused and complex problems and called for a dialogue with the government of Hun Sen. "I hope that the opposing Cambodian sides will sit down at the negotiating table," the head of the cabinet emphasized.

The Thai leader pointed to his government's desire to promote the region's economic development. In his view, Thailand can do a great deal here: it has a favorable geographical location—in the center of Southeast Asia; it is a major exporter; it is characterized by political stability. All this enables it to become the foundation of a trade bridge between the ASEAN countries and Indochina.

Thailand, the prime minister noted, is ready to open its doors wide to a Soviet economic presence. Bangkok is here pinning great hopes on the visit by the head of the Soviet Government. It sees new economic prospects and the growth of mutual understanding between the two peoples.

Since the Soviet-American summit in Malta, the Thai leader stressed, new and favorable horizons have opened up for the world.

"I would like our talks with the distingished Soviet visitor," he said, "to make a tangible, albeit modest, contribution toward creating a climate of trust and varied cooperation on our planet."

The upcoming visit, Chatchai Chunhawan thinks, is inseparable from the processes of perestroyka in the USSR. "I personally am impressed by the ideas of President Gorbachev," he pointed out. "His policies can rightly be called farsighted. They have managed to become a new political factor, a force in our world. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to wish the Soviet people success along this far from easy road."

## Prime Minister Departs for Thailand 10 Feb

*LD1002192690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] At the invitation of Thailand's Government, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov left on an official visit for Bangkok today.

The Soviet prime minister also will pay official visits to Australia and Singapore.

Ryzhkov was seen off at the airport by Zaykov, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, and Biryukova, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, and other officials.

### Arrival in Bangkok

*LD1102061190 Moscow TASS in English 0605 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok February 11 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov arrived in Thailand today for an official visit at the invitation of the country's government.

At the capital's Don Muang Airport Ryzhkov was met by Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan of Thailand. Among the welcoming party were government ministers, other Thai and Soviet officials, and A. Valkov, Soviet ambassador to Thailand.

The state flags of the Soviet Union and the Kingdom of Thailand were hoisted at the airport and the national anthems of the two countries were played.

Then Ryzhkov reviewed a guard of honour lined up on the tarmac.

### Trip to Textile Plant

*LD1102142890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok, 11 Feb (TASS)—TASS special correspondents: Matters relating to a further expansion of business and trade cooperation in the two countries' interests are at the focus of attention of N.I. Ryzhkov's official visit to Thailand. The head of the Soviet Government visited the large TAT textiles firm in a suburb of the capital.

Its president, S. Potiratanankun, acquainted the visitor with the production potential of the firm, which in Bangkok alone includes 16 enterprises employing 40,000 people. The most modern automated and semiautomated equipment has been installed and it ensures the complete production cycle and a high quality of output.

N.I. Ryzhkov was shown the workshops, beginning with those producing yarn and fabrics, and going on to the cutting and stitching shops. The firm's products are exported to over 20 countries, including the Soviet Union. Through orders from the Dutch Berghaus firm and other companies, the TAT enterprises annually manufacture for our country up to 250,000 raincoats and coats from fashionable fabrics.

In conversations with the firm's management, the thought was expressed that it is necessary to arrange direct links with Soviet trading and production organizations, and also purchases in our country of raw materials for textiles production, namely, cotton, dyes, and other goods. It was noted that there is a good future for Soviet-Thai trade if full use is made of existing potential. The time has come to create a stable base for trade and to go on to broad economic mutually beneficial cooperation.

N.I. Ryzhkov highly praised the production and technical potential of the TAT firm and made an entry in the honored visitors' book.

### Government House Luncheon

*LD1202033590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0315 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok, 12 February (TASS special correspondent)— A lunch was given today in the ancient building, Government House, on behalf of the Thai Cabinet of Ministers in honor of N.I. Ryzhkov, of the USSR Council of Ministers chairman, who has come here on an official visit. At the lunch were persons accompanying the head of the Soviet Government, members of parliament, and ministers of Thailand. At the lunch, Ch. Chunhawan, prime minister of Thailand, delivered a speech.

N.I. Ryzhkov then delivered a speech.

### Thai Prime Minister's Remarks

*LD1202125690 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok February 12 TASS—"Thailand welcomes the Soviet Union's readiness to promote friendly relations and beneficial cooperation with the countries of the region. We also appreciate the Soviet efforts to reduce tension and military competition in the region," Thai Prime Minister ChatChai Chunhawan said today.

He made a speech at a luncheon in honour of visiting Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

Touching upon ways to settle the Cambodian conflict, the Thai prime minister said that the USSR and Thailand share the desire to see an early end to the fighting in Cambodia. "I believe that a solution to the problem can only come about through political dialogues and negotiations. Thailand deeply appreciates the Soviet Union's constructive efforts in helping to find a political solution to the problem which is long overdue."

Chunhawan said that the Soviet prime minister's visit to Thailand "is a historic event in Thai-Soviet relations."

"We have made good progress in improving relations over the years," he noted.

The Thai prime minister welcomed the Soviet Union's interest in increased contact and cooperation with Thailand. "In this connection, the programme on cultural and scientific exchanges, the protocol on the implementation of the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and the agreement on the provision of land for use as embassy premises, signed during this visit, are indicative of the progress made in our relations. These agreements constitute another foundation for future increased cooperation," the prime minister said.

### Ryzhkov Calls for Broader Relations

*LD1202131290 Moscow TASS in English 1253 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok February 12 TASS—"From the Soviet Union's viewpoint, the promotion of political dialogue and of equitable and mutually advantageous commercial and economic cooperation among all nations of the Asian-Pacific region will be a realiable guarantee against the war danger and will improve the climate in Asia, including its southeastern part," Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov said here today during an official luncheon given in his honor by Thai Premier Chatchai Chunhawan.

Ryzhkov's official visit to Thailand is in its second day. He will also visit Australia and Singapore.

"The Soviet Union's policy vis-a-vis Thailand," Ryzhkov said, "has always been based on principles of equality, respect of sovereignty and mutual interest. Today we have every condition to strengthen friendship between the USSR and Thailand, to expand mutually advantageous economic relations and to cooperate actively in the search for solutions to vital international problems."

Turning to the reforms in the Soviet Union, Ryzhkov said the results of the recent plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party, the ideas it discussed and the decisions it adopted, showed that "we are witnessing a crucial turn in the history of our party and Soviet society in general. Its purpose is to consistently deepen the process of democratic reforms."

Ryzhkov said that not only the Soviet peoples, but other countries and the world community in general stood to gain from perestroika's success in the Soviet Union, because it ushered in new political thinking in international affairs.

Ryzhkov stressed that the first results were already obvious due to new approaches to international problems—the growth of trust among nations, the ending of the "cold war" and lesser confrontation between the two military-political blocs.

Turning to the Soviet-Thai negotiations in Bangkok, Ryzhkov noted the goodwill and sincere desire of both parties to deepen the enrich their bilateral relations. He said the sides have acknowledged the need to expand commercial and economic relations in traditional areas and to seek new domains including joint ventures.

Ryzhkov said the Soviet Government would help Thai business circles to expand cooperation with Soviet counterparts. "The Soviet Union can take part in building power, railway, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and gas industry projects," he said.

## Sub-Saharan Africa

### Foreign Ministry Official on De Klerk Reforms

*LD0802202490 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Reform proposals by President de Klerk of South Africa may lead to a completely different situation in the region, according to a senior Soviet diplomat, who warned of its impact on southern Africa and on the entire continent.

De Klerk's proposal to free Nelson Mandela, legalise the African National Congress (ANC), the Communist Party and 33 other democratic organisations was a bombshell, Boris Asoyan, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry African Department, told TASS.

President de Klerk's parliamentary speech was unprecedented, and reflected the growing understanding of the South African authorities of the need for a dialogue with the democratic opposition and to begin talks on South Africa's future.

President de Klerk's statement that the South African Government attaches much importance to talks for a just constitution, granting equal rights to all South Africans, carried a lot of weight, Asoyan said.

These changes would have been impossible without efforts by the Anti-Apartheid Movement inside and outside South Africa, without a turnaround in the military and political situation in southern Africa and without the rapid international thaw, he said.

However, one has to be realistic about Pretoria's readiness for a rapid and complete dismantling of apartheid, he said. Much is still unclear in the government's position, especially on the length of the emergency situation and the abolition of remaining discriminatory laws.

De Klerk hung on to the idea of preserving the dominance of the white minority. His promises, no matter how positive they might appear, have yet to be confirmed with actions.

Nelson Mandela is still behind bars and troops are still in townships and it is hard to expect a quick transition from hostility to trust, Asoyan said.

Hopefully, South African political forces, entering the dialogue, are aware that every new step towards negotiations will be vehemently opposed by die-hards, the diplomat said.

"South Africa has a historic chance to end injustice and violence, and it must use it."

### Commentary Eyes Mandela's Release, 'Key' Role

*MB1102095090 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Vladislav Chernukha commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] It has been announced in Pretoria that the leader of the African National Congress [ANC] of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, will be released from prison at 1300 GMT on Sunday [11 Feb].

The man, who in his lifetime has become a symbol of the heroic struggle against apartheid, is to regain freedom at last.

The campaign for Nelson Mandela's release has long continued everywhere in the world, including in the Soviet Union. Both the public and governments, including Western governments, took part in that effort. The release of Nelson Mandela and his associates has been demanded by the United Nations and other international organizations.

Nelson Mandela is leaving prison when he is 71 years old; the past 27 and ½ years he has spent in jail.

Mandela was arrested as the commander of the military wing of the ANC of South Africa, Umkhonto weSizwe, the Spear of the Nation. The ANC shifted from nonviolent methods to armed struggle against apartheid after the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. The operation of Nelson Mandela forces caused panic among South African rulers. They went to great lengths to capture him. Mandela and a group of other ANC leaders were sentenced to lifetime imprisonment.

Now, Nelson Mandela is about to be set free.

Is it a concession to the world community? This is true, but only to some extent. The main reason is that Pretoria has had to start a new policy. After last year's victory in the presidential elections, the new chairman of the ruling party, Frederik de Klerk, released from prison a number of Mr. Mandela's associates. He made public a five-year program for reforms aimed at achieving the equality of races.

On 2 February this year, the South African president lifted the ban on the ANC and more than 30 other antiracist organizations. It was also decided to lift many other restrictions introduced under the state of emergency and to release political prisoners. These steps, and Nelson Mandela's release, are about to create a favorable situation for a dialogue between genuine representatives of the black majority and the authorities.

The success of the talks will depend on whether President de Klerk and his team prove consistent enough and able to dismantle the system of apartheid despite the resistance of the conservative members of the white community.

As for the ANC, it is determined to work for the equality of all South Africans and the emergence of a democratic state. There must be no doubt that the former captive of the racist regime will play a key role at the talks with the authorities.

Nelson Mandela's intention to bring down apartheid is firm, as before.

### Fedorov Believes RSA's Future 'Not Clear'

*MB0802224990 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 8 Feb 90*

["South Africa Today" program prepared by Aleksandr Fedorov—read by announcer]

[Text] I joined the chorus of voices hailing President Frederik de Klerk's decision to democratize political life in his country.

As a contributor to the program South Africa Today, I have few reasons for being optimistic over the past 15 years. Reports from South Africa were rather indicative of an impending disaster, described so vividly by Nadime Gordimer.

Luckily, a nationwide catastrophe did not take place, even though many black and white people lost their lives at the height of classical apartheid. Many died in prison for having failed to comply with dozens of laws which regulated people's behavior from the cradle.

There's no need to be a graduate of Stellenbosch University to realize that the state of affairs could no longer go unchanged.

What characterizes truly great statesmen is their ability to turn a fatal development of events into a blessing for their nation, said the French novelist Victor Hugo.

Though the development of events in South Africa was not the result of peaceful circumstances, but the outcome of the deliberate aggravation of tensions, this only emphasizes the realism and resolution of President de Klerk.

Currently, many people in South Africa, and beyond it, are engaged in planting the negative and the positive offshoots of his (?goal). The positive ones include the invitation to visit Britain, received after his address to Parliament.

Since the world of apartheid is crumbling, why not venture beyond it? There is no need to imitate the first settlers who took positions up around their (?camps), prepared to hold out until the end of time.

Some (?assert) that President de Klerk became scared by the news of economic sanctions and decided to forestall developments. The country's entire population suffered, even as a result of minimal isolation. The blacks were prepared to face the sanctions, not because they liked them. They only wanted to dismantle apartheid as soon as possible.

On deciding to free Nelson Mandela, President de Klerk evidently wanted to avoid looking as inhuman as his predecessor, Pieter Botha, did. After all, personal motives are often intertwined with state interest. Therefore, it is useless to fall into (?doubtful) conjectures and guesswork.

I don't think that everything will go smoothly in South Africa in the wake of the address to the South African Parliament. The consequences of the [word indistinct] of the National Party will affect all areas of live in South Africa for a long time yet.

Judging by news reports, adherence of apartheid, within the Conservative Party and in the ultra-rightist Afrikaner Resistance Movement, are consolidating their forces.

The country's future is not clear, since the two sides fundamentally differ in their views on constitutional issues and on economic problems.

But, there is the essential factor without which all talk of reconciliation would have been impossible: The legalization of opposition parties will make it possible for them to outline their platforms without fear that the authorities will distort them. The population will be able to make its choice, only if no one prompts it or (?to support). Therefore, one can only agree with President de Klerk [words indistinct] in his televised statement that, now, much depends on the endeavors to create the necessary climate for the start of peace talks.

In our times, climate depends not only on the forces of nature.

## Moscow International Views Reforms in RSA

*AB0902125390 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] It was a decision in the right direction; it was a step ahead; it was a decision aimed at setting aside the apartheid policy: These are the remarks made by the international media in reaction to the announcement by the South African president, Frederik de Klerk, at the opening of the Republic of South Africa [RSA] Parliament. The reason for supporting the announcement by President de Klerk is understandable. The decision to unban the African National Congress [ANC] and the South African Communist Party, the plan to release Nelson Mandela soon, the relaxation of the rules governing the state of emergency, and an immediate invitation to all political leaders in the country to participate in talks on the future of South Africa—all this has been described by many as the biggest political change South Africa has ever experienced for many years.

Many people have praised Nelson Mandela and Frederik de Klerk. The presidential announcement that the ANC leader would be released soon was described by the British prime minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, as bold and courageous.

At the same time, it does not mean that the overall response to the announcement by President de Klerk had only one meaning. Not all agree with the views of the UN secretary general, Perez de Cuellar, that the steps announced by Frederik de Klerk, especially the unbanning of the ANC, represented the beginning of the process of dismantling apartheid. Nor is there a unanimous opinion that so far the South African Government has fulfilled the proper requirements to pave the way for talks with the leaders of democratic forces in the country.

For instance, the Zimbabwean foreign minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, issued a special statement in Harare in which he stressed that the announcement by President de Klerk satisfied only some of the ANC's conditions to hold talks with the government. Also, the announcement complies with part of the conditions approved by the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, and the United Nations. The minister said: We are disappointed by the fact that in De Klerk's announcement there is no mention of the removal of the apartheid policy, although that is what the international community and the democratic forces in the country have been fighting for.

This question also is being taken into consideration by the ANC itself. AFP reported that the ANC was not very happy with the announcement by the president, and also quoted the views of one of the ANC's spokesmen, Pallo Jordan, who said that Mr. de Klerk had chosen to fulfill only some of the actions he was required to take. He was supposed to have gone even further.

The problem is that between the government and the ANC there are basic differences regarding their views on constitutional arrangements. Frederik de Klerk still rejects the principle of one man, one vote, although that is what the ANC is aiming at. The issue also causes problems in the present debate. After announcing that some of the ANC conditions had been met in readiness for talks, the president has tried to put the ANC in a difficult position by saying that those who insist on past conditions are not in favor of talks.

Mrs. Winnie Mandela, after a visit to her husband, stressed that as a result of the half measures taken by the government, especially on the state of emergency, there are still obstacles preventing Nelson Mandela from leaving prison.

It is true that an important step forward has been taken. That was stated, for instance, by the spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but according to his statement, much more remains to be done.

Quoting the views of a high-ranking diplomat, REUTER says that 12 EEC governments may consider the measures announced by President de Klerk as not going far enough for them to lift all the sanctions against South Africa announced in 1986. However, although there are some problems remaining, it is clear that the changes in South Africa are of great importance, and are opening the door to solving the country's problems.

## Commentary Says Peace 'Paramount' in RSA

*MB0902192590 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Boris Asoyan commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] President F.W. de Klerk's 2 February address to Parliament caught many people off guard. An announcement of Nelson Mandela's release might have been anticipated, but the unbanning of the African National Congress [ANC], the South African Communist Party, and the other antiapartheid organizations was unexpected.

President de Klerk must be given his due. He has so far not shirked his undertaking to bring peace to the region through the gradual elimination of apartheid. A month and a half from now Namibia will be independent, and South Africa has stopped its armed incursions into independent African countries and announced that it had stopped giving support to rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique.

Within South Africa itself, antiapartheid organizations have been unbanned and a group of political prisoners has been released, including ANC veteran Walter Sisulu. And, above all else, De Klerk's address is very different to what we have been accustomed to hearing over the years in South Africa's Parliament. In it he voiced the government's profound undertaking to hold negotiations with antiapartheid organizations within the country. De Klerk wants the negotiations to get under way on a new dispensation that will find favor with all the country's people in all sectors. If this pace of change continues, South Africa will soon have a new political dispensation that will be acceptable to other independent African countries in the region.

It would be erroneous, however, to pile the credit on the Pretoria government for the now-apparent changes in South Africa. Change would never have come without pressure from the antiapartheid campaign waged within and outside the country and without the new political thinking the world over. However, there is no need for debate over the stepped-up paced of reform in the country.

In the minds of South Africans much is still puzzling concerning the state of emergency and the scrapping of apartheid legislation. The president's pronouncements still evince some bent toward retaining white supremacy. While the state of emergency is operative, the government can use it to quash those that threaten it.

No matter how nice De Klerk's pronouncements were, the question still arises on whether they will be followed by action. It is unlikely that apartheid will be scrapped in sectors like education, and it is unlikely that all political prisoners will be released. Not all ANC members will feel free to return to South Africa without fear of imprisonment. The government might still try some of them in court for offenses against the government.

While Nelson Mandela remains in jail and government troops are deployed in black townships, it is difficult to envision the lessening of suspicion and a move towards reconciliation and trust. It is not an easy thing to give in, but if the government is genuinely in favor of reform, it will have to contend with much opposition from the right. The right maintains that De Klerk's pronouncements constitute a political sell-out and threatens to take up arms. It will still take some time for whites to accept the new political thinking and relinquish their blind hatred of communism which has been engendered in them all these years by the Nationalist government. They will have to adjust like the white Rhodesians did and forget about the myth of an Afrikaner liberation movement. Their leader, Andries Treurnicht, who is desperately holding on to the past, has remarked that this is the moment of truth for South Africa's whites.

We want to believe that leading political bodies in South Africa are joining the path of negotiation with the realization that each new step toward negotiations will meet with the anger of rightists who cling to the past.

Today South Africa has a golden opportunity to formulate a new and just dispensation that will kill the specter of revolution. Confrontation must be replaced by reconciliation. Peace must be paramount in the minds of all leading bodies in the country. South Africa is tired of fragmented reform. The pace of reform for a new South Africa without discrimination must take on an increased sense of urgency for the sake of the entire nation.

## General Staff Aide on Mi-8 Crash in Ethiopia

*PM1202170590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[N. Burbyga report: "Catastrophe in Skies Over Africa"]

[Text] A Soviet Mi-8 helicopter crashed in Ethiopia 7 February. Our military specialists were on board. IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked Lieutenant General Ye. Smirnov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate, to comment on what happened.

[Smirnov] This happened in the region of the Dire Dawa population center. The helicopter plowed into a mountain in fog. On board at the time were Major General A. Semenov and Senior Lieutenant A. Biryukov, crew members Major S. Yarushnikov, Senior Lieutenants I. Tarasov and P. Klimov, and student V. Voloshchenko, along with 11 Ethiopian citizens. They all perished.

What caused it? It is still difficult to say anything definite. A special commission has flown out to Ethiopia to investigate the causes of the crash.

We sincerely share the grief that has befallen both Soviet and Ethiopian families and express our profound condolences to them regarding this incident.

## East Europe

### 2nd Round of Withdrawal Talks With CSSR Ends

*LD0902142490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] I now will acquaint our listeners with a few of the latest reports to reach our editorial.

We have just been told that the second round of Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations on Soviet military units stationed in the CSSR and their withdrawal ended in Moscow today.

The Soviet side has confirmed its readiness to carry out a complete withdrawal of its troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia.

In the sides' view, the possibility of a substantial proportion of the subunits being withdrawn already before the end of May is real.

### To Continue at Experts Level

*LD0902155890 Prague CTK in English 1506 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow Feb 9 (CTK correspondent)—The first part of the second round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia finished here today. The talks will continue at the level of experts' groups.

The last session of the two delegations brought the positions of the delegations on some points closer to one another. The delegations discussed a Czechoslovak draft agreement, involving dates of departure of the Soviet troops and ways of settling property questions.

The Soviet side said it is prepared to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia completely. The delegations discussed the possibility of withdrawing a substantial part of the troops by the the end of May 1990 and both sides agreed that this step is realistic.

The delegations decided to continue work at the level of experts. A plenary session can be convened upon a proposal of one of the sides at any time.

### Aboimov Quoted on Troop Withdrawal From CSSR

*PM0902174990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[APN political observer V. Markov article: "Troop Withdrawal and Mutual Interests"]

[Text] The Soviet Government to all intents and purposes made the decision to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovak territory by giving its consent to the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks, the second round of which is being held in Moscow. According to preliminary Soviet calculations, up to 60 percent of the troops could be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia during 1990. This was reported during a conversation between APN's political observer and I. Aboimov, USSR deputy foreign minister, who is heading the Soviet delegation at the talks.

As I. Aboimov said, the second round of talks is currently being held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. Both delegations have realized that the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia should be regulated by a special intergovernmental agreement. The working group to draw up the text of such an agreement based on the plans put forward by both sides started work 7 February. Another working group is dealing with the military and technical problems associated with the Soviet troop withdrawal. The Soviet side has given the Czechoslovak delegation detailed information on Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, including the tonnage of the loads to be taken out by the units and subunits, and so forth.

The sides also agreed that questions of a material and property nature would be settled in a separate agreement. Preparations for this accord will begin in the very near future, but it will obviously be concluded after the troop withdrawal agreement is signed.

The key question which is being discussed at the talks concerns the timetable for the final Soviet troop withdrawal. The timetable proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation for a complete Soviet troop withdrawal—by late 1990—seems too tight to the Soviet side. It is hardly compatible with a desire to carry out the operation in an organized fashion. The Soviet side should be concerned to ensure that Soviet servicemen and members of their families are relocated in the USSR as normally as possible, and do not find themselves in extreme conditions.

One has heard it said in Czechoslovakia recently that if Soviet troops could enter Czechoslovakia in 24 hours, why can't they leave within the same period? Every military subunit maintains its readiness to mobilize at the shortest notice. But the withdrawal of such a large formation as the Central Group of Forces, which is deployed in Czechoslovakia, involves not just complex organizational and technical issues. A factor of considerable importance, I. Aboimov noted, is that in order to accept a considerable contingent of servicemen and their family members a considerable amount of preparation will have to be done in the Soviet Union to create the necessary infrastructure not only to house the personnel and combat hardware, but also the families of the officers and warrant officers serving in Czechoslovakia.

There are currently around 16,000 such families in Czechoslovakia, and most of them do not have permanent housing in the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are around 20,000 children in these families, of which approximately half are of school age. That is why we must be concerned to ensure that these children can continue their studies.

Another problem is linked with the limited throughput capacity of Czechoslovakia's Chop railroad junction, through which the bulk of troop trains will have to pass. Both delegations have made corresponding calculations. However, in the Soviet delegation's opinion, the Czechoslovak calculations do not take account of the technical capacity of the Chop transshipment center.

Soviet specialists believe that in order to prevent disruption above all to the normal rhythm of national economic freight shipments, which pass through this station from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries, it would be possible to add no more than four troop trains every 24 hours. But since Soviet troops will be withdrawing from Hungary at approximately the same time, Chop will receive no more than an additional two troop trains from Czechoslovakia every 24 hours. It would hardly be acceptable for the Czechoslovak side for Soviet military hardware deployed in Czechoslovakia to move under its own steam along the country's highways without the relevant preparation.

Bearing in mind this range of problems, the Soviet delegation has stated its readiness to resolve on a mutually acceptable basis all issues connected with the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia in 1990-1991. In order to leave the Czechoslovak side in no doubt about the sincerity of Soviet intentions on this score, even before the signing of the agreement the Soviet Union is prepared to begin in the very near future withdrawing military units drawn from formations which it had been planned to withdraw in May.

As for the demonstrations and rallies in Czechoslovakia timed to coincide with the second round of the talks, during which demands were made for an immediate Soviet troop withdrawal and certain extremists slogans were chanted, the head of the Soviet delegation said:

"We believe that these actions reflect the feelings of only a certain part of society rather than of the entire Czechoslovak people. They can hardly promote the reaching of agreement at the talks.

"The difficulties associated with the Soviet troop withdrawal," I. Aboimov stressed, "in no way mean that we would like to use them to delay the talks or postpone the troop withdrawal. These difficulties are objective and it will take a certain amount of time to overcome them.

"We hope that our arguments will be taken into consideration by the Czechoslovak side," I. Aboimov stated. "I am convinced that the achievement of a mutually acceptable solution is only possible on the basis of mutual consideration for each other's interests and that there should be no place for ultimatums, particularly if we want not only to solve the Soviet troop withdrawal problem but to show concern for future relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia."

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## Vacek Predicts Complete Agreement in Troop Talks

*LD1102033690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] The Czechoslovak mass media are commenting extensively on the preliminary results of the second round of talks in Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia. Our correspondent in Prague, Vladimir Taranov, reports:

[Taranov] Here is the opinion of Evzen Vacek, CSSR deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Czechoslovak delegation at the talks:

[Begin Vacek, in Czech, fading into Russian translation] I believe the two countries will manage to achieve complete agreement on the definitive time limits for the complete and accelerated withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia in the very near future. In this regard, it is essential to stress two important points. First, the Soviet side unambiguously confirmed its decision on the complete withdrawal of its military subdivisions from Czechoslovakia. Second, the withdrawal of Soviet Army combat units will begin in the very near future, and specifically in a few days time, so that by the end of May a significant part of the combat subdivisions will have been withdrawn. [end recording]

We believe the most important thing is the point dealing with the definitive date for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia, concluded Evzen Vacek, CSSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Jiri Dienstbier, Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs, commented on the course of the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks in Moscow. He said the Soviet side continued to substantiate the impossibility of withdrawing all its troops by the end of 1990 by the fact that there are difficult internal social problems in the USSR, and a lack of apartments for the officers and their family members.

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## Havel Cited on Need for U.S. Troop Cuts

*PM0902160790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "Talks Concluded"]

[Text] Prague, 7 Feb—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker has ended a two-day visit to the CSSR. The head of the U.S. foreign policy department was received by CSSR President V. Havel and had talks with the country's Foreign Minister, J. Dienstbier.

According to CTK, much attention was given during J. Baker's meeting with V. Havel to reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. V. Havel emphasized that the Czechoslovak public wishes the earliest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country's territory. In his words, this question will be raised at the forthcoming talks with M.S. Gorbachev. V. Havel also said that, in the context of the expected sizeable reductions of Soviet troops in central Europe, it would be expedient to also reduce the numerical strength of U.S. troops on the European Continent.

The theme of J. Baker's talks with J. Dienstbier was questions concerning the further development of the pan-European process. The sides concluded that the purpose of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be examined in the context of changes in international relations.

### Delay in Pullout Could Affect CSSR Election

*PM0902160390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Old Town Square Seething"]

[Text] Prague—On Tuesday at nightfall thousands of people gathered in Prague's Old Town Square. (There were several hundred of them the day before in Wenceslas Square.) They demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. Powerful loudspeakers had already been set up near the monument to Jan Hus. Regrettably the banners were not always polite: "Ivan go home, Natasha is cheating on you," or "Occupiers! The Kremlin's calling."

Those present adopted a letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposing that Soviet troops be withdrawn by 31 May this year, and that the damage done to Czechoslovakia in connection with the presence of Soviet troops since 1968 be eradicated and compensated for.

The newspaper RUDE PRAVO, organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, featured a report headlined "Bon Voyage" on the rally, which was organized by the Social Democratic Party. The tone of the report was conciliatory, and it was pointed out that "the few suspect shouts were countered by a high assessment of the USSR's participation in liberating Czechoslovakia in 1945."

I asked one of the rally participants why the demonstration had been held if agreement had already been reached in principle and specific talks were under way.

"To support our position," he replied. "And then, I'm not sure that you've already agreed to withdraw..."

The previous evening several hundred young and not-so-young people literally attacked the Soviet Embassy: They climbed on the gates and attempted to attach a Czechoslovak flag and placards to the railings. They indignantly shouted that, in revenge for the demands for a troop withdrawal, our side had allegedly "cut off" oil supplies to Czechoslovakia.

An adviser at the Soviet Embassy went out to the crowd and tried to talk with them. At first they would not let him, then they listened. They were surprised to learn, for instance, that the second round of Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on the question of the presence of troops begins in Moscow Wednesday. They were mistrustful about the assurances that nobody had shut off the oil pipelines or was planning to do so...

The easiest thing is to shrug off such cases and describe them as manifestations of anti-Sovietism. It is clear that there are rumors, that there is ignorance, and that there are passions. These things need to be explained to people. But something else is clear too: Any unjustified delay in withdrawing our troops threatens to grow into hostile feelings on the part of the country's population and will be an effective card in the election struggle.

### Glazunov Views USSR-CSSR Troops Talks

*LD0902153890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] The Czechoslovak news agency has said talks to pull out Soviet troops have been stalemated. Here is an opinion from Viktor Glazunov:

I took the report with a heavy heart. A blind alley is always bad and this one is twice as bad. Recollections of how the Prague Spring was frozen are still giving me a feeling of burning guilt. It has been wise and fair to officially admit that the August 1968 allied action that involved Soviet troops was a political mistake. But Soviet troops are still stationed in Czechoslovakia. When it asked for a total withdrawal this country said yes.

Why have the talks got into a blind alley? Czechoslovakia insists on a troop withdrawal to end before the year is out. It wants one-half of the troops to return home by next June. This country said the notice was too short. It sure is, but it took this country about the same time to withdraw its huge troop contingent from Afghanistan under combat conditions. More general considerations, both military and political, seem to play a role in the Czechoslovak case.

The press in this country has already carried opinions that this country must not rush out troops from Eastern Europe. It argued this could upset military stability on the continent and damage the Vienna talks for reducing conventional armed forces in Europe. You may know that under discussion in Vienna is also the reduction of both Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the American in Western Europe. These weighty views too must be take into account. Nonetheless an agreement to reduce armed forces in Europe will defintely be signed this year. The agreement will provide for reducing both Soviet and American troops. And attempts will be fairly tight as well, so this country will all the same have to withdraw much of the troops from Eastern Europe.

If this is so, is it wise to aggravate relations with Czechoslovakia? Bearing in mind the August 1968 mistakes it is important both morally and politically to meet Czechoslovakia halfway now. A Soviet move of this kind would impress the rest of the world even greater. It would not complicate the Vienna talks as some claim. On the contrary this would only stimulate the talks.

### Envoy Denies Hungarian Maneuvers Report

*LD0902115190 Budapest MTI in English 1040 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 9 (MTI)—Igor Dvurechensky, counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, has given a statement to NEPSZABADSAG.

(As reported, the Thursday issue of NEPSZAVA carried a statement by Colonel Viktor Koreshkov that the Soviet Southern Army Group was going to carry out shooting exercises in the vicinity of Veszprem from February to May. Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati requested the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group not to hold any kind of manoeuvere between February and mid-April, the period of elections and the following government-forming talks, that would involve moving troops from their garrisons.)

The counsellor said, "No kind of military manoeuvre by Soviet troops is planned for the time of the elections in Hungary."

Dvurechensky's opinion about the statement in NEPSZAVA: Col. Koreshkov must not have said such a thing. His words might have been misunderstood. It would be ridiculous for a senior officer of the Southern Army Group to say just the opposite of the HQ statement issued a day before refuting the military manoeuvre. According to the Soviet statement published in Hungarian newspapers on Wednesday, no kind of military manoeure is being held in Hungary with the participation of Soviet troops, and there are no such plans for the months to come. The originally envisaged exercise—as Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth also said—has been postponed and become untimely. The Soviet soldiers only carry out the usual exercises at their garrisons. Any information to the contrary is incorrect, said the counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Budapest.

### Hungarian Socialist Party Criticizes Opposition

*PM0902155190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch: "Another 'Round Table'"]

[Text] Budapest, 7 Feb—A "national forum" of parties opened in parliament today. Last year they assembled twice at "national roundtables" at the initiative of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] to elaborate and agree on ways for peaceful transition to the new model of society. Once more, the "round table" has been convened at the MSZP's initiative.

The republic's Prime Minister M. Nemeth took part in the sitting. The MSZP delegation was headed by its Chairman R. Nyers.

The complex economic and political situation in the country demands consolidation, compromise, and social balance. Any "rocking of the boat," which is already half-full with water as a result of the election campaign struggle between the parties, could end badly. In its latest documents, the MSZP suggests that the opposition is attacking the peaceful transition and is undermining the government's authority.

### Bulgarian Opposition Unwilling To Join Coalition

*PM0902155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "In No Hurry To Become Ministers"]

[Text] Sofia, 7 Feb—Leaders of opposition parties and associations have declared at the "round table" sittings now being held in Sofia that they are unwilling or "find it impossible" to join the present coalition government. This is the position of the Union of Democratic Forces, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, the independent trade union "Support" [Podkrepa], the Radical Democratic Party, and others.

Justifying this decision, Zh. Zhelev, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces, declared that real prerequisites for participation in a coalition government can emerge only after the free general election for the National Assembly, scheduled for May... So they are in no hurry to become ministers. Why? The economic situation in Bulgaria is so complex and social tension is so high that, on joining the coalition government, it will be necessary to also accept responsibility for the country's present and future situation, with society as a witness.

## West Europe

### Kohl, Genscher Stage Two-Day Visit to Moscow

#### TASS Comments on Issues

*LD1002130490 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Kikilo and Sergei Sosnovsky]

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher are arriving in the Soviet Union today. They are expected to hold talks with the Soviet leadership focusing on disarmament issues, bilateral relations, situation in Eastern Europe, as well as relations between the two German states.

The Soviet Union believes that the problem of German unity affects not only Germans and should be solved in the context of existing European and world realities, with due account taken of the interests of other countries and, naturally, the lessons of tragic history. The Soviet leadership did not have in the past and does not have now any problems with the principle of self-determination of the two German states. This is a natural right of the peoples, the right of free choice, to an independent way of development.

At the same time the Soviet Union cannot but be concerned over how the situation in Europe will develop in connection with the process of rapprochement between the two German states. All peoples, especially those in the USSR, should have the right to a guarantee that the threat of war will never again come from German soil.

The Soviet Union took note of the declaration by senior West German politicians on the eve of the visit of the West German leaders, and of Bonn's interest in the forthcoming talks. In particular, attention was paid here to an interview of West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to West German television, in which he expressed the view that the unification of Germany should not compound the position of third countries.

A viewpoint of Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, seems to be realistic. Vogel believes that the visit by Kohl and Genscher should be primarily used to remove mistrust, caused by the position of the FRG chancellor on frontiers in Europe. In a statement released in Bonn, the Social Democratic leader said it was necessary for the chancellor to allay apprehensions of the Soviet leadership concerning the possible threat to the interests of the Soviet Union and other countries from a unified Germany, and to make clear positive impulses for forming a new European world order that can come from the process of rapprochement between the two German states. The chancellor, Vogel said, should reaffirm without any reservations the inviolability of post-war borders in Europe, to take full account of the interests of security of the USSR, to support further radical steps in the field of disarmament and to agree to the prospect for gradual dissolution of the two military blocs as a result of joint actions in the framework of the European process.

## Moscow Radio Reports Arrival

*LD1002145790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] A plane landed at Vnukovo Airport at 1400 today, bringing FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to our country for a working visit in accordance with an agreement. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, federal vice chancellor and foreign affairs minister, arrived with him. The FRG statesmen were met by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and other officials.

The first words that the two countries' statesmen exchanged at the airport already indicated the great mutual interest in this new meeting. Even to non-diplomats, it is clear that a new political situation is taking shape in the center of Europe, the nature of which is largely determined by the two German states—the GDR and the FRG. And, of course, it is not by chance that the visits to the Soviet Union by their heads of government, who have already approved in principle the idea of the creation of a single German state, have come close together in terms of time.

The concept for the sequence of the stages of activity which was proposed by Modrow, head of the GDR Government—a treaty association with confederative elements, a confederation of the GDR and the FRG, and federation or German union—is already known in Moscow. Now it is necessary to have a clear idea of the position of the FRG, because the problem of unification affects the interests of not only Germans.

In Bonn, on the eve of the visit, West German officials stressed during a meeting with journalists that when any decisions are made on this matter, the FRG will take into consideration the interests of the security of the Soviet Union. The chancellor and his deputy have stated, in particular, that they are coming to Moscow with a view to giving assurances to the Soviet leadership on the process, which is gathering pace, of the unification of Germany and on its impact on the balance of military forces.

The Soviet-West German talks are intended to clarify the two sides' positions. A meeting in the Kremlin between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl is expected shortly. But one thing is clear even now. The working visit to the USSR of the head of government of the FRG will serve to strengthen the all-European process in the spirit of the new political thinking.

## Gorbachev Receives Kohl

*LD1002143490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Problems relating to the intra-German process could presumably be one of the main topics in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's conversation with FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who arrived in Moscow today on a working visit with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The meeting of the Soviet leader with the head of the West German Government began an hour ago in the Kremlin.

A new political situation is taking shape in the center of Europe, and the character of this situation is being determined to a great extent by the GDR and the FRG, which have in principle approved the idea of creating a unified German state. It may be presumed that, during the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, views will be exchanged on a wide range of international problems and they will touch upon the whole spectrum of Soviet-West German relations. Whatever the case, it is already clear that this visit will serve to strengthen the all-European process in the spirit of the new political thinking.

A meeting has begun at the same time in the Kremlin between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

### First Gorbachev Meeting Ends

*LD1002175190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1700 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Excerpt] The Soviet head of state, Gorbachev, and Federal Chancellor Kohl have ended their first private talks this evening in Moscow. The foreign ministers of the two countries, Shevardnadze and Genscher, had parallel discussions. The two government delegations are at present meeting in Moscow. A joint dinner is planned afterward, according to agency reports. Kohl and Genscher arrived in the Soviet capital in a special aircraft of the Federal Luftwaffe at noon today. The discussions will deal, above all, with the German question. According to information from the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, Kohl intends to speak with Gorbachev about the speed, as well as the form and manner, of the process of rapprochement between the two German states. [passage omitted]

### Talks Promote European Process

*LD1002181590 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergei Zharkov and Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev had two-hour talks with West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Kremlin, who arrived for a working visit in Moscow in the afternoon today.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met his West German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher also in the Kremlin.

A joint meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev, Helmut Kohl, Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher was also held.

This exchange of views will, undoubtedly, promote the European process in the spirit of new political thinking. Great mutual interest in dialogue can be explained by a new political situation in central Europe whose nature is, largely, determined by the German Democratic Republic and West Germany which have in principle approved the idea of a single German state.

But, the unification problem concerns not only Germans.

Before the current visit, West German officials in Bonn emphasised that in making any decisions on this issue, West Germany would take into account the interests of the Soviet Union's security.

The Moscow talks are expected to clarify the sides' position.

### 'Official Statement' Released

*LD1002205490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1935 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—Here is the full text of the official statement on the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl:

On 10 February, M.S. Gorbachev met Helmut Kohl, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Kremlin. Although this meeting took place in a very different situation, it is directly connected to the results of their previous meetings in Moscow and Bonn, and is based on all the principle provisions, without exception, of the joint Soviet-West German statement signed in June last year. It took place in an atmosphere of deep mutual understanding and trust, reached earlier, on both the political and personal levels.

The times are such, M.S. Gorbachev said, when it is constantly necessary for us to be in contact. And the chancellor is right that everything which needs to be done, must be done proceeding from the spirit and letter of the joint statement.

This was a direct, substantive conversation with complete understanding of the responsibility of the moment and the significance of those decisions which can be taken as a result of such an exchange of thoughts on, and evaluations of, the course of present events.

The discussion proceeded along two channels, corresponding to two objective processes, indissolubly linked to each other. We will solve the German question on the present level only in a context of general European development, taking into account the security and interests of both neighbors and other states in Europe and the world.

M.S. Gorbachev stated—and the chancellor agreed—that there are now no disagreements between the USSR, FRG, and GDR on the question that the unity of the German nation must be decided by the Germans themselves, and they must determine their choice and in what state forms, within what time frame, at what pace, and under what conditions they will realize this unity.

And here M.S. Gorbachev referred to his recent conversation with H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. He specifically stressed that all the Germans, both in the East and in the West, should know this position of the Soviet Union. While solving their national question, however, they should keep in mind the realities: that there was a war and that, along with the post- war period, it has left a legacy. Now we are rethinking all that. We have departed from confrontation, and the European process is developing. And the German rapprochement should not damage the positive results that have already been achieved here; nor should it damage East-West relations in general, or disturb the European balance. On the contrary, M.S. Gorbachev said, it can and should progress in such a way as to contribute to constructive all-European development.

Therefore, only such a policy is acceptable which takes into account all the realities and all the possible consequences: internal political, foreign political, economic, and, of course, the psychological reaction both of the Germans and people of other countries, especially of those which took part in the war.

Solution to the German question is inseparable from success of the talks on disarmament in Europe, from the changing role of the two military and political alliances, and from issues relating to the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of European states.

H. Kohl confirmed the firm resoluteness that had taken shape among Germans: No war will be unleashed from German soil ever again. He even strengthened this formula: "Only peace should emanate from German soil."

The building of German unity, M.S. Gorbachev remarked, and the finding by Germans of a new place in the European and world structure should constantly take into account the fundamental realities of the new times.

I said long ago that a solution to the German question would be a matter for history to decide. And history has gone to work with surprising speed. We must weigh our actions very carefully, taking truly historic criteria into account.

In this new situation, it is necessary to cooperate in such a way that not only is there no violation of the mutual understanding reached at the state level nor any damage done to the new character of relations between the German and the Soviet peoples, but that these relations are developed and enriched.

The conversation partners agreed to continue the extensive, open [otkrytiy], and fruitful one-to-one conversation which had lasted more than two hours and also to hold this conversation in contact with other interested sides, above all with the United States, Great Britain, and France. The dynamic of events persistently requires this.

In rounding-off the main part of the conversation, the chancellor said: We agreed in Bonn that we are opening a new chapter in our relations and it is now clear that the need to cooperate in precisely this spirit has not lessened; it has grown. M.S. Gorbachev, agreeing, noted that at this current and most crucial stage it is extremely important to raise the level of cooperation, to increase confidence, to adhere staunchly to the accords reached, and to turn to one another immediately should the situation so require.

The meeting was then expanded to include E.A. Shevardnadze and H.-D. Genscher, who reported on the parallel discussion held between them. An overall result was given and the view expressed that the visit was most timely and useful. It is important that there be complete clarity between the USSR and the FRG regarding German affairs and on the key problems of European and international politics.

### Gerasimov on 10 Feb Meeting

*LD1002204890 Moscow TASS in English 2033 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—Today's meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl "is evidence of the growing intensity of contacts at summit level, an expression of the sides' desire to observe and fill with constructive contents the programme of joint actions, set out in the Soviet-West German statement of June 13, 1989." Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov made this remark at a news briefing here after today's talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher and a joint 30-minute conversation of the four statesmen.

Summing up their results, the Soviet spokesman said, Gorbachev declared that the "conversations were held in the same spirit of dialogue." "The sides have agreed to cooperate in the name of preserving and extending the atmosphere of trust in order to openly deal with the current problems and open the way into the future," the Soviet leader stressed.

As for the ministers' meetings, Gerasimov continued, it was noted that the policy of new thinking opens "a unique chance for closing the period of confrontation and mistrust, for beginning to overcome the division of Europe and build a common European home, for creating structures that would ensure security and prosperity."

In an exchange of views on German affairs, the Soviet spokesman said further, the Soviet side stressed that a search for ways of rapprochement between the two German states, the elaboration of forms and conditions for realising "the idea of eventual German unity" "calls for special responsibility and circumspection."

It concerns finding such solutions that would meet the interests of the GDR, FRG, the Soviet Union, Germany's neighbours and other European states, "take account of the responsibility of the four powers for German affairs and with regard to West Berlin, or juridical and political realities."

The peoples must have a guarantee that "the threat of war will never come from German soil," that "changes will not lead to the breakdown of the existing balance of forces in Europe," and that "no claims will be made to re-carving the post-war frontiers" in this region, the spokesman said.

Replying to a question, the spokesman agreed that "the process of rapprochement of the two German states outstrips the process of common European cooperation—the Helsinki process."

According to him, this poses "the problem of synchronising these two processes." Therefore, he stressed, "much attention was paid today to speeding up preparations for the summit conference, i.e. Helsinki II." As the West German chancellor said, "We should move simultaneously and try to catch up with the first process while pushing forward the second."

### Kohl Comments on Discussions

*LD1002214990 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 2100 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union will respect a unification of the two German states. State and party leader Gorbachev said in his talks with Federal Chancellor Kohl that it is a matter for the Germans to determine for themselves the time and the path. [passage omitted]

In reply to questions from journalists, Kohl indicated that he and the Soviet head of state assessed differently a possible neutrality for Germany. The chancellor said that Gorbachev had taken note that neutrality does not come into question for the Federal Republic. Kohl said that alliance membership must now be discussed in close coordination with Washington, Paris, and London.

Regarding a time for unification, Kohl said that first the GDR must hold free elections on 18 March. He said, and I quote: And then I think things will go very quickly.

He could not at the present moment say whether the Bundestag elections [scheduled for December 1990] would be postponed. The monetary union that is being sought would greatly accelerate unification. But no one could present a timetable.

Kohl thanked Gorbachev, who had made possible this historic result, and stressed: This is a good day for Germany.

### Kohl Holds News Conference

*LD1002221490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2116 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 11 Feb (TASS)—A new chapter in Soviet-German relations has been opened by the summit meeting, Helmut Kohl, FRG federal chancellor, declared here. He spoke late on Saturday evening [10 February] in Moscow at a news conference on the results of his talks with Mikhail Gorabachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The federal chancellor made a statement in which, inter alia, he stressed that Mikhail Gorbachev and he "agreed that only the German people have the right to decide the question of whether they want to live in one state."

In the statement it also was pointed out that the Soviet leader had assured Helmut Kohl that the Soviet Union would respect the decision of the Germans to live in one state, if such a decision were made, and that the resolution of the issue of time frames and the path to unity depends on the Germans. He and I also agreed on the fact that the German question can only be resolved on the basis of proceeding from realities, remarked Helmut Kohl. Its resolution must be coordinated with the "pan-European architecture" and the common process of development of relations between West and East. It is necessary to take into account the interests of our friends, neighbors, and all our partners in the whole world, he said.

He stressed that on this path the FRG and GDR must act "with circumspection, with an appreciation of the measure of possibility, and with purposefulness." It is very important for the FRG government to discuss these issues with "friends in Washington, Paris, and London," said the chancellor. At the same time he expressed confidence in the fact that together "we will manage to find a common solution,"

"I thank General Secretary Gorbachev for making possible the achievement of this historical result," declared Helmut Kohl. He stated that both sides have agreed to support further close contacts. "This has been a marvelous day for Germany and for me personally," he said.

Answering questions, the chancellor stressed that regarding the issue of the unification of Germany, his government will not act behind the back of the four victorious powers.... "We do not want to pose a threat to the security interests of our neighbors and the disarmament process. Peace must emanate from Germany," he said.

The federal chancellor rejected the idea of the possibility of the "neutrality of a united Germany."

### Kohl Cited on Reunification

*PM1202090990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "H. Kohl Statement"]

[Text] The Soviet-West German summit meeting has marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between the USSR and the FRG; this is how FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl commented on its results to Soviet and foreign journalists. He was speaking at press conference in Moscow late in the evening of 10 February.

The central topic of the conversation between the West German head of government and M.S. Gorbachev was the inter-German process. It is the German people's right to decide whether they wish to live in a single state; this was the common opinion expressed by the Soviet leader and the FRG head of government. H. Kohl announced that the Soviet side's stance was unambiguously stated by M.S. Gorbachev: The USSR would respect this decision if it were made. It is up to the Germans to arrive at an acceptable timing and specific paths to unity.

We were agreed, H. Kohl emphasized, that the entire spectrum of these problems can be resolved only on the basis of existing realities. Consequently, it must be interlinked with the pan-European architecture and the overall process of development of relations between West and East.

The FRG head of government noted that Germans in the GDR and the FRG must continue to act along this avenue with caution and a sense of the limits of what is possible. M.S. Gorbachev and I agreed that the problem of security acquires special importance in this context. Therefore, the chancellor said, membership of the military-political alliances has to be discussed with all interested sides. I am confident that we will manage to find a generally acceptable solution. I am very grateful to M.S. Gorbachev for making it possible to achieve this historic result.

### Foreign Ministers' Meeting

*LD1002205890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1921 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (TASS)—We are transmitting the full text of the official report on the meeting between the USSR and FRG foreign ministers:

"On 10 February E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, met H.-D. Genscher, FRG minister of foreign affairs, who is in the USSR with H. Kohl, the FRG federal chancellor.

The ministers noted with satisfaction that the working meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and H. Kohl, the federal chancellor, testified to the increased intensiveness of contacts at summit level and the wish of the sides to observe and enliven the program of joint action set out in the Soviet-West German statement of 13 June 1989.

It was noted that, as a result of the implementation of the policy of new thinking, a unique chance was opening up to finally put an end to the period of confrontation and mistrust and to begin overcoming the division of Europe, the construction of the common European home, and the creation of structures which would safeguard the security and prosperity of its countries and peoples.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions on German matters. The Soviet side stressed that the search for ways to bring the two German states closer and the working out of forms and conditions for implementing the idea of eventual German unity requires particular responsibility and circumspection. It is a matter of finding solutions which would comply with the interests of both the GDR and the FRG and with the interests of the Soviet Union and the other European states, and which would take into account the responsibility of the four powers involved in German affairs and consider the status of West Berlin, as well as legal and political realities. Peoples should have a guarantee that the threat of another war will never again come from German soil and that the changes under way will not lead to a break in the existing balance of forces in Europe.

They should also be convinced that there will be no claims put forward for a review of the postwar frontiers in Europe.

E.A. Shevardnadze stressed the need to give the people of the GDR the opportunity of effecting its right of choice in a normal situation, without any pressure or outside interference.

It was emphasized that the movement of the GDR and FRG toward one another should be put into effect gradually and synchronized with the development of the Helsinki process. It is important that this should serve to strengthen the stability and security of Europe.

Great attention was given to matters of deepening the all-European process. H.-D. Genscher backed a proposal from the Soviet Union to hold an all-European summit. Such a meeting would, in the opinion of both sides, facilitate working out a view on the future architecture of Europe common to both East and West, further substantial lessening of military confrontation, strengthening of confidence, and the advance of disarmament.

The ministers examined the state of affairs at the Vienna talks on conventional weapons in Europe and stated their intention to promote in all possible ways their being most rapidly concluded by specific and weighty results. This would create preconditions conducive to a transition to the second phase of the Vienna talks.

The ministers spoke in favor of extending economic, scientific, and technical links between the states of Eastern and Western Europe, giving great significance to intensifying these links and to the removal of all barriers and restrictions still in existence. The economic forum which is to be held in Bonn in March and April is designed to be a new step on this road.

The progress of implementing the accords reached during Soviet- West German summits was examined, as were some practical matters of bilateral relations."

### West Germans Depart 11 Feb

*LD1102102390 Moscow TASS in English 1008 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 11 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl left the Soviet Union today upon completion of his working visit to this country. He was acompanied by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

At Moscow's Vnukovo Airport, Kohl and Genscher were seen off by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials.

## TASS Cites Analyst on German Unification

*LD0902132490 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—"The two German states' rapprochement must be synchronised with the process of creating a new system of European security. An early convocation of 'Helsinki-2' is very important—it is bound to focus on the German issue. It concerns not only Germans, after all. It is a European, even a world problem," says Aleksandr Tolpegin, analyst of the weekly "ZA RUBEZHOM," in the seventh issue of the magazine, which went on sale today.

Analysing the current situation in the two German states, the author notes that the "German Democratic Republic is living through a grave socio-political and economic crisis. The command and administrative system is being scrapped and democratic, humane values are being restored. On the other hand, there are also certain negative phenomena.

The exodus of skilled labor to the FRG is continuing. More than 58,000 people emigrated from the GDR in January. This jeopardises not only the national production programme, but daily worsens the people's living conditions, which, in turn, prompts more people to leave the Republic. Many people in the GDR believe that the only way out of the vicious circle is to merge the two German states."

Tolpegin stresses that "leading politicians on the other side of the border apparently no longer see any obstacles to reunification and call for its urgent implementation. They do not deem it necessary to 'respect GDR statehood,' but simply propose to extend the powers of the FRG Constitution to a neighbouring republic."

The author says that many Western politicians realise full well the undersirable consequences of such a course. He quotes Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who said that Germany's reunification should proceed at a pace that will leave time to settle many problems, otherwise it may lead to complete distabilisation.

Noting that there should be no haste in the solution of the German problem, Tolpegin stresses that all sides concerned—the GDR, West Germany and four victorious powers, responsible for German affairs, as well as other participants of the European process—should act concertedly and take joint decisions. "It is important to seek and find a balance of interests in the German issue, just as in the discussion of other international problems. The implementation of the German people's national aspirations should not create a situation in which other nations feel uneasy about their future," Tolpegin writes.

The author believes the borders issue should be made absolutely clear. "By signing the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, as well as the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, West Germany has recognised the integrity of post-war borders. Nevertheless, Bonn claims the Federal Republic has no right to speak for the future all-German government. The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court that the German Reich continues to exist de jure within the borders of 1937 remains in force," he notes.

There is yet another important question—that of the attitude of the two German states, and later of a reunited Germany, to the existing military-political blocs. The concept advocated by Hans Modrow, head of the GDR Government, envisages the military neutrality of both German states during the federation's formation. Furthermore, the Party of Democratic Socialism insists on Germany's demilitarisation. However, these ideas were turned down by the FRG and other Western powers as "infeasible." Some politicians propose instead to incorporate all of Germany into NATO. "But such an approach is unacceptable in pinciple for the USSR and its allies," the analyst says.

Tolpygin concludes that "both German states should apparently remain members of the corresponding blocs and should discharge assumed commitments. But the blocs themselves should be turned from military-political to mainly political alliances. At the same time, it is necessary to step up the disarmament talks and to achieve a radical reduction of conventional armaments in Europe, including in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany."

## Kornilov Opposes United Germany in NATO

*LD0902190990 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Commentary by TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov]

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrive in Moscow on Saturday [10 February]. The Western, above all West German, press continues to discuss the visit, dwell on the problem of the unification of two German states, ponder the stand of the Soviet side.

The Soviet Union's principled stand is well-known. It remains unchanged. The striving of people in the German Democratic Republic and West Germany for rapprochement and interaction is understood in the USSR.

We are convinced that the question of German national unity can be solved in the framework of the European process, within the common European home.

The Soviet side is prepared for serious, constructive and substantive discussion of various legal, political, economic and military aspects of the problem.

In view of this it is important to hold the Helsinki-2 conference earlier. The German question will undoubtedly be debated there.

It is still difficult to predict how the bilateral and multilateral dialogue will develop. Various alternatives might be suggested, various proposals and models discussed.

It should be emphasised that the Soviet Union and other European countries are not indifferent to the place that is assigned to a united Germany in the military-political structures existing in Europe.

In this connection there is concern that some in Bonn and in other capitals, on the eve of Kohl's and Genscher's visit to Moscow, continue to suggest a political scheme in accordance with which a united Germany would be a NATO member. The Soviet public cannot understand and accept such plans.

Some in the West, also at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, have been suggesting that a united Germany will be a NATO member, but NATO troops and armaments will not be deployed on the territory which is now German Democratic Republic.

This version, which some Western news organisations try to present almost as a concession to Moscow, can hardly be viewed as constructive and realistic.

It does not create reliable guarantees that German unity will not become a source of threat to the security of other countries.

The growing striving of Germans for unity, for life within a single state, is an undoubted fact and we in Moscow are for the creation of united Germany. But we wish it to be truly peaceful and democratic. We want it to be a country that would not threaten its neighbours and would become an important and durable link in European and universal security.

## FRG Seen Aiming at 'Annexation' of GDR

*PM1202094990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4*

[Own correspondent Ye. Grigoryev dispatch: "'Unplanned' Visit"]

[Text] Bonn, 9 Feb—Back in January, FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl spoke at a news conference of his intention to continue the dialogue with the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, no one here thought that this would happen so soon.

So the report of the chancellor's visit to Moscow scheduled for this Saturday and Sunday came as quite a surprise in Bonn. The West German side took the initiative for the meeting. H. Kohl attaches "key significance" to it, as the entire press here points out. It is based on a desire to discuss with the Soviet leadership the problem of German unification and the associated questions of European security—an understandable and natural desire. It reflects, in particular, the new atmosphere of relations among European states, when complex and vitally important questions are becoming the subject of exchanges of opinions and talks. The chancellor will be accompanied by FRG Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher.

Government circles are pointing out that the trip to Moscow is perceived under the sign of the fact that relations with the Soviet Union are of central significance to the FRG, while the Soviet side has repeatedly noted the FRG's key role in European affairs.

The aforesaid circles also name Soviet-West German relations as another package of questions in connection with the upcoming meeting in Moscow. Here they emphasize their total adherence to the existing accords and agreements between our countries, particularly the joint statement signed last year, and also express their desire and readiness to comprehensively develop cooperation and to surmount the difficulties of the Soviet economy. A third group of questions named as a subject for dialogue relates to problems of European security and the all-European process.

This week has seen the creation of a government "German Unity" committee headed by the federal chancellor. Within its framework the corresponding ministers have been entrusted with the practical elaboration of questions of financial union with the GDR, the implementation of economic reform there, the future state structures, and so forth. The "treaty community" idea proposed by the GDR Government and accepted by Bonn has now been discarded. Many signs attest that the West German Government is taking a line toward the accelerated formation of conditions and structures resembling not so much the unification of two equal states as the FRG's annexation of the GDR.

It is being pointed out here that the West German leaders see it as their first task to "reassure" Moscow with regard to their intentions on the German question. It has to be said that outwardly Bonn's reasoning appears quite logical. The point is that the mass resettlement of Germans from the GDR to the FRG is really continuing. They totaled 58,000 during January. This is causing serious economic and social difficulties in both the GDR and the FRG. "Stay home" appeals have not yet met with a response. According to descriptions here, the GDR is collapsing; the pressure among its population for reunification is assuming an extraordinary nature and is building up like an avalanche; and there is said to be nothing left for Bonn to do but to seek a way out by means of accelerated decisions toward unification. "Kohl intends," DIE WELT writes, "to emphasize the urgency of the problem and the constructive nature of Bonn's position."

This is the leitmotiv. Nevertheless, not everyone in the FRG shares it. First, this is because, despite the radical change in the situation in the GDR and the opening of its border with the FRG, the numerous material privileges for settlers, which attract many people, have not yet been abolished here. Second, the opposition is criticizing the government for doing virtually nothing to effectively assist the GDR economy and population over the last few months, even though it has virtually unlimited potential for doing so. Let us also mention something which people here prefer not to talk about—namely, the fact that brazen interference by FRG political forces in GDR internal affairs, and especially in the election campaign now under way there, could not and cannot help stabilize the situation in the GDR.

The orientation toward early German unification brings up the most complex question concerning the future status of a united Germany. This perturbs and alarms everybody. It is hard to find any other problem with the same international aspect. Each of the two German states belongs to a different military-political alliance. It is well known that GDR head of government H. Modrow proposed neutrality for both states along the path to unity. But this is rejected here. Instead, the concept of united Germany belonging to NATO is being promoted. A whole range of people here are declaring that such an approach is incompatible with the fundamental interests of security in Europe, including the Soviet Union, and virtually blocks the way to the unification of the two German states. The following reservation/amplification is advanced in Bonn in this context. It is said that, even in the event of NATO membership, the part of Germany which is now GDR territory would not be part of that bloc's sphere.

One of the options also envisages the possibility of Soviet troops' remaining on what is now GDR territory for a certain transitional period. At the same time, there are rumors about guaranteeing nonextension of "NATO territory" to other Warsaw Pact states. All this is described in the press as the "Genscher Plan" and is depicted as a construction capable of taking into account the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and, subsequently, and within the framework of pan-European development, even leading to "suprabloc structures" and a "partnership in stability." It is obvious that this topic is also part of Bonn's diplomatic disposition before the Moscow talks.

## FRG Providing Financial Aid for Foodstuffs

*LD1002233790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1222 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Bonn, February 9 (TASS)—As reported today by Hans Klein, an FRG official government spokesman, the Bonn Cabinet made a decision to provide the USSR with free financial aid to the sum of DM220 million. This money will be used in countries of the European Community to purchase 142,000 tonnes of foodstuffs, above all meat, which will be supplied to the USSR in the next 10 weeks.

As stressed by H. Klein, Bonn believes this aid to be an expression of "good and reliable relations of good-neighborliness between the two countries in a spirit of the joint statement signed during M.S. Gorbachev 's visit to the FRG in June last year. [no closing quotation mark as received]

## Medvedev Continues Visit to Great Britain

### Addresses UK Scientists

*LD0902175190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Yuriy Petrov, newsreader] And now to news from abroad. A meeting took place in Great Britain between the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, headed by Comrade Medvedev, and English scientists.

[D. Biryukov, correspondent] Having also discussed those difficulties which our restructuring is encountering and plans for overcoming them, Comrade Medvedev stressed that nothing would be possible without the common platform that is called the new political thinking, and this refers to both domestic and foreign policy. It was especially noted that the Soviet Union is not renouncing its ideology, and intends as formerly, to be a mighty world power. But, precisely on the basis of the new political thinking, no military threat will ever emanate for anyone from the side of the USSR, and no attempts will be made to impose one's views by force. [video shows V.A. Medvedev and Member of Parliament D. Howell on the platform in a Chatham House function room; Medvedev is making a speech]

Immediately after the official speech and questions from the scientists, a news conference for journalists took place. The leading British media was represented there. [vidoe shows Medvedev speaking at news conference]

Before the meeting at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev and the other members of the delegation visited Highgate Cemetery, where a wreath was laid at the grave of Karl Marx. The inscription on the ribbon read: An expression of deep respect of the founder of a fundamentally new direction in philosophical thought. [video shows Medvedev, USSR Ambassador Zamyatin, and other delegation members at a cemetery; Medvedev lays wreath at Marx tomb]

### Holds London News Conference

*PM0902192190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 First Edition p 5*

[TASS report under the general heading "USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation Visit to Britain Continues"]

[Text] A press conference has been held by V.A. Medvedev, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation.

Opening the press conference, M. Marshall, chairman of the British Interparliamentary Union [IPU], noted that there was a frank exchange of opinions between the Soviet and British parliamentarians. It is necessary to note one distinguishing feature which typified our talks, he said. This is that, in the spirit of the IPU's long-standing traditions, we avoided discussing the question of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, because a more favorable atmosphere has now emerged, and we focused our attention on other issues which elected organs of power are designed to deal with.

At the press conference a statement by the Soviet delegation was distributed. The statement noted, in particular, that the meetings with the British leadership—above all, with Mrs. M. Thatcher—and the discussions with Westminster colleagues had reaffirmed the fundamental commonality of views on the nature of international processes and the need to deepen their positive dynamics. We were once again convinced of the historic justification for the overall conclusion that the protracted "cold period" is giving way to a peaceful phase in international relations, in whose structure our two countries will undoubtedly play a notable part. We agreed that this would be the subject matter for the bilateral contacts planned for this year, including another Soviet-British summit.

V.A. Medvedev then answered journalists' questions.

Question: The CPSU has expressed its readiness for dialogue with those political forces which observe the country's Constitution. This is a socialist constitution, and, if there is a multiparty system in your country, will you only recognize socialist parties, or will parties of a different persuasion be allowed?

Answer: The document adopted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum states that the CPSU, in implementing its policy, explaining it, and campaigning for the people's support, is prepared to enter into a dialogue and partnerships with other political forces and movements. There is nothing fundamentally new about that, since, both in previous practice and currently, the Communist Party closely cooperates with a number of traditional and newly emerged organizations. So it is a question of deepening this practice and conducting it in accordance with the further development of the political process in our country. As for other parties and movements, the future law on social organizations, which is now at the examination stage, will define the demands to be made of such political organizations when they are registered and recognized. These will be the most general demands to exclude any whipping up of interethnic strife, calls for violent demonstrations against the constitutional system, and so forth. As for ideological questions, the party is already conducting discussions—and, if you like, a campaign—on them. And it will continue to conduct this campaign, but within the framework of the Constitution and those laws which will make the Constitution specific.

Question: Can you foresee a time when cooperatives and private enterprises will publish books?

Answer: Publishing will be regulated by a law on the press, which is currently being examined by the supreme organs of state power. This law will entitle state, social, and cooperative organizations to set up presses and publishing houses. One version of the law envisages entitling individual citizens to set up press organs. There is also another version without this right. This is a question which will be and is being discussed by our society. The Supreme Soviet will make a final decision taking this into account.

Question: The CPSU Central Committee has decided that republic parties will no longer exist. What would the CPSU do if a republic Communist Party announced that it was breaking away?

Answer: The Central Committee has not decided that republic parties will no longer exist. We have republic parties. Each republic has its own party organization operating with the rights of an independent party but within the framework of the single CPSU and with a single set of statutes and a single program. Moreover, the party Central Committee Plenum embarked on the path of considerably expanding the powers of union republic parties, envisaging the possibility that they could all have their own programs to take into account ethnic and historical features, the specific conditions of their economic development, and so forth. But, naturally, on the condition that this program does not contravene the program of the CPSU as a single party. Concerning the situation with the Lithuanian Communist Party, which has decided to exist outside the CPSU, the plenum adopted a resolution disapproving this step. At the same time, taking into account the Lithuanian Communists' major actions to democratize and reform the party, we called on them to weigh their decision once more. The main questions which gave rise to doubts, and on which the arguments in favor of leaving the CPSU and setting up an independent Communist Party were based, were essentially resolved in the document adopted by the party Central Committee Plenum. Moreover, I should say that the documents put forward by the Lithuanian Communists, who have proclaimed the independence of their party, still state that they are maintaining ideological unity with the CPSU and are prepared to cooperate with the CPSU. So this is not a simple question. It is in the process of discussion, and the future will show how it will be resolved. The gist of the Central Committee's decision is that it called on Lithuanian Communists to take into account the real process of the transformation of the CPSU, to remain within the CPSU, to choose delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and to continue to participate in the CPSU's work.

Question: Do you think that the CPSU, having abandoned its monopoly on power, has avoided the fate of communist parties in East Europe?

Answer: Yes, it is a question of abandoning a monopoly on power. But this does not mean that the CPSU is abandoning the struggle for the ruling party's position. Political parties exist to struggle for political power, and not by using methods that rely on the constitutional enshrining of certain special rights, but by using democratic methods—methods of political struggle. If we compare the situation in the Soviet Union with the position in other socialist countries, then, thanks to the fact that we started perestroyka in 1985 and have plowed up major layers of our life, illuminated them, revealed problems, and embarked on their resolution, we have averted a large explosion and turned the process into a controllable reaction. But this is just an opportunity which will have to be grasped using the methods of practical politics and taking people's feelings into account. I think that we have avoided a serious outcome and gained an opportunity to control the development of events and move steadily, and also rapidly, without any delay toward the new state which we call humane and democratic socialism. Wherever this process is artificially held up or wherever it has been accompanied by antidemocratic and authoritarian leadership methods, it has led to major explosions and extremely serious consequences, which do not form part of the concept of democracy.

Question: Do you think that the next Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] session in Paris will approve the West German initiative to lift the ban on high-technology exports to the Soviet Union?

Answer: I think that the entire Cocom system is part of yesterday; it was a result of the mentality and politics of yesterday. And the longer that system is maintained, the slower the new order in the world will develop, and the slower the principles of new political thinking—which we support—will be implemented. It is not just that access to certain scientific and technical achievements is restricted. There is also the sociopolitical aspect. This does not promote the organization of normal relations.

Question: Glasnost has promoted the expression of political aspirations faster than perestroyka has been able to provide for economic needs. What short-term measures are planned with a view to filling store shelves with goods?

Answer: We are ready and would like to increase our imports of high-technology products from various countries, including Britain. But, unfortunately, we are forced for the time being to buy large quantities of more prosaic goods abroad. And that's our problem. We are still forced to buy grain and other agricultural products. And that problem needs to be solved as quickly as possible. Only after this will we be able to buy the most modern industrial products from the West, even though we ourselves are planning to rapidly build up output produced by the electronics industry and other sectors. The country's foreign currency balance is quite tight. We have suffered large losses in our oil exports. They are calculated at R7 billion to R8 billion rubles for the year. That's a lot. In general we have plenty of foreign trade problems. I must say that probably the most interesting and important sphere of the development of economic relations is not only the trade in high-technology products, but trade in technology itself and collaboration in this sphere. In this area, despite the major currency difficulties, we are prepared to engage in very extensive cooperation right away. And we are doing this, not least of all with Britain.

Question: It is said that perestroyka is borrowing many things from other countries. What, in your view, out of all you have seen here in Britain, would not suit the Soviet Union?

Answer: That's an unusual question, and it prompts me to criticize something in Britain. But I would currently prefer to state what we do like, what does suit us, and what we do need. If it is a question of political experience, we have repeatedly said that our young, emerging, and very excitable parliamentary democracy needs to be considerably reinforced with experience. And in this area, of course we are prepared to learn a very great deal from you.

### Speaks on Perestroyka

*PM0902214790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
*10 Feb 90 First Edition p 5*

[TASS report under the general heading "USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation Visit to Britain Continues"]

[Text] London, 9 Feb—The program of the visit to Britain by the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was diverse and busy.

The delegation leader spoke at one of the oldest and most prestigious centers for research into world politics—London's Royal Institute of International Affairs. Addressing the prominent British public figures, politicians, political scientists, historians, and journalists—many of whom are professionally involved in studying the processes taking place in the USSR—present in the auditorium, he said, in particular:

The experience of perestroyka and the difficulties, problems, and contradictions which have emerged in the course of its practical implementation convincingly show that the deeper the transformations, the more serious and comprehensive the theoretical substantiation of a policy must be. Having carefully and objectively analyzed the path taken by the country and its current condition, the CPSU concluded that the social system that emerged in the country at previous stages—a system that made it possible through immense effort and self-denial to get out of economic backwardness and create a relatively strong material potential—could not ensure the necessary dynamism under present-day conditions. And we are not talking about some individual shortcomings in this area, but of an ossified economic management and political system and dogma-driven ideology which preserved the state-administrative model of early socialism.

Lenin came to the conclusion, based on the experience of "war communism," that socialism cannot be built through state coercion. He saw the way to neutralize authoritarian tendencies as lying in democratization, the development of economic accountability and commodity-money relations, and the involvement of the broad people's masses in the creation and running of the new society. Stalinism put a stop to democratic trends in the country's development. In the thirties a different vision of socialism—Stalin's vision—was implemented, the most typical characteristics of which were the total immobilizing [ogosudarstvleniye] of the economy and of all social life, the bureaucratization of the party, the suppression of democracy and glasnost, and mass reprisals. In short, the features of totalitarianism noticed by Orwell—with whose works Soviet readers are now able to familiarize themselves—became increasingly evident on the face of society.

We have bid farewell to many illusions, scholastic impressions, and Stalin-style pseudosocialist dogmatizing; we have abandoned the view of people as a tool of pragmatic state policy; we have abandoned our view of the world as an arena of implacable confrontation between two social systems; and we have abandoned the primitive concept of socialism as a uniform social system for all time and for all peoples. We have given up the narrow class approach and the absolutism of class interests, and we advocate the priority of common humanist values. We have realized that many economic mechanisms, political theories and structures, moral imperatives, and philosophical concepts which used to be seen as fallacious merely because they were labeled bourgeois, are actually achievements for all civilization. We are turning to world socialist thinking and seeking a rational kernel in the work of Georgiy Plekhanov, the work of the Fabian socialists, and in the platforms of the parties of the Socialist International. We are turning to the far-sighted ideas of outstanding contemporary scientists—Einstein, Rutherford, Russell, Kapitsa, and Sakharov—who were the first to show that in the thermonuclear age all mankind faces Hamlet's question: "To be or not to be?"

Perestroyka is not a departure from socialism, as conservative critics of the renewal policy in our country and certain analysts abroad are trying to convince us. It is a transition from an authoritarian state model of society to democratic and human socialism geared to people. We in no way intend to abandon all that is positive in our own experience. Perestroyka does not mean rebuilding.

We do not accept the nihilistic writing off of all our democratic and revolutionary legacy, which dates back to the peasant uprisings against serfdom, the Decembrists who opposed Tsarist tyranny in 1825, the populists of the 19th century, the legacy of the titans of Russian social thinking and literature, Russian social democracy, and the national liberation movements of our country's peoples.

We have the ideals and spiritual strength of our October 1917 revolution, the steadfastness, labor, valor, and courage of generations of Soviet people who turned the country into a world power and who defended their independence—both during the civil war, when our two countries fought on different sides of the frontline, and in World War II, when we were together. We have the people's creative energy, and we have their faith in the future.

The philosophy of perestroyka is largely based on freeing the fundamental values worked out by such outstanding thinkers as Marx, Engels, and Lenin from dogmatism. The genuine legacy of the great thinkers is not dogma, and we do not approach that legacy as an infallible and frozen teaching. It is above all a method of cognition; it is the ability to sensitively appreciate and translate into specific policy the interests and needs of the broad people's masses.

We remain Communists, reviving the Marxist approach by which communism is not a state to be established within a certain period, nor an abstract speculative scheme into which—as if into a "Procrustean bed"—we have to drive a living society and actual social progress itself. We do not need picturesque snapshots of a beautiful future, but a definition of general guidelines and leading trends which prevent us from losing our perspective amid the hurly-burly of current affairs. Our new vision of socialism is a kind of compass on a ship whose sails are being buffeted by the winds of a new life; it is the fruitful experience of all the best that world civilization has to offer.

The socialist idea, as we understand it, is first and foremost the idea of freedom in its broadest sense—extending from an economic structure ensuring the combination of individual and social interests, to the spiritual elevation of the individual, goodness, order, honesty, and conscientiousness in human relations.

The main criterion governing the socialist nature of a society is its attitude not to people in the abstract, but to working people and their interests and needs. Socialism is also a social system which affirms the labor principles of life, frees working people from exploitation and oppression, places them at the center of social life, and creates conditions for the free development of each to be the condition for the free development of all.

Socialism is also the rejection of the use of force or the threat of force in the international arena. It stands for respect for every people's right to determine their own destiny independently, without outside coercion.

The definition of the outlines of the new concept of socialism and the interpretation of social processes and moods in the country have served as the theoretical basis for the perestroyka policy. The main conclusion to which life has led us—and it is impossible to outwit life—boils down to the following: In order for socialism to acquire a new quality it needs not partial change but a radical transformation of the entire social system.

These ideas have determined the party's activity since 1985. They have now become a concrete action program whose draft has just been adopted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The philosophical core of perestroyka and the starting point and purport of its policy is man, the person, the individual. We have advocated the resolute humanization of social relations, the abrupt reorientation of the economy and policy to people's needs, and the assertion of the principles of social justice.

Labor is the father of social wealth, and therefore of people's prosperity. We are striving to expand the conditions for creative work and for all members of society to reveal their skills, aspirations, enterprise, and talent, to earn unlimited income on that basis, and to acquire with it the goods they need.

We oppose the sentiments which are quite widespread in our society of universal leveling and parasitism on the part of able-bodied people at the state's expense. We oppose the ideology and mentality of equality in poverty and attempts to increase one's own share of the social pie irrespective of one's personal labor contribution. One of the foundations of social justice is the differentiation of people's material status on the basis of the results of their labor, the suppression of unearned income, and, at the same time, the eradication of unjustified privileges for the bureaucratic elite and a number of other social categories.

By encouraging enterprise, we are trying—despite all the economic difficulties and the budget deficit—to find ways to expand social guarantees for all those who are unable to work properly and need public support. We see our prime task as being to help millions of people to rise above the poverty line and make a decent life for themselves.

In the economic sphere our strategic line is the transition from a bureaucratic and excessively centralized system to a socialist system of commodity production. The main components in the country's new economic system should be the diversity of forms of ownership and economic management, and healthy state-regulated competition between producers. In the discussions raging in the USSR about ownership problems, the party leadership upholds the idea of the equality of diverse forms of ownership—state ownership administered on a democratic footing by working people themselves; collective and cooperative ownership, including proportional, share, and joint-stock ownership; and private ownership, if it is based on individual labor and rules out exploitation.

One other central question of economic perestroyka is the formation of a socialist regulated market. We favor its phased formation, which will require painstaking work to restructure finances, credit, and price formation. The role of centralized planning is changing fundamentally too.

Our country can no longer remain aloof from the world economy and technological breakthroughs in the third millennium. We advocate dismantling the "iron curtain" which still impedes the normal circulation of ideas, technology, goods, and capital investment.

The success of these economic and social transformations could be guaranteed to a considerable extent by the depth of reform in the political system. It should be noted that we have already gone far further in the political sphere than we have in the economy. Glasnost, the growing freedom of the press, and freedom of information have been powerful factors in the renewal of our society. Thousands of unofficial organizations have emerged to immeasurably expand the political spectrum of social activeness. Freedom of conscience is becoming a legal reality. We will consistently implement the principle of the division of power.

Noting that political reform in our country is inconceivable without radically changing the Communist Party's role, V.A. Medvedev stressed that the CPSU is called upon to assert its leadership every day in free and honest competition with other political forces, and to demonstrate in practice the grounds for its approaches to the life of the country and the people. Renewing the Communist Party means profoundly democratizing intraparty relations as well. We are leaving behind the view of the party as a hierarchical, strictly centralized organization operating on orders from above. Full freedom of opinion in discussing all problems is guaranteed, as is the opportunity to shape alternative political platforms, to hold referendums, and to respect the rights of minorities. The independence [samostoyatelnost] of union republic communist parties and other party organizations is being resolutely expanded. The entire system of electing the CPSU's leading organs is being changed.

The long-overdue transformation of federative relations is becoming particularly urgent in the tragic light of the bloody conflicts that have flared up on ethnic grounds. The present situation in the sphere of interethnic relations has longstanding historical roots, many of which go back to before the revolution. We are essentially having to pay off old bills.

Today it is exceptionally important to meet the interests of ethnic development halfway. There is only one restriction in this area—the interests of one people should not be set against the interests of another. Our party considers it necessary to elaborate a legislative mechanism for implementing ethnic rights, including a union republic's right to secede from the USSR. In recognizing this right, we do not confuse it with the question of the expediency of secession and we openly state that we advocate retaining an integrated, renewed, and real federation in the interests of all the peoples inhabiting it. In our approach to ethnic problems we proceed on the basis that human rights come above ethnic rights.

In conclusion, V.A. Medvedev said: I can firmly assure you that perestroyka is serious and for the long term. It is not a tactical maneuver, but our principled policy line in domestic and international affairs. We really want a strong country and a strong economy, but this desire is not a threat to other states. Quite the contrary. A flourishing Soviet Union as one of the guarantors of European, Asian, and world stability included in the system of a new humanistic world order—that position on the part of our country is in line with the interests of the whole planet.

We know that abroad perestroyka has far more friends than opponents. We value the support given by the British public and official circles for the main avenues of our political course. The growing mutual understanding between our two countries and peoples is paving the way to the development of mutually advantageous relations and cooperation in the economy, culture, and in solving acute political and global problems.

We are fully resolved to see the perestroyka we have initiated through to the finish. The guarantee of our success is the intellectual and spiritual wealth of our people and their resolve to prevent a return to the past and to strive for the implementation of the goals of perestroyka.

### Leads Delegates on Wales Visit

*LD1002232490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Video report on the visit to Wales of Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by D. Biryukov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The first day of the delegation's stay in Wales has started with a visit to a main enterprise of the British Steel Corporation in Llanwern. The works' managers spoke on how very high technological standards have been attained, enabling the enterprise not only to be competitive but also, to a degree, to dictate their conditions to the consumers. After visiting the shops, trade union leaders of the works in Llanwern met the Soviet parliamentarians in the same room where representatives of the management had spoken about the enterprise's achievements. The conversation was intended to be frank, and both the questions from the visitors and answers to them showed that. On the whole, it was a useful exchange of information and not an attempt to prove that somebody has a monopoly on truth and knows the only right approach to solving complex technological and everyday problems. [video of Medvedev, Shmelev, and others at meetings with managers and trade union leaders]

The visitors were expected, too, at the next point where their program took them. Perhaps, for the first time in slightly over 900 years, our red Soviet flag was hoisted on the turret of an ancient castle in Cardiff. At the castle, the Soviet parliamentarians met their colleagues who are to familiarize them with their work in Welsh constituencies. No doubt, this will be a useful exchange of views. The visitors made an entry in the castle book for guests of honor. So far, the Russian language has been a rarity here. [video of Medvedev and delegation welcomed by the mayor at the castle; Medvedev writing in the guest book]

### Meets Welsh Secretary of State

*LD1002221890 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Cardiff February 10 TASS—Current Soviet-British relations and ways to extend links between the Soviet Union and Britain in various fields were discussed by Vadim Medvedev, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, and Secretary of State for Wales Peter Walker. A lunch was given in honour of the Soviet guests.

The delegation visited various election districts of Wales, met deputies of British Parliament from these districts, was told about their work with voters, exchanged views on the place and role of MPs in tackling the socio-economic problems of the population. Meetings and conversations with British voters, local authorities, journalists and the public were also held.

### Appraises Trip's 'Candid Talk'

*LD1102095990 Moscow TASS in English 0937 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[By TASS special correspondents Yuri Levchenko and Vladimir Shishlin]

[Text] Cardiff February 11 TASS—"The present political meaning of the visit to Britain allows us to sum up some results and appraise what has been done over a short time to develop the rich potential of cooperation between our countries," Soviet Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev told TASS, sharing his impressions of the visit. He heads the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet now visiting in Britain.

"In going to London, we hoped to conduct a thorough analysis of the tendencies in world politics and were prepared for the most candid talk on our perestroyka.

"It was important for us to compare our viewpoints with the major European power exactly today, at the watershed period of history, to look where we can expand interaction on issues which are crucial to the future of human civilisation," Medvedev stressed.

"These hopes have largely been realised. The meetings with British leaders, primarily with Margaret Thatcher, discussions with colleagues in Westminster Palace have confirmed that we hold a common view of fundamental issues and the need to deepen their positive dynamics.

"We saw for ourselves one more time that the general conclusion about the protracted period of the cold war giving place to a peace stage in international relations, in the structure of which our two countries undoubtedly hold an important place, is historically warranted," Medvedev said.

"We agreed that this thrust will underline bilateral contacts planned for this year and the new Soviet-British summit."

"I cannot fail to note the strong interest which everything related to perestroyka continues to evoke in the West. We witnessed this on many occasions during our meetings here. We spoke about current transformations, without concealing difficulties and also without dramatising the situation because there are no grounds for apocalyptical forecasts.

"Certainly, economic problems, the aggravation of interethnic relations, and the pace of the reform of the political system call for thought-out decisions, weighed-up and stage-by-stage moves to prevent the destabilisation of society with all ensuing unpredictable consequences, which are dangerous not only to us.

"From this point of view we clarified the meaning of the results of the just-ended Soviet Communist Party Plenum and the decisions of an exceptional importance which were adopted by it.

"Among the important goals of our visit was to develop and deepen the practice of inter-parliamentary interaction. We pay maximum attention and time to this. We have discussed a wide spectrum of issues of frank debates with members of the British Parliament.

"New political thinking in East-West relations was the topic of the roundtable at the London conference hall named after Queen Elizabeth the Second. At the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament we exchanged views on prospects for building a common European home.

"In addition, we have learnt a good deal of positive things for ourselves when familiarising, although briefly, with the activity of the House of Commons. We hope to use them in the activity of our legislative body as well, only applied to our conditions and pecularities," Medvedev emphasized.

"We are opening anew, as it were, many things for ourselves. I hope that our British colleagues have sensed that they talked with deputies of the new Soviet parliament, young as compared to the British Parliament but already dynamic and sometimes willful," Medvedev said.

In visiting Wales, the Soviet delegation exchanges views on developing trade and the economy and deepening mutually beneficial cooperation, and studies experience in local self-governing and labour organisation.

### Meets British Communists

*LD1102224590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2150 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] London, 12 Feb (TASS)—On 11 February, V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met N. Temple, secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain [CPGB], M. Jacques, member of the CPGB Political Committee, and (K. Mayant), member of the CPGB executive committee. Comrade Medvedev informed the British Communists of the main problems discussed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and of the party platform for the forthcoming CPSU Congress. N. Temple, for her part, spoke about the recent CPGB Congress and about the discussions which are developing in the Communist Party on the main issues of and prospects for its development.

L.M. Zamyatin, ambassador of the USSR in Britain, took part in the conversation.

### Visits Welsh Museum 11 Feb

*LD1102191290 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Cardiff February 11 TASS—Visiting USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev toured a Welsh folk art museum in Cardiff today.

On behalf of the delegates, Medvedev thanked the staff for hospitality and a warm welcome extended to the Soviet parliamentarians in Wales.

Director J. Jenkins said the museum aims to preserve Welsh ancient traditions and culture.

Intensive contacts between Wales and the Soviet Union give an added boost to traditional ties between the Welsh and the Soviet people, he said.

### Comparison—Meeting With MP's

*PM0902163390*

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 9 February 1990 carries in its Single Edition on page 7 a TASS report on a meeting between V.A. Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and members of the British Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee 8 February in London. The PRAVDA item, entitled "Visit Continued," has been compared with the Moscow TASS English item headlined "Meets Members of Parliament," published in the 9 February Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 3, revealing the following variations:

Column two, paragraph one, PRAVDA begins: [Text] The visit to Great Britain by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by V.A. Medvedev, USSR people's deputy and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is continuing.

A meeting took place today between V.A. Medvedev and G. Howe, British deputy prime minister and leader of the House of Commons. During the conversation, possibilities for broadening the bilateral practice of parliamentary exchanges and giving it new forms was discussed. There was also an exchange of opinions on a number of topical questions of European policy.

On the same day, the delegation met members of... (rewording first sentence; adding paragraphs)

Page 42, column one, second full paragraph, sentence one in PRAVDA reads: ...about Europe's future, Medvedev said, one cannot forget... (adding words)

Sixth full paragraph, sentence two in PRAVDA reads: ...are not visualised. It is no joke that two British candidates... (adding words)

Seventh full paragraph, only sentence, PRAVDA ends: ...and universal dialogue. (deleting "Medvedev said." and last five paragraphs)

### Sitaryan Receives Austrian Economic Minister

*LD0802213190 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan today received Austrian Economic Minister Wolfgang Schuessel who is leading the Austrian delegation at the 21st session of the mixed Soviet-Austrian Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

During the meeting the sides discussed trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Austria. The meeting was held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.

The meeting was attended by Soviet Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov and Austrian Ambassador to the USSR Herbert Grubmayer.

### Silayev Meets Italian Industrialist Cantarella

*PM0202113190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received 31 January Fiat Managing Director Cantarella, who has arrived in the USSR with a group of specialists. The group is scheduled to hold talks on implementing the agreement signed in November 1989 between the USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building and Fiat on cooperation in building cars at the Yelabuga plant.

### Frolov Meets L'HUMANITE's Leroy in Moscow

*PM2601104990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Report by A. Borisova: "Thanks to Policy of Perestroyka"]

[Text] Roland Leroy, member of the French Communist Party [PCF] Politburo and political director of the newspaper L'HUMANITE, was in Moscow 15 through 21 January at the invitation of the PRAVDA editorial collegium.

R. Leroy had meetings with I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, and at the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the visit it was noted that cooperation between PRAVDA and L'HUMANITE has long-standing traditions. Right now, thanks to the policy of perestroyka taking place in the USSR, it can become more fruitful and reach a qualitatively new level.

A protocol was signed providing for the continuation and expansion of the forms of cooperation which traditionally exist—the exchange of journalists and articles and help in their work for permanent correspondents. At the same time new forms of cooperation were approved like the quarterly publication in two languages of a joint supplement devoted to questions of modern culture in the USSR and France, the periodical publication of anthologies of the most important articles printed in PRAVDA and L'HUMANITE, and the publication of individual supplements devoted to events of special importance like the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the PCF and the first PRAVDA festival. An interesting innovation will be the exchange of letters from Soviet and French readers. L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE will publish questions from its readers about the Soviet Union with replies given to them by PRAVDA, while PRAVDA will publish questions from its readers about France with replies given by the editorial office of L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE.

Both sides confirmed their readiness to cooperate and to mutually promote the successful holding of PRAVDA and L'HUMANITE festivals.

## Latin America & Caribbean

### Supreme Soviet Group To Eye Nicaragua Elections

*LD1202093190 Moscow TASS in English 0921 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—A delegation of the Central Commission for the Election of the USSR People's Deputies, led by commission Deputy Chairman Dmitry Golovko, left here for Nicaragua today.

The delegation members will familiarise themselves with the course of the election campaign in that country.

## Cuba Complains of Nondelivery of USSR Grain

*PM3101142290 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 90 p 3*

[Own correspondent A. Novikov dispatch: "Grain—Bone of Contention]

[Text] Havana—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published earlier the report of the Cuban Council of Ministers Executive Committee (27 January 1990). Essentially, it states that during the past two months Cuba, for the first time in the history of our relations, has not received from the Soviet Union the so-called advance deliveries of grain for 1990. This, the report indicates, is the reason for the abnormal situation which has developed on the island in bread supplies to the population and also in certain livestock sectors. As a result, the Cuban Government has been forced to raise prices for eggs and bread and also to cut distribution rates. Indirectly, responsibility for the exacerbation of the food problem in Cuba is to some extent attributed to the USSR.

On 24 January GRANMA published "additional information in connection with the situation concerning grain shipments," which, judging by appearances, was to soften the impact of what had been said earlier. Two days before the publication of the government statement, and on the day of its publication, two Soviet ships arrived in Cuban ports with some 43,000 tonnes of wheat on board. It is also reported that in accordance with Soviet-Cuban accords, wheat for Cuba is currently being loaded onto ships in Canadian, French, and Belgian ports.

Nonetheless, the government decision adopted a week ago seems to be still in force.

## CPSU's Falin Receives Cuban Ambassador

*PM0902153390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[TASS report: "Ambassador Received"]

[Text] V.M. Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, received J. Camacho, member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to the USSR, at the latter's request 7 February.

A conversation took place, during which several topical questions of Soviet-Cuban cooperation were discussed.

## Baltic Republics

### Further Reportage of Lithunanian Supreme Soviet

### Call for Release of KGB Chairman

*LD0902120590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0906 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Speech by Deputy Bronius Genzelis at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] As we all know, pickets ceased to be present last Monday at the State Security Committee. Was this a folly or a necessity? Was it only a pre-election trick, as General Eismuntas wants to describe it? Is it true that, and I quote: Nonobjective information is being disseminated or, to be more precise, rumors about our office? This office is continuing its work as before. [passage omitted]

General Eismuntas is avoiding the issue. Mildly speaking, he does not speak the truth. This is publicly acknowledged also by his underlings. [passage omitted] The General states that no archives have been removed from Lithuania. But, as we know, this is not true. What is the General's office engaged in? We do not say that the state should not have secrets. But the trouble is that Eismuntas is convinced that he is not subordinated to parliament. In this respect the general's attitude does not differ from that of Stalinist Checkists. [passage omitted]

What does our Security Committee do? It should catch foreign spies who with arms are encroaching on the foundations of the state. We have not heard of them finding something like this in our republic. Lately this office should work on major crimes—cases of currency and drug smugglers. Have you heard, esteemed deputies, that in recent years our security men coped with such cases? Thus what does the Security Committee do? Why is it so afraid of openness? The security should protect the society from provocations. We do not feel this.

Here are some recollections: Anti-Russian leaflets appeared last year casting an aspersion on Sajudis. During a Sajudis meeting with the republic's leaders General Eismuntas was asked to investigate. Silence. And the recent anti-semitic attack in Klaipeda? Inciting leaflets were signed in the name of Jaunalietuviai [Lithuanian youth organization], but they categorically denied it and demanded that the provocateurs be discovered. Nothing happened. Do such incompetent men work in the Eismuntas office? I would have thought, if not an investigation of a minor incident in Jurbarkas Rayon. One person has written some angry letters to Ivanov and Gureckas. He was found immediately. [passage omitted]

The Soviet security has great traditions of provocation and infiltration. It would be possible to see from the archives who accuses innocent people and why. In the name of stabilizing society their names should be known. [passage omitted] Therefore I have no grounds to believe the General and that he does not interfere in ideological processes taking place in our country. If General Eismuntas will not be able to convincingly explain what this department is doing, I have grounds to think that the incitement of the society taking place recently is not without the assistance of his men. I am convinced that many of his agents have inflitrated in the present movements of the society to do their dirty job. Therefore, the archives are being destroyed and removed.

Consequently, I propose that this session thoroughly analyze the work of the Security Committee and remove General Eismuntas from the leadership of this committee. The nation must have confidence in all its services including the Security Committee.

### Postpones KGB Debate

*LD0902211290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1650 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Vilnius, 9 Feb (TASS)—According to the agenda ratified at the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session here, a bill on archives and a report on the implementation of the decision made by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on 7 December 1989 "On ensuring the preservation of the funds of state and departmental archives of the republic", was to have been discussed today. These issues have become more poignant in Lithuania after certain Sajudis leaders accused the Lithuanian SSR Committee for State Security of allegedly destroying its archives. There was an extensive response to this in the republic. However, when the time came to consider these issues at today's session it emerged that Eduard Eysmuntas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Committee for State Security, was not taking part in the proceedings. Since the session is to continue its work for several days, it was proposed that these questions should be postponed until next week.

However, Bronislav Genzyalis, a Sajudis leader and a USSR People's Deputy, took the rostrum to read two letters signed by two KGB employees, which allegedly confirmed that there had been cases of the destruction of archive documents. He accused KGB staff of ignoring the Supreme Soviet. In addition, they, the deputy claimed, are deliberately creating situations aimed at worsening the atmosphere in the republic. He proposed that E. Eysmuntas should be removed from his post. After this, Deputy Zigmas Vayshvila proposed that decision be adopted to transfer the KGB from union and republic subordination to republican subordination.

Algirdas-Mikolas Brazauskas spoke. He pursuaded the deputies to postpone consideration of these issues until next week and not to take ill-considered and hasty decisions.

### Brazauskas Interviewed

*LD0902215190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by commentator Benas Rupeika; date, place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Rupeika] [passage omitted] I would like now to return to next Monday [12 February]. As I heard it, you are invited on Monday to attend a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

[Brazauskas] Yes, during the session [Lithuanian Supreme Soviet 7 February] we adopted many decisions, especially on an evaluation of the events of 1939-1940 and on the cancellation of the declaration on joining the Soviet Union. Also, that third article which we did not discuss at the Presidium meeting emerged only during the Supreme Soviet session, which will provoke some reaction. I have no doubt about it because already today the Presidium officials from Moscow were looking for our decision. We told them that it will be published in the press, but they asked for the original.

[Rupeika] So, on Monday—you are already used to standing there in Moscow against the attacking majority.

[Brazauskas] I am used to being in another building, at the Central Committee. I am going for the first time as chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. This is a completely different sphere. I understand this and it is necesary for me to be prepared for such a first meeting.

[Rupeika] [passage omitted] This flood of laws that are being passed is taking place against the background of a government crisis in the republic.

[Brazauskas] This is a different sphere. I think that this crisis should be evaluated differently. I think it has been somehow exaggerated.

[Rupeika] But, as chairman of the Presidium and secretary, it took you three hours to end it yesterday.

[Brazauskas] I had to do it as chairman of the Presidium. It is very good that such a conversation and a meeting of both Presidiums took place. These conditions and circumstances demanded that such a meeting should be held. [passage omitted]

I would not call it a government crisis. I would call it a very difficult and responsible concluding period of time of our present Council of Ministers and its Presidium. This concluding period is complex and difficult for many reasons. First of all, it is a concluding period. It affects people and leaders correspondingly. This is natural. On the other hand, those who observe the work of the Council of Ministers and who critically assess it, assess it thinking that it is a concluding period and that during such a period the work could have become weaker, a feeling of such a temporary period may emerge. But, yesterday during our conversation I did not have such an impression. All members of the Council of Ministers expressed their opinion on individual problems, and said what should be done in organizing our republic's economic reform. [passage omitted]

[Rupeika] I, and I think many listeners, were astonished by your polemics about an absurd insinuation that a spectacle conducted by Gorbachev is taking place in Lithuania.

[Brazauskas] Of course, I do not pay any attention to this. But, an intensive election campaign is taking place in Lithuania, a sharp campaign, and each such canard may have some influence. It is essential to explain to people, tell them the truth, and I wish to repeat that I was astonished that here in Lithuania some people have such a lively imagination, that there are people who can invent such matters.

[Rupeika] Maybe it is not a lively, but a primitive imagination.

[Brazauskas] I trust the wisdom and understanding of the Lithuanian people. Furthermore, today PRAVDA carries information—we have decided to publish it also in our press, in TIESA and in other newspapers—information about the Moscow plenum. I think that each person will be able to form his opinion about these problems. Guesses and advice are not necessary here.

[Rupeika] [passage omitted on Rupeika remark that he had attended a meeting of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and did not feel any depression there after the Moscow plenum]

[Brazauskas] The Bureau is very resolutely disposed, of course. We take it to heart; we take to heart this moral pressure which took place during the plenum. But, we are very concerned about those communists who hitherto have not decided what to do next. Of course, various ways are possible. But, I am convinced that we have to strengthen the independent Lithuanian Communist Party by every means, because this other wing, or the other party, I will not mention its long name, its doing a great deal to strengthen its ranks.

[Rupeika] And they are not engaged in state activity.

[Brazauskas] Yes, and our every minute is counted and it is more difficult for us to do this. But, I appeal and believe that these communists will make a decision in the nearest future and will strengthen our ranks. We will be able to unite these forces, strengthen these forces, and continue to follow a firm line.

[Rupeika] It is essential to know who and what force is represented.

[Brazauskas] We are collecting information from all towns and rayons. On 1 February there were 78,000 communists who had made their decision. I believe that on Monday we will know how many more there will be.

We believe that this process after the Moscow Plenum and after the conclusion of this, so to say, case—the process of this decision should accelerate.

[Rupeika] Reading PRAVDA one has an impression that the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is a small part of a branch of the CPSU. At least I have such an impression as a journalist. Maybe the authors of this dispatch are to blame?

[Brazauskas] Maybe. People can say many things. It is stated in the decision itself that we have dissociated and separated. This says a lot, too. Many words have been said; I think, words of goodwill, words inviting understanding of the situation. It was said more than once, the last time a few days ago. But, unfortunately, very few people taking part in the plenum understood our situaiton. I can state once more that, unfortunately, not one of them stood up and expressed his opinion.

[Rupeika] I wish to propose a description of this CPSU plenum: This is the last revenge of those lagging behind. This is too sharp and you, as a politician, cannot agree with this.

[Brazauskas] As a journalist, you can say this and even more. I would not like to repeat your expression. I imagine that this was the last such profound examination. I did not expect such a hostile attitude, especially from those persons who visited us with Comrade Gorbachev, or from those who had come before him.

[Rupeika] Maybe these are death throes?

[Brazauskas] I think that now, after other decisions were made at the plenum, on bringing closer the convening of the 28th congress, especially when the talk was about the platform, when the situation about the Russian Communist Party organizing itself was analyzed thoroughly, they proposed me for the editorial commission. Comrade Gorbachev looked at me several times, and proposed me and Burokevcius for inclusion in the editorial commisison. I stood up and said that I was not interested, that since we already have our program, I should not take part. But a vote was taken, and they included me, too. Sitting there I had an opportunity to see such complex work by the general secretary when these principled party problems were discussed, that is, the evaluation of Article Six in the Constitution and further steps by the party in the multiparty system, about the Russian Communist Party, about the president in the state and many other problems. There were different opinions.

[Rupeika] And what is your opinion? Is there any logic in this? The approval of an independent Russian Communist Party, and condemnation of the independent Lithuanian CP [Communist Party].

[Brazauskas] Maybe. You have noticed that I attempted in my speech to appeal and say that such historical decisions or proposals for discussion have been made, and at the same time, almost the same problem is discussed, but the reaction is completely different.

[Rupeika] Have you ever found that illogical action has a future?

[Brazauskas] I would not call it illogical. I would call it the result of mechanical thinking. All four of us, my colleagues and me, did not take part in the voting.

[Rupeika] But PRAVDA said that you voted.

[Brazauskas] But people who were present saw it.

[Rupeika] There may be another canard, like the first one.

[Brazauskas] Of course, but we have our program, and we are advancing.

[Rupeika] Is it not possible to describe this plenum as follows: That for the sake of Russia and elimination of Article Six and the multiparty system, the Lithuanian Communist Party was sacrificed in order to appease those who spoke most fiercely at the end of the plenum?

[Brazauskas] It is possible, but I am not convinced that there was a strategic maneuver.

[Rupeika] But, time is passing and the events are fast. How do you feel on the second day after Moscow's plenum?

[Brazauskas] I do not feel badly. Of course, the day of the plenum was very difficult. This waiting was complex. When one is surrounded for three days by the same people and these people are mostly thinking differently, or their convictions are different, it is very difficult to be in such an atmosphere. Although, I must say that this time there were more people than last time who talked in support, the union ministers whom I have known for many years, leaders of party organizations in union republics. Some people asked for our program and statute. I had booklets and these I presented to them. We are not completely forgotten, people are interested. As far as I know, our statute is used in drawing up the Union's new party regulations, because there are many democratic features in it. [passage omitted]

### Adopts Press Law

*LD0902230390 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Vilnius February 9 TASS—The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet today adopted the law on the press.

The law stipulates that the mass media in Lithuania are not to be censored. Interference in their activity involving the preparation and circulation of information is not permitted.

The law goes into effect on March 1, 1990. From that moment the issuing of permission for the registration of news organisations will be the prerogative of the republic's Council of Ministers or the organisation it indicates.

The scope of potential publishers will widen. Under the law the right to establish news organisations belongs to state and public organisations and movements, to creative workers unions and scientific societies, religious, cooperative and other organisations, as well as Lithuanian citizens residing in the republic's territory who are of age.

Under the law the compensation for moral damage inflictd by a news organisation is established by court which can order the organisation to pay up to R30,000 in favour of the injured party.

The session has also adopted a law proclaiming February 16, the day of the revival of the Lithuanian state, Lithuanian national holiday. Other national holidays were instituted: the Mother's Day observed on the first Sunday in May, the remembrance day November 1, as well as Eastern and Christmas.

## New Lithuanian Council Established

*LD0902150690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1037 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, read out by Deputy Sabutis at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] On 31 January the Presidium examined a decision by the people's deputies of the Salcininkai Rayon which approved the regulations of the Polish national territorial self-government. The decision of the Presidium stressed that the rayon soviet ignored the decision of the Presidium of 21 September 1989 which viewed the proclamation of the Salcininkai Rayon as a territorial Polish national rayon as illegal. This violates the requirements of the constitution and Soviet law. It was acknowledged that the decision of the rayon soviet is illegal and it was proposed that this problem be reviewed again at a session of the rayon soviet.

The republic's procuracy, the republic organs for the protection of law and order, and other departments were instructed to examine how the laws are observed in this rayon as a whole and provide information to the presidium. Vilnius city, Ignalina, Svencionys, Trakai, and Vilnius Rayon Soviets are recommended to set up their social national minority commissions which will help to objectively solve international relations and consolidate the society.

Apart from that, in an attempt to strongly focus society's attention in Eastern Lithuania on the present political, economic and social processes and also to disseminate in that part of the country the idea of national and state rebirth, a social initiative Eastern Lithuanian council, consisting of 32 members, has been set up. It includes scientists from the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences and high schools, representatives of the Ministries of Public Education, Culture, Health Service, the Committee of Nationalities, press radio and television journalists, workers of industrial and agricultural enterprises and organizations. This commission must closely link its work with the permanent commissions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the republican Council of Ministers, ministries, departments, public organisations and movements.

## Lithuanian Decree on USSR Oversight Law

*90UN0843B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1*

[Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet decree: "On the USSR law 'Constitutional Oversight in the USSR'"]

[Text] The Lithuanian SSR [Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To approve the statements of the Baltic Parliamentary Group and the USSR people's deputies from Lithuania at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies concerning the USSR law "Constitutional Oversight in the USSR".

2. For the purpose of protecting the republic's sovereignty and Lithuania's right to statehood proclaimed in the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, to determine that the law on constitutional oversight in the USSR does not take effect on Lithuanian SSR territory as of the day it is enacted. The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will not register the law on constitutional oversight.

3. To instruct the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to form a commission for the elaboration of a draft Lithuanian SSR law on a constitutional court.
[Signed] A. Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[Signed] L. Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Vilnius, 15 January 1990.

## Presidium Member Rejects Oversight Law

*90UN0843D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 pp 2, 3*

[Report of Kazimeras Moteka, member of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 16th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet: "Suspending the Law on 'Constitutional Oversight in the USSR'"]

[Text] Dear Deputies! On 23 December 1989 the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies enacted the law "Constitutional Oversight in the USSR" and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies decree determining the procedure for implementing this law. Article 125 of the USSR Constitution was altered together with the adoption of the above legislative enactments and a Congress of USSR People's Deputies decree on the election of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee was adopted.

All these legislative enactments proclaim that constitutional oversight in the USSR is being introduced to ensure the protection of the democratic foundations of Soviet society and the rights and freedoms of the peoples of the USSR, specifically, the citizens. However, enactment of the law on constitutional oversight under the conditions of the domestic political, economic, social, and cultural life of the USSR is not a voluntarist attempt, divorced from real life, to reflect and reveal features of the Soviet system which have never been typical of it and which are not characteristic of it now. The law on constitutional oversight in today's USSR is an anachronism. We can see on the basis of day-to-day experience that although perestroyka has been declared, it is not being implemented. Perestroyka in the domestic policy and domestic life of the USSR, perestroyka with the exception of glasnost—this small particle of democratization—is running in place, and a manifest stagnation of perestroyka is being observed. The so-called revolution from above is there, above, choking itself. The calls for democratization, decentralization, economic upturn, struggle against the administrative-edict system, and other such slogans proclaimed recently in all walks of life remain empty, at best, half-empty declarations doing absolutely no good. However bitter the truth, the course of events and their sequence undoubtedly show that the activity of the party and state machinery of the USSR has been and remains aimed at strengthening not the democratic form, not the "demos" and "kratos," as the form of the power of the people of sovereign states in the USSR but at strengthening a unitary dictatorial state under the cover of democracy and its slogans. Artificially thought up by the leaders of the October Revolution and taken up by their successors in power, the alliance of sovereign states in a federative state built at variance with the objective regularities of the development of society and impracticable owing to the contradictions of the nature of the concepts is nothing other than a performance of the theater of the absurd in international law and in the eyes of the whole democratic world. This is a version of Soviet socialism, threadbare and compromised in the eyes of the whole world, only with a so-called "second wind" and in a "new federation". The whole world, and we specifically, support M.S. Gorbachev's steps in the sphere of disarmament and easing the threat of war in the world. Such steps would have been impossible without public recognition by the USSR of the errors and crimes it has committed. We approve also the policy of glasnost, but glasnost is not in itself democracy. In addition, it would be a mistake to think that these processes are occurring solely thanks to the initiative of the USSR and its good will. Such fields of perestroyka as disarmament and glasnost, which were implemented at once, are the result of the objective changes not so much in the Soviet Union as throughout the world. Had such changes not occurred in the world, we would not have had long to wait before the "voluntary" incorporation within the USSR in this form or the other of, say, Afghanistan or other states. Alas, the "voluntary" incorporation of the Baltic states in the USSR was armed violence at a time when no changes were occurring in the world.

In the course of the processes of democratization occurring in the world, voices indicating that the USSR is the world's last colonial empire are making an increasingly confident mark. The fact that the peoples are on the move and that a process of their revival within the empire under the conditions of glasnost is taking place shows clearly that the USSR as a union of states is merely a fiction and that it was created and has developed through violence, terror and armed aggression. All this has been done by way of the conquest and enslavement of other peoples and states with their subsequent "voluntary" entry into the USSR. In all cases these actions were previously and are now also carefully enmeshed in a thick layer of democratic laws, constitutions and other "voluntarily" enacted laws which are also embellished by hypocritical, ornate slogans glorifying and thanking the USSR and the party and addressed, as a rule, so as to confuse the outside world and the world community. However strange it is hearing it after the long years of Soviet oppression, the truth stings one's eyes: The colonial policy of tsarist Russia, originally accurately designated the prison of the peoples, is being vigilantly guarded today also. The decisive say in the fate of the USSR belongs to Russia, its revival, and the processes of its democratization. After all, it is not for nothing that Russia still does not have its own party, its own trade and youth unions, its own intellectual center—an academy of sciences—and many other institutions. For the all-guiding All-Russia Communist Party (Bolshevik), subsequently renamed the CPSU, such institutions were unnecessary for their existence would plainly have revealed Russia's role in the business of the enslavement and subordination to itself of other peoples and states. The revival of a democratic Russia will put an end to the world's last colonial empire: An empire which is still covered by the fraudulent and quite tattered screen of a union of republics.

Dear deputies, we can see that, not counting the easing of international tension and glasnost, perestroyka is running in place in other spheres. Does this not prompt the thought that the restructuring process influences some, even the most complex, cases of disarmament and other international relations, even the problems of Afghanistan and East Europe, right away and that there is no question of any objective or subjective obstacles; while in other cases, however, at the time of the solution of far simpler questions of the USSR's domestic life, it is at a standstill. And attempts are being made to persuade us that perestroyka is being impeded by some insuperable forces of stagnation, there is even talk of a threat on the part of the Soviet Army. Has perestroyka really come up against insoluble internal problems in the USSR, as a result of which the democratization processes cannot be put into practice? No, things are not like this. We can see that the economy has found itself on the edge of the abyss, and according to M.S. Gorbachev, has already slid into this abyss. We see also that no urgent, more or less radical measures, that are ready for implementation, or more, measures pertaining to economic recovery and the people's increased well-being are being adopted in the

Soviet Union. We know that the democratization of the state is inconceivable unless there is a demarcation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority and if the system of the dictatorship of one-party leadership persists. We also understand full well that the Soviet Union has never been and never will be a union unless it consists of sovereign states. Today's Soviet Union is not a union but a manifest colonial-unitary state whose existence is based not on democracy but relies on force and the crude diktat of the center. Who should know this if not we inhabitants of the Baltic states for we have experienced this at the cost of the torment and suffering of our peoples.

It is more obvious today than ever that there is no restructuring in the USSR's domestic policy and that the party and its state machinery are doing everything to consolidate the unitary, dictatorial state. This is graphically confirmed by the events of recent days in Lithuania and also the congresses of USSR people's deputies and the activity of the Supreme Soviet. These are the highest organs of power not of a democratic state, these are the organs of implementation of the party's diktat. There is virtually no whiff of "demos" and "kratos" there. This is confirmed by numerous laws enacted by these bodies and this has been perceived by we representatives from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and other USSR people's deputies who are characterized by democratic views.

Constitutional courts or constitutional oversight in other forms are an institution characteristic only of a democratic, law-based state. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union cannot be ranked among such states. This is recognized even by its leaders, and they are today merely proclaiming that we will aspire to the creation of such a state, but are doing nothing material for this. Yet it becomes clear from the law on constitutional oversight that its mission is not stimulating but slowing down the processes of democratization in the union republics. Nor is a highly popular democratic slogan like defense of citizens' rights and liberties being overlooked here. Article 1 of the decree on implementing the law on constitutional oversight says that at this stage the law provisionally will not affect the constitutions of the union republics, but the exception does not extend to laws enacted in the republics which specify citizens' basic rights and liberties.

Dear deputies! Are there not today sufficient voices from all kinds of Stalinist nooks and chauvinist crannies to the effect that the laws enacted by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet do not guarantee or infringe even the rights of "unity types" and other defenders of socialism of a variety of persuasions? Were not such complaints heard during the visit to Lithuania of the leaders of the Soviet state and party? Did we USSR people's deputies from Lithuania not observe how, following the discussion with M.S. Gorbachev, two of our deputies of different nationality followed him and how one of them then from the congress' rostrum called on Moscow for help, saying that the rights of all Soviet Poles, to a man, were being infringed in Lithuania?

Therefore, under the conditions of the law on constitutional oversight laws enacted by us will have a life of a matter of days and hours unless we immediately avail ourselves of the provision of Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution. I appeal to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and call on all deputies to unanimously defend the republic laws which they have enacted, the shoots by whose cultivation we will lay the way toward the independence and democracy of Lithuania and people's free self-determination. The law on constitutional oversight in the USSR would deprive us of the last legislative, albeit limited, rights of parliamentary struggle for independence and for sovereignty, although formal, nonetheless, constitutionally enshrined. None of our voters who are not indifferent to Lithuania's future ever gave or will give any of us authority to enact a law on constitutional oversight or any other USSR law which could revoke or render invalid the laws of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

I hereby notify the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet that the parliamentary group of Baltic deputies and USSR people's deputies from Lithuania lodged a protest at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies against the enactment of the law on constitutional oversight in the USSR and declared in writing that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would not recognize and would not permit it to come into force in these republics. The electorate had given us no authority for adopting such a decision on this matter.

I therefore call on the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to adopt today the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decree of the following content:

"The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

"First, to approve the statements of the Baltic Parliamentary Group and USSR people's deputies from Lithuania at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the law on constitutional oversight in the USSR.

"Second, for the purpose of defense of the sovereignty of the republic and the rights to statehood of the Lithuanian SSR proclaimed by the Lithuanian Constitution to establish that the law on constitutional oversight in the USSR on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR be invalid as of the day it was enacted. To instruct the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium not to register the law on constitutional oversight in the USSR.

"Third, to instruct the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to elaborate a draft Lithuanian SSR law on the constitutional court."

## Chairman's Report to Lithuanian Presidium

*90UN0843C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 2*

[Report by Lyudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 16th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted several edicts in the period since the 15th Session of the Supreme Soviet, which ended on 7 December. Today these enactments have been submitted for discussion and confirmation by the Supreme Soviet.

Fulfilling the assignment given to it at the preceding session—to determine the procedure for the registration of political parties which will be in effect until the enactment of the law on political parties of the republic—the Presidium has revised and supplemented the previous edict, "Provisional Procedure of the Registration of the Rules of Voluntary Citizens' Associations," of 17 February 1989. Consequently, a uniform provisional procedure for the registration of the rules of voluntary citizens' associations and political parties has now been approved.

The purpose of the Presidium edict, "Alterations and Additions to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Criminal Code and the Lithuanian SSR Code of Administrative Offenses," is to tighten administrative and criminal liability for profiteering, defrauding the citizens, and selling goods from warehouses and depots of trade or public catering enterprises, and also for hoarding and other acts. This was prompted both by the wishes of the population and specific proposals form the republic law enforcement authorities. Thus, 743 cases of concealing commodities worth more than half a million rubles were established last year. Some 700 cases of profiteering were uncovered. Administrative proceedings were instituted against 1,500 persons for trading in unauthorized locations.

A distinguishing feature of the edict is the fact that considerably greater fines than those set in the laws which had previously been in effect are stipulated for the above and certain other offenses. The maximum fine under administrative procedure for mercenary violations has been increased to R1,000 (up to R200 previously). Fines will be levied in a more differentiated manner for acts which contain the elements of a criminal offense.

In the course of implementing the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict of 28 July 1989 there have appeared in the 29 September 1989 version of the law new, hitherto unforeseen problems, and if they are not resolved, this will complicate the process of rehabilitation and the drawing up of the pertinent documents.

The provision of clause "A" of Article 1 of the Presidium edict of 8 January of this year, establishing complicity with the Hitlerites in their killings of the civilian population, has been expanded, it being pointed out here that rehabilitation does not apply to persons who abetted the Hitlerites in the killings and punitive measures which they perpetrated.

The transfer of criminal cases following initial investigation to the state security authorities outside of the republic for further investigation was practiced extensively in the postwar years, and in this instance the detainees were sent to places of confinement simultaneously. There they were judged by a military tribunal or special court.

It has not always been possible to make an affirmative decision through supervising such cases on the question of the rehabilitation of the persons subjected to punitive measures since there area different practices for reviewing cases in individual regions of the Soviet Union. For this reason Article 2 of the edict has been newly worded.

In addition, the Lithuanian SSR KGB is obliged in conjunction with the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the commissions of the city and rayon soviet executive committees to assist the republic procuracy in making decisions on questions of the rehabilitation of persons detained by extrajudicial procedure and persons in respect of whom there are no archive documents on their detention.

The alteration in Article 6 of the Presidium edict, "Compulsory Treatment and Labor Re-education of Inveterate Drunkards (Alcoholics) and Drug Addicts," was predetermined primarily by the negative trends in these establishments. This is connected more often than not with the fact that the people receiving treatment here leave the preventive clinics without authorization. More than 1,000 such violations were recorded last year (829 in 1988). Although Article 195.1 of the Lithuanian SSR Criminal Code stipulates criminal liability for absconding from a medical-labor or educational-labor preventive clinic, criminal liability is stipulated in this case when this is done for the purpose of evading treatment. The majority of persons leaving preventive clinics without authorization and subsequently returning are frequently driven by the most diverse motives (family circumstances and so forth, for example). For this reason the edict determines that the time spent following unauthorized departure from a preventive clinic whose purpose is not the avoidance of treatment and re-education may by decision of the people's court also not count as part of the time of compulsory treatment and labor re-education.

The new version of Article 68 of the Lithuanian SSR Housing Code provides for the rights of persons who have taken up residence in the accommodations of a tenant, as guardians or wardens, to these accommodations. It has been prepared with regard for the citizens' wishes that legislative instruments be adopted to regulate the right of the guardian or warden of a tenant to avail himself in certain instances of the tenant's accommodations. It should be mentioned that, in accordance with this article, the guardians or wardens who have taken up residence in the accommodations of the tenant do not, as before, have independent right to these premises but enjoy them as temporary residents. But the guardian or warden acquires independent right to these premises upon the expiration of the period of guardianship or wardenship in connection with the decease of the person under guardianship or a change in his place of residence.

In addition, it is established that this right is accorded a guardian or warden only provided that he is registered in the procedure determined by law at this same place of residence as being a person in need of an improvement in his housing conditions. In other cases such persons must, upon expiration of the period of guardianship or wardenship, move out in due legal form without being granted other accommodations.

You have been handed a draft Supreme Soviet decree which proposes confirmation of the Presidium edict, "Release of Lyaonas Ryauba From His Duties as Minister of Trade of the Lithuanian SSR," and also edicts by which Yakov Kiryushchenko is relieved of his duties as chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Committee for Material and Technical Supply in connection with his transfer to other work, and Romualdas Kozyrovich is appointed chairman of this committee.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium requests that the republic Supreme Soviet discuss and enact a law and resolution decree the above edicts.

I will notify you in brief of some other legal documents adopted by the Presidium since the last session.

By decree of the Presidium of 7 December 1989 a 12-man working group was formed to prepare the draft Lithuanian SSR law on political parties. The group includes representatives of various parties, lawyers, philosophers, and other specialists. Stasis Stachekas, director of the Legal Expert Appraisal Research Institute, was confirmed as chairman.

The Presidium clarified the procedure for application of Article 9 of the Lithuanian SSR Referendum Act (the procedure for realizing the right of initiative pertaining to the announcement of a referendum). The decree stresses that the authenticity of the citizens' signatures must be certified by officials, who, in accordance with the Lithuanian SSR State Notaries Act, have the right to effect notarial actions. This may also be done by the leaders of state, political, and public organizations and public movements. A specimen deed confirming the authenticity of a signature is determined. It is also noted that citizens are exempted from the stamp tax for confirmation of the authenticity of a signature on the proposals-applications for the announcement of a referendum.

In accordance with Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, a number of union legislative instruments has been registered. Four USSR laws primarily:

"Procedure for the Solution of Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)" of 9 October 1989. This law will be in force until the enactment of the corresponding law of our republic;

"Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR, and the Estonian SSR" of 27 November 1989;

"Alterations and Additions to Article 34 of the Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics" of 28 November 1989;

"Status of People's Deputies in the USSR" of 21 December 1989.

USSR Supreme Soviet decrees of 2 November 1989, which will be in effect until the enactment of the corresponding republic rules of law, have also been registered. The drafts of some of the latter have already been prepared. In addition, seven ordinances of the USSR Council of Ministers have been registered.

We have today to discuss one further draft decree of the Supreme Soviet: "Extension of the Time Allowed for Nomination of Candidates for Deputy of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Lithuanian SSR." In accordance with Article 32 of the law on Elections of Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Lithuanian SSR, the nomination of candidates for deputy of local soviets by electoral okrug begins two months and ends 35 days prior to the elections. In accordance with the calendar plan for the elections, this would be from 24 January through 17 February. The election of deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet will not have taken place by this time. For this reason the republic Electoral Commission for the election of deputies of the 12th Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet requests that the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet extend the time allowed for the nomination of candidates for deputy of the local soviets in order that it might be possible to also nominate as candidates for deputy of the local soviets the citizens who were nominated as candidates for deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet, but who were not elected. The Supreme Soviet Presidium discussed this submission on 8 January and, having approved it, proposes that the Supreme Soviet adopt the corresponding decree.

## Debate on Lithuanian Chairman's Report

*90UN0843E Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 2*

[Account of debate on the report by Lyudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 16th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Deputy Zigmas **Vayshvila** made known to the deputies the appeal of the provisional council of the "Green" Party to the Supreme Soviet. Our sacred goal—Lithuania's independence—he observed, is to increasingly unite ever new and emergent parties and organizations of honest people of the republic. The independent Lithuanian CP [Communist Party] has moved in this direction also. I would like to hope that it will confirm this by its activity as well. The first step of the Lithuanian CP following the 20th Congress—its hurried registration—showed how the administrative-edict machinery still operates. After all, the Council of Ministers had until then refused to register the party.

With the change in Article 6 of the constitution the Presidium was empowered to prepare a law on political parties. It is on the basis of this law that the party's registration should have begun. However, in order to satisfy the impatience of the independent Lithuanian CP the old apparatus worked without a hitch—it altered the Presidium edict of 17 February 1949 on the temporary procedure for registration of the rules of a voluntary citizens' association. In order not to inflame passions it also registered the Democratic Party, forgetting about the Social Democratic Party. With the change in Articles 6 and 7 of the constitution, party activity in the state establishments and organizations and at enterprises should be abandoned. We hope that this idea will be supported both by the Lithuanian CP leadership and its members. This would be the first genuine step of renunciation of one-party dictatorship not in words but in deed. The "Green" Party proposes that the Supreme Soviet Presidium edict be supplemented with the following clauses:

"Clause 4. Parties on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] are organized and operate per the territorial principle.

"Clause 5. Citizens working in the law enforcement authorities (Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB, the procuracy, and the courts) may not be members of any party."

The deputy called attention to the situation in which the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the KGB could find themselves if, for example, the Lithuanian CP was proscribed and only members of the CPSU remained. A conflict between the representatives of these two parties could arise even without the prohibition of party activity in the law enforcement authorities. According to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the CPSU remains the guiding force. At this particular time the law enforcement authorities are not subject to the supreme authority of Lithuania. I believe that we should vote for each clause separately, having seriously discussed this.

Deputy Algirdas **Brazauskas** disagreed with Deputy Z. Vayshvila that the edict had been adopted specially for the Communist Party. This issue had been raised by other parties also.

Deputy Vitautas **Sakalauskas** observed that, without having confirmed the edict, the Council of Ministers could not register the Social Democratic Party. And if the edict is invalid, it will be necessary to annul the rules of parties confirmed earlier also. For this reason this enactment should be confirmed and the commission's proposals examined at the coming session.

The edict concerning petty profiteering was discussed by USSR People's Deputy Alfredas **Smaylis**. The buying up and reselling in small quantities of books, sheet music, phonograph records, cassettes, and other valuables are considered petty profiteering. Article 267 points out that persons who have engaged in petty hooliganism or petty profiteering may be taken into custody, and a people's judge or representative of the internal affairs authorities will make the pertinent ruling. These are different categories of crime, the speaker noted. A person who has sold a video cassette cannot be compared with a person who has engaged in a street mugging. On the other hand, custody involves state expenditure and the official registration of cases and takes up a great deal of time. I would therefore suggest that the paragraph on the application of remedial measures in respect of petty profiteers be worded as follows: "...or persons who have engaged in petty profiteering on a repeat occasion may be taken into custody." If it is not a repeat detention, the representative of the law enforcement authorities has an opportunity to make an arbitrary judgment. The wording could be as follows: "A person may not be taken into custody for petty profiteering."

## Lithuanian Press Counters Gorbachev Efforts

*PM0502170390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
*3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS observer N. Zheleznov commentary: "Let Us Preserve Our Dignity. The Answer to a Vilnius Taxi Driver's Question"]

[Text] There was an unusual telephone call from Vilnius to one of the TASS editorial offices. It was a taxi driver who, three weeks before, had helped the agency's team of journalists to report on Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's trip to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. During the days of hard work, with the assistance of Yonas and his two comrades, over 40 photographs and 150 pages of text from M.S. Gorbachev's conversations with working people and all his speeches were delivered, decoded, developed, and then distributed to the newspapers.

Yonas recalled these three intense January days when he did not switch off his car radio, listening to broadcasts of meetings in his native republic. How much energy, excitement, how much cordial warmth M.S. Gorbachev left behind in our land, the driver said in the telephone conversation. He listened to everyone and expected an opinion from everyone. He called on all Lithuanian inhabitants to think over the prevailing situation in our republic in a considered and responsible way. Scarcely a week went by before I felt annoyed because his anxious words seemed to have been completely forgotten, Yonas admitted. You don't believe me? Look through the January files of Lithuanian newspapers, he suggested.

We, eight TASS journalists and photojournalists authorized for this important trip, sought out the newspapers that now are making our Lithuanian comrade so indignant.

We recalled the animated faces of workers, collective farm members, and students in conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich in the streets, factory shops, and conference halls. Some people were agreeing with him, many were arguing. They argued fairly, but most often they gave in, captivated by their interlocutor's logic, proofs, and frankness. Struck not so much by his fascination as a speaker as by the unconcealable spiritual concern of a man who had hurried there as if to the scene of a disaster. Surprised by the speed with which he came down from the aircraft and immediately made his way to the most crowded crossroads in the Lithuanian capital—the very heart of the dispute.

Then suddenly, after the visit, there is a wave of newspaper headlines whose intent is patently obvious: To cancel out the results of the meetings and return those who had again formed hopes for peace in the Lithuanian home during these January days to their circles, that is, to the bosom of "Sajudis."

At the same time, none of the speakers who heard the arguments at the meetings with Mikhail Sergeyevich and fully shared his alarm about the increasingly complex situation in Lithuania was given the opportunity to express his opinion in the columns of republican newspapers. As one of them put it, the word "pluralism" could have been written in quotemarks a long time before the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

The Lithuanian reader has clearly been unlucky with pluralism this year, quotated or not. We were curious about our colleagues in other Baltic republics, where important changes in political life and the stormy processes of a transfer to economic independence are in evidence just as in Lithuania: How did the local press react to the conversations with the Lithuanian working people? All material from Vilnius, we were told, was put into the current editions. A number of newspapers reprinted the well-considered opinion of the Lithuanian public—the Lithuanian scientists' and writers' appeal under the heading "Let us Preserve Our Dignity"—from Vilnius party publications. SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA published the text of a letter addressed to the CPSU Central Committee by the republic communist party Central Committee Secretariat in connection with inaccuracies in TASS reporting 11 January concerning the number of citizens in the country, and in Estonia in particular, who live outside the boundaries of their ethnic formation. On our return to Moscow, having checked these figures at the State Committee for Statistics, we realized that they were indeed inaccurate. The proportion of the Slavic population of Estonia is 40 and not 35.2 percent, and this is not the previous figure but the present one, according to 1989 census. The latest census also bears witness to the fact that 11.3 million Russians live in the Ukraine, whereas the figure named in the account of the conversations with the inhabitants of Vilnius was 15 million.

Both the difficult working conditions and the huge volume of transmissions made during this time by the agency's guest team provide only an illusory justification in such a situation.

Of all the important events in the Estonian SSR's political and state life, our colleagues in Tallinn turn our attention to the recent publication in the newspapers of the republic Supreme Soviet's statement on the Estonian people's right to integrity. The Estonian press is continuing to publish commentaries in connection with the political declaration adopted by the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. Its meaning is that the Lithuanian model for an independent communist party does not suit Estonian communists. Their motto is to renew the Estonian Communist Party within a renewed CPSU.

These reporters' notes, which I am writing on behalf of all the members of the TASS "assault force" in Lithuania, must not, of course, be considered a full answer to our Lithuanian taxi driver friend. We all share his anxieties and hopes and we believe that the answer will be given at the upcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress.

### Resolution on Results of Gorbachev Visit Adopted

*90UN0843A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1*

[Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, 17 January 1990: "Results of the Visit of M.S. Gorbachev, General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Lithuania"]

[Text] 1. The Lithuanian CP [Communist Party] Central Committee plenum observes that the visit of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Lithuania served mutual understanding between the CPSU and the Lithuanian CP.

The Lithuanian CP expresses confidence that the visit of M.S. Gorbachev and the group of members of the CPSU Central Committee to our republic will exert a positive influence on the aspirations of Lithuania's communists becoming more comprehensible to the members of the CPSU Central Committee and all communists and on the adoption of a wise decision acceptable to both parties.

2. The Lithuanian CP Central Committee declares to the CPSU Central Committee plenum that the resolutions on the party's independence adopted by the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress are a cardinal, logical, and democratic restructuring of the party predetermined by the new realities of the life of Lithuania. The Lithuanian CP intends to adhere firmly to the principles of equal cooperation with the CPSU expressed in the documents of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress. We propose that the Lithuanian CP Program and Statute be seen as a model of restructuring in the CPSU which should be examined at the 28th Party Congress.

3. The Lithuanian CP Central Committee Plenum calls on all communists of Lithuania to adopt a tolerant attitude toward the various views of the processes of restructuring in the party and to orient themselves

toward the party's main goal—the creation of an independent Lithuanian state and a democratic society.

### Lithuanian Communists' 1918-1989 Authority Viewed

*LD1002045290 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] The Independent Lithuanian Communist Party will attain a new status in society and multi-party system only in case the overwhelming majority of population recognzies it as a national party and a force sincerely safeguarding national aspirations and social interests of the Lithuanian people. The constitutional way of turning the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party into one of the Lithuania's political parties is plausible only after a historical and unbiased assessment of the former Lithuanian Communist Party and its officials has been given—reads a statement signed by Romas Gudaytis, chairman of the commission set up at the Central Committee Bureau to assess the authority of Lithuanian Communists in the years 1918 to 1989.

Established in 1918, the Lithuanian Communist Party had to once become an implement of Bolshevism while Communists themselves an anti-national power [as heard] that carried out policy alien to the Lithuanian people. The Communists ignored the rights to self-determination and the drive to restore Lithuanian state. They saw our future only within the federal or, to be more exact, unitarian Soviet Russia. Later on, being obedient servants to Comintern and Stalinist leading bodies of the All-Union Communist Bolshevik Party, the Lithuanian Communists became anti-national and anti-constitutional party, reads the foresaid statement.

In 1940 the Lithuanian Communist Party backed up the occupation of Lithuania carried out by the Soviet Army, the country's annexation and shortly itself became incorporated into the All-Union Communist Bolshevik Party. A tool of rapid Sovietization, the party helped trump up Lithuania's state self-determination, that is, its incorporation into the totalitarian Soviet Union. Its activity in 1940-1941 is treated as treason of Lithuania and its people.

After the war the Communist Party became a force operating in the Stalinist administrative-edict system and defending Soviet but not our national interests. The branch of the Soviet Communist Party in Lithuania today is a relic of Bolshevik traditions, reads the statement.

Meanwhile, the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party is determined to remove from politics the remnants of Bolshevism by legal means.

### Estonian Party Conference Opens

*LD1002114190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] One more important report has reached us from Estonia. A conference of the republic's communist party has opened there. Some 400 delegates, representing all Estonia's party organizations, are discussing the question of the ideological and organizational foundations of the preparations for the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress. It is planned also to examine drafts of the party's program and statutes.

### Valjas Addresses Conference

*LD0902134390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] It took nearly half an hour to implement today's party conference in the Communist Party [CP] of Estonia building. An initial assessment of forces filled this period. Namely, a proposal was made not to include Mikk Titma, secretary of the CP of Estonia Central Committee, within the presidium of the conference as his actions were said not to be in line with the desired party line. Vaino Valjas [first secretary], put the question to vote and the auditorium answered with the following assessment: In favor of Titma belonging in the composition of the presidium 227, 91 against, and 8 abstaining. 368 delegates have been elected to the conference, with 10 delegates not present in the auditorium.

Six reports have been planned for the conference. Vaino Valjas, first secretary of the CP of Estonia Central Committee was the first to speak. How else is one to judge the conduct of many party members who have laid down their party membership cards, declining to be within the party ranks and without assisting in the radical change in the party way of thinking, Vaino Valjas said. Can those who at present are making a display with their party cards retain their honesty in the future, in the political [words indistinct]?

Within the past few years a big political breakthrough has been completed in Estonian political life, Valjas continued. All this must be kept in mind and one also needs to act in the future advisedly. There is no point in demonstrating one's frame of mind by running down other movements, marching out through doors, with one movement entering one way and another the other. This concerns also internal party differences which are characterized by two words: a party split. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Gobdun presented an alternative party program. He said that separating from the CPSU is a dead end and that the CP of Estonia must not act like the CP of Lithuania did. In the speaker's opinion, the CP of Estonia must be an indivisible component part of the CPSU while being fully independent. [passage omitted]

### Conference Ends 10 Feb

*LD1102112690 Moscow TASS in English 1106 GMT 11 Feb 90*

["Estonian Communists Fail To Agree on Program Document"—TASS headline]

[Text] Tallinn February 11 TASS—The Estonian Communist Party conference ended here on February 10.

The conference was convened by the decision of the 16th plenum of the Party Central Committee held in January.

Three hundred and sixty eight delegates to the conference, representing 100,000 Estonian communists, were to formulate the ideological and organisational principles of holding the 20th party congress, which was decided to convene on March 23.

Estonian Communist Party chief Vaino Valjas delivered a report on the party's role and place in society in conditions when a multi-party system is being formed in the republic, and on the tasks stemming from this.

On the agenda of the conference were also items related to the elaboration of the party's rules and program documents, and historic appraisal of the party's activity.

The debate launched at the conference reflected the breadth of delegates' views ranging from proposals fully to reform the party and give a new name to it to preserving its status quo.

Delegates discussed the two alternative drafts of the party program documents. Supporters of the first document suggest drastically renewing the party, supporters of the second one believe that it will be enough to elaborate a programme which does not affect the foundations of the Soviet Communist Party unity.

The sides failed to reach full agreement and draft a document which could be put to the discussion of the delegates of the Estonian Communist Party congress. They need help from all members of the republican organisation.

The adopted resolution on the procedure for conducting an inner party discussion on the program documents commits the republican party organisations to holding pre-congress debates and drafting proposals aimed at ensuring the efficiency of the Estonian Communist Party and extending to each communist the right to a free expression of will.

The conference charged the Party Bureau with forming a working group. Its task will be to generalise, relying on the mutual respect of interests, all proposals and prepare a respective material for the 20th Party Congress.

## Estonian Deputies Call for Independence

*LD0502151190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] Last Friday a general meeting of Estonian deputies of soviets at all levels was held in Tallinn. Of 4,500 deputies elected by the people, 3,090 deputies took part in the meeting. The meeting adopted a declaration on the restoration of Estonian independence. This document states that Estonia is a state annexed in 1940, that the peace treaty [passage indistinct]

Estonia will wage its struggle for independence exclusively with peaceful means. The declaration reminds the United Nations that after the World War II all independent states occupied during the war by the belligerent sides were restored with the exception of the three Baltic states. Estonia appeals for support to the world public, including the summit conference which will take place in Helsinki. [passage omitted]

The meeting proposes to the USSR Supreme Soviet that negotiations start with legal representatives of the Estonian people on the restoration of independence of the Estonian state. The declaration was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes: 101 deputies voted against and 17 deputies abstained.

On 14 February a routine session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will open in Moscow. Our deputies will raise there the question of negotiations. It was announced at a press conference that we will act jointly with the deputies from Lithuania and Latvia.

Even during the preparation for the deputies' meeting deep differences arose about the future of Estonia. At the meeting, after heated arguments, a political declaration of a group of deputies from northeastern towns and Tallinn was heard. They opposed the idea of independence and announced the setting up of a committee for the defense of minority rights. This committee consists of 25 people, mainly representatives of the Russian society. The chairman of the committee is USSR People's Deputy Yarovoy, director of the naval military works.

In its statement the committee announced that it will cooperate with the authorities in towns, rayons, and other inhabited areas which recognize its rights. The committee will decide which republican acts are valid and which are not. In essence it is a claim to dual power. The political declaration threatens a whole arsenal of measures against the restoration of independece, including civic disobedience, strikes, and a demand to the USSR Supreme Soviet that a new national territorial formation be created in Estonia. By the way, last Monday the Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration on the republic's territorial integrity. It is possible briefly to describe as colonial the aims of the committee in defending the soviet rule and civic rights in Estonia on the basis of this last item. The committee should be called a colonial committee. I am convinced that soon we will have our own Estonian alternative party.

The situation in Estonia today is calm but tense.

## Estonia To Open Independence Talks with Moscow

*LD1002094390 Moscow TASS in English 0913 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[By ETA correspondent Alexander Suits]

[Text] Tallinn February 10 TASS—An event has occurred in Estonia that six months ago would have been viewed as inconceivable and calls for it would have been branded as extremist: The assembly of people's deputies of all levels has decided to begin talks with the USSR federal authorities on the restoration of an independent Estonia.

True, it is difficult to say if the decision can be regarded as legally valid, as the assembly is not a body of state authority and it has not been registered, in accordance with law, by the presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet as a political organisation. But the declaration of state independence is signed by most deputies of the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

So, the decision has been made. What next? At the moment, no one in the republic, including the deputies who promulgated the declaration, can say how, when and where talks will begin.

According to Yulo Nugis, a Soviet people's deputy who initiated the assembly, most of them are inclined to delegate the decision on the beginning of talks to the republic's supreme legislature, the Supreme Soviet, but only after it is reflected on March 10.

Political scientists, including philosophy professor Mikk Titma, a central committee secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, believe that the new parliament's most influential force will comprise a bloc of parties formed on the basis of the Popular Front and the Front of Work Collectives, the largest public organisations in Estonia.

What is the opinion of the republic's future held by the leaders of the two major parties—Liberal and Social Democratic?

Yulo Nugis, who leads the liberals and is presently chairman of the council of Estonia's Work Collectives, and Rein Veidemann, deputy chief of the Social Democratic Party, are confident that talks with Moscow should proceed peacefully without undue haste, and the strength of the Estonian delegation must be based on its confidence. They are sure that the achievement of independence depends above all on the position of the centre and, consequently, do not count on quick success.

Incidentally, Nugis is also quite confident that Estonia is not yet ready to become politicaly independent soon. As regards economics, neither of the two political leaders can picture Estonia's economic life without close economic ties with the Soviet Union.

In a related development, the ETA News Agency has reported from Kohtla-Jarva that deputies from Estonia's northeastern regions plan to proclaim at the next session that republican laws which are at variance with the USSR constitution are null and void on their territory.

## Estonian Premier Explains Price Hikes

*LD0602100690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2115 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Recently it has been reported that prices in Estonia have gone up. Which prices? By how much? Here is our correspondent with details.

[Khelmut Lenk] In Estonia, a bottle of vodka now costs between R12 and R16, a bottle of beer on average R1, and a pack of cigarettes from 60 kopeks to R1. That is, on average alcoholic beverages have gone up by 20 percent, cigarettes by 50 percent and beer by 100 percent. What caused the Estonian government to take this step? [Video shows Lenk demonstrating bottles and cigarette packs.]

[I. Kh. Toome, chairman of Estonia's Council of Ministers—identified by caption] The economic situation in the republic is fairly difficult. But when we looked again at what step, what unusual step we must take, we decided on increases on these products, that is, on beer, on tobacco, and on wine and spirit products. We collect these resources, they are not at all small, into a special social fund; there is a fund council, and it determines where and how these resources are to be used. It has already been established with their assistance that the minimum pension in the republic will be R80.

[Lenk] Could you tell me how the public received this government decision to raise the prices of alcoholic drinks?

[Toome] The public received it normally. The reaction of the central bodies is fairly equivocal in the sense that they criticize us fairly strongly for thus affecting neighboring oblasts and worsening their situation in supplies of wines, spirits, tobacco, and beer, because our people buy up all these products there. I doubt that our little republic is going to affect all these oblasts so badly that we have to talk about a catastrophe.

[Announcer] Well, to my knowledge no one has so far been talking of a catastrophe. But the problems mentioned by the Estonian premier of course merit separate discussion. Indeed, many inhabitants of the republic now travel to neighboring oblasts, where they buy cigarettes, vodka and so on at our, Russian prices, naturally when these are available. And the reaction of the locals you can imagine for yourselves. But the fact that the Estonians know where the money they pay for more expensive goods is going is something to be welcomed in my opinion.

## Estonian Supreme Soviet Rejects Division

*LD0802204190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 31 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] First, about today's session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium. Lembit Karri reports on the telephone.

[Karri] I am sharing these thoughts at the moment from the building of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The first point discussed today at the session of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has been worded quite laconically: On the Statement of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. In essence it is the case of a group of democratic deputies [officially recognized group within the Supreme Soviet] who share a great concern over the fate of the Estonian territory. People's Deputy Enn Poldroos explained the stances on behalf of the group of deputies. [passage omitted]

But the essence of the matter? I will acquaint you with one section of the statement:

The Estonian political atmosphere has recently been acutely exacerbated by appeals presented in the press, as well as at various meetings by some USSR people's deputies, to set up an autonomous state entity upon Estonian territory. Concern over a possible development of events of this kind had also been expressed at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, being the top body of state power in the Estonian SSR, can provide but one assessment to intentions of this kind: Splitting the Estonian SSR is impermissible. Estonia is uniform and indivisible. According to international law, the indigenous population decides the fate of Estonia, as of any other area which has been formed ethnically and historically, because the right of self-determination belongs only to it. For this reason, only the will of the people can alter how a state is organized. [passage omitted]

## CPSU Central Committee Plenum

### PRAVDA Carries Speeches on Lithuanian Debate

### Brazauskas Answers Questions

*PM0902144390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Single Edition p 4*

[Debate speech by A.M.-K. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Comrades! I have already spoken from this rostrum about what made it necessary to convene the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and adopt such unusual and, I would say, unaccustomed decisions for the CPSU, which were sharply criticized at the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum. Six weeks have elapsed since then.

This time has given us much. Much has also changed in the life of the entire CPSU. Each one of us has been able to calmly ponder once again the essence of this issue in depth and assess the new elements and processes taking place in the republic, throughout the country, and even abroad.

In this light Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit, the fact that he came to our republic, and the earlier visit to Lithuania by a group of Central Committee members were of great significance. Without doubt, this facilitated greater mutual understanding of and deeper familiarization with the situation in our republic and the decisions and other documents from the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

I must tell the plenum that our path and our decisions have met with pretty good understanding among Lithuania's communists. I must also add that we are receiving very many letters from many oblasts and republics in the Union which also take the state of affairs and the processes taking place in our republic to heart. I believe that the lively, innovative discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress throughout those three days has reflected general understanding of the Lithuanian communists' new ideas. After all, a considerable number of this document's proposals designed to speed up perestroyka within the party had already been practically realized at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress are in fact now being tested in practice.

But, comrades, a historic decision has been adopted today. The draft platform, for which we voted an hour ago, contains a section on republics' communist parties: They can independently decide organizational, financial, cadre, and publishing questions. The question of a Russian Communist Party was discussed. The question of the formation of a CPSU Presidium with representation from leaders of all the union republics' communist parties also found a place in the program. What about Article 6 of the Constitution? What about a multi-party system? Our ears are not yet perhaps very accustomed to the word, but it is happening. Our program is close to social democracy—and we have been very fulsomely criticized for it.

Next. Electing delegates to the congress. We have utilized this experience in primary organizations. It turned out to be very good. It is now a question of the whole party's using this method. Well, would that be a bad thing?

And so on and so on and so forth.... Comrades, allow me to put a stop to this; I do not know what will happen next. But I would in turn like to give reasons for the steps taken by the Communist Party. After all, as first secretary, I must and do have that right. The Lithuanian Communist Party has become an independent political party with its own program, rules, and other political documents. This has not happened because of someone's personal interest, but on the initiative of primary party organizations, which were the first to raise this question and have been raising it for a long time.

The party can only play a positive role in and influence society as a political force if it is capable of making forecasts and adopting the requisite political decisions in a timely fashion. In other words, the party must be at the forefront rather than the tail end of events. From this viewpoint it must be stated that the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress enable us Lithuanian communists to enjoy definite support within society, as indicated by a recent sociological study in the republic. I think that that is a good thing. It does not happen that often in party organizations either in the oblasts, or in other republics. We think that we have, I would say, overcome the crisis situation within the Lithuanian Communist Party. We have overcome it and become a most influential force, and we may have taken the lead among the influential forces in the republic.

The aim of any political organization, particularly a party, is to recognize the interests arising in society in a timely fashion and take steps to implement them, not impose its programs and concepts on people forcibly, but on the contrary base its policy on their rational demands. This is a new approach, a nontraditional one, I would say, in our political system. It has still not been accepted by everyone. Some people are of course still holding back and working in the old way with the old, so to speak, way of thinking, according to the old habits. We can see for ourselves increasingly profoundly that the people and their most progressive strata, in their endeavor to achieve something in a democratic and aware fashion, always prove to be correct. It is useless to doubt or particularly try to curb the people's sudden impulses with plans born in the hush of an office. I believe that many of those present have been able to see this for themselves from personal experience.

It is necessary today to find and open up windows to new ideas and borrow progressive elements from other countries' parties—everything that ultimately benefits people. That must be the determining method in our work. It is from this stance that we propose considering the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. The idea of national rebirth and restoration of statehood has become a crucial one for most people in the republic, as Mikhail Sergeyevich said just now in his report. However, many people in Lithuania have a different understanding of the ways to achieve this. That is why there is a broad spectrum of opinions ranging from very left-wing to the absolute opposite. There are also extreme viewpoints. However, most of Lithuania's inhabitants are united by our communist party's slogan. We do not hide the fact that a Lithuania without sovereignty is a Lithuania without a future.

Sovereignty is interpreted as the real opportunity to independently resolve economic, political, and sociocultural problems with consideration for all factors—both external and internal. Most of the republic's inhabitants are convinced that this only lies within the powers of a sovereign, that is, above all a politically independent republic state.

Not everyone understands this formulation of the question. Especially, of course, those who do not live in our republic. But that is not a reason for arrogantly pinning on the "labels" which have become customary in our republic: Separatism, isolationism, nationalism, and even—it has been said on television—national socialism. No one cultivates or uses that word in our republic. Or other different "isms." Can we really say this of nations which once had and want to restore their independent state? Not just on paper, incidentally, as minuted here, but in fact. Especially since a national state is, in our view, a highly reliable guarantee of the survival and full-blooded existence of a nation, particularly a small nation, the preservation of historical continuity, and the further enrichment of cultural values, among which tolerant, good-neighborly relations with people of all nationalities living on this state's territory hold a particularly important place. Incidentally, the draft platform that has just been adopted says a very great deal about this.

This stance has been set out in Lithuanian Communist Party program documents. They say with total clarity that the party's aim is a democratic society in which socialism's fundamental humanist ideals—freedom of the individual and social justice—are implemented. In implementing its strategic aim of restoring a sovereign Lithuania, the communist party sees this path as a sequential, phased process.

The main thing today is to secure economic autonomy (there are, incidentally, great difficulties with this) and establish true political pluralism and parliamentary democracy. What is more we have chosen a peaceful, parliamentary, and constitutional path founded on good will and mutual understanding. It has already demonstrated its promise compared to other methods. That is why we are terrified to hear the oft-repeated reproach that we are about to break off our economic ties with our partners and destroy the economic integration that has taken shape. Something completely different is at issue.

Economic ties need to be established founded on market relations, and mutually beneficial economic interests need to be established within the Soviet Union. It is market relations that are, in our view, the sphere for and guarantee of cooperation among the peoples.

We have received and are receiving many letters supporting us. However, we are meeting with a great deal of incomprehension and, I would say, hostility today. Above all from those who are fighting for unitarian unity within the CPSU at any price, even though today we are already tackling these questions today in a different fashion. I must say that unity is the sum total of opposites, a dialectical process. But what kind of unity and founded on what? We believe that we must enter the 21st century with a qualitatively different level of consciousness, on principles of cooperation, equal partnership, mutual trust, and respect.

One cannot help but see that opinions are divided and different platforms are emerging within the party. The words "monolithical unity" have in fact somehow already ceased to exist in our vocabulary.

I must say that perestroyka alone, initiated by progressive forces within the party and by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, has taken the first steps toward the kind of unity that is founded on humanist, democratic values. Certainly, perestroyka within the party still lacks clear organizational structures. But we have already heard about the Gorbachev platform, the interregional communist group platform, the association of conservatives, the Lithuanian platform, and so on and so forth. That is, perestroyka within the party has already begun, and it has begun with the ideological separation or definition of its positions.

As I have already said, the Lithuanian Communist Party also has its own position. This does not involve disintegration and an appeal for demarcation but questing, without which there can hardly be progress. We see no other way, given the crisis within the communist movement. So, at this difficult time, let us spend a little more time analyzing what is happening and a little less time leveling accusations at one another.

Thus, we see the radical restructuring of the CPSU as a process with its own phases, special features, and contradictions. It requires maximum consideration for the specific conditions in every republic, the prevailing sociopolitical situation, and readiness from the communist party to acquire independence.

In conclusion I would like to point out that the party has reached a very serious time for self-analysis. Moreover, it must be realized that a great deal should have been done yesterday, that lost time in politics, as we can see from the example of Eastern Europe, is a very dangerous thing.

So let us ponder this together, propose constructive solutions, and reach a common understanding.

I would add that the independent Lithuanian Communist Party now contains 40 percent of the former Lithuanian Communist Party. Every communist who has determined his position with his signature is not, as it were, joining the Lithuanian Communist Party but undertaking to be guided by the Lithuanian Communist Party program and statutes. All of this has taken shape in our republic at party meetings and is being documented. We have been reproached for deciding at the congress amid the general uproar that this would be done automatically, but in practice every communist is in fact defining his position himself and putting his signature to this decision. So now we have 40 percent. This process is taking place; it began right after the congress. We delayed this process for a long time until the arrival of Mikhail Sergeyevich and the group of comrades and until the plenum, which was somewhat postponed. But party organizations themselves are also displaying initiative, and we only have to record these facts.

A word about the draft resolution read by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A word about the items in this resolution.

It is a fait accompli. The Communist Party has taken an organizational form: All organizational structures, statutes, program, and other documents. It is now hard to imagine how this process could really have been halted or the program and statutes set aside or ignored until the 28th CPSU Congress. Of course, those communists who have already taken their stand, myself, and other secretary colleagues who are here now can hardly imagine this in practice.

We are not proceeding, Mikhail Sergeyevich, dear comrades, to some conflict with our colleagues in the party who have formed another party in our republic. There are, of course, people putting forward their proposals in the newspapers and on television, but no steps have been taken by us in the Lithuanian Communist Party.

I would propose that the plenum take a serious look at the situation that has taken shape in the republic, within the Lithuanian Communist Party. I propose that no decision be adopted until the 28th CPSU Congress. Life is moving ahead, very interesting, historic decisions are being adopted for the whole CPSU, many of them involving those decisions which we adopted at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Adopting a decision of this kind could hardly help to unite and promote understanding among the Soviet Union's communists. [Brazauskas ends].

M.S. Gorbachev: Will you take part in the congress, or what? How do you intend to treat me—as president of a neighboring country?

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I never intended to treat you as president. You are perfectly well aware of that. It was other people who wanted to do that, and it is of course very difficult for me to answer for those people from this lofty rostrum.

M.S. Gorbachev: Comrade Brazauskas, here is a specific question. We do not want to fall out and sever all ties. That is absurd. First, it is a question of communists; second, of communists operating within a single state.

What is to happen if you do not suspend the congress decisions as regards the operation of the CPSU program and statutes? We are not saying that it is necessary to rescind them or to disband. We are responding just to this section of the congress decisions. That is, correspondingly, the essence of our proposal. Since two wings have already formed, let them carry on. But you have left the CPSU according to some of the provisions, resolutions, and statutes adopted at the congress. Will you not elect delegates then? No. You have left!

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: I am having difficulty in finding an answer today.

M.S. Gorbachev: We are giving you an outlet, you see?

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: It is very hard for me to answer this question right away on this platform.

M.S. Gorbachev: I have been telling you for a long time that you need to think.

G.K. Kryuchkov: I would like to ask the speaker a question. His position is understandable, as is the logic behind it. Apart from anything else we have been told to look at what has happened as an experience that the party should follow. The last plenum's resolution even said this. I have just one question. We are now reading foreign press reports—I have not as yet seen reports in our press —that the leaders of "Sajudis" are blatantly saying that there would be nothing for communists to do in an autonomous, independent Lithuania. They are saying outright that the Lithuanian Communist Party and its apparatchiks now state that they advocate an independent Lithuania, but there will be no place for them there. We have all read this, and comrades present here are aware of it.

M.S. Gorbachev: Yes, Comrade Kryuchkov. They are not even abashed. What is the point. It is now being said that we will hold the coming elections under the slogan "Soviets Without Communists."

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: That is what is in preparation.

G.K. Kryuchkov: I have the following question about this. The plenum speaker has now urged us to follow their path. He said that they have overcome the crisis within the party. They have overcome the crisis by destroying its unity. How do they picture the future? If they come to the logical end of the path on which they have embarked and of which they have spoken frankly both here and at the congresses of people's deputies, and if the "Sajudis" threat is realized—and we have seen positions surrendered one after the other at the demand of "Sajudis"—Lithuania will indeed be left without communists. Is that the path which we are being recommended, or is there another one?

A.-M. Brazauskas: This certainly is a very long and complex question and cannot be answered that easily. I can only turn this question about and ask the following question: What would have happened to the Lithuanian Communist Party had the 20th Congress not been held? If you had begun with that, Comrade Kryuchkov, I would agree with you. The situation would be approximately as you have said. But now more than 60 percent of candidate deputies are communists and many of them have chances of becoming deputies—I am referring to the republic's Supreme Soviet—at the coming election 24 February. Today, since the 20th congress, the Lithuanian Communist Party's standing has become very high. People, quite a large group of people, a very large group, support communists. I will tell you bluntly and frankly that some of "Sajudis"' leaders are communists—very many of them—and they were elected to the Central Committee at the congress and are working vigorously and defending the Lithuanian Communist Party positions. That arouses this kind of reaction, but it is real life. If we began to cut ourselves off from these movements, that would mean cutting ourselves off from the people.

"Sajudis" is seen as a kind of exclusive, closed, small organization. That is not the case. It is necessary to learn about it, so to speak, on site, and find out what it is like. It is an organization which in very many respects reflects the sentiments of most of the republic's population. You must understand that. If we seek common viewpoints with these organizations—and in other republics—and find common ground somehow when resolving common questions, normal life may be maintained in the republic. We must seek ways to reach such decisions in our time of perestroyka. And resolve those questions enshrined in the draft CPSU Central Committee program for the 28th congress.

I would not agree to unequivocally consider "Sajudis" to be a handful of people pursuing their own interests alone.

M.S. Gorbachev: A question? You would not object to being asked a question, Comrade Brazauskas?

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: Please, go ahead.

Yu.A. Prokofyev: I recently read your interview in a Lithuanian newspaper, a conversation with young people. You asserted there—and your comrades have also said it—that the title communist party is not absolutely necessary. You said that times are changing, and everything is undergoing change. You held forth there about how to establish mutual relations with an army of "occupation." "It is even advantageous for us to have it on our territory." You cited the example of West Germany also having an army of occupation, the U.S. Army, which defends West Germany. So you said that there is no need to expel the Russian occupiers since they are defending us, too. This was a real Lithuanian newspaper. If you are now saying that communists are boosting their standing in this manner, I would not like to be in that kind of party.

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: I am frequently asked why the Communist Party has this name and why it is not called something else. It has not been said officially in our republic, we have not said officially that the Lithuanian Communist Party aims to seek a way out by this means. I have not said that anywhere. People may have written what they wanted. I did give an interview, I did meet with our Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League]. Second, a word about the Army. We have very complex relations with the Army. Because there is a wing of people and young people who are being egged on and they are raising the question very vehemently. We put this question quite differently. We see the Soviet Army deployed in the republic as force in resolving questions in Lithuania's future as a sovereign republic within the Union. This is the only path that we see as feasible. When Mikhail Sergeyevich met with the leaders and commanders, I also raised the question of the need to adopt a law on the units deployed in republics. A law on the status of these armies, because there is a force in our republic which is raising very categorically the question of the Army—very categorically. We must seeks ways of resolving these questions.

S.I. Gurenko: I have a specific and very short question. I understood from the results of the vote that you voted in favor of the draft platform today. Is that so? You did not abstain and did not vote against. I am interested in this context in your position at the coming Congress of USSR People's Deputies when the Constitution will be changed. How do you justify this as a member of two parties.

Voice: What about Article 6?

S.I. Gurenko: And Article 6 and the presidency, everything that was raised today during the discussion of the draft platform.

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: I totally justify it. I justify everything totally. Article 6 has been rescinded in our republic.

## Shved Addresses Plenum

*PM0902160690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Debate speech by V.N. Shved, secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform), at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! In the last six weeks so much has been said about the situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party that you would not think there was any need to speak at all. But after studying the draft resolution I ask you, nonetheless, to hear me out once again.

I realize that this is the third day and it is a great strain for you both physically and mentally, but 200,000 communists and nearly 4 million people in the republic are waiting for your decisions.

As regards the draft resolution, one could agree with many of its provisions. But at the same time the lack of clear political assessments of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party decisions gives rise to a degree of doubt.

In general these assessments are necessary not in order to slam the CPSU's door in the face of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party. We, too, are in favor of leaving these doors open. But it is necessary to know what thoughts, what ideas and ideology, people are bringing to the CPSU. We remember Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's principled report in December; these assessments were given then. Today, after M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania, the republic's Communists await confirmation of these assessments by the plenum itself. And not only Lithuania's communists, I am sure. The debate at this plenum has shown that in general the Lithuanian situation could repeat itself both in individual components and in the CSPU as a whole. The draft resolution proposes that the 20th congress decisions be regarded as proposals for the 28th CPSU Congress. Yes, it is true that a number of points put forward at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress merit attention. But in general, what is the ideological and political thrust of the 20th congress documents? Can they be regarded today as a new contribution to perestroyka in the party, as Comrade Brazauskas proposes?

It has been said here that the crisis in the Lithuanian Communist Party was overcome thanks to these decisions. You can judge that for yourselves, comrades, on the basis of an illustration, though perhaps not a very tactful one. The father of the debate or, so to speak, the movement for the Communist Party's autonomy, Professor Stasis Uosis, handed in his party card only a week ago, saying that there is no place for him in this renewed party, it is too burdened down by crimes. Only a month has elapsed since the end of the 20th congress, at which he spoke out very energetically. What new crimes have been committed by the party which he has suddenly left? He did his bit, then left. But, if I may say so, the communists whom he won over have remained behind. And there are many such cases today. A whole series of "esteemed" comrades led the Communist Party up a blind alley and are now trying to evade responsibility. So can you perhaps form an assessment on the basis of these facts: Has the crisis in the Lithuanian Communist Party been overcome? As regards perestroyka in the Lithuanian Communist Party's activity in general, I think Mikhail Sergeyevich is right when he says that this is not perestroyka, but the surrender of positions and a change of goals, ideas, and slogans.

One cannot ignore the fact that as a result of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress decisions a number of fundamental contradictions arose, primarily in the ideological and political sphere, between the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU. I would say that there has been a kind of ideological reorientation of the Lithuanian Communist Party. The essence of the main contradiction between supporters of the reorganized party and us amounts to this: "Outside the Union or inside the Union." We too are in favor of Lithuania's independence from diktat, voluntarism, strong-arm tactics, and bureaucratic centralism. But we are in favor of an autonomous, socialist, free Lithuanian republic within a union of similar republics. That in itself is where we differ ideologically and politically from the supporters of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party.

It is therefore highly necessary for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolution to give not only an assessment based on organizational statutes, but also an ideological and political assessment of the 20th congress decisions. Ambivalence and uncertainty are absolutely impermissible on these questions. Yet the proposed draft resolution does not make its points entirely clearly.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolution will do much to determine what forces—destructive forces that prey parasitically on perestroyka, or consolidating forces that defend the party's perestroyka in practice rather than in slogans—will prevail and take the upper hand in the CPSU. After all, it is not very long until the 28th congress.

The resolution should also express itself more clearly on the subject of CPSU members in the republic. Under the present draft it seems that all communists remain members of the CPSU, that is, in effect the status quo is retained in the Lithuanian Communist Party. But as the comrades who spoke before me have noted, that is not the case. It is proposed even that the elections of delegates to the 28th congress be carried out jointly, that is, by both the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party and the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. Yet even from a purely organizational viewpoint that is virtually impossible to do.

In the six weeks since the 20th congress, and Comrade Brazauskas has confirmed this, an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party has been created, with all the appurtenances and with its own structures. We too, albeit rather belatedly, have begun correspondingly to form our own structure, although, you remember, we promised not to do this before the end of the plenum. But we were forced into it. Today there are some 35,000 members in our ranks, and some 74,000 in the ranks of the reorganized party.

We are well aware, comrades, that the split in the party exacerbated the situation in the republic and generally exacerbated the situation in society as a whole. The split took place at virtually every level of the organs of power. We are constantly asking ourselves one question: Was any other development of the situation possible? If you look at it in theoretical terms, the answer is "yes," but in practical terms, given the existing tactics and the CPSU Central Committee's reaction to unusual situations, I think the answer is "no." It is distressing, but that is the answer.

I recently came across a review of the situation that was sent to the CPSU Central Committee from the republic on 15 May of last year. One question that it formulated and substantiated was: Is the CPSU Central Committee ready for the formation of autonomous Communist Parties in the Baltic republics if this is done without prior consultation? In December, that was the situation we were presented with. But the question was put back in May. I am not prepared to say why this happened. There were probably situations, unknown circumstances, that prevented the CPSU Central Committee from adopting the appropriate measures. But let us come back to the recent past.

The first part of our plenum ended on 26 December. Inspired by your support, we went back to the republic. And what then? Then... we had to wait a whole two weeks for the arrival of the CPSU Central Committee members. I realize there was the New Year and a whole range of other problems, perhaps it was difficult to come. But comrades, it was during those two weeks after the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the main work was done in the republic to form the organizational structures of the reorganized Communist Party, and the presence of the CPSU Central Committee members would probably have halted that activity. But it did not happen. Unfortunately Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was greeted, on his arrival, by representatives of two republican Communist Parties.

Another interesting point. The attitude of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee to its supporters is doing much to attract communists into the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party. To be honest, I actually envy them. For instance, in Shalchininkskiy Rayon there are more than 2,000 communists, of whom only 102 have gone over to the reorganized Communist Party. And what do you think? Literally within the week they formed a raykom [rayon committee] and resolved all the other questions. In the city of Snechkus there are even fewer supporters of the Lithuanian Communist Party—only 20 or 30—but nonetheless it is planned to create a gorkom [city committee] here, too.

Yet we have been in a state of uncertainty for six weeks, and are losing people. And unfortunately, judging by the draft resolution, this uncertainty will not really be lessened, and further losses are possible. Yet there are about 100,000 communists in the republic who have not yet made up their minds. About 100,000!

The communists' process of making up their minds is very severely affected by the lack of legal protection for CPSU members. It has already been said that the practice of ignoring union laws and adopting republican laws that contradict union laws has become widespread. Against this background the talk of outlawing the CPSU—which has also been mentioned here today—becomes very real for many communists. Furthermore, yesterday the republican newspapers published a draft Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] law on political parties. Article 2 of this law reads: "Political parties of other states may not be formed or operate on Lithuanian SSR territory."

If you add to that the fact that at this very moment (yes, it is now 1647 hours, Vilnius time) it is possible that the Supreme Soviet is adopting a decision in our republic deeming unlawful the Lithuanian People's Seimas declaration of 21 July 1940 on Lithuania's entry into the USSR, the reaction of many CPSU supporters to the possibility of finding themselves outlawed is quite unequivocal. In light of the constant psychological pressure that Comrade Kuptsov spoke of, when the labels "Ceausescu-ist" and "CPSU-ist" are generally the least offensive, the lack of legal and social protection for CPSU members becomes clear.

I therefore support the proposal for greater legislative activity by our people's deputies from the party in the sphere of protection of the constitutional democratic rights of CPSU members.

It should perhaps be stated frankly in the plenum resolution: "People's deputies from the CPSU are instructed to present to the Supreme Soviet proposals on strengthening democratic guarantees for CPSU members in the union republics." Well, perhaps (I am no lawyer) it should be formulated slightly differently. Apart from that, I think the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee should also have a weighty say.

Today the party is losing much ground by virtue of the communists' lack of theoretical armor against the problems that have arisen recently. The Central Committee's scientific institutions (the Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Higher Party School) do not provide us with sufficient scientifically argued criticism of the pseudocommunist ideas and documents that are being propagandized widely today.

Unfortunately, the reverse sometimes happens. Not infrequently, processes that are by no means perestroyka processes are given a blessing at the highest level. For instance, I was asked to tell the members of the plenum that many communists in the republic associate the ideological and theoretical basis for the processes that led the republic to today's situation with the visit to Lithuania by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev in August 1988, when this situation was only just taking shape. But when the situation had patently taken a wrong turning, for some reason a prompt reaction did not ensue from the CPSU Central Committee.

One last thing. The Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform is today operating in unprecedented conditions. We will not achieve success without the broadest democracy and autonomy in the activity of primary party organizations and of the party itself. Therefore we are already utilizing in practice a number of the provisions of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress that were discussed yesterday and today.

I think the plenum will support us in this respect and will consolidate de jure (since, comrades, this is already the case de facto, and there is no escaping that) our right autonomously to resolve all local questions.

In general, speaking of the status of the union republic Communist Parties, I am entirely in solidarity with Comrade Ivashko in the view that the new CPSU Statutes should reflect only the basic principles of party organization, while the tactics and methods of resolving local questions should be defined autonomously by the union republic Communist Parties.

The resolution that is to be adopted at the plenum today should, in my view, be the first practical step toward implementation of the proposed CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, I have three points for the draft resolution, shall I read them?

First. It should be noted that the 20th congress decisions are a blow against perestroyka and are separatist in nature. The program documents adopted at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress are basically a departure from the ideological and political principles of the CPSU. As a result there has been a certain ideological reorientation in the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party.

Second. The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress decisions are basically a step toward the splitting of the CPSU and an attempt to reorganize it as a union of Communist Parties. While assessing positively the idea of equal participation by all republican Communist Parties in the management of the affairs of the entire CPSU, bearing in mind the federalist and localistic trends that have recently intensified within the USSR, the federal principle of party organization should be deemed unacceptable for the CPSU at the present stage.

Third. In accordance with Paragraph 21 of the CPSU Statutes and the basic provisions on party perestroyka set forth in the draft CPSU Central Committee program for the 28th program, the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) and its Central Committee should be allowed to decide basic questions of organization of the activity of party organizations autonomously, in accordance with the existing situation.

Since we received the draft resolution very late, I propose that another point be formulated in such a way as to leave the door open for the 100,000 communists in our republic who have not yet made up their minds.

## Paletskis Discusses Situation

*PM0902152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6*

[Debate speech by Yu.-V.Yu. Paletskis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee plenum 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Although the ceilings of this auditorium are high, the past, of course, dominates us all. That is how it is and how it is going to be for many years to come; there is nothing you can do about it. Unfortunately, our past has not been a series of victory marches and joyous reports. It contains little democracy and tolerance but a very great deal of authoritarianism, much totalitarianism, and many personality cults. There have also been cults without personality.

Today, together with my colleagues from the Lithuanian Communist Party, I have been delighted to see that the CPSU has adopted an innovative platform which must help the party on the eve of the elections. It represents a big step forward in the renewal of the party and society, a creative quest, and assistance for those who believe in the party's creative strength.

As far as the second question on the agenda is concerned, in my view, the past is stubbornly dragging us back and opinions still incline toward the same old stereotypes and willful, strong-arm decisions.... Evidently not for the first time, the processes in Lithuania are being linked to Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev's arrival in the republic in August 1988. I think this is quite wrong. The first rallies—rallies involving hundreds of thousands of people—had already staged in Lithuania before his arrival and were connected with seeing our delegates off to the 19th party conference and with meeting the delegates. I do not think there is any need to accuse the 19th party conference of anything here. To go even further back, many will say that the root of the processes in Lithuania lie in April 1985. Indeed, if it had not been for perestroyka, we would have continued to let functionaries have a quiet, easy life and would have successfully gone on the skids to a Romania-type situation, I would say.

When Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev visited Lithuania on the eve of the 20th congress, our guest came under a storm of attack in a closed auditorium, with nothing relayed on television or printed in the press (that is what happnes in our republic, as a rule). These attacks were not directed against Comrade Brazauskas or Comrade Berezov, but against perestroyka and our party's current leaders. There were cries for help like: Save this socialism which we are so used to and which is so dear to us. In short, save the old brand of socialism!

Many of those who complained so bitterly now find themselves in the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform). I do not mean that we have no dead wood in the Lithuanian Communist Party. There are all kinds of people in the party, and we have decided, incidentally, to set up a commission to draw up criteria whereby we could get rid of communists who have violated the norms of law and morality. But I think that there are very many people among our opponents who do not like the CPSU of perestroyka. The CPSU of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's times or of the still more distant past is more to their taste.

It is very good that the plenum materials are going to be published. I think that, unfortunately, there have been not only many inaccuracies but also a great deal of disinformation from this lofty tribune—not only on the first part [of the agenda], but also on the second question. I have no doubt that, once all this has been published, there will be refutations.

Comrades Kuptsov and Grigoryev attended a rally in Shalchininkay in the republic. They met some members of the local Polish community there, and this has been mentioned as an impressive moment here. Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies went to this region yesterday and also met with Poles, Belorussians, and Russians there. But the comrades are probably aware that Poles live in Belorussia and the Ukraine, too. With regard to schools where classes are conducted in Polish, teaching in higher education, and also Polish newspapers and journals, the situation in Lithuania is much better than in the other republics I have just mentioned. Of course, the situation in our republic is not ideal in this respect: We need to improve the conditions for Belorussians, Poles, and representatives of other nationalities in our republic.

Someone here used the phrase: "Self-defense." This immediately evokes associations—armed detachments, militants, and so forth. This is not the case at all, of course. I do not intend to comment on what has been said in Lithuania about self-defense, but what was meant was defense via the law and not via some armed struggle. Unfortunately, it has been said again here at the plenum that the events in the Baltic are comparable to the events in the Transcaucasus. As if we too are in chaos, as if we too have bloodshed or something similar. That is not true. Comrades who have visited us have seen this for themselves.

I would like to say a few words about feelings of panic among the nonindigenous population of Lithuania. Obviously some people are panicking. I believe there is similar panic in Moscow and other regions of the Soviet Union. But, overall, there is no cause for panic in Lithuania.

Comrade Burokyavichyus said almost nothing about his own party in his speech, but mainly talked about the "mortal sins" of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Comrade Shved talked more about his party but also mainly concentrated on our sins. I do not think that these complaints that this party is being insulted or the appeals for some kind of assistance are really warranted. People familiar with the situation in Lithuania will certainly agree with the conclusion that the situation in the republic is gradually improving if you compare it with what it was like a year ago. People are taking a more sober view of the future. The loudmouths and demagogues no longer have the kind of support they had, say, during the elections of USSR people's deputies in March last year. At that time a popular phrase was this: An orangutan could be elected under the "Sajudis" flag. Now, I think, the people of Lithuania have a better understanding of their parliament and orangutans will not be elected to the local soviets. On the contrary, competent, honest people and, of course, people who have shown their mettle in the conditions of perestroyka will be elected.

The wave of support for the renewed Lithuanian Communist Party very soon turned into a great wave of anticommunism in Lithuania. It must be said that this wave was directed not against the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform but against the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, as a real political force which for some people represents a very serious rival in the election battle.

A rhetorical question has been asked from this rostrum: To be or not to be, to be part of the USSR or not? I do not think that either Comrade Brazauskas or Comrade

Burokyavichyus is empowered to answer this question. The only people who can answer this question are the people of Lithuania.

Someone said here yesterday that Eastern Europe is our buffer zone and someone has smashed it, and so forth. I think this is offensive both to the peoples of Eastern Europe and to any other peoples. If we are moving toward democracy, the people's choice cannot be stopped. We must renounce such imperial ways in this respect.

In conclusion, there is something I would like to say on behalf of my colleagues Berezov and Glavyatskas, secretaries of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee (evidently they will be unable to speak). We are confident that the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, which was preceded by broad debate in party organizations, adopted documents consonant with the democratic and progressive aims of perestroyka in our republic. We hope that all democratic forces in the CPSU will treat them with understanding. The renewed party of Lithuanian Communists has dissociated itself from the crimes committed by the Lithuanian CPSU organization against its own people in the past under the diktat of Stalinism. The Lithuanian Communist Party is striving to create a democratic society in which the basic humanist ideals of socialism will be put into practice: Freedom and social justice, and also personal values common to all mankind—the individual, the family, the nation. Performing the will of the people, it has proclaimed its main aim to be the restoration of Lithuanian statehood, lost in 1940 as a result of the criminal collusion between Stalin and Hitler.

Proclaiming the idea of sovereignty in their program documents, members of the independent Lithuanian party fully support the Lithuanian people's desire to restore the independence of the Lithuanian state by peaceful, democratic means. We are confident that, in pursuing the above aims, Lithuanian communists will strive to preserve and strengthen friendly relations with the CPSU.

## Yakovlev Calls Situation 'Blow to Perestroyka'

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[Debate speech by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Comrades!

It is always unpleasant and awkward trying to justify oneself. But I must clarify the situation, since one way or another my name has cropped up umpteen times at the plenum in connection with the Lithuanian events. What do I think about it and what did I say in Lithuania?

But first and foremost I want to stress that I endorse the analysis and assessments contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report to the plemum.

I would put it more strongly: I regard what happened in the Lithuanian organization as a blow to perestroyka at the most difficult, the most crucial, the most critical time. The international consequences could be serious, too.

The report is right: Whether the 20th congress participants like it or not, the decisions they made objectively encourage both in society and in the party a return to the strong-arm, command instincts of the past and furnish its champions with speculative arguments.

If the comrades cannot understand this, we are dealing with political naivety, which will inevitably lead to the Lithuanian Communist Party's disappearance, and the more intensive the separatist processes in the republic become, the sooner that will happen. Anyone who is not familiar with the nuts and bolts of politics cannot expect to succeed.

But if they can see this, if they are aware of it, and if this is precisely the effect they want to produce, then they are setting a trap for themselves, and no one else.

One of the paramount principles on which the building of our party began is that of overcoming the ethnic disunity of individual detachments. The Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party was essentially born out of the debate about whether it should be an agglomeration of national organizations or an integrated whole. They opted for an integrated whole.

It is true that in the past common sense has sometimes been distorted. We know all this. Certainly, what happened is to some extent a penalty for such distortions, for allowing the pendulum to swing the other way. But this does not relieve the Lithuanian communists of responsibility, of course. It seems to me that it is extremely important today to endeavor to examine the reasons for what happened in a calm way, curbing the understandable emotions. Otherwise it will be difficult, impossible even to outline and implement really effective steps to rectify the situation.

The subjective aspect is well known. The activity of opposition forces. Mistakes and errors by the party organization. Nationalism—it is all there, it is all operating, and it is all extremely dangerous, particularly nationalism, in all its manifestations.

We all know about the particular danger of nationalism. But the phenomenon keeps on cropping up, like a Phoenix from the ashes. So there are objective as well as subjective causes. We must find them. We must get away from dogma and cliches, not only in relation to nationalism, but in relation to all other factors that contribute to it, because the nationalities question is an extremely delicate, extremely subtle one.

What did I talk about in Lithuania, at the republic party-ideological aktiv conference in August 1988? This and other speeches were published in full in the republican press, so there is no need for conjecture. Anyone can read them.

I talked about the republic's contribution to unionwide culture and science, I said that people would remember Mezhelaytis' poem "Man," Iokubonis' "Grieving Mother" monument, and Zhalakyavichyus' movie "No One Wanted To Die," which became famous in the sixties. In the seventies the country discovered the honest and profound prose of Avizhyus, the philosophical poems and plays of Martsinkyavichyus, and the theater in Panevezhis and Vanionis? became a very popular Soviet actor. In the eighties the Lithuanian Chamber Orchestra gained national recognition and the star of the young director Nekroshyus rose.

I also talked about the danger of nationalism, but also about the need to protect all peoples' national assets, language, culture, and architectural and other monuments. About the economy's contradictory influence on interethnic relations. About federation problems, which none of the peoples has avoided, including a republic like Russia. About the fact that the party aktiv must have a considered and cogent stance on these and other issues of interethnic relations.

I said that internationalism is a moral as well as political category, a general national and human asset. That the 19th all-union party conference came out very strongly in favor of international socialist fraternity of the peoples.

That is my view of the issue. I have expounded it more than once in other speeches. It has been and will contionue to be my view. I am categorically opposed to all nationalism, but I am in favor of all things national developing on the broadest front: Language, culture, good traditions, all that constitutes The People. And the smaller the people the more tact and attention it requires.

Is the situation in Lithuania a lost cause? I think not. Are there dangers? Certainly, and they have been indicated pretty accurately here. But there is something else, apart from the danger. It has to be admitted that the situation in the republic is the all too familiar one of a party organization that is unable to function. The leadership has been shortsighted.

The Lithuanian Communists are declining to share the common burden. It is not only going to get heavier for each of us, it will become much heavier because each successive step will be inhibited by doubts about one another—what if someone else decides to drop out? Because yet another problem is being added to the numerous problems of perestroyka, perhaps the most serious—the prospect of a split.

Who benefits from what has happened? The Lithuanian people, the Lithuanian Communist Party, the republic, its renewal, and democracy will benefit in the future, we are told. To be frank, I would like to believe this, but I do not. I do not believe it because now, today, not in the future, this step obviously benefits primarily the conservative forces inside and outside the republic; it benefits nationalism and chauvinism, which reject the principle of internationalism and self-determination of nations.

I am convinced all communists, including Lithuanians, will now find it harder to live and work. It will be harder to follow the path of absolutely essential transformations, harder to prepare for the next, 28th congress, harder to uphold a progressive platform and democratic party Statutes.

I would urge Lithuanian Communists to display common sense—think the question over again and again, discuss it again and again, unemotionally, unhurriedly, debate the situation with all communists, discuss everything that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said today in a reasonable way and with a sense of responsility to their people and to the Soviet state..

Finally, whatever happens—I cannot, of course, tell people what not to say—I would ask you to listen to what was published in the Lithuanian newspapers. What I said was as follows:

Nationalism begins when national exclusiveness is fostered, when the interests of one's own people are counterposed to the interests of other peoples, when spiritual ties between nations are restricted or severed. Nationalism is not only blind, it is inhuman. It seeks enemies, not friends; it confronts and does not unite, and it ignores universal human values.

There are too many links between our peoples, their past and present, economies and cultures, for people to cease regarding these links as an asset. In fact, the elimination of the bureaucratic-command style of leadership, ignorance, and indifference on the way to the renewal of society will lead to stronger socialist unity of nations and ethnic groups. We can only eliminate common woes by acting together. If we act separately, an impasse is assured.

Leading society means, above all, having a fine appreciation of the nature and meaning of the processes occurring in it and reacting correctly to them.

True patriotism is a powerful force. Speculative pseudopatriotism must be countered by vigorous, clear-sighted patriotism and its prestige must be enhanced in the public's mind. Conscious love of one's own people is incompatible with ethnic isolation, hostility and prejudice toward other peoples and cultures, and attempts to demean their honor and dignity.

A nation's prosperity presupposes the creative assimilation of all the best things that have been devised by mankind and the ability to offer to other nation's something valuable from its own experience. In other words, true patriotism always leads to internationalism and fostering of universal human interests.

That is what I said in Lithuania. I am not responsible for the rumors that are being spread; well-meaning, perhaps, by hearsay, or, maybe, with an ulterior motive.

That is all I wanted to say. I will stop there and leave you to judge.

### Obkom Head Kuptsov Comments

*PM0902162190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Debate speech by V.A. Kuptsov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Vologda party obkom, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! Like other members of the party Central Committee, I have also had occasion to participate in many meetings with Lithuania's labor collectives and party organizations and to talk with the republic's population, communists, and party aktiv. Since 25 December last year, we all have had time to interpret everything that has been done, and for us also what we have seen, and to once more ponder our actions.

Frankly speaking, I had considerable doubts about the expediency of the trip to Lithuania. Nonetheless, in the wake of this accomplished fact, I want to tell members of the party Central Committee that we found the only correct way out of the prevailing situation. It was supported by people and made it possible to convincingly prove yet again to everyone that the CPSU Central Committee seeks all possible ways out of a difficult situation.

Now about the conclusions. In my view, the situation in Lithuania is considerably more complex than we previously imagined and than we imagine even today. Of course, we should have gone there not in January this year but at least a year ago, possibly even after the situation in Lithuania had been appraised during Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev's trip....

Of course, the republic, like everywhere, has quite a few difficulties—and this must be objectively admitted—and its own domestic problems. There are very many complaints about the center. Matters are aggravated by the republic's particular historical past. Quite a few mistakes have been made even during our period of perestroyka. The most important point is that questions raised by Lithuania's leadership are not promptly solved at central level. For this reason a critical mass of dissatisfaction with Moscow accumulated, and even some sort of an image of the center as an enemy took shape. This is why everything undertaken by Moscow is perceived with mistrust, with a peculiar and painful suspiciousness. This is why the evaluations and conclusions of the CPSU Central Committee December (1989) Plenum were greeted critically and are regarded as a manifestation of our conservatism.

The position of adhering to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress decisions remains as deliberately rigid as ever, even after our departure. The split in the party and the stratification of society along national lines continue. The past confrontation of all political forces and their fundamental differences in interpreting the objectives of perestroyka have today perfectly clearly evolved into organized actions by all movements and political parties in a single direction—toward Lithuania's national isolation, its secession from the USSR, and the Communist Party's functioning only outside the CPSU. This is how I perceive the essence of the situation prevailing in the republic today. This appraisal should also make clear to us the entire game that was played with us as members of the party Central Committee by the Lithuanian Communist Party's leaders (Comrade Brazauskas) throughout 1989.

The lack of a profound approach toward the interpretation of what is happening is noteworthy. Quite a few people are in a state not of euphoria but of some sort of intoxication with the "boldness" of the challenge to the center. This is especially noticeable in purely Lithuanian collectives.

The task of restoring the Lithuanian state's independence is always linked with history, with abstract concepts of freedom and independence, without taking into account the effect this will have on society's socioeconomic development. Dissociation from the CPSU is perceived as the only chance of boosting the Communist Party's prestige and ensuring its influence in society, primarily during the election campaign. Indeed, the party's rating is very high. According to the Lithuanian comrades themselves, whereas it was somewhere around the 16-percent mark previously, the rating went up to approximately 75 percent after the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. What made it rise? Primarily political concessions. This must, obviously, also be admitted by the Lithuanian comrades.

In the course of conversations, many communists asked us to inform party Central Committee members that the generator of these ideas is the very well organized "Sajudis" movement, which controls virtually all the mass media. The direct executants—this was another thing many communists asked us to convey to the party Central Committee—are the Lithuanian Communist Party leaders themselves.

The decision to break away from the CPSU—this is my personal opinion—was made by them perfectly deliberately, and not in December last year; it ripened considerably earlier. It is, of course, founded not only on the party's interests but also on personal ambitions, on the gaining of leadership positions in both the Communist Party and the republic, as was confirmed by the 20th congress and the latest session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. This must be seen as the real reason behind the alignment of the Lithuanian Communist Party (independent) with "Sajudis" and the forgetting of our all-party interests in favor of separatism.

You might think that, in view of the general difficult situation, we should show great tolerance in appraising their actions—as Comrade Brazauskas asked us to do today—and somehow understand them. But how can we avoid making a political appraisal of real actions by communists in leadership positions?

This is why, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I deem it necessary to introduce a clear note into the draft resolution: "To condemn the actions of the Lithuanian Communist Party (independent) leadership, which are aimed at splitting the party and forgetting the principles of internationalism."

If we do not adopt this provision, but again sidestep the issue we will make ourselves the target for thousands of questions. I think that we must bluntly say in the resolution that the 20th congress decisions are a step aimed at an organizational and political break with the CPSU. They are fraught with further destabilization of the situation in the republic and could have the most serious negative consequences for our entire party and the entire union. It must be borne in mind that this really is a hitherto unprecedented step in the Communist Party.

Second, and no matter how bitter and painful this might be for us, comrades, in view of the real state of affairs in the republic we must recognize the existence of two parties. Let me repeat: No matter how bitter it might be to admit it! This is already a fait accompli enshrined, on the one hand, by the congress decisions and, on the other hand, by the party conference decisions. In my view, there will be no reconciliation between the communist parties. It is simply impossible in this atmosphere. Above all, the independent party's leadership has no interest in it because of tactical interests in the election campaign, tactical interests in the struggle for power.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to support the proposal made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—to find methods for conducting a dialogue with it, to constantly find contacts. The main point is that we must, as swiftly as possible, take decisive measures to ensure the organizational formation and normal activity in the republic of the Lithuanian Communist Party which remains on the CPSU platform. This must be done in order not to lose communists. It seems to me that we have already wasted exactly 1 and ½ months. Had a decision been made back in December, maybe by the Politburo rather than a CPSU Central Committee plenum in view of the emergency situation, and had we created conditions for normal work, we would not have lost at least 20,000-30,000 communists.

Therefore, the request made by the provisional committee must be supported. Urgent creation of the new party's organizational structures was going on even while we were there, while the Central Committee team was at work, and it is still going on now. The majority of party city and rayon committees have switched to its positions. A campaign of defamation and psychological pressure has been launched against supporters of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform). What will happen to this party when we secede from the USSR and when it finds itself outlawed?—this thesis is being stubbornly fostered, and people constantly strove to emphasize this to us in conversations.

In essence, party members have to make a choice: Either to declare their views and be subjected to psychological pressure, or to display political conformism. All this is prompting some communists to make public statements in favor of the independent party even though not all of them actually approve of the break of organizational links with the CPSU.

Personal conversations indicate that many of them could be engaged in active work today. It is only fear, however—and I want to emphasize this—only fear for their families, only fear of losing their jobs, only fear of finding themselves without work and being deprived of social security that prevents them from making a principled statement of their positions. This view is typical of communists in the party organizations of multinational collectives. It is shared by people from the older generation, by party, war, labor, and army veterans.

So what political way out of this situation can be found? It seems difficult here to seek the middle ground which would satisfy everyone. But it is necessary to back the proposal made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that at this stage, taking into account the draft CPSU Central Committee platform that has been discussed and the proposed date of the congress, the operation of the 20th congress resolution as regards deeming the CPSU Program and Statutes to have ceased to be valid in Lithuanian organizations and also a number of provisions concerning membership must be suspended until the 28th CPSU Congress. The Lithuanian comrades should not reject this but, taking advantage of their high prestige, should influence communists and persuade them to change their minds. The independent Lithuanian Communist Party is being given yet another opportunity to take advantage of what might be the last chance and to establish contacts.

One last point, comrades. We must urgently elaborate a draft law on the mechanism for republics' secession from the USSR. And, exercising the right to initiate legislation, submit it already at the USSR Supreme Soviet's third session. This will make it possible to place the problem on a new legal basis and mainly to open the eyes of very many working people to the complexity of the entire question and the possible consequences. This mechanism should make provision for all aspects of the problem, without overlooking the social protection of Russian-speaking population on the republics' territories. I recall to this day a meeting that Vladimir Viktorovich Grigoryev, first secretary of Vitebsk party obkom [oblast committee], and I had in Shalchininkskiy Rayon, where the majority of the population is Polish. More than 1,000 Poles carrying flags and banners spent two hours in the rain and dark waiting for us. Initially I even felt somehow intimidated. But people came out to meet us only in order to present a petition about protecting the Poles' interests and their autonomy. A failure by the Lithuanian comrades to perceive this problem, to perceive these difficulties, would mean aggravating the state of affairs further still.

We must speed up the definition of a mechanism for republics' secession from the USSR. Speeches by several comrades at the Lithuanian Communist Party plenum have already been cited here. I would like to add just one more quotation so that the prevailing situation can be understood. The words of Comrade Ozolos, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and one of the "Sajudis" leaders. He said at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum that "a mechanism not only for self-management but also for self-defense, right up to the point of proclaiming independence tonight or tomorrow if we are provoked into doing so, must be immediately prepared." In other words, such actions have been worked out and their consequences could be unpredictable. But we must anticipate these actions so that we can at least state our clear-cut position.

These, comrades, are today's realities. We must perceive them as they actually are. Now we are moving toward fundamentally new relations between the center and the republics. Taking this into account and displaying reasonable tolerance, we must take the initiative, respecting the rights of all nations and ethnic groups but being firm in upholding statewide union interests.

## Final Section of Debate

*PM0902143190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 6-7*

[Unattributed transcript of final part of 7 February debate at CPSU Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev: Have we finished the discussion?

Voices: Yes.

M.S. Gorbachev: Comrades have expressed their proposals. They are different from what I read out. I'll try to sum them up.

It is said that we should put on record the Lithuanian Communist Party's break with the CPSU, as Comrade Kardamavichyus proposed.

Both Comrade Kuptsov and Comrade Shved asked that paragraphs condemning the actions of the Lithuanian Communist Party leadership and at the same time ordering a halt to the action be added and that the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress concerning the CPSU Program and Statutes be deemed ultra vires. They asked that we condemn actions aimed at weakening the party and essentially working toward splitting it. An important point. This could be said and the initial version submitted by the Politburo could be fleshed out in this way.

Point two: to support the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) and to create all the necessary conditions for its activity, resolving all material, financial, cadre, and other questions. The content of the second version essentially boils down to this. I see no difference between what Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev] said and the second version.

Voice: They asked to be given autonomy....

M.S. Gorbachev: That is lost in this formula, the formula should be developed.

Essentially the issue boils down to two decisions that we can adopt, since there were no other proposals. I will then put it to a vote.

So, in the order in which they were submitted. The first decision will be what I read out, incorporating the additions of Comrade Kuptsov and Comrade Shved: To condemn the actions of the Lithuanian Communist Party leadership and Comrades Brazauskas and Berezov aimed at weakening the unity of the CPSU and damaging the party at a period of revolutionary transformations for the socialist renewal of society. And, two, the second addition: To provide all necessary support for the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) and the Central Committee it elected and to adopt the necessary measures to create the conditions for its successful work.

These are additions to the draft that I read out. Bearing in mind that paragraph two says, I would remind you: Mindful that the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress was convened within the framework of the CPSU and that its congress delegates lacked the powers to decide the question of the Lithuanian Communist Party's withdrawal from the CPSU, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum suspends until the 28th CPSU Congress the operation of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress resolution with regard to deeming the CPSU Program and Statutes to have ceased to be valid in organizations of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and likewise a number of provisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party statute regarding party membership. In light of the considerations expressed by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum, the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress documents, the program, and the statutes are to be regarded as proposals for the 28th party congress.

That was the initial proposal. I have read out the second one—to place on record the rupture. I am reminding you so you can make the choice.

Yu.Yu. Kuolyalis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Provisional Central Committee: The decisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Second Plenum that feature in the draft resolution—we will almost seem to be praising these decisions, we are proposing that they be regarded as a proposal for the 28th CPSU Congress. But what they actually said was they should be regarded not as a proposal but as a model for perestroyka of the CPSU. Just imagine, that is what they said: As a model for perestroyka of the CPSU. Thus the break is good, it is a model. The abandonment of Marxism-Leninism is a model. The abandonment of internationalism is a model.

Ye.K. Ligachev: No way can we....

M.S. Gorbachev: So what do you want to add to the draft? Or are you supporting paragraph two?

Yu.Yu. Kuolyalis: Yes, I support it. It's just this point—support for the decisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Second Plenum. That should be deleted.

M.S. Gorbachev: That should be deleted. Right.

So there is the first version and a second. To put on record that the decisions adopted at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress signify a break with the CPSU. That is the first proposal. The form may be polished one way or another, but the essence is clear. Proceeding from this, there is the second point: To provide full support for the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) and the Provisional Central Committee it has elected and in this connection to resolve all questions arising from this—in the practical sphere, in the financial sphere, and in others. That is the essence. Two drafts. Is everything clear? Or not?

A.A. Logunov: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I realize, of course, that everybody is tired, but it is a serious matter. If we have a recess for 20 minutes or so, we can get everything clearly written down.

Voices: Have a recess.... We don't want a recess....

A.A. Logunov: But it's such a, such a fundamental issue. What if we make some omission in our haste. We should formulate everything and say it clearly.

M.S. Gorbachev: I have no objection, but this doesn't change the essence of the matter.

G.P. Bogomyakov: It was proposed to incorporate our address to Lithuania's communists.

M.S. Gorbachev: To the other party?

G.P. Bogomyakov: No, no. To all Lithuania's communists from the Central Committee plenum.

M.S. Gorbachev: Fine. In that case I see the need for a recess.

A recess for one hour.

M.S. Gorbachev, in the chair: Comrades! We are continuing the sitting.

The following draft is submitted in the name of all Politburo members, Politburo candidate members, and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee:

"CPSU Central Committee Plenum Resolution 'On the Decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.'

"Paragraph one. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum regards the decisions adopted by the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress as [signifying] the party's organizational and political break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"The plenum condemns such actions since they undermine the CPSU's unity and inflict great damage on the processes of the renewal of the Soviet federation and on society as a whole.

"Two. The plenum supports those Lithuanian Communists who formed the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), remained loyal to the principles of internationalism, and advocate implementing revolutionary transformations in conditions of the democratization and renewal of the CPSU, which consolidates all peoples of our multinational union.

"The plenum instructs the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to provide all necessary assistance to the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) in its practical activity and to create the appropriate material and financial conditions for this.

"Three. The plenum once again calls on those Lithuanian comrades who have joined the autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party to suspend until the 28th CPSU Congress the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress concerning the validity of the CPSU Program and Statutes and, on this basis, to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress along with the Lithuanian Communist Party espousing the CPSU platform.

"The plenum appeals to Lithuania's Communists to join in the discussion of the precongress draft CPSU Central Committee platform and to be conscious of their historic responsibility for the fate of the Lithuanian people and of our entire multinational state and for the fate of revolutionary perestroyka."

In other words, we are presenting paragraph two of the version of which I spoke as paragraph three and we are addressing the communists who proclaimed the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence and telling them to take a stand. As they decide, so it will be.

Who wants to speak? Our comrades from Lithuania—Comrade Brazauskas, Comrade Burokyavichyus?

M.M. Burokyavichyus: We agree.

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: I don't know what to say.

M.S. Gorbachev: What is there to say? Everything is said objectively. You made a decision—it constitutes a break. Paragraph one puts that on record. Paragraph two states that the organization with the Provisional Central Committee has emerged in parallel and that attention must be displayed toward it. That also is a statement of realities. And paragraph three—we appeal to you once again: Think everything over and act together with the CPSU. Could anything better be devised?

A.-M.K. Brazauskas: Everything is clear.

M.S. Gorbachev: Everything. I am putting it to the vote. CPSU Central Committee members should vote.

Everyone in favor of the proposed draft resolution, please raise your hand. Lower it, please. Who is against? Who is abstaining? Carried.

I want so say again: If you think about the meaning, this is a principled position both so far as what has happened is concerned and so far as the future is concerned. The doors are open, party comradeship has been displayed, and a hand has been held out. That is so, isn't it? Good. We've decided this question. Is there anything else we have to decide, or is that all?

V.A. Masol: Mikhail Sergeyevich, a point of information.

M.S. Gorbachev: A point of information, go ahead.

V.A. Masol, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers: Esteemed Comrades! I have something to say about Comrade Nikitin's speech about deliveries to all-union stocks. This is a fundamental question, and I wanted the plenum participants to know something.

We, when we were forming the plan for 1990, a contract was signed between the republic and the government, the commission for food, and was unofficially approved by the Supreme Soviet. [sentence as published] We pledged to deliver meat, milk, and other products and to receive feed concentrates. The figures were agreed. The republic fulfilled and overfulfilled the plan for the surrender of grain to the state. Then Comrade Nikitin independently reduces deliveries of mixed feed to the republic and says: Sorry. So we (I also want to address you, Mikhail Sergeyevich) are "converting" poultry units and pig complexes. Tomorrow the country will go without eggs, because these are state enterprises, and without meat. We will be forced to close them simply because we have had our state feed concentrate deliveries reduced by 25 percent. What can we call this phenomenon? Yet we are nearing a congress. So I would like everyone here to understand everything correctly—this is said to be a contract system. There is a new economic mechanism—we provide things and things are supposed to be provided to us. Today we can also make complaints to the commission: We will have no profit, we will not be making contributions to the budget because we cannot produce output. So Comrade Nikitin ought to get to work. If he doesn't know what the new economic mechanism is like, let him learn a little from our economists.

N.I. Malkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Chita CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee]: Comrades, I have two questions. The first is in connection with the speeches of Comrades Ligachev and Shevardnadze, and Ligachev and Yakovlev.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, we at local level hear lots of different statements about Politburo members which stem from fantasy and rumor, or so I have hitherto believed. Every time this happens we try to persuade people that nothing like that is the case and we have never witnessed this. I think that today the Central Committee members are entitled to place the question before the Politburo in the following terms—clarity must be introduced before the next plenum, which will obviously be in a month's time. After all, for two years there has been talk about Comrade Ligachev from one quarter [storona], and now there is talk from another quarter, too. Let's sort things out. If Comrade Shevardnadze is wrong, he ought to be told at a plenum that such behavior is unacceptable. If Comrade Yakovlev is wrong, he ought to be told the same. If Comrade Ligachev is wrong, the same goes for him, too. But after today's plenum, for the umpteenth time, we are weaponless and have nothing to tell communists. It is not only party members who will put these questions to us.

The next question. After our last plenum Comrade Granin could not contain himself and published the information you are aware of. After that Comrade Medvedev, in his speech to correspondents at the press conference, evaded giving a clear account of what Comrade Granin had already said. Probably Comrade Granin was right about everything, apart from the last couple of lines, where Comrade Granin was presumably expressing his own personal opinion. A question arose: Who is being truthful? Comrade Granin or Comrade Medvedev? Comrade Medvedev is not here now, but this question is put directly to him.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, the third matter is the need for an assessment of the emerging process of the demise of bureaus and party obkoms, not to mention first secretaries. The Central Committee and the Politburo are not offering any assessments. Either we think that everything is proceeding in a proper and healthy fashion, so we agree with this process developing further. Or we should express our viewpoint. In order to express it, we must know the essence and the causes of the emergence of these processes and why they result in such decisions in present conditions. I think this simply must be done, otherwise what we call unity in party ranks ends up more like the opposite of this.

S.N. Fedorov: Esteemed comrades! I am very glad that at long last at our plenum we have begun to deal also with questions of the economy in medicine. I want to explain that when our intersectorial scientific and technical complex, on which the state spent R100 million, was created, we carried out a whole load of scientific work with the Soviet Union's Gosplan [State Planning Committee] relating to the cost of treating someone with an eye problem. We established that in Gorkiy Oblast, in Moscow, and in other cities an average of R266 is spent on treating the patient. Then we set for our intersectorial scientific and technical complex a normative of R214, and we also included in that sum 24 percent for science.

Thus the cost of treatment in the intersectorial scientific and technical complex is R171, while on average R266 is spent on these purposes in the Soviet Union. So what's the secret, how come the intersectorial scientific and technical complex' earnings have been so good?

The explanation is very simple. The thing is that in the Soviet Union an eye surgeon conducts an average of 105 operations per year. In Moscow the figure is 110—a little better. Our surgeon carries out 750. Naturally, labor intensification yields an advantage. If I made more cars, I would also be richer. If I made more television sets, the same would naturally apply. Now the question: Who pays, or, to be more accurate, who gains? Because the price of an operation in our complex is R40 less, and our budget is gaining R10.8 million this year alone. Some 400,000 operations have been carried out over the last three years. Huge numbers of people have had their sight restored. The number of operations does not adversely affect the quality—there are 20 times fewer complications. In the intersectorial scientific and technical complex complications run at one-hundredth of a percent, whereas in our country as a whole the incidence of complications and grave complications entailing loss of sight runs at 0.2 percent.

So I think that Comrade Saykin is wrong when he said that Moscow provides eye treatment for R116. Because Moscow spends R4.8 million on 1,200 eye beds, and if you divide the eye clinics' budget by the 18,000 operations and the number of patients treated, it turns out that Moscow spends R266, not R116. What you say, Comrade Saykin, is absolutely wrong because the cost of a bed-day in a rural rayon hospital is R8, in the city it is R15, and in a major clinic it is R40. In America a bed-day costs $250. In the Soviet Union each eye patient occupies a bed for 15 days. If you have even a passing knowledge of mathematics, and Comrade Saykin does, work it out. And everything becomes clear.

I think that in this case the Gosplan did not make a mistake. Our country has now received a profit of over R30 million.

That is not all. In three years, by operating on the lease system, we have earned $12 million. That is money we are using to treat you. When you come to us, we invest in each operation $40 for treatment and 50 of our rubles—that is the cost of the operation. If the collective was not earning this money from the lease system, we would swiftly have to close the intersectorial scientific and technical complex, otherwise everybody would be wandering around half-blind. Those are the economics.

V.V. Nikitin: Comrades, what Comrade Masol said is the truth. Any republic can say the same today, because grain has been taken from everyone. But we haven't actually taken grain, we have simply changed the figures that had been allocated. The point is that it was simply not possible to procure as much grain as was outlined in the national economic plan ratified by the Supreme Soviet. The grain simply did not exist. It was not possible to purchase abroad the 5 million extra tonnes of grain needed for settlements with the republics.

Today the situation is that there is no grain. In order to act correctly, all that remains for me to do is to make one more decision and cancel the delivery of a certain quantity of meat corresponding to this grain. There is no grain because there is no money. We must be aware of this and have a very clear idea of it. There are no other reasons.

## Lithuanian Communists Issue Statement

*LD1002124190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] The activities of the Lithuanian division of the Soviet Communist Party have already overstepped the limits of a political discussion and strongly resembles the methods of the Stalinist and the Brezhnevist eras. The bureau of the Central Committee of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party has issued a statement to the people of Lithuania on the recent plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee.

The statement says that the exaggerated accusations of the hardliners against the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania were also provoked by the leaders of the Moscow loyalists of Lithuania. It became evident afterwards that a lot of lies were told at the Moscow plenary meeting by the loyalists.

The statement of the Central Committee bureau of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party appeals to the communists of Lithuania to decide on their membership. Those who want to join the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party can do so till the end of March.

It was announced yesterday at a televised news conference that the Lithuanian Communist Party has a membership of 76,000 already. The leaders of the Moscow loyalists, otherwise known as the Midnight Party, says that 36,000 Communists of Lithuania have decided to remain members of the Soviet Communist Party. This number is thought to be far too big.

Reports say that leaders of the Midnight Party have not returned from Moscow. The session of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee decided to support the loyalists materially and financially.

## PRAVDA Publishes More Plenum Speeches

### Alekseyev Cites Peaceful Transition

*PM0902194590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p3*

[Debate speech by S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! It is certainly extremely important to establish a starting point, a point of reference in any matter. A point of reference from which to go further and conduct a discussion.

It seems to me that the initial reference point, crucial to the difficult discussion now under way at the plenum, is a thorough assessment of the present time. I feel that we are persisting in using dramatic words and phrases which frighten others and frighten us, too: "crisis," "worse and worse," "failure," "collapse." We sometimes reduce ourselves to a hysterial frenzy.

However, if we approach the present period from a really broad scientific standpoint, I must say with all responsibility that we are living through a major, important time. A time of transition—peaceful transition—from an extremely centralized and, until quite recently, extremely totalitarian, violent system to a system of relations of humane, democratic socialism.

We have only just begun to emerge from this system. But we have yet to enter the new system. This, as I understand it, is the source of our difficulties and the root of all our difficult problems.

If we proceed from this kind of fundamental assessment of the present time, we can draw a series of fundamental conclusions, as I see it. I would like to draw your attention to four of them.

The first is a philosophical conclusion. It is now being said abroad, and in our country, too, that socialism is collapsing. That is not true. Only one version of the socialist movement has proved bankrupt—bureaucratic, centralized socialism (or, to be more precise, war communism)—while humane, democratic socialism has still not really begun. It was begun under Lenin, when it produced clear, excellent results of free labor. We look forward to its results in the future and it is worth working for the sake of this.

The second conclusion is a strictly practical one. Even psychological to a certain extent. Such a gigantic transition in such a gigantic country from one system of relations to another cannot be easy and simple—that would be fundamentally impossible. I think we made rather a mistake when we ventured to promise that, given patience and a year or two, everything would be fine. That there would be manna from heaven. Well, that manna from heaven has come—in the form of allocations forthcoming as a result of making the printing presses churn out more money. We have what we have. I think that, as soon as our party embarked on such a difficult and, as I see it, historically global path of switching to a socialist system based on new principles, it should have immediately geared itself and everyone else to hard, rigorous work, without losing optimism or the belief that this work of ours would end in success.

The third conclusion is of a strategic nature. Every task has a key feature. What is the key feature of this gigantic transition? Many now believe that the main feature is political power, the relinquishing of political power, and so forth. We have all become stuck on this notion, for some reason. But, in fact, not only does political power sometimes make your head spin and cloud your reason—political power per se does not solve any problems. The sources of political power—this is a fundamental precept of Marxism—lie in the economy. So the main feature now, as I understand it, is economic power. If we are talking about economic power and the elimination of the alienation which does in reality exist in relations of ownership, the first thing we must discuss is really transferring economic power to organizations of working people on a leasehold and redemption basis.

It has been said more than once that miracles happen when workers and working people are allowed to be in charge. Working people in charge do not go on strike. Working people in charge do not work badly. Working people in charge have a responsible attitude to their jobs.

Did you know that America is beginning to use socialist values on the quiet? They propagandize private ownership for us, but there are now as many as 10,000 enterprises in the United States which are owned by a group or collective. All 10,000 of these enterprises were operating at a loss. But when the workers themselves took the means of production in their own hands on a buyout or leasehold basis, within a year or two they had sharply increased labor productivity.

We have issued the Law on Leaseholding. I must say with all responsibility that this law is not being put into effect. I would like to make a proposal to communists: Should we communists lead a process whereby organizations of working people acquire real economic power?

There is no better way, no more infallible way of winning authority. If communists lead this cause—a really sacred cause for socialism—the party's authority is assured.

Finally, the fourth conclusion, a conclusion concerning an urgent matter. We need to strengthen the state. If I may say so, we have suffered a national disaster. This disaster lies not in our difficulties, in the outrages, in the growth of crime, it lies chiefly in the fact that during this very complex transitional period the main force that could ensure stability and confidence in transitional conditions—the state—has shown itself to be weak and feeble. Sometimes I even feel rather sorry for our state organs, when they are unable to resolve the simplest, most elementary questions.

Where has this disaster come from? From the development of democracy, as some people say? Nothing of the kind! We cannot do without the development of democracy: This is the historical path of mankind, the path of assertion of the socialist idea. The whole point is that the development of democracy should be accompanied by the simultaneous strengthening of the state as a rule-of-law state. In the Supreme Soviet we have, I think, already taken some steps in this direction. In particular, major judicial reform measures have been adopted. The law enforcement organs must, of course, be further strengthened. I am in favor, for instance, of putting the internal troops on a professional footing as soon as possible.

But the most important thing here is the structure of state power, the way it is organized. The Congress of People's Deputies has created the Constitutional Oversight Committee. A heavy burden now rests on the shoulders of those of us who have set about tackling this difficult task. It is a good thing that the platform speaks of presidential power, because this, too, is one aspect of the structure of state power, one way of giving it stability and durability and safeguarding the rule of law.

Of course, the platform that we are now discussing also contains certain defects, and further work must be done on it. I am in favor, for instance, of defining more precisely the significance, the historic importance of the moment we are now living through. It is necessary to inspire in us, in the communists and all the citizens, strength and confidence in what we are all doing now. I am in favor of including in this document words to the effect that communists should set about the main task—the acquisition of economic power by the working people. But I believe that this platform, in its refined, developed form, is a document that we can take to the congress.

## Mironenko Cites Young People's Demands

*PM0902170990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[Debate speech by V.I. Mironenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! I think that this plenum's decisions and the attitude of people and Communists toward them will be tremendously important. They will either believe in our ability to realize the state in which the country finds itself, the way millions of people live, and to understand that their patience is not inexhaustible, or they will demand that we depart—and rightly so. We must finally realize that several hundred thousand Muscovites in Manezhnaya Square are not a mob [sborishche], as one speaker said on the first day of our work, but the people, who give power and take it away. The people, who demand resolute actions capable of improving their situation. I believe that the time for reflections and doubts is over, we must act in a well thought-out and considered but decisive manner. I am no longer speaking about young people. Many of those present, I hope, participated in the recent Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] report and election conferences and are well aware that commitment to dogmatism, indecisiveness, and inconsistency prompted a reaction from young people and heated the situation among young people to the limit.

So what is it that young people want? Let us try to work this out. It is hard to talk about all young people, but meetings, conversations, and debates enable me to to say that the main point is to ensure that words do not diverge from deeds. And that words are followed by deeds. Young people want to see power handed over to soviets not in words, but in deeds; they want to see communists really set an example of modesty, honesty, and simplicity. They want to see the party as the political vanguard in real terms, rather than simply juridically. They want to see the Soviet Union preserved, not by coercion but in conformity with the sovereignty and interests of every people who form part of its republics, of every—including the smallest—people. They want to see people choose for themselves where they work and dispose of the results of their own labor as they want. They want to see all existing monopolies demolished—of power, of the truth, of expressing the people's interests. They want to see the law the same for all.

What is it that young people actually want? In my view, they want social justice and truth, they want socialism. And the conditions to realize themselves.

What does the platform propose? It proposes to finally take a decisive step: From the authoritarian-bureaucratic system to democratic and humane socialism, from bureaucratic centralism to internal party democracy, from monopolism and voluntarism in the economy to compliance with the laws of its development.

Of course, for the time being the platform provides us with a very general but nonetheless fully outlined sketch, a blueprint of the new society and the renewed party. Let us be honest. In adopting the platform—I do not know what work was done by the editing commission yesterday, but say in the form in which it was presented to us—we would be agreeing to the appearance in our lives of much that was in no way classed as part of socialism until recently. Personal freedom as the supreme value, political pluralism, the market, a mixed economy, diversity of forms of ownership, parliamentarianism.

We are predetermining a completely different role for the party and completely different conditions for its activity, completely different forms of its influence on society. After the platform is adopted, questions about Article 6, the nations' right to self-determination, and the multiparty system will, in my opinion, become rhetorical. Never mind, the time has probably come to recognize realities and proceed from them rather than from schemes and dogmas, no matter how close they might be to somebody's heart.

The easiest thing of all would be to blame the Central Committee, the Politburo, and its individual members for everything. We all bear great responsibility before the party, and nobody intends to evade it. It is, however, also necessary to objectively appraise the situation. Boundless authority is fine under an authoritarian regime. With society's democratization, however, it gives rise to boundless complaints which are impossible to satisfy, and yet it is dangerous to ignore them. Unfortunately, so far the voice of the grassroots, of young party members is either inaudible or very weak here in the Central Committee.

Fresh forces, party organization secretaries must be involved in preparations for the congress. Proposals from local organizations must be taken into account. In my view, the apparatus option is totally unsuitable here, we became convinced of this when preparing for the 21st Komsomol Congress.

I would strongly urge you to also take into account the proposals of Komsomol report and election conferences regarding democratization in the party and regarding the state of affairs in our society as a whole. The example of the Volgograd party organization showed that the results of a reluctance to listen might be unpleasant at times. The Central Committee's new composition will be able to function efficiently only if there is a clear demarcation between party and soviet functions, if the life of the party itself is decentralized and democratized. The rights, duties, and real potential of each level of management within the CPSU must be clearly defined.

The platform speaks on two occasions about mutual relations between the party and the Komsomol, the league of young people sharing its ideological positions. In my view, what it says is basically correct. But in life and in the platform alike one can notice a trend toward the party's equidistance from both the Komsomol and the other young people's structures which are emerging, still emerging with great difficulty in the absence of appropriate legislative normative acts on public organizations.

I might be wrong, but it seems to me that this contains an overtone of annoyance with the unusual behavior of Komsomol organizations and their press organs. By no means everything in them is normal, but in many cases there is often total incomprehension and rejection of criticism of the indecisiveness and sluggishness of party committees, including the Central Committee, in making urgent decisions and of decisions concerning the situation in the party adopted by Komsomol conferences.

Yes, this is unusual for us. But I perceive it as normal in relations between the party and the youth league. At the forthcoming Komsomol Congress we will examine the platform and will formulate special resolutions on it and our proposals for the forthcoming party congress; we think that they will be useful. I think, however, that it is necessary to right away reflect in the platform's wording at least the party's desire to single out its relations with the Komsomol and the All-Union Lenin Young Pioneers Organization. Without any privileges, of course. To involve them in the elaboration of its policy and then, naturally, in its implementation.

When discussing the results of the All-Union Student Forum on 7 December last year, the Central Committee Politburo decided that the basic principles of the party's youth policy in contemporary conditions should be reflected in the CPSU Central Committee's political platform for the 28th congress. Unfortunately, this subject has not been developed in the document under discussion today. We have no more time left for debate, and yet it would be—to say the least—irresponsible to farm youth policy out to someone or other.

The Komsomol Central Committee spent three years very seriously elaborating a concept of the state's youth policy and of appropriate normative acts which could lay a sound foundation for the elaboration of the party's "youth policy." I ask the Central Committee—let us instruct communist deputies in the Supreme Soviet to support the examination of the question of the state's youth policy at the third session. By way of a legislative initiative, the Komsomol Central Committee prepared these documents back in the spring of last year. In essence, this is a most important political action by the Komsomol, and the fact that it is being effectively ignored causes bitterness, to say the least.

Is it not obvious that any refusal to listen to Komsomol deputies inside the hall will ultimately necessitate having to listen to the same arguments put forward by young people out in the square. I think that there is no need to explain that the nature of the polemics will be different, just like the nature of the demands put forward. Moreover, I cannot rule out that forces that will want to exploit young people as an instrument for social manipulations may not emerge in the conditions of exacerbating political struggle in society.

In conclusion, I would like to say this. First, in my view, the platform must be adopted. Of course, with due consideration for the debate and the remarks which have been made, and it should be published as early as possible, together with the draft CPSU Statutes.

Second. In preparing for the congress, it must be borne in mind that a party which is rejected by young people and lacks its own youth organizations is a party without a future.

One idea keeps coming back to my mind. Everything that we are discussing and that CPSU Central Committee members are talking about has already been partly experienced and tried out by the Komsomol. If the party Central Committee had been more attentive toward Komsomol problems during the years of perestroyka, much of what we are now coming up against could have been at least anticipated and prepared for.

I hope that the adoption of the proposed platform by the CPSU Central Committee plenum will nonetheless make many people pause to think, and maybe will help them to realize who is calling for consolidation and action and who is calling for confrontation, economic chaos, and political destabilization. I see no other way. Of course, the platform on its own will not be enough. It is necessary to act. I agree with Comrade Prokofyev on this point—to act immediately and decisively.

## Makhkamov Calls Party Criticism Just

*PM0902164990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[Debate speech by K. Makhkamov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 7 February]

[Text] Comrades! The complexity and seriousness of the situation now being experienced by the party and our entire country have been discussed with the maximum frankness and perfectly justified concern both in the report and in the speeches to our plenum.

The draft CPSU Central Committee platform on the 28th party congress prepared by the Central Committee is a document of enormous political importance which sums up the results of what has been done so far in the task of renewing the party and outlines ways to further develop the party and all society. It is the basis on which the party can prepare for its congress after this discussion and the introduction of amendments.

It is clear to everyone that a considerable number of mistakes, deviations, and outright distortions of the Leninist principles of socialist building were permitted during the years of Stalinism and then during the stagnation era. Naturally, the party is not absolving itself—and has no right to absolve itself—of the responsibility for all this. It must be admitted that the criticism addressed to it and to the party apparatus is largely just. Criticism that, even in the conditions of restructuring, far from all party cadres have abandoned the old, outmoded methods of leadership is also valid.

However, attempts to cancel out everything done by the party since the October Revolution are causing bewilderment and determined protest. Surely we cannot ignore all that we have achieved during the years of restructuring, initiated by the party? Surely we could not have dreamed a few years ago of the democratic transformations now taking place in the country? Surely the deepening glasnost and openness, the course of political and economic reform, and the very important steps in the direction of a rule-of-law state attest to radical changes in society's life?

Fully aware of this, many communists in our republic decisively condemn any attempts to discredit or split the party—the guarantor of restructuring's irreversibility and the only real force that has everything necessary to carry restructuring through to its planned objectives and to preserve and strengthen the USSR on a new basis.

In conditions where the ideological-political struggle in society has become extremely acute, we cannot fail to be alarmed that far from all party organizations have appreciated the need to accelerate restructuring processes within the party itself. One can see their confusion when faced with new, complicated problems and the contradictions of a situation whose development is not straightforward.

The consequence is that there is an acute shortage of political fighters in elected bodies and the apparatus who are capable of working efficiently in the present conditions. This largely explains the fact that the concentrated attack on the party and the open mockery of the entire history of the Soviet state are not being given a proper rebuttal by the CPSU ideological corps.

As a whole, as I have just said, while approving the draft platform in principle, I would like to express some ideas of my own on some of the provisions in the draft under discussion.

The first point. When discussing creative freedom the draft platform states that, while encouraging a diversity of forms in the cultural sphere, the party will at the same time uphold humanist criteria and protect society against pseudo-culture and that a commercial approach to culture is unacceptable to socialism. This is a very timely statement and one which we fully support.

I would like to give an example of the negative phenomena associated with commerce in culture. Some deviation from humanist principles in our country's culture has been observed in recent years. A stream of violence, pornography, depravity, and other phenomena alien to our society has rained down on the Soviet viewer from movie screens, all manner of video salons, and even television. This is received particularly badly in the specific conditions of the Central Asian republics, contributing to a loss of moral principles and, as a consequence, leading to a sharp rise in crime, particularly among young people and juveniles. We are probably going to have to take legislative measures in our republic to ban the import and showing of movies like these. We are currently working on the draft of an appropriate law.

We believe that corresponding measures must also be taken on an all-union scale, because similar films are beginning to be produced in our own country.

Second point. It seems to us that the wording of the provision on strengthening guarantees of fulfilling the right to work is not sufficiently clear in the draft platform. The problems of finding work for the significant section of the population of Tajikistan and neighboring republics not engaged in social labor have been raised more than once from this and other lofty rostrums. It is virtually impossible to solve this problem without an all-union program. Consequently, in our view, the draft platform should more clearly and precisely reflect the party's attitude to resolving such a difficult, but exceptionally important problem.

Third point. The draft contains a proposal on the desirability of holding regular all-party conferences in the intervals between congresses, investing these conferences with the right to re-elect the members of leading bodies. There is evidently no need to introduce cooptation in this connection.

In addition to this, it would be worth considering the question of whether 28th congress delegates' powers should last the entire five-year period.

Fourth point. The section on the democratization of the party states that the Communist Party is a voluntary organization of like-minded people and that, henceforth, leaving the party cannot have any political or civic consequences. But in real life we encounter the situation where, being of advanced years, some communists—party veterans—are sometimes unable, for reasons of health, to take regular part in the work of primary party organizations. But under no circumstances do they want to leave the party. You can understand how they feel. Taking these circumstances into account—and they are certainly true of many other regions as well—I propose that we found an institute of honorary CPSU members for party veterans of advanced years who, as party members, may take part in the work of primary party organizations when possible.

Finally, a few words about privileges. Questions about the privileges of the party and state apparatus and other leading personnel have been raised very often recently. Some senior comrades have made this issue their leading banner in the struggle against bureaucracy, and rumors about the existence of various "special purpose" centers and facilities—for leading personnel, of course, and mainly leading party personnel, of course—are spreading among the people. Very often, our meetings with working people begin with the question: What is the situation with the "special stores"?

It is well known that there is a working Supreme Soviet commission on privileges. But is it not time to introduce clarity in this matter in the party and through party channels and make it clear once and for all what is allowed by law and what must be renounced? This should be announced to all the people and the matter thereby closed.

## First Secretary Urges Bold, Quick Action

*PM0902172990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[Debate speech by A.M. Masaliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Comrades, I also believe that the draft Central Committee platform prepared for the 28th congress could be approved with additions, with amplification, and taking into account suggestions and observations by Central Committee members.

It will soon be five years since perestroyka began. As has been said in the report and speeches, profound changes are taking place in the country in this sphere. At the same time, there have been no appreciable results in the economy and social sphere. Interethnic relations have become extremely bad. The most painful thing is that the political vanguard of society—the Communist Party—is beginning to lose its authority. In this unenviable situation we have to adopt a draft Central Committee platform for the congress envisaging a fundamental change in its function. According to the platform, the CPSU voluntarily relinquishes its monopoly position and commanding authority. And it will struggle to preserve its status as ruling party.

To be frank, it is an extremely difficult task. We must be fully aware that a further decline in the party's authority as a consolidating force poses the threat of a catastrophe for society, for our multinational state. Therefore, while relieving themselves of direct leadership of economic building, which is something that is already taking place, the CPSU Central Committee, Supreme Soviet, and Council of Ministers and local party committees must adopt urgent measures to strengthen the position, rights, and duties of the soviets, to which all power is being transferred. There must be no delay, otherwise the country could find itself in an even graver situation.

I agree that many of our problems are due to the mistakes and errors of the past. We are criticizing them correctly, rejecting them, and switching to democratic, economic, and political work methods. Obviously, this is the only correct path of future development and way out of the present situation.

But we leading cadres must all be courageous, honest, and self-critical in assessing our activity, heed our work comrades' observations and pronouncements, and, most importantly, draw conclusions and actively analyze the situation. This does not always happen. What I have said applies equally to the leadership of the country and the regions.

We must all be accountable for what is happening at the moment. Do we not discuss acute and important questions enough? Take the CPSU Central Committee plenums, the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies, the

Supreme Soviet sessions, and Council of Ministers sessions. In recent years many major issues have been considered and the requisite decisions have been taken. However, they are not working properly and not everything is being done at local level to implement the plans more fully. Often our fine words are not backed up by corresponding organizational work, practical actions, and results.

We talk a great deal about perestroyka and the democratization of our life, but we do very little to strengthen discipline and public order and are being incomprehensibly slow and unjustifiably cautious. How much can one say, for example, about transport congestion, numerous breaches of public order, and nondelivery of consumer goods? The situation is not improving quickly enough.

Indeed, many goods are in short supply in the country. Moreover, speculation is flourishing. Dishonest people are making a fortune out of the people's needs, with impunity. Money obtained by dishonest means is being openly laundered in various cooperatives and associations and by other methods. Anyone can see this. The discrediting of the cooperatives and the failure to implement certain laws have meant that the people take a negative, prejudiced view of every new step and new document and do not believe that it is reliable or has any force. It has been said many times that many problems have accumulated in the country. They must be eliminated. But they will not be eliminated by rallies, demonstrations, strikes, or weapons, but by steady, highly productive labor, a high level of organization, and enhancement of the role and responsibility of our existing public organizations.

Unfortunately, this is not happening. Moreover, every day there are reports on the television and radio and in the press about the appearance of more and more public movements, about various associations and unions. All this is passed off as democracy and is using perestroyka as a cover. But many of them are out of control. Their representatives are traveling the country, getting people worked up. I am not convinced that these entities are helping to solve problems. In fact, they are only causing harm. The majority have already produced political slogans. Their activities are essentially directed toward the destabilization of society and the collapse of the economy and the country's political system. We are not aware of a principled stance on this on the part of the CPSU Central Committee and country's government. We regard as very important the attitude of leading party and state figures to particular events. Any civilized society, particularly a rule-of-law state, which is what we are striving for, has the right to protect itself from attacks if they disrupt life and work.

We must make a great effort to arm party, soviet, and public organizations and law-enforcement organs with the relevant guidelines, elaborated on a firm, rule-of-law basis. It is time to look the truth in the eye and stop trifling with it. An uncompromising struggle for power is under way. At the moment the vast majority of Soviet people support the party, believe in it, and hope that it will find the strength to master the situation.

Let us act, comrades. Act quickly and boldly. The main thing is to address the people. At such a difficult time, when the fate of socialism is being decided, we party cadres must work, as they say, in two or three shifts, remove the barriers between the apparatus and ordinary communists and all citizens, have fewer meetings, and visit collectives more. This also applies to personnel of the CPSU Central Committee, government, and other central organs.

More and more people are saying that the party committees' apparatus is still too big. They are also talking about bureaucracy. Perhaps there is some truth in this. It is a multitier system: Agent, sector chief, department deputy chief, department chief, and, finally, party committee secretary. This is bound to slow down the solution of questions, paralyze apparatus initiative, and have an adverse effect on efficiency. A lot of time is wasted in the coordination and passage of ideas and documents up this complex ladder.

I believe the apparatus structure must be changed and simplified. I support the report's thesis on this. I believe that the abandonment of the multitier party hierarchy will untie the apparatus' hands and make it more mobile.

In conclusion, comrades, a few words about 1990. We have given the people assurances and promises that there will be changes. But it has been an indifferent start to the year. Comrades have mentioned this. I believe, comrades, that it is necessary to unite efforts both centrally and locally and really work to bring about positive advances in the economy and social sphere. Otherwise the platform will not work. The people will indeed be disenchanted. Much depends on us. If we do it we will be able to show people that the party and its Central Committee are capable of tackling complex tasks.

## Delegate Stresses Economic Demands

*PM0902124190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 5-6*

[Debate speech by N.F. Tatarchuk, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Kalinin Oblast Party Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! On the eve of the plenum we met with workers, collective farm members, journalists, veterans, first secretaries of party committees, and other members of the aktiv. I would like to confirm what has already been said here by many comrades. That these were very difficult conversations about accelerating perestroyka and renewing our party. It was not just well-intentioned wishes that were heard here, but entirely rigorous demands that were made. A rigorous demand was made of us Central Committee members, the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat, and party organizations at all levels. And the oblast's communists and working people are expecting from this plenum specific, unambiguous answers to questions about how to carry on living and working, in what direction to move, and what the party's platform will be.

Of course, many people are convinced that events in the country are developing in a haphazard fashion. Opinions are being expressed increasingly insistently about the crisis of authority, people are asking what kind of government is this if it cannot provide what is needed and ensure people's security. There is unrest in the country, discipline has deteriorated, there is corruption and a mafia which is trading freely in the most precious natural resources.

Of course, it is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out political work. Our party is losing support in the people's eyes. In the last 5 years a lot which had been promised by perestroyka has not been fulfilled. The decline in the party's prestige worries the working people. Diyanov, communist and driver at the Penovskiy timber processing combine, asks how he can have confidence about the future? Why in times of awesome trials did the country under the party's leadership surprise the world with its practicality, persistence, and courage in incredibly difficult conditions? Nowadays, it turns out, the party has lost its militant qualities. Are there really no communists left who are dedicated to the cause? In the difficult times of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War party leaders appeared in virtually all our press publications, they explained the party's policy and reinforced its prestige. The party press at that time, without in any way losing its critical edge, was a collective agitator, propagandist, and organizer. May we then ask, he continues, what they are appealing for now, what they are agitating for, and what many newspaper publications, journals, cinema, television and variety shows are organizing. Concern for the real acceleration of perestroyka is frequently supplanted by the cheap, opportunistic pursuit of bold phrases aimed against party committees and their personnel. At the same time party committees are blamed for virtually everything, for the unrest, the shortcomings in trade, medical services, and transport operations, and even the unloading of railcars. Of course, they are not responsible for this. But these questions are within the Soviet organs' competence.

And party committee secretaries are legitimately saying that essentially this is the third time that the party organs have been blamed for everything. Particularly after the wage increase. This third round was such a blow. Many party organs believe that the wages should be reviewed. There are legitimate complaints. Indeed, the situation as regards many social questions and foodstuffs has deteriorated. And people say to us party workers directly: You only talk about power, the power of the soviets in words, but you don't want to give it up and be deprived of this power. And indeed, the 19th All-Union Party Conference firmly defined the practical ways of dividing the functions of party and soviet organs. Two years have passed, and what has been done to ensure that the local soviets can really be masters on their own territory? Virtually nothing, leaving aside the fact that the party organs eliminated sectorial departments.

So far, unfortunately, the law on local soviets, the law on self-management has not been adopted, the structure of the local soviets' executive organs has not been formulated, and in two months the organs of Soviet power will be fully staffed. There are no legislative acts or other provisions. And the draft CPSU platform which we are discussing says nothing about this either. I think that this section—"The Soviets"—needs to be very seriously reinforced. We should set up a special working group, since there is little time left, and include in it experienced soviet workers so that these and other necessary local soviet legislative acts will be adopted in the immediate future. And then the soviets will really become organs with full power, consistently expressing the people's will, and will gather in their hands the reins of state management. The positions and prerogatives of the USSR Council of Ministers and its working organs, particularly of ministries and departments and above all of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], must also be strengthened.

Comrades, let us return and analyze whether we acted correctly by eliminating the ministries of agriculture, food, and the meat and dairy industry and, 6 months later, the State Agro-industrial Committee, the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, and some other organs which were entrusted with resolving the food programs? What is the result, what effect did the reorganization have, and did our agricultural work improve? One wonders: Isn't it time to stop? It is almost a year since the March Central Committee Plenum took place. It defined the main directions in fulfilling the Food Program, but what was done in practice, and how was the task of giving priority to the agroindustrial complex organized?

As a whole across the Union the target amounts of social construction in the countryside (I mean the commissioning of housing and of social and cultural facilities except for schools) were not fulfilled. And not just not fulfilled, but left below the level for 1988. As regards material and technical supply to the countryside, particularly in construction, only 70-75 percent of material resources have been provided for this year. Financial and other questions have not been solved.

How are we going to fulfill the Food Program? What lies ahead of us? This particularly concerns the working people of the Nonchernozem zone. Here people's mood and their attitude to the party directly depend on what specifically is decided, and when, as far as the provision of foodstuffs and prime necessities is concerned. And who is responsible for dealing with these questions?

Meanwhile in the fifth year of perestroyka we can establish only that the situation has become more complex. People no longer believe that we will produce consumer goods worth 66 billion rubles this year. These targets are by no means supported by raw materials and resources. Will there be a significant increase in the production of foodstuffs in 1990-1991? It should also be noted that inconsistency in the implementation of economic reform is worsening. The role and responsibility of the central organs are clearly weakened.

The draft platform says that the party is in favor of structural economic perestroyka to the benefit of the consumer sector. But no mention is made of fundamental measures, how, in what ways, and when the structural restructuring of the economy will be implemented to the benefit of the consumer market and above all to resolve the problemy of food supplies to the population in the next few years.

One more important question. The draft platform says on page 6: "Implementation without fail of the housing program. Every Soviet family must be given housing by the year 2000."

Why is it that not only was the plan for commissioning housing throughout the country as a whole not fulfilled in 1989, but even less housing was commissioned than in 1988? What are we to build with if the production of the materials which are most in short supply, such as cement and slate, increased by only 0.7-1 percent in 1989 compared to 1988? Probably we should have a good state-wide program for the production of construction materials and sanitary engineering equipment, so that it is somehow just slightly ahead of current demand not just for state-cooperative construction, but also individual construction.

Comrades, our party has the political will, the ability, and the duty to work more resolutely. Cohesion and unity in the party ranks and political and social protection of its organs are needed today as never before. The situation requires specific measures to put the country in order. Without giving up the values of perestroyka which have been won, it is time to assess and where necessary to put a stop to the activity of those movements, associations, and fronts which, calling themselves "defenders of the people," are destabilizing the situation. Finally, we need to resolutely stop the decline in state and labor discipline.

The state of party work in the Soviet Army also requires a political assessment. The situation there is unfavorable. We have very many subunits on our oblast's territory. In this connection a mass of criticism aimed at Comrade Yazov and Comrade Lizichev is being expressed.

Specific work is being done in the oblast party organization, and the Kalinin Oblast communists are making the following proposals to the current Central Committee plenum: To bring forward the date of the 28th Congress and call it an extraordinary one; and to hold it in June-July this year.

We must discuss and ratify the party platform about the need to accelerate reforms; and discuss the solutions to urgent socioeconomic and political tasks to renew and strengthen our party's unity on the Marxist-Leninist and democratic socialist platform. The new Statutes must be discussed and adopted. Elective party organs, obkoms [oblast party committee], gorkoms [city party committee], and raykoms [rayon party committee] should be given the right to autonomously determine the structure, and number of the party apparatus, expenditure on their upkeep set within the limits of the budget, and up to 50 percent of party dues given to primary party organizations.

The procedure for payment and the scale of members' dues should be reviewed, particularly for pensioners. Before the report and election campaign begins, the status of the elective party organ and the secretary of the party organization should be formulated and ratified.

The Congress must find its feet and introduce proposals to our country's Congress of People's Deputies about Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. The elections of candidate delegates to the congress must be held on a contested basis in party okrugs, the number of which will be determined by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in accordance with the representation norm.

Elective central party organs must be elected.

Report and election campaigns in obkoms, raykoms, and gorkoms should be held after the 28th Congress.

The oblast's communists propose setting up before the 28th Congress an All-Russian Party Conference which must define and decide the structure of the Russian party organ.

I must say that the oblast communists do not understand the Russian CPSU Central Committee Bureau, set up and ratified at the Central Committee December Plenum.

And last of all, I wholly and fully support the idea that there should be a discussion of the results of today's Central Committee plenum at local level with the participation of members and candidate members of the Politburo, secretaries and chiefs of the CPSU Central Committee departments, and leaders of the Council of Ministers. At the same time this participation must be not casual, but thorough—that is, we need to experience the situation and circumstances in which party organizations and labor collectives at local level find themselves, their moral-political mood, and their practical measures to improve the economy and social development.

## Gorbachev Aide Summarizes Plenum Decisions

*LD0902145690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[By TASS Parliamentary Correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 9 Feb (TASS)—Nikolay Petrakov, assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, called the decisions of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "a colòssal step toward guaranteeing the irreversibility of the process of perestroyka in the USSR." He gave an interview to a TASS correspondent today about the results of the plenum.

Describing the economic section of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, which was adopted at the plenum, Nikolay Petrakov said that its basis will be "a diversity of forms of ownership including cooperative and individual and encompassing ownership of the means of production as well."

"We have long been intimidated by private ownership, but such ownership, in the classical understanding of this term, no longer exists even in the West," Nikolay Petrakov said. "And a whole spectrum of intermediate forms exist between private and state ownership, including cooperative and joint stock, which need to be given the green light. Fears expressed recently that curtailing state management of the USSR economy would lead to the country being sold to capitalists, newly brought to light, are simply absurd," Nikolay Petrakov considers. He favors issuing shares in state enterprises and moreover the shareholders could, in his opinion, be either private individuals or soviet enterprises and banks and, in the long term, possibly foreign firms as well.

In Nikolay Petrakov's opinion, radical measures, including unpopular ones, are required to pull the country's economy out of its crisis. Only an authority which enjoys the full confidence of the people and which has received a mandate of confidence from them is capable of this. In connection with this Nikolay Petrakov decisively supported the idea of establishing a presidential government in the USSR.

Speaking about the party's role at the new stage of perestroyka, the assistant of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said: "Having relinquished the legislative consolidation of its leading role in society, the party has confirmed that it is carrying out the profound changes which are occurring in Soviet society and is ready for internal renewal. For this, in particular, a review of the basic principle of the CPSU's political structuring—democratic centralism—is required."

"The minority in the party should not only gain the right to be heard, but also to conduct a struggle to become the majority" he said.

"In a situation of political pluralism the party is faced with a choice: To restructure itself and prove its right to be the ruling one in a competitive battle, or to slide into the opposition, perhaps even to leave the political arena," the assistant of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee declared.

Nikolay Petrakov is a famous Soviet academic economist who was subjected to sharp criticism in 1971 for his support of market methods of economic management. A month ago he became Mikhail Gorbachev's assistant.

## 'Top Priority' Views CPSU Plenum

*LD1002222890 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 9 Feb 90*

["Top Priority" program presented by Sergey Goryachev with political analyst Sergey Plekhanov]

[Text] [Goryachev] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to "Top Priority." I'm Sergey Goryachev. The full-scale meeting of the Soviet Communist Party voted recently to abandon the party's monopoly on power, thus actually paving the way to a multiparty system in this country. Now what is behind the move and what are the consequences of that, both short term and long term? I've invited Sergey Plekhanov, political analyst, today to discuss that. Hello Sergey.

[Plekhanov] Hi.

[Goryachev] Our roundtable is not quite round today because our second participant did not show up.

[Plekhanov] I think he is just on a vacation.

[Goryachev] He is on a vacation. Okay, my first question, Sergey, is: Do you believe that the party's decision to abandon Article 6 of the Constitution which proclaims the leading role of the Communist Party is really that significant? Now, after all, this article was only introduced in 1977 under Leonid Brezhnev. Before that the party also had that grip on power which was not weaker. So do you insist that this move has a meaning which is more than symbolic?

[Plekhanov] I think it's not so important, it's not as important, what the role of the party is according to the Constitution. What is important is what actual role it performs in society. Under Stalin and under Brezhnev the party was part of the administrative-bureaucratic system. It actually ran the country, which is not what the political party is supposed to do. This is not what socialism is all about. So it's natural that the question of changing the constitutional role of the party came to the fore when serious democratization started in the Soviet Union. So the question was bound to crop up, it did crop up this year, immediately after the first freely elected legislative body was convened this spring. And so the move taken by the plenum of the Central Committee this week was a natural reaction of a party which wants to be in the forefront of democratization, which wants to be part of the new politics in the Soviet Union. It is really a historic step.

[Goryachev] Well, this is more than symbolic, right?

[Plekhanov] Absolutely.

[Goryachev] Is it practical?

[Plekhanov] Of course. If the party doesn't do that then it will simply, may wither away.

[Goryachev] This is of course the most radical step during the years of perestroyka. You agree with that?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I agree with that.

[Goryachev] So how will that change the political landscape here?

[Plekhanov] It's extremely hard to predict the way the political trends will develop. My hunch is that we will have to wait a long time before serious opposition parties will emerge. I mean, we now have a lot of groupings, political organizations, informal groups, movements, fronts as they are called. But as far as a nationwide party similar to the Communist Party is concerned, I don't really see such a thing happening in the near future, for several reasons. Number one, because the traditions are not there. Number two, because the Communist Party is very actively reforming itself, it does want to be the political moving force for radical reform and there are a lot of people who sincerely want—I'm talking about party members—sincerely want the party to be a vanguard of this kind. So odds are that the party, while continuing to struggle for power in a new way by persuading people, by going through elections, by running candidates and so on, that it will be able to retain its leadership role for quite a long time, but it will be a different party of course.

[Goryachev] So you say that you do not see any significant force that could be formed into a new party in the near future. Do you expect a splitting of the Communist Party?

[Plekhanov] Well that's a possibility because right now there are several trends, at least three trends, in the party, three groupings in the party. The plenum has made it possible to keep those trends together. The platform was adopted virtually unanimously and it's a progressive platform, (?and) it shows that the conservative groupings in the party at this point do not want to go on their own to offer the voters their own ideas, even though I think at the individual level in various party organizations, in various local races in the country, some party candidates will be more conservative than others, so we will see some competition between various trends in the party. But as far as the organizational set-up of the party is concerned there's a clear unwillingness in all groupings in the party to split, to divide the party, and I think it's good because this country is already split so many ways.

[Goryachev] (?And yet) if that happens do you think the conservatives will go away or the radicals—from the party—and form their own party?

[Plekhanov] Well you know, as people usually say in these, in such cases, each side will blame the other for going away and maintain that itself was the true party. So I don't know how you will be able to describe it. I hope it does not happen.

[Goryachev] Okay, let me ask you this: Mikhail Gorbachev himself presented the proposal to abandon the monopoly on power by the Communist Party. Now, two months ago he passionately defended this Article 6. Let me remind you that in December he told the country's highest legislative body that any discussion as to whether this article should be changed was premature. What has happened over the two months that has made him change the mind?

[Plekhanov] I disagree with the statement that he passionately defended Article 6.

[Goryachev] Okay, I remember his speech over the television, you know, everyone was watching how he defended Article 6. He was kind of pressing the, the Congress of People's Deputies not to make that move, not to put that...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Or his position.

[Goryachev]...on a vote even.

[Plekhanov] Right. His position was that Article 6 will have to be changed as part of a broader constitutional change. He said let's not single this article out as the worst article of them all and in need of immediate revision. It's not, it doesn't reflect on his attitude toward what the party's role should be, it's just a question of timing. As a politician he has his own timetable and he has views on which particular measures should be submitted at this particular time.

[Goryachev] Okay, but you say that this should be a constitutional move of course, but the Congress of People's Deputies is that body which is authorized to make changes in the Constitution, so that was a very right time probably to make that move then.

[Plekhanov] No. The idea was that, let's build a new constitution, let's write a new constitution and that work had already started. And part of the overall revision of the constitution—let's deal with Article 6—that was his idea. He did not want Article 6 to be singled out as the article most in need for revision.

[Goryachev] But it was singled out at the plenum.

[Plekhanov] That's right. Well, that's, that's the case when events...

[Goryachev, interrupting] No, what happened?

[Plekhanov] What happened? I think that events have taken such a turn that this particular point, namely the role of party in society, had to be dealt with in first place. I still consider the article itself, the article business, as—it's in itself less significant than the real things that are happening in the party and in the country, because even though of course it's important for the plenum to take this decision, but again we will have to see how the various forces in society will deal with it.

[Goryachev] Probably he arrived at that conclusion after trips to the Baltics, to Lithuania.

[Plekhanov] Well, not only Lithuania. There have been many events which have taken place since then.

[Goryachev] Let's talk about how the Central Committee meeting voted on the decision. As far as I know only one person voted against that—that was Boris Yeltsin, a recognized leftwinger.

[Plekhanov] Well it's really an ironic turn of events, especially since the plenum has made the platform which was submitted for discussion at the start of the plenum more radical, more progressive. It is a paradox. Most of the speeches were of a conservative bent, they criticized Gorbachev from, and the perestroyka process, various aspects of it, from a more conservative position. And yet they've come up with a document which is even more progressive than it was at the start and you have one of the most radical members of the Central Committee voting against it. I think the political—that shows where the (?vector) of political process goes, so the tempo of change is quickening and there is a powerful trend toward radicalization. I think Boris Yeltsin wants to maintain his position as the leader of that more radical trend.

[Goryachev] Yes, he says too much has been compromised.

[Plekhanov] Yes, well, that's what he always says and I think it's a classic case of an opposition politician never being able to satisfy himself with the changes that are taking place by the government. The moment he becomes a member of the government his whole outlook changes and it turns out that politics is the art of the possible.

[Goryachev] Do you think that the fact that the plenum was widely covered by the press, I mean the publishing of all the speeches in the newspaper PRAVDA, somehow affected the decisions?

[Plekhanov] Oh, absolutely. It was a glasnost plenum and everybody speaking there had to think of the consequences of what the rank and file people, the millions, the tens of millions of Soviet people and rank and file communists would say about what this or that delegate to the plenum said. I think it did constrain the conservatives somewhat. It forced them to watch their words and, among other things, I think it had affected the voting on the platform.

[Goryachev] Probably one of the positive effects of the plenum was that people now know who is who. Do you agree?

[Plekhanov] Yes, they don't know that about everyone and besides, you know, political struggles do not always reveal, even when they're conducted in the open—Americans know it very well and Europeans do to—there are all kinds of ways of concealing what you're really after. That's—there are thousands of years of political rhetoric developed precisely for those purposes, so I'm not sure that people already know exactly who stands for what after these publications. It will require more listening, more questions and answers, more political struggle.

[Goryachev] But the process has begun of getting to know who is who.

[Plekhanov] It's extremely healthy for the Soviet Union.

[Goryachev] Now let's talk about the role of the president in the Soviet Union. The platform adopted at the plenum suggests that the president is given more power. What does it mean for the Soviet Union?

[Plekhanov] Well, the Soviet Union needs a strong executive now, a strong, progressive executive, an executive which would be able to make the decisions and implement them more effectively than the current structural set-up is able to. The current set-up has been transitional, from the old system with the top control of decisions by the party, and now the control is shifting to the government. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet is a position which has more to do with legislative duties. In the executive we have the Council of Ministers which does not seem to have enough power to deal with the issues. It's not that it doesn't have enough power. It's a bunch of ministries, several dozen ministries and its day to day running of the affairs of government. There must be a strategic cockpit at the head of the state where the buck stops, as you know, and where the ultimate authority is placed—and that's the presidency.

[Goryachev] I understand Mikhail Gorbachev is going to be our new president.

[Plekhanov] Well, there will be an election.

[Goryachev] A fulltime president.

[Plekhanov] There will be an election and I hope that it will be a multicandidate election, but I am convinced that he can win in a free election.

[Goryachev] Whom do you see as Mikhail Gorbachev's rival for the presidency?

[Plekhanov] No, I don't want to speculate about that really but I assume that, you know, Boris Yeltsin, has political itch and has been put forward in fact by some candidates, some members of the Congress of People's Deputies in the first session in the spring and early summer, so it could just well be that some people may run him again.

[Goryachev] Andrey Sakharov warned a few times against too much power concentrated in one person. Now, do you think this could play against Mikhail Gorbachev if he remains the general secretary of the party, or the leader of the ruling party, the Communist Party, and a new president with more powers?

[Plekhanov] I don't know. This country has a tradition of putting faith in strong government.

[Goryachev] I mean, William Safire already called Mikhail Gorbachev a super Tsar.

[Plekhanov] Now who cares about what William Safire says? Maybe just the readers of THE NEW YORK TIMES.

[Goryachev] Well, I mean, a lot of people think that way. He only reflects, probably, some of the feelings.

[Plekhanov] Well, some of the feelings in the (?Boston)-Washington echo chamber, but as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I think there has been impatience with Mikhail Gorbachev not being forceful enough, not being strong enough. In fact there have been even articles to the effect that we must give him special authority in order to push through the changes because the obstacles are so great, so powerful, the inertia is so strong, that it really takes a lot of concentrated effort to push the changes through. So, I think that this strengthening of his position will get the popular support in the country.

[Goryachev] And getting back to a multiparty system, which will probably exist in the Soviet Union in the near future, ah, more democracy means unleashing people's power and don't you think that people's power is not always creative. It seems to me that this multiparty system, which is designed to somehow defuse the political tensions here, will create even more instability when different factions will start forming their new parties and run for power.

[Plekhanov] That's conceivable.

[Goryachev] Kind of a deadlock...

[Plekhanov] That's conceivable; freedom can be intoxicating. Other nations have seen it, we have seen it a number of times in our own history and there is a danger that...

[Goryachev, interrupting] Taking, taking into account our own history and lack of democratic traditions here.

[Plekhanov] Yes, and you see there is a real danger of politicking, with a lot of ambitious people running for the sake of running, for the sake of grabbing power and not really being concerned about the serious problems that confront the country. But those are the costs of democracy. I mean, we have made a choice in favor of democracy and it always reminds me of a conversation I had with, with a top official in the Chinese Communist Party about the policy of China's opening to the outside world, that was before Tiananmen, and that guy was progressive, and he said, I asked him whether he was not afraid that sending so many students to the United States and other Western countries would contaminate them with bourgoise ideologies; he said, you know, when you open a window to get some fresh air you know that there'll be some dust and mosquitoes that will come through but that's not an argument against opening the window.

[Goryachev] Against opening the window, no, I agree. At this moment the reactions in the United States and elsewhere have been very positive, on the plenum; now, do you think that the developments in the Soviet Union will make the United States probably change their politics. This multiparty system will create some uncertainty for the United States as to who will run the country—in contrast to the past when the party leader will be...[changes thought] and they were sure, will definitely be running the country for a decade, for decades actually. So, probably this also effects the United States in that respect—do you agree with that?

[Plekhanov] Well, yes, well for some people in the State Department and the presidency who do the actual analysis of events in the Soviet Union and the probable, possible changes in the course of the soviet policy, it may involve more uncertainty and more work but...

[Goryachev, interrupting] Like in East Germany, they are waiting for the elections there, they don't know who is going to win.

[Plekhanov] Right, right, but that's the kind of uncertainty we have had to deal with in our relations with the United States and we always complain that, you know, what, how can we deal with you—every four years you change your president, you have your election and the foreign policy veers this or that side. So, we are in the same, in the same position right now and of course I can sympathize with those Kremlin watchers who will have more work now for them, but on the other hand I think a democratic and open society is basically more predictable than a close society and totalitarian society which may look monolithic but when it falls apart you get a lot of instability. And besides, you never know what's behind that solid facade. In a democratic society there is a lot of commotion but at least you can gauge which direction things are going.

[Goryachev] Thank you very much Sergey Plekhanov. That's all for today's edition of Top Priority. I'm Sergey Goryachev; thank you for listening.

### Fedorov, Fisenko Interviewed on Plenum

*LD1102051390*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1920 GMT on 9 February in the "View" program carries a 12-minute interview with Svyatoslav Nikolayevich Fedorov, director of Moscow's Opthalmic Microsurgery Research Institute and Konstantin Fisecko, a blaster from Kochegarka mine of the Artemugol Association, both of whom attended the 5-7 February CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Fedorov and Fisenko are interviewed by students Vladimir Sidorov and Yanna Chernukha. The program is presented by Aleksandr Poltikovskiy.

Asked to give their impressions of the plenum, Fedorov called it the "February Revolution," while Fisenko said that two days after being criticized by the KGB chairman from the plenum's rostrum, he had ended up on the "View" program rather than involved in some "catastrophe." He did not elaborate.

Fedorov agreed with Politkovskiy's suggestion that everyone at the plenum seemed to be over 60 or at least 40, and that the impression was given that they were solving that generation's problems.

Yanna Chernukha asked how, given that Academician Shatalin had said in his spech that the very concept of socialism was not defined in the party's platform, something so incomprehensible could be built. Fedorov agreed that socialism has been understood to mean totalitarianism or even fascism, but that it really means workers' ownership of the means of production without exploitation of man by man. Chernukha commented that while the CPSU platform did mention the exploitation of man by man, it fails to deal with the state's exploitation of man. Fedorov said this will end some day.

Fedorov explained that he had called the plenum a "February Revolution" because other parties are being permitted for the first time; because there will be a multi-party system; and because the party has admitted the existence of ownership by individuals, cooperatives, shareholders, and so on. Concerning the multi-party system he said, "Each party will defend your interests, your interests, and my interests, and via these several principal parties we will be able to put people in the Supreme Soviet and the legislative bodies who will defend our interests." In addition, "the party has quite rightly renounced any kind of exclusive role whereby it commands everything, including politics, ideology, morality, and so on. There will be no Article 6 in the Constitution, but it will be laid down that all parties have equal opportunities."

Asked whether he thought the party platform was radical enough, Fisenko said he thought not. He noted that Yeltsin explained his reason for not voting for the re-edited draft of the platform as being that eight of his ten proposals were not included in it, after the editorial commission had done its work. Fisenko noted that when those invited to the plenum voted on the document, he abstained. He said he had had a considerable package of proposals, one of which was that where the platform speaks about industrialization, where there is "unchecked exploitation of nature", he wants it to read "of nature and of man." He explained there was no reaction to this, that he made some more proposals, and he was asked not to speak again and to leave the microphone. Fisenko said because he was unhappy with this, Gorbachev said that he could submit his proposals, which he later did. He said he told Gorbachev and the audience he was abstaining from the vote because he did not know what form the platform would eventually come out in. "If is is in this form, I believe a more radical step is needed on matters of democratization," he concluded.

On the subject of Article 6, Fisenko said it was a mere declaration and that the first draft of the party platform actually stated that the party does not need to decree its leading position; in other words that it will not insist on this because it "has the real mechanisms of power in its hands. The real mechanisms of power. I saw this at the plenum." Fisenko said as a miner he has seen how his colleagues had spoken to all levels of authority without obtaining results. It is the party apparatus rather than the rank-and-file communists who hold the real power in the country, concluded Fisenko. It is the people at the plenum who are in power, not the government or anyone else, and "it should have been clearly stated in that program, the platform, what mechanisms of real power the apparatus has, and how these mechanisms can be brought to a position whereby it makes less use of them." (The video shows interview particpants sitting at a table in the studio]

## Yeltsin Visits Leningrad, Explains Vote at Plenum

*LD0902223790 Moscow TASS in English*
*1910 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Leningrad February 9 TASS—Soviet Communist Party Maverick Boris Yeltsin, now a candidate for a place in the Russian Federation Parliament, arrived in Leningrad today at the invitation of a number of informal organisations.

Journalists asked him upon his arrival if the visit was connected with his announced intention to become Russia's president.

Yeltsin, who is already a USSR people's deputy, answered that it would be immodest of him to say so.

"The collectives that have nominated me told me that I should not refuse, as I did at the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, if I am nominated president of Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet," he said.

During an impromptu news conference, Yeltsin explained the reason why he refused to support the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress to be held next summer.

Yeltsin pointed out that he had disagreed with the Soviet Government's programme for the country's economic recovery submitted to the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

"I opposed that programme and voted against. The programme did not envisage radical measures for overcoming the crisis, nor did it suggest specific efforts to resolve the food programme and create a mechanism of transition to a market economy. So how could I vote for the programme if I have already voted against? Yeltsin said.

Today he had meetings with Leningraders at the polytechnical institute and Leningradsky Metallurgichesky Zavod Amalgamation.

## Political & Social

### Ryzhkov Visits Komi Enterprises 7 Feb

*LD0702202590 Moscow TASS in English 1943 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Syktyvkar February 7 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov arrived today in the Komi autonomous republic on a fact-finding visit. Right after his arrival, he went to the Syktyvkar industrial timber complex, one of the largest producers of paper in the Soviet Union, which was built slightly over two decades ago.

He had meetings with workers and specialists and discussed accelerated improvement of the social sphere which is a key to further expansion of production capacities.

Late in the evening the cabinet head visited a scientific centre, a subsidiary of the Urals branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

### Sounds Out People's Views

*LD0802112190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's stay in Komi ASSR is continuing. [Video shows Ryzhkov descending aircraft steps with officials to be met by other officials on the tarmac where he is interviewed]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent P. Orlov] Many are saying that this trip is either an old duty or a new opportunity to have contact with the miners. I will remind you that the last meeting took place quite recently, just a week ago, on 1 February.

[Ryzhkov] I would like...immediately after the plenum to travel to one of the regions of our country, well, to meet people, to have a talk here, and, at the same time to fulfil my old duty, so I think that there are two tasks to resolve.

The platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress of the party has been adopted and will be published, after a little editorial correction, for nationwide discussion. Of course it experienced many political problems, including certain questions...they were raised in their time in December...and they were raised in Vorkuta, but I can't say that Vorkuta had the monopoly here—these questions have become imminent everywhere, both in Vorkuta, and in other regions.

But if one speaks specifically, then they received a certain prompting here in their own time, a certain attitude...so that there are things to talk about. I have to inform people about the decisions of the plenum, and, evidently about the atosphere of the plenum, but the most imporant thing is our attitude to certain political matters, and especially toward party matters. That is the main thing, the main matter which was discussed at the plenum—how the party is to be hereafter. I am ready for dialogue. I am in the mood to exchange views, and, the msot imporant thing is not just to report on the position of the government, say, or the position of the political leadership. I would very much like, and I want to listen to what people are thinking and to hear about those problems which concern them, and I know that there are very many of these problems.

[Orlov] But this program is not restricted to dialogue with the miners. According to the schedule, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov is aiming to acquaint himself with all the opportunities of the republic. He has already paid a visit to an industrial timber complex, and has met with staff of a scientific center in Komi. [Video shows Ryzhkov being shown around what looks like a paper mill, speaking with workes]

Today, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is at the Zapolyarnaya and Vorgashorskaya mines in Vorkuta. [end recording]

### Meets With Komi Miners

*LD1002201990*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 10 February broadcasts a 14-minute report on Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's visit to the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The announcer begins with an apology for the delay in broadcast of this particular report due to poor weather conditions.

The video shows Ryzhkov getting off the plane and talking to an unidentified television correspondent. Ryzhkov says: "This is really an old obligation, because, when we conducted discussions—if we can call them that—I promised then to come to Vorkuta and go to this mining country. I intended to do this in January, but, unfortunately, affairs in the country did not allow me to wrench myself away, you see. And now I would like to go to these...to one of these regions of our country immediately after the plenum. Well, first to meet people, to talk, and at the same time to fulfill my old obligation. So, I think I will fulfill two tasks. And the most important thing is our attitude to certain political issues and especially to the party issue. The main issue which was discussed at the plenum was what the party will be like from now on. So, I think there will be questions and there will be answers. I am in the mood for dialogue and in the mood for exchanging opinions. And the main thing is that I am in the mood for not only delivering the position, let's say of the government or the position of the political leadership, but I would very much like to listen to what people think and hear about those problems which concern them; I know that there are very many of these problems. So, I hope that during these two days that I will be here, I will glean a lot for myself."

The video then shows Ryzhkov walking between machines and meeting with staff at a paper company.

The video also shows a convoy of vehicles travelling along a snowy road to the Zapolyarnaya Mine and Ryzhkov in hard hat and overalls inspecting the miners' canteen.

The television correspondent says: "Next, after being given a complete set of equipment, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov went down to the pit face. The descent was to section nine, on a complete tour, as they say here, for two hours. There was a ride on the miners' wagon and then a stretch on foot. Incidentally, this is how the miners get to work every day. And there, underground, they told the Council of Ministers chairman about the disastrous situation regarding technology and equipment. An interesting example is that our cameras were not allowed at the pit face for safety reasons, while at the same time the mines are still being supplied with motors that are not blast-safe." The video shows Ryzhkov descending into the mine shaft.

The scene then switches to a miners' assembly, addressed by Ryzhkov. The correspondent comments: "People came here to find out firsthand how, for example, the problem of housing for miners leaving for other regions will be solved. This, though Nikolay Ivanovich, is something that should be handled by those departments that operate in the north, because one can no longer count on the goodwill of local soviets. Then there was a question on pensions: How will they be credited to the miners under the new law. And here the team accompanying the USSR Council of Ministers chairman came into action: (Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov), chairman of the State Committee on Labor answered. Another important piece of news is that the government decision on the socio-economic development of the Pechora Basin is to be confirmed in March. The amount of construction of housing and hospitals alone will double. Incidentally, similar documents will be adopted for all the coal basins." The camera shows Ryzhkov and (Shcherbakov) answering questions.

The correspondent then describes the delegation's journey to Vorgashorskaya mine. "But here something that nobody expected happend: a snowstorm. The government convoy was skidding in the blizzard; visibility was practically zero. We proceeded one meter at a time, and a few minutes later the vehicles came to a stop. A few hours later we ran out of gas, and the vehicles became covered with ice and frost." The video shows vehicles in a showstorm; the driver's cabin of a bus covered in ice; people laughing. "Yes, people kept up each other's spirits with laughter and jokes, and tried to get warm; it was more than 40 degrees below. But at the same time, dozens of vehicles on the ring road with a hundred people ended up trapped by the snow. It was a ruthless arctic snowstorm. We shot these pictures while the cameras were still working. Nearby, in the same kind of vehicle, was Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. The cross-country vehicles came for him only six hours later."

The correspondent goes on to say: "We received a full picture of the disaster the following day, when Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov came to the meeting at the headquarters which was set up as a matter of urgency. The city was left without water; there were cases of people freezing. The Severnaya pit operation was halted. And the first concern of the headquarters is saving people. All the cross-country vehicles were deployed to the ring road. But of course, the inhabitants of the mining settlements had it worst of all. It turns out that they were cut off from the city". The correspondent says that heavy equipment was drafted in to clear up the snow. The video shows snow plows operating in blizzard conditions.

The correspondent speaks to Ryzhkov inside a building: "Nikolay Ivanovich, this is the way that your familiarization with Vorkuta and the miners went."

Ryzhkov replies: "Indeed. Unfortunately, my familiarization ended precisely with such a natural disaster. I even feel awkward at times; either I appear at the scene of natural disasters. Well, in this instance, it was simply a coincidene. Of course, my trip was absolutely not connected with the natural disaster, although we got caught up in this snow storm and were stranded for about six hours there. You were there, too? You were there? You were there, too, in the next car.

"Nevertheless, I think that the day was very fruitful and very interesting. It began in the pit. We visited the pit and talked with the work collective. They are interesting people. They are, I would say, very responsive people, in my view. Evidently, the North nevertheless forges a certain kind of person, of character, and of attitude to life. Well, in the evening, after being stranded and despite the fact that we kept people waiting almost three hours—not even almost, but a whole three hours—you saw that there was a full hall. This means that people not only listened with interest to my report about the plenum, about the development of the economy, and about the difficulties which have formed in the economy of our country, but you also saw that there were very many questions. I was even unable to answer half of the questions and have taken them away with me. Well, many questions were repeated, but I was unable even to answer half of them. So then, I will have to look into all this thoroughly in Moscow.

"Well, today it was necessary to conduct here at the executive committee a small conference and an analysis of the situation which has formed. The comrades here are doing all that is needed, although the situation is difficult. These now are precisely the most critical hours, in my view, these three or four hours while it is still light. If they can manage to find the breaks in the tundra of the electric powerlines—breaks took place there—and restore power quickly, then there will be no threat to people. If they cannot find them, then there will be great complications with the heating of the houses. Well, the comrades currently are working, and I think that it is necessary to give them the opportunity and the freedom to act. They are experienced people, although they say that it is unusual to have such a situation in the North, but nevertheless they have very rich experience, and I think that they will cope with this problem."

The correspondent then speaks to Ryzhkov: "There were cases, it has been said, when it was necessary to evacuate Vorkuta in similar situations. Did that issue not figure now in the sitting?"

Ryzhkov replies: "I do not think that it did figure, that the whole town should be evacuated, but, nevertheless, we talked about the further development, possible development of the situation, that if in the next hours we do not manage to restore electrical transmissions...[changes thought] where the lines are, it is unknown what has happened to them. Maybe breaks or maybe telephone poles have fallen, because the gusts of winds were up to 48 miles per hour. So, therefore anything could have happened there. Those scouts who have gone have not yet reported anything. Now a convoy of five or six cross-country vehicles, which are loaded with materials and specialists, is going there. Specialists are going there. So it is possible that one of the rayons—I say rayon theoretically—a part of the town will have to be evacuated into some other buildings according to evaluation, if it develops in an unfavorable direction."

The correspondent comments: "On the same day in Syktyvkar, there was a meeting with Communists, workers, engineers, and specialists. What was one of the most critical questions?"

Ryzhkov replies: "My attitude to monetary reform. I have spoken many times already and I know that I do not have my hundred-percent like-minded people, but, nevertheless, I will once more express my point of view. I consider that what is called a regressive monetary reform should not be carried out. The point is that, when carrying out monetary reform, one must always realize why we are doing this. Before starting at all, I would say that this is not even a question of economics. This is rather a socio-political question. We must think what we are following, what purpose we are following, and then, that is, as they say, adopt definite decisions, which should be given specific content, and so forth. If we think that at the cost of some kind of regressive system we will seize the money in the shadow economy from those people who, by some dishonest methods, have acquired large amounts of money there and so—I don't know—we will hardly be able to do this because we have seen how adaptionally all this operates in our country. That is, all this money will go along completely different channels. Everything will be exchanged and so forth. But we will subvert trust in all our stability in general, and second, we will inter alia strike at those savings which people have."

The report concludes with a video shot of Ryzhkov speaking with the correspondent.

## Briefs Miners on Plenum

*LD0902221290 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Vorkuta February 9 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, now visiting the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, today met miners living in the Arctic region.

Ryzhkov spoke in detail about the work of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Plenum. He noted that the plenum was held in the exceptionally complex period of perestroyka.

"Political instability has been added to economic and social tension in recent months. The party is going through hard times. All this imparted particular significance to the plenum," Ryzhkov said.

"All work after the plenum and, above all, preparations for the 28th Party Congress should give a powerful impetus to the efforts to reshape the entire mechanism of the party, take it out of the present state, raise its vigour and activeness and the offensive nature of the actions by party organisations and committees.

"Democratising inner party life is the mainstream in the efforts to reshape the party," Ryzhkov went on. "Drastic changes in the party rules are crucial for expediting this process.

"They should aim at democratising the formation of elected governing bodies, staffing all links of the party apparatus on the alternative basis, using a sound mechanism for recalling members of party committees at any level, and reviving the Leninist idea of defending the rights of the minority in the party."

Ryzhkov told miners that new wholesale prices for coal would be introduced in 1991. They will take into account the spending on recultivation, environmental protection, the changing of the mining and geological conditions and other expenses.

The USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions examined and accepted the proposals by representatives of work collectives of the Vorkutaugol Association, Ryzhkov said.

He informed miners about measures taken to improve social conditions in the region, to supply the mining industry and miners this year with material and technical resources, consumer goods and food.

## Discusses Party, Economy

*PM1002224190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "To Strengthen Perestroyka With Concrete Deeds"]

[Text] The concrete, principled decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum have aroused not only in the party but in the entire Soviet people a feeling that we have all been so lacking in recently: a feeling of confidence that the perestroyka processes are gathering momentum and have not turned off the main road. This is also the belief of the miners beyond the Arctic Circle who met with N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who is visiting the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

It had not been easy to get through to Vorkuta, cut off from the world by a freezing blizzard and fog. The local radio reported that schools were not operating because of the bad weather, and transport was making progress very slowly in the fog. However, hundreds of miners were waiting for N.I. Ryzhkov at the "Zapolyarnaya" Mine when he arrived.

Only quite recently the mining city of Vorkuta was considered a "hot spot" on the map of the country. The strike wave gripped many labor collectives, yet the miners, who have always been and still are one of the most organized and cohesive detachments of the Soviet working class, realized their responsibility to the country and to perestroyka and were able, where necessary, to rise above their own interests and to master their emotions for the benefit of society.

M.S. Gorbachev's recent meeting with a group of miners from a number of coal basins played a great role in this. The democratic and frank discussion helped to finally clarify positions and to make the necessary corrections to the implementation of government resolution No. 608, which is designed to maximally straighten out the social distortions in coal regions....

The cage descended to a depth of half a kilometer, then there was a journey of several kilometers in an underground miners' "streetcar," followed by a walk along a gallery, and the head of government met with the collective of the No. 9 extraction section, which is led by V.P. Svistun. A conversation started up. The miners asked Nikolay Ivanovich about the work of the plenum and about the measures which the country's leadership is taking to extricate the economy from the crisis, which is particularly serious for the working person.

The miners' mood is equable and businesslike. The mine, which was in a fever for a long time, is beginning little by little to "feel" its line and is for the first time attaining the rated capacity of 1.35 million tonnes of coking coal a year. But there are also problems and questions, which N.I. Ryzhkov answered.

What is of concern to the "Zapolyarnaya" miners? More efficient and reliable equipment is needed.

Mine veteran O.N. Samoylov described how they organize labor there so as to guarantee the stable fulfillment of the shift target.

The Vorkuta coal, which the country needs so badly, is not easy to extract. Yes, the miners admit, their earnings are not bad, although this money is, of course, earned. But there is frequently nothing to buy with it. The miners believe that their collective should be given a license to sell above-plan coal, including for hard currency. Barter deals will help to give people a better supply of scarce goods.

But Nikolay Ivanovich also had many questions for his interlocutors: How do people assess the draft Law on Pensions, and what do they think about the legislation on leave? Both acts must be adopted as soon as possible, he believes, and the government is literally racking its brains over where to get these funds from.

And considerable sums are involved—on the order of R50 billion.

V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, answered some of the questions. The leaders of a number of sectors are in Vorkuta with N.I. Ryzhkov. Only these are not "accompanying persons" but a working team, and every member of it has his specific sector.

The miners had many questions for the leader of the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry. M.I. Shchadov was constantly making notes in a work notepad. Many problems connected with the development of the Arctic coal basin have to be resolved. Much also has to be done to strengthen the mining region's transport base. Railways Minister N.S. Konarev is tackling this in earnest, while problems of power generation in the region are at the center of attention for Yu.K. Semenov, leader of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification. The USSR Ministry of Trade, whose leader, K.Z. Terekh, is also in Vorkuta, must also take a more interested part in resolving acute social questions.

A conversation with Leonid Gostishchev, one of the "afgantsy," came round to the complex problem of housing.

I believe, Nikolay Ivanovich said—and we discussed this at the plenum—that more housing must be built in cities such as Vorkuta. But more thought must also be given to the people who have worked for long years in the north and who now wish to take up permanent residence in other regions. Housing must be prepared for them more actively by the corresponding ministries and departments, and we must not wait for this question to be resolved by local soviets alone. Such a model, he believes, suits both metallurgists and power workers, for example.

The discussion with miners shifted from the gallery to the mine's "red corner," which was filled to bursting. And again there were dozens of pointed but essentially constructive questions.

Ahead lay difficult kilometers in a blizzard. Only after being held captive six hours by the snow did the bus in which N.I. Ryzhkov was traveling to a meeting with the miners' aktiv manage to reach the center of Vorkuta.

Addressing the miners, the Soviet head of government said:

The CPSU Central Committee plenum has just completed its work. It was taking place at an exceptionally complex period of perestroyka. In recent months economic and social tension has been compounded by political instability. The party is living through difficult times. All this lent special significance to the Central Committee plenum and placed it among the historic events directly connected in recent years with the fate of the people, of society, and of the state.

Soviet people—Communists and nonparty people—expected the plenum to answer the most urgent questions concerning not only the situation in the party but also the program of specific actions aimed at stabilizing society, accelerating the practical realization of both economic and political reforms, and tangibly improving the people's living conditions.

Assessing on a difficult plane the debate which developed at the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the decisions which it adopted, it is possible to say most definitely that they adequately reflect the acuteness of the situation and the main problems and tasks facing the party and the country.

The overwhelming majority of the speakers emphasized that neither today nor in the foreseeable future is any other movement or any other of the political and state institutions that exist in the country in a position to formulate a concept of a strategic course or to ensure the consolidation of all healthy forces which advocate the renewal of socialism on a democratic and humane basis. This was the plenum participants' unanimous assessment of the party's role and of the tremendous significance of the transformations in implementing which the Soviet people are actively involved on the party's initiative. But this assessment is merely the background against which the idea was clearly manifested that the party cannot fulfill its mission unless it undertakes a radical renewal of its organizational structure and of the forms and methods of work with the masses.

As a member of the Central Committee Politburo, N.I. Ryzhkov said, I fully share the viewpoint expressed by the plenum participants that we are clearly dragging our feet over the timely analysis and elaboration of a platform on such a burning question as interethnic relations. In fact we still do not have a clear-cut, comprehensively elaborated concept of the party's place and role in the system of political power under conditions of the development of democracy and the formation of a rule-of-law state. Hence the tardiness and inconsistency in work on delimiting the functions of party organs and soviets and the "defensive position" in connection with Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

Life is always richer in theories. And it is not always possible to find the correct answer right away to all the questions which it poses. But there is also another danger here—noninterference in the course of events can lead to another extreme. The Communist Party is by its nature not a temporizing party but a vigorously thinking and acting party. Precisely this is why it is fundamentally important that the plenum approached from these positions its assessment of the upcoming work on elaborating the strategy of the CPSU's renewal.

What conclusions is it possible to draw from the decisions of the Central Committee February plenum?

First. All work after the plenum, above all that connected with preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress, must give a strong boost to the perestroyka of the party's whole organism, extricate it from its present state, and enhance its militancy and activeness and the assertiveness of party organizations and committees. In short, fire the party with optimism.

Second. Very decisive measures must be taken in the very near future along the lines of the CPSU Central Committee and of local party organs to ensure that the CPSU's activity in society is carried out by political methods. For this it is necessary to renounce administrative-edict interference in the affairs of the state, the national economy, public organizations, and ideological establishments.

Third. The chief conclusion from the plenum decisions is that the CPSU's political leadership is exercised through the elaboration and correction of the theory of social development in the interests of socialism, particularly the concept of perestroyka; the selection and placing of cadres, realized as the party's proposed delegating of its supporters, including those who are not CPSU members; organizational functions; the constant dinning—because of the mixed economy—of socialist consciousness into the masses; critical analysis of the non-Marxist concept of social development. All this was clearly underlined at the plenum, and it was all made the basis of its decisions.

Fourth. The democratization of internal party life is the main area of the party's perestroyka. Fundamental changes to the CPSU Statutes must be envisaged to accelerate this process. They are aimed at democratizing the formation of leading elected organs, staffing all components of the party apparatus on a multiple-candidate basis, utilizing an efficient mechanism for recalling members of party committees at any level, and reviving the Leninist idea of protecting the rights of a minority in the party.

An important point, which received support at the Central Committee plenum, is that the CPSU's right to political leadership must be proved, above all, by practical and theoretical actions, by the party's moral authority, and by its ability to constructively resolve the problems facing society.

The next conclusion, which stems directly from the plenum decisions, is connected with the fact that the CPSU's new aspect is based on fundamental changes to the mechanism of the relationship between its top echelons and its lower links. The task consists in creating conditions so that party policy proceeds from the needs and interests of the whole people.

The way to resolve this task is to democratize party life. A very important constituent part of this process will be the enhancement of the independence of primary party organizations. Very complex work lies ahead in order to revive the creative independence of primary party organizations and to direct them toward adopting enterprising political decisions.

Finally, about the party, the system of management and state power. The first point, from which the need to radically change the party's attitudes toward questions of the economy's direct management stems, is connected with the fact that managerial functions are based on ownership relations and presuppose the mutual responsibility of the parties to these relations. Not being included in this system, the party has always been restricted in its actions to political-command methods alone. We also have to get away decisively from this in the very near future.

As regards the party and state power, it follows from the speeches of the plenum participants that for long years the special difficulties of our situation were determined by the fact that the concepts of the ruling party and power were considered synonymous. At the same time international experience and our own experience attested that only organs legislatively elected by the people or formed by them can exercise power and govern. In short, everyone must mind his own business.

One of the party's most important tasks is to consolidate all the healthy forces of our society to strengthen the economy and improve the life of the Soviet people, N.I. Ryzhkov continued. Special attention was devoted to this question at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, and I, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, would also like to dwell on it in detail.

The tactics and strategy for overcoming the present economic crisis, ways to further develop the national economy, and a package of agreed measures making it possible to improve the economy and successfully resolve social tasks are defined in the government program supported by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The head of government went on to dwell on the tasks and order for creating a new model of the economic system and on its social guarantees for all members of society. Above all, he emphasized, it is necessary to realize the priority measures aimed at reducing social tension in the country.

The year 1990 is to be of crucial significance in resolving the task of sharply increasing consumer goods production. N.I. Ryzhkov recalled that the increase in this production is to total R60 billion against an average of R17 billion a year during the past period of the five-year plan. Production of foodstuffs is to increase by R14 billion.

The resolution of these extremely complex tasks will require strenuous and harmonious work by all components of the national economy and all working people, a great deal of organizational work, the instilling of order in the spheres of production and distribution, and the strengthening of discipline, he said.

It is perfectly clear that if order is not instilled in production in the very near future, if there is a continued delay, and if people wait for someone to come along, get to the bottom of things, help, and organize work, then the 1990 plan will be wrecked, and this will jeopardize both the first stage earmarked for 1990-1992 and the entire program of economic improvement and make it impossible to begin the transition in the next five-year plan to new management methods based on the introduction of the very important legislative acts which the upcoming USSR Supreme Soviet session is to adopt. The preparations to switch to new work principles and the creation of conditions for their utilization are another special feature of this year.

I would now like, the head of government continued, to proceed to questions of interest to both you and me—to problems directly connected both with the purpose of my trip to this region and with the events which occurred in the country's coal basins last year and which were perceived acutely and ambivalently in society.

As is known, the government, with the broad participation of representatives of labor collectives, provided for a number of measures in the well-known USSR Council of Ministers resolution No. 608 aimed at improving the system of moral and economic incentives, improving miners' working and living conditions, developing the social sphere, strengthening the material and technical base of enterprises, and also broadening their economic independence and introducing new forms of management.

The socioeconomic programs for the development of the Donetsk, Kuznetsk, Karaganda, and Pechora coal basins in 1991-1995 provide for the country's coal regions to attain the average union indicators for provision with housing, kindergartens, schools, preschool establishments, medical centers, and hospitals.

As regards the Pechora coal basin specifically, the draft resolution on this region's socioeconomic development, which will be approved in March, proposes to provide for an 80-100-percent increase in the volumes of construction of housing and hospitals in 1991-1995. Spending on the social sphere in the Pechora basin is increasing from R360 million in 1986-1990 to R737 million in 1991-1995.

Now about the country's coal regions. In all of them it is proposed to carry out a package of work to improve the environment, to lay on gas and electricity supplies to cities and settlements, and to improve the water supply. Programs for the development of health care in 1990-1995 and for the period through the year 2000 have been approved for the republics and oblasts of the country's coal regions. A sharp improvement in the provision of medicines for the population and medical equipment for medical establishments is envisaged.

I cannot fail to mention also the fact that on 13 January 1990 the USSR Council of Ministers and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers adopted joint resolution No. 37 "On Conducting the Experimental Development of a Management Mechanism Based on Self-Management and Self-Financing in Kemerovo Oblast in 1990." In accordance with the requests of labor collectives, 262 enterprises in the coal industry as a whole have switched to full independence, and 116 of them are mines and open-pit mines, with all the provisions of the Law on the State Enterprise applying to them. In all, six mines (46 percent) have made the switch in the "Vorkutaugol" Association. Two concerns and an association have been created in the Kuzbass. The "Intaugol" concern has been created.

In 1989 the number of management apparatus workers in associations was reduced by 2,200 (21.5 percent) and by 12,800 (7 percent), in all, at the sector's enterprises. Some 29 percent of the management apparatus was released at associations in the Pechora basin.

Coal-extracting and processing enterprises (associations) were granted the right, as of 1 August 1989, to sell (including for export) coal and products of coal processing produced over and above state orders and accepted for fulfillment of consumers' direct orders in accordance with centrally set quotas (on condition of 100-percent fulfillment). Vorkuta people have also been given permission to sell abroad coal extracted over and above the state order and above concluded contracts. The USSR Council of Ministers has made provision for the USSR Coal Industry Ministry to be set normatives for deductions into currency funds for 1990 to the tune of 20 percent of the proceeds from the coal sold.

New wholesale prices for coal will be introduced in 1991, and the project for them takes into account spending on recultivation, ecology, changing mining and geological conditions, and other expenses. The USSR Council of Ministers jointly with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has examined and adopted the proposals of representatives of the "Vorkutaugol" Association's labor collectives.

At the same time, N.I. Ryzhkov emphasized, despite the measures being taken, a number of questions are not being resolved satisfactorily. There are, for example, valid complaints against the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, and the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making. Miners' labor collectives have complaints about the low quality of a number of types of equipment and metal being supplied. The agreed schedules for the railroads to supply cars to be loaded with coal are still being violated.

The head of government briefed the miners on the measures being taken to provide the coal sector and miners with material and technical resources, nonfood consumer goods, and foodstuffs this year. The government, he said, has adopted a proposal to improve the organization of coal sales and to supply the national economy with solid fuel and has transferred coal sales organizations from the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply to the jurisdiction of the Coal Industry Ministry—which not only extends their rights but also strengthens their responsibility for satisfying the fuel requirements of the national economy and the population.

The miners of the Pechora coal basin, N.I. Ryzhkov pointed out, have always ensured the fulfillment of coal extraction plans. The labor collectives in the Arctic region have made a good start to this year too, having extracted 200,000 tonnes of coal over and above the plan in January. This is a good beginning. He urged the miners to continue working rhythmically, ensuring the fulfillment of the state targets for fuel extraction.

In conclusion N.I. Ryzhkov said that the CPSU Central Committee plenum decisions oblige us to look again and again at the state of affairs not only in society as a whole but also in every region and in every labor collective from positions of profound realities. The CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress contains the main areas and points of extreme importance for the whole of society, for which all Communists—I am firmly convinced of this—will struggle in the sectors in which they work. It is not words that are needed now. More than enough of them have been spoken. What is needed is strenuous, concrete, daily work.

Some people say that this appeal for harmonious and efficient work has already become a bore. I believe that this is not the position to which the working person is geared. Only the consolidation of all healthy forces in society and the orientation of their efforts toward the practical fulfillment of the economic improvement program supported by the Second Congress of People's Deputies can truly produce real results.

### Addresses Republican Party Activists

*LD0902235490 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Syktyvkar February 9 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who is currently visiting the Komi Autonomous Republic, today attended a meeting of the headquarters responsible for clean-up operations after a disastrous snowstorm in Vorkuta.

In the afternoon he addressed a meeting of republic party activists.

### More on Ryzhkov Trip

*PM0902122990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[TASS report: "Visit to Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] Syktyvkar, 7 Feb—N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who arrived here today, began his familiarization with life in the autonomous republic at the shops of Syktyvkar's timber industry complex, where he went straight from the airport. The complex is one of the country's largest suppliers of paper and sundry paper products, and was commissioned just over 20 years ago.

N.I. Ryzhkov toured several production sectors in the enterprise which operates around the clock. Despite the late hour, numerous meetings and conversations with production workers and specialists took place. They discussed problems of accelerated improvement in the social sphere, which is a key element as regards the further buildup of capacities.

Late that evening N.I. Ryzhkov visited the Komi Scientific Center, a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Department. A detailed conversation about the paths of the autonomous republic's development was held here. The Soviet Government leader answered numerous questions about the work of the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

### Ryzhkov Restates Opposition to 'Monetary Reform'

*PM1102162590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "Key Problems of Economic Perestroyka"]

[Excerpts] The decisions of the recently held CPSU Central Committee plenum are creating an unambiguous mood in the party and in society: It is necessary, people believe, to break the negative trends in the country's life, resolutely put an end to apathy, and overcome confusion. For this it is necessary, above all, to step up work sharply.

Hence the careful search for new opportunities to enhance production efficiency in all sectors. This is the way to strengthen the material basis of perestroyka and enhance the Soviet people's well-being. The participants in a working conference held 9 February in Syktyvkar, where N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was present, focused their attention on a package of problems connected with this. [passage omitted]

During the conference its participants made many specific proposals and expressed wishes aimed at making resolute changes for the better in the national economic sphere. N.I. Ryzhkov answered questions connected with various aspects of economic improvement. In particular, a group of questions concerned the attitude of the government and its head toward monetary reform. He emphasized that the USSR Council of Ministers takes an unambiguous and firm stand: We will not undertake any monetary reform. Such "shock therapy" is unacceptable for resolving complex problems of the economy. I have already spoken of this, N.I. Ryzhkov recalled, at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Detailed replies were given to other questions too.

### Leningrad Deputies' Voting on Ryzhkov Plan

*90UN0800A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Dec 89 p 3*

[Article by V. Chichin: "Thirteenth or First?"]

[Text] The subject is the next five-year plan. It has already been decided that it will be called the 13th, i.e., the next in turn. But it could be the first as well—such proposals have been heard in the congress. And, as you know, its essence is not in what you name it or why.

It is hard to hold back once this topic is touched upon. Here is a verified fact: Not a single one of the preceding five-year plans has been fulfilled. How much we would like just one to remain intact—all the more so the current one on which the fate of perestroyka depends. But again the question arises: What has actually occurred in our native land that causes us to have become witnesses to a miracle?

Not a single sociological survey has taken note of an improved situation in the economy. In my opinion, there is no basis yet for considering that this is the cost of growth, or payment for perestroyka. We speak and think more radically, more daringly than we act. We think of the government's plan of action, or more accurately, its program for the next five-year plan, and we ponder: Are there any grounds for optimism?

As we know, the congress found them. Those who follow the work of the congress know why such a decision was made. Dissenters did not just make up a simple minority—when it came to voting on the government's program, they comprised hardly more than one-fourth of those supporting the government plan. All the same, despite the ovation following promulgation of the voting results, it just seems to me that there are grounds for not accepting the government's program.

What model of a future economy is the government proposing? How can we fulfill the promise of introducing a market while simultaneously holding on to administrative-edict management methods? Perhaps People's Deputy G.Kh. Popov stated it too harshly: "The congress should reject the approach to the 13th Five-Year Plan as being anti-perestroyka." But a fact remains a fact: The government program does not contain an integrated set of measures that would liberate the direct producers of material benefits in the near future.

So here we see uncertainty. How much longer do we intend to rely on the actions of the administrative anesthetic—which is in fact what the government wanted, presenting such a report to the congress and requesting that it not simply be taken under advisement, but adopted as well? How could we adopt the program for a five-year plan without having accepted the fundamental laws on property and land, on local self-rule? Questions and more questions. And it is not that they are difficult to answer. The consequences of this—our 13th Five-Year Plan—collapsing cannot be predicted.

In conclusion, some words as to how the Leningraders voted on the government program. "Bidding farewell" to the deputies, M.S. Gorbachev presiding, stated: "Comrades, the question, quite frankly, is a political one—either we are going to support the government and what it has introduced, or we will keep it in such a condition all the time that it will be unable to accomplish its work. This is what we are talking about. I therefore put up for a vote the matter of supporting the program proposed by the government. Deputies must express their attitude toward this program—either they are in favor of supporting it, or they are against supporting it. Is everything clear?"

1. V.A. Almazov—"for." 2. Zh.I. Alfarov—"for." 3. A.I. Baranov—"for." 4. V.S. Belyayev—"for." 5. N.P. Bekhtereva—"absent." 6. Yu.Yu. Boldyrev—"against." 7. V.A. Berovkov—"for." 8. G.V. Bykov—"against." 9. D.A. Granin (German)—"against." 10. B.V. Gidaspov—"against." 11. A.N. Gonchar—"for." 12. I.V. Gorynin—"for." 13. A.I. Demidov—"absent." 14. A.A. Denisov—"against." 15. N.G. Dmitriyev—"against." 16. A.S. Yezhelev—"against." 17. A.V. Zhuk—"against." 18. N.V. Ivanov—"against." 19. V.S. Kabakov—"absent." 20. Yu.N. Klepikov—"against." 21. I.F. Klochkov—"for." 22. V.I. Kolotov—"against." 23. L.A. Kuznetsov—"against." 24. K.Yu. Lavrov—"for." 25. S.B. Lavrov—"against." 26. A.V. Levashev- -"against." 27. D.S. Likhachev—"for." 28. Ye.D. Maltsev—"against." 29. V.I. Matviyenko—"for." 30. A.I. Melnikov—"for." 31. A.A. Mylnikov—"for." 32. N.P. Napalkov—"absent." 33. B.N. Nikolskiy—"against." 34. A.M. Obolenskiy—"absent." 35. A.P. Petrov—"against." 36. V.S. Petropavlovskiy—"for." 37. Yu.V. Popov—"for." 38. A.M. Ridiger—"for." 39. A.I. Rusanov—"for." 40. A.A. Sobchak—"against." 41. V.I. Sokolov—"for." 42. N.I. Sotnikov—"for." 43. I.D. Spasskiy—"for." 44. G.I. Stoumova—"for." 45. Yu.P. Sychev—"against." 46. M.I. Falits—"for." 47. S.A. Tsyplyayev—"abstain." 48. A.A. Shchelkakov—"against."
Moscow (by telephone)

## Ryzhkov Holds Talks With Fishermen 3 Feb

*LD0302211190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Ryzhkov today met a group of delegates from the extraordinary congress of fisheries workers' trades unions, which opens next Tuesday. An exchange of opinions on the state of affairs in the industry, the complex working conditions of fishermen, especially during long voyages, and the most acute problems of their everyday lives, took place in a businesslike atmosphere.

## Ryzhkov Greets Friendship University 5 Feb

*LD0502213790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1717 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Excerpt] Moscow, 5 Feb (TASS)—"The very existence and humanist activity of the Friendship of Peoples university is acquiring particular significance today, now that recognition of the freedom of sociopolitical choice and of the priority of common human values has been placed at the basis of the USSR's international policy," states a telegram of greetings from Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov to the collective of the Friendship of Peoples University.

The university marked its 30th anniversary today. Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the rectors of Moscow's higher education establishments, the heads of public organizations, tutors and students, and the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in the USSR attended a ceremony to mark the jubilee at the Rossiya movie theater and concert hall. [passage omitted]

## ANT Accused of Magnesium Export to Japan

*LD0802172190 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—The now infamous Soviet ANT state-cooperative concern, recently caught attempting to export Soviet tanks and vital metals, has now been accused of planning to ship 50 tonnes of magnesium ingots to Japan.

Officials from the chief administration of customs control at the USSR Council of Ministers told TASS that the buyer was not yet known.

The activities of ANT are now being investigated.

## Export of Prohibited Metals Foiled

*PM0602151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 8*

[PRAVDA stringer A. Khramtsov dispatch under the "Details" rubric: "'ANT's' Northern Deal"]

[Text] Murmansk, 5 Feb—Mass media representatives were invited by competent organs to Murmansk Maritime Trade Harbor this morning. At one of the warehouses we were shown a consignment of nonferrous metals delivered a few days ago by the motor ships Tiksi and Dmitriy Donskoy from Dudinka Harbor. At first glance they were ordinary packages of electrolytic sheet nickel and copper no different at all from hundreds of other identical packages stacked right next to them. Their markings showed nothing remarkable, either—Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine. But the consignee... Yes, as you might have guessed from the headline, this strategic metal has been bought from the combine by the selfsame "ANT" Industrial State-Cooperative Association which gained notoriety through its recent attempt to get a group of combat tanks through Novorossiysk Station for sale abroad.

As we can see, on this occasion the tracks of the Moscow cooperative members' "foreign economic activity" led to the northern maritime port. In contravention of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution prohibiting cooperatives from exporting nonferrous metals abroad, the wheeler-dealers are trying to export not scrap metal but very expensive nickel and copper. The accompanying documents show the border station of Chop as the final destination of this consignment of 20 tonnes of nickel and 70 tonnes of copper.

Thanks to efforts by staffers from Murmansk Oblast KGB Directorate and the oblast Prosecutor's Office, the valuable cargo detected in the harbor will not now slip over the border with impunity.

### Belousov on ANT's Attempt to Export Tanks

*LD0702131890 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] An absolutely extraordinary event took place recently in the activities of Soviet cooperatives. The ANT cooperative—ANT as it's called for the first letters of Automation, Science and Technology in Russian—tried to sell 12 T-72 model Soviet tanks abroad.

The ANT cooperative made a deal with a munitions plant in the Urals and sent a trainload of tanks halfway across the nation to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk where a foreign ship was to have collected the tanks.

This was truly a high adventure to which the government has paid attention. The Cabinet considered the involvement of officials in this case under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov. [passage omitted: sale of armaments abroad can only be done with government's consent; this case contravened Soviet foreign economic policies] The activities of the ANT cooperative have been suspended and the guilty parties face charges now. The National Procurator's Office is making a thorough investigation of these illegal activities of the cooperative. To comment on the situation we asked the Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov:

[Belousov, in Russian, fading into English translation] What happened really had no precedent and it could happen only because of gross violations by irresponsible people of the laws that forbid selling military hardware abroad without government commission. [passage omitted: sanctions will not be introduced against the cooperative movement in general as a result of this case.]

[Announcer] Can such a case happen again, and are there any guarantees that weapons will not be taken out of the country? And the following question—is there a need to review some methods of organizing our foreign economic ties with the direct involvement of some of the plants?

[Belousov] I must say that immediate extra measures will be taken to rule out any chance of transfer or sales of any type of arms and combat vehicles inside this country or abroad. [passage omitted: specialists' opinion of soviet cooperatives published in KOMMERSANT]

[Moscow World Service in English at 1200 GMT on 6 February in a similar report adds: A consignment of valuable non-ferrous metals has been spotted at the port of Murmansk in the north of Russia. Dealers from the ANT association attempted to export illegally 20 tonnes of nickel and 70 tonnes of copper. Recently the same association was prevented from exporting a consignment of tanks through the port of Novorossiisk in the country's south.]

### First 'Public' TV Station Begins Operations

*LD0702164690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] The country's first public joint-stock television company—TV Sibir—has begun operating in Barnaul. So far, its transmissions can be watched only by residents of the city and adjacent areas.

### Regional TV in Far East Expands

*LD0702155190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Television broadcasting for the whole of the Far East region is now being conducted from Khabarovsk. Residents of Chukotka Maritime Kray, Yakutia, and Kolyma have for the first time simultaneously watched the new information and journalistic program Far East produced jointly by six radio and television committees of the region. Using satellite communications, it was possible to receive the output of local studios in distant settlements where previously only the First program of Central Television was relayed via the Orbita and Moskva systems. Regional Television will tell of the problems of the economies of the Far Eastern oblasts. Much attention will be devoted to interethnic relations.

### New TV Transmitter in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast

*LD0402114390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 4 Feb 90*

[Summary] Here is a report from Taldy-Kurgan Oblast. The remotest villages and settlements in the southern Balkhash area have begun to receive the second channel of Central [Moscow] television. This has been made possible by the installation of a transmitter built 2,500 m above the sea level at the Dzhungarskiy Alatau radio and television complex. Now viewers of this whole area can watch three programmes: two from Moscow and a republican channel from Alma-Ata.

## New 'Far East' TV Program Broadcast

*LD0602104190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] As our correspondent has reported from Khabarovsk, the first broadcast of a new regional television channel, Far East, has gone on the air. In this way, via a space communications satellite, the inhabitants of the Khabarovsk and Maritime Krays, of Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and Amur and Magadan Oblasts now have their own joint television channel.

## Tajik Newspaper Published in Samarkand

*LD0302053790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 2 Feb 90*

[Summary] The first issue of OVOSI SAMARKAND [Voice of Samarkand] newspaper in Tajik is out in Samarkand Oblast. This is an organ of the oblast party committee and the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; it will be published three times a week.

## New Publication in Uzbek Launched

*LD0402222190 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1500 GMT 15 Jan 90*

[Summary] As from the beginning of this year, a new newspaper called DOSTUK [FRIENDSHIP] began to be published in Uzbek in Aravan rayon, where many Uzbeks are living. It has a circulation of 5,000. At present there are an average of 36 various publications in Osh Oblast, which are being published in the Uzbek and Russian languages. Most local inhabitants are able to listen to the local radio and to watch the television programs in their mother tongues.

## SMENA Newspaper Transferred to Komsomol

*LD0802165190 Leningrad Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 January 90*

[Text] Yesterday by a resolution of the 30th Komsomol conference the Leningrad newspaper SMENA became the organ not of the oblast committee and the city committee, but of the Leningrad organization of the Komsomol. This is an important democratic transformation in which one of the mass media has been removed from subordination to an executive organ and has been transformed into being accountable only to the conference. This is a step toward extending freedom of the press, and hence of glasnost.

## New Lithuanian Newspaper Published

*LD1102123590 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] This week, a new newspaper under the heading (SIAURINIS ATHENE), NORTHERN ATHENS, was launched in Lithuania. Its appearance naturally did not go by unnoticed, though we have quite many independent periodicals [word indistinct]. Its editors are the well-known cultural figures of Lithuania. One of them is Arvydas Juozaitis, philosopher and activist of the reform movement Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Resructuring].

The first issue carries a manifesto which says that Athens is not only a historical but also a present-day seat of Europe. Europe is inalienable from democracy, political and civil rights, free and responsible man. The manifesto goes on to say that Lithuania is determined to make its comeback to Europe. We are confident in our future as freedom has won our hearts.

## Estonian Daily Changes Name

*LD0702203990 Tallinn Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 1 Feb 90*

[Summary] From today, the NOORTE HAAL daily paper will be replaced by PAEVALEHT. Editor Margus Mets says in the editorial that the new PAEVALEHT is not the successor of the pre-war paper, even if it wishes to follow its principles. The pre-war paper was not the publication of any one party, its views being close to those of the government of the republic of Estonia.

## Reasons for Newsprint Scarcity Viewed

*PM0602104590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4*

[Article by Vasiliy Parfenov under the "Polemical Comment" rubric: "Paper Boom? No, an Ill-Considered Plan!"]

[Text] For the first 25 days of January this year PRAVDA appeared daily in an 8-page edition. On the 26th day it "slimmed down" by a quarter. "What has happened?"—asked the frequent callers to the editorial office information desk. "Is the world's leading country—in terms of forests—really unable to supply the chief party newspaper with enough paper?" "Why are members of informal groups and cooperatives launching their own newspapers and covering fences with pamphlets while there is not enough paper for PRAVDA?"

Before answering our readers' questions I visited the Ministry of the Timber Industry [Minlesprom] and spoke with workers in the State Planning Committee [Gosplan] and the leaders of paper-supply plants, and I now share with you what I learned.

I feel bound to quote the peculiarly graphic utterances of V. Malygin, chief of the USSR Gosplan subdepartment in charge of the allocation of timber and paper products.

When I told him about the complaints made by indignant PRAVDA readers, he retorted:

"For our citizens, who are unaccustomed to genuine democracy, nothing is right now, in the period of glasnost: The 'Greens' are closing plants while the "reformists" [zheltyye] vilify those same plants. And all this chaos in the country is paid for by the exchequer.... Take, say, the Slokskiy paper and pulp plant. In terms of environmental standards, it is one of the top five such enterprises in the world, but Latvian people's deputies decided to close it down. Some 91,000 tonnes of first-rate special paper have disappeared into thin air. And 23,000 of those tonnes went to Latvia. Latvia will now have to go around begging."

"People know about Sloka. It produces special braille paper and paper for punch-cards. It is the shortage of newsprint that PRAVDA's readers are indignant about. Where has it all disappeared to?"

"It hasn't unless you consider that the state order was 95 rather than 100 percent. Paper industry workers have now been given the right to sell 5 percent at top contract prices and to trade with foreign countries. But we get no special benefit here. We sell our own paper at $330-350 per tonne but buy at $450."

"Why is there such a disparity?"

"Packaging in our country is worse, banding and stamping are not as they should be, whiteness is not up to scratch, we have yet to find our place in the world market, and we don't know how to trade...."

"Why does PRAVDA experience a paper shortage? After all, the combines now together produce 1,834,000 tonnes of newsprint. And PRAVDA's needs only amount to an extra 16,000 tonnes."

"In 1989, when the paper came out in 8-page editions 103 times, with 6 pages other days, you used 163,000 tonnes of paper over the year. For 1990 with the same newspaper publication schedule the Gosplan has, in the light of the alterered printrun, allocated 130,000 tonnes.

"That is to say, 33,000 tonnes less? if PRAVDA had received last year's volume of paper, we wouldn't have had this problem and could have brought out an 8-page edition every day."

"That's as may be, but the paper industry is, you know yourself, under pressure," V. Malygin countered.

I then understood that you won't find the sought-for rolls of paper other than at the Minlesprom. Since the minister was away and his first deputy, F. Liner, was hurriedly preparing for a trip abroad, the conversation with the latter was conducted only by telephone. That conversation was, however, pointed and frank.

"Although paper is looked after by another deputy, V. Chuyko, I do know about the reduction in the volume of PRAVDA's paper," F. Liner said. "The position in the paper and pulp enterprises is difficult on the whole. The plan in terms of the volumes of raw materials and production is completely out of balance. That is one problem. Another is that the delivery of the finished paper from the paper combines is irregular. Some 70-75 percent is delivered to us in Ministry of Railways freight-cars. The delivery of pulp for Kondopoga from plants in Kaliningrad and Solikamsk is experiencing disruptions."

"But those enterprises, like the timber procurement establishments, do come under your ministry. Is it really impossible to instill order within the sector?"

"We cut down the trees and supply the paper industry workers with raw matrials, but the felling areas for the sector are assigned by other departments. In recent years forestry areas in which a stock of 200 million cubic meters of exploitable lumber is growing have been withdrawn on the basis of decisions made by local soviet organs. The timber is overmature and may not be felled. The USSR State Committee for Forestry [Gosleskhoz], which opposes the creation of comprehensive timber procurement establishments, is obstructing us. This year's timber procurements plan is the same as last year's and is 14 million cubic meters out of balance—timber areas have not been allocated. The same log has to be turned in three directions—toward export, construction needs, and paper. But no additional raw materials are derived from this. The fifth year of the plan is upon us. Not a single minister has been removed. The sector leadership has been "purged" in the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. But things are going badly. Do you think it accidental that we occupy 49th place in terms of world paper production, although we have the biggest forests? In short, talk to our chief economist, Deputy Minister N. Medvedev. He will reveal the state of affairs in the sector to you in greater depth."

Nikolay Akimovich Medvedev has worked in forestry since 1953 and has received the degree of doctor of economic sciences for his research. At our meeting he spread out a sizable pile of official documents in front of me—letters to the government and the USSR Gosplan, reports with tables, and draft resolutions that have not been adopted. What conclusions does one come to on studying this material?

"First: The country's paper boom is on the increase while we are planning the sector's development in an ill-considered way, so to speak. A sector which should extract an infinitely renewable resource for people has for many decades, through the fault of the USSR Gosplan, been in a state of acute crisis. There has been no increase in capital investment in the sector, particularly in the intensive processing of wood—the production of pulp and paper—from one 5-year plan to another. It even fell by R542 million in the 12th 5-Year Plan compared with the previous one. This has seriously undermined the sector: After all, in 20 years the necessary expenditure per cubic meter of capacity for lumber procurement has increased from R18.2 to R60—that is to say, more than three times.

"Even more meager resources have gone into the production of pulp, cardboard, and paper. It is no accident that the commissioning of capacities has fallen catastrophically from one 5-year plan to the next. Of the 157 paper and pulp enterprises only 25 have been built since 1960. Compared with the 9th 5-Year Plan, commissioning of cardboard-manufacturing shops in the current 5-year plan has fallen ninefold and the commissioning of capacities for manufacturing paper—'the mainstay of cultural life'—is down almost half. Yet each year the country demands more and more of this product.

"That is why the actions of the 'Greens' and the 'reformists' who unthinkingly demand the closure of more and more paper and pulp enterprises are very rash and contentious. In recent years pulp production has ceased at the Priozerskiy and Lyaskelskiy plants, the Okulovskiy paper and pulp combine, and others. The production of pulp—the chief raw material for paper—has fallen by 218,000 tonnes because of this. It would perhaps have been more sensible to build new purification facilities than to close down plants?

"The second conclusion from analysis of the facts is as follows. As a result of ill-considered planning of the timber sector it lacks a sound technical base. Our forest-rich country does not produce modern pulp and paper manufacturing equipment. We have hitherto bought our equipment from many countries for hard currency and also in exchange for paper and rough lumber. But foreign machinery also breaks down. Equipment lies idle while spare parts are awaited from abroad. This alone accounted for combines producing a plan shortfall of 15,000 tonnes of paper—almost as much as what PRAVDA now lacks for its 8-page edition.

"A few decades back two major enterprises were constructed in Izhevsk and Petrozavodsk to produce paper-making equipment of our own. However, to design and build the paper-making machine prototype our designers and plant workers spent... 15 years. It is no wonder that the first machine was called the B15. While they were engaged in producing it, it became completely obsolete.

"The development engineers have not progressed beyond this model. Therefore, the two plants designed to produce equipment for paper industry workers have gradually switched over to manufacturing chemical equipment, particularly as it is simpler and more profitable to do so. As a result paper industry workers' orders make up 45-48 percent of the workload of 'Petrozavodskbummash' and only 25 percent of "Izhbummash" capacity. These plants now come under the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building [Mintyazhmash] and therefore both enterprises have for all intents and purposes been separated from the sector for which they were created."

What, then, do the leaders of Mintyazhmash think on this score? Before beginning my conversation with First Deputy Minister P. Arutyunov, I read through a paragraph from an article entitled "Paper and Machines" published in PRAVDA almost 17 years ago—back in March 1973. Here is the paragraph: "It is essential for our country—the world's greatest timber power—to have its own well-developed paper and pulp machine building industry. It will be difficult otherwise to achieve rapid growth in paper output...."

When he heard this paragraph, Rafael Nikolayevich said tersely: "The Minlesprom has not yet discussed any questions about paper manufacturing machinery with us. True, we did acquire this subsector recently. But the people who ran this work in the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building before the merger of our ministries have scattered in all directions. The development of equipment for the paper and pulp industry in Mintyazhmash is looked after by a section which is made up of six people. All are newcomers. So it is too early to criticize us. We have to rethink everything. We have to prepare a detailed resolution. We will be holding a collegium meeting."

It's not credible—six out of a total of 950 ministry workers involved in "working out" how to develop the paper and pulp machine building. It is a very small number. And will another circular help?

Yet another problem, which is perhaps developing from a technical problem into an outright political one. According to USSR Minlesprom figures, because of disorders in rail transport and even in certain book publishing houses quite a lot of newsprint and printing paper is being sold "on the side" for large sums of money—it is being bought by the publications of informal and cooperative groups. That is why many walls of apartment blocks and fences are becoming increasingly covered with pamphlets made from good-quality paper and samizdat rags are sold in large numbers for a pretty penny at street crossings and in streetcars, trolleybuses, and the subway. Do not these "publications" sully such fine and correct tenets of perestroyka as glasnost and democracy? They represent the total license and anarchy in which extremists of all stripes feel perfectly at home.

The matter of PRAVDA's 16,000 tonnes of newsprint could and should be solved immediately if we instill order in the planning, production, and distribution of paper. The paper boom should exclude ill-considered planning. Given the current acute "scarcity of ideology," the party and its general staff should have the opportunity, above all through its own organ—PRAVDA—to speak to the full extent of its capacity with communists, the entire people, and everyone. Why is it that the newspapers of leading parties in neighboring Western countries and overseas come out daily in 10-page editions and are therefore able to reflect life in all its variety while we PRAVDA workers spend a considerable part of our efforts each day trying valiantly to squeeze all the material into six pages? And all this because of a shortage of 16,000 tonnes of newsprint, which represents less than 1 percent of the country's total output.

## Transcaucasus Situation

### Central Press Continues Reportage of Events

### Roundup on Transcaucasus

*PM1202115390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6*

[AZERINFORM-TASS reports under general heading "Concerning the Situation in Azerbaijan"]

[Text] Baku, 10 Feb—The situation in the city remains calm on the surface, but tension among people remains high. Law and order organs and servicemen from Internal Troops and Soviet Army units, with the public's help, are taking measures to further stabilize the situation.

According to data from the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], crimes committed during January are still being investigated. There have been 568 reported attacks on apartments as of today. A serviceman was attacked 9 February, an automatic rifle and bullets were taken from him, and the serviceman received firearm wounds and was hospitalized. A total of 52 persons have been detained for curfew violations. Robberies continue. For example, unidentified persons destroyed property in the apartment of citizen Khachikyan, who had earlier left her place of residence. This case is also under investigation.

A press conference was held at the party city committee yesterday, at which Lieutenant General V.S. Dubinyak, military commandant of the city, described the situation prevailing in Baku as complex and contradictory.

Stepanakert—Work to normalize the situation continues in the state of emergency region. The military commandant's office in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and adjoining rayons of Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has implemented a series of measures aimed at fulfilling the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree dated 15 January 1990. Passport regime inspections are being carried out, weapons are being confiscated, and persons of Azeri and Armenian nationality without local residence permits are being sent out of the state of emergency region. Informal organizations have been disbanded in the NKAO and all adjoining rayons of the republic, a number of leaders with extremist leanings have been detained, and conditions have been created for normal work by local party and soviet organs. All operations are being conducted without the use of either weapons or special means.

Weapons are being voluntarily handed in in Mir-Bashirskiy and other rayons. A TASS correspondent was told by Lieutenant Colonel A. Abdulgaparov, military commandant of the rayon, that 64 hunting rifles had been voluntarily handed in by the population in the rayon center as of today. "Many rayon residents are showing understanding of our work—weapons are still being handed in," the rayon commandant said.

Preventive measures are still being taken, aimed at preventing the expropriation of weapons and ammunition. The military have taken 29 hail guns and 1,044 shells out of warehouses in the NKAO's Askeranskiy Rayon.

V.P. Polyanichko, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and Major General V.N. Safonov, military commandant of the state of emergency region, had meetings in Lachinskiy, Kubatlinskiy, and Dzhebrailskiy Rayons of Azerbaijan SSR with those rayons' party and soviet officials and members of the public to discuss questions pertaining to the normalization of the situation. A conference of internal affairs officials from the autonomous oblast, held in Stepanakert, was also devoted to this topic.

Armenian and Azeri elders are holding meetings in several NKAO villages; they are reaching agreements on mutual safety, joint work, children's education, and interethnic reconciliation.

From a USSR MVD report:

Azerbaijan SSR—The situation in the republic is under control. Some 46 percent of the republic's industrial enterprises are still on strike, including 80 percent in Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], about 90 percent in NKAO, 30 percent in Baku, 40 percent in Gyandzha, 70 percent in Sumgait, 60 percent in Mingechaur, and 73 percent in Sheki. Material damage suffered through work stoppages at enterprises since 18 January amounts to 434.2 million rubles.

There are 124 freight trains standing idle on the railroad, 59 of which are on their way to Armenia. There have been 52 persons detained for curfew violations. A further 11 persons have been detained for nonfulfillment of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's 15 January decree. Internal affairs organs confiscated 13 hunting rifles in Vardinskiy Rayon.

Highways are still blockaded in the NKAO. Only enterprises providing vital services are functioning in Stepanakert and Mardakertskiy Rayon. A number of Martuninskiy Rayon industrial enterprises have ended their strike. Unidentified persons from Tsmakaog Village rustled 12 head of cattle in Mardakertskiy Rayon during the night of 9 February. An investigation is under way.

Armenian SSR—The situation remains substantially unchanged. The following were handed over during the last 24 hours: A carbine, a small-caliber rifle, a "TT" pistol, and 25 hunting rifles. On 8 February, in the course of the implementation of measures by internal affairs organs to confiscate stolen weapons in Dilizhan, two former convicts offered armed resistance and received firearm wounds; four revolvers were confiscated from them. There were no casualties among militia personnel. An unauthorized rally was held in Yerevan yesterday. Speakers discussed the results of the meeting, held in the Baltic region, between representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan and the Armenian Pannational Movement, as well as the prevailing situation in NKAO. There were no breaches of public order.

### Troops Meet 'Growing Understanding'

*PM1202121990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "From Mistrust to Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] Baku, 9 Feb—Any unusual events in the city today put its inhabitants on their guard and generate incredible rumors.

For instance, we saw a group of people outside the Narimanovskiy Rayon commandant's office. What was it: a picket or an expression of protest, or had someone been arrested? Passersby were concerned. Everything proved to be simple to the point of banality: Officials of the rayon authority, in whose building the commandant's office was temporarily housed, were giving out wages.

Despite the state of emergency, life is taking its course. But the situation in Baku is still complex and contradictory. According to State Committee for Statistics data, 34 percent of industrial enterprises are still idle. Certainly these figures by no means provide an accurate reflection of the true picture. Many people are going to their enterprises but not getting down to any work. At the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] Press Center, we were told that there is information regarding attempts to picket plants, factories, and public transport depots. Workers are subjected to constant brainwashing at enterprises, ranging from appeals not to stop the strike to direct threats. People are intimidated and tense.

Telephones ring at the rayon commandant's offices in the city, people come along asking to be defended and protected against threats and demanding that normal working and living conditions be ensured. Often their fears are exaggerated. However, sometimes cases are confirmed.

Thus, N. Lyubov telephoned the "confidential line" at the republic's MVD. She is Russian and a Group II invalid; her husband is Armenian and has left the city, while her daughter is studying in Leningrad. Everything was quiet in the beginning, but of late a strange man has begun to approach her, demanding that she leave her apartment. He says that she no longer lives there and her apartment belongs to him. Local rayon internal affairs department staffers have taken steps and the visits and threats have stopped. As for the "stranger," he proved to be an unscrupulous neighbor living opposite of her.

Nevertheless people are beginning to return to the apartments they abandoned. It is easy to imagine someone's indignation when they find strangers have moved into their apartments without leave. The "squatters'" illegal actions are suppressed by MVD and military commandant's office personnel.

Keeping public order and ensuring citizens' security is by no means the military's sole job these difficult days. They transport foodstuffs in their own transport, thereby filling empty stores with goods once again. They sometimes fulfill the functions of house management committees, help townspeople fill out various documents, and meet with representatives of labor collectives and leaders of enterprises and departments in attempts to find ways out of the situation together.

The people are increasingly profoundly aware that the military presence is necessary at present. Our friend Sh. Eldar told us that the situation is calmer with them around. Voluntary assistance from former "Afghan" soldiers living in Baku to paramilitary patrols also illustrates this. Voluntary military patrols act as interpreters, and their very presence in the details suppresses many conflicts that flare up. Moreover, they have an excellent knowledge of the city.

More and more facts indicate the growing mutual understanding between local inhabitants and soldiers; they assist one another at difficult moments with increasing frequency. Here are just a few examples.

A driver lost control of his military vehicle en route from Gyandzha to Kyurdamir. The truck overturned and fell into an irrigation channel. Five servicemen were injured. Local inhabitants who witnessed the incident took the casualties to Agdash City Hospital. S. Rakhimov, head of the hospital's surgical ward, nurse S. Babayeva, and orderly A. Mamedova donated blood for transfusions.

Meanwhile military demolition experts in Gyandzha, with specialists from Gyandzha's "Vodokanal" Trust, restored the drinking water supply line. This artery supplies water to the 300,000 inhabitants of the city and Azerbaijan's Khanlarskiy Rayon.

Over the last few days great efforts have been made to ease tension in the region. With mediation from the command of the troops units stationed in Khanlar, dialogue has been established between the Armenian population and the rayon leadership.

There have been no significant changes over the last 24 hours in the situation in Azerbaijan's capital. Some 115 citizens have been arrested, one for a crime.

Weapons and munitions are still being found. Last night, city commandant General V. Dubinyak announced that two firearms and one grenade had been confiscated. Weapons and explosives in the hands of irresponsible people and criminal elements constitute one of the factors preventing the stabilization of the situation.

Staffers from the USSR and republic MVD's and other law-enforcement bodies are working to expose pogrom attacks that occurred 13-16 January. We were told at the Azerbaijan MVD Press Center that 545 such cases have been revealed. The investigation is continuing.

### First Recent Signs of 'Hope'

*PM1202121590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Own correspondent Sergey Bablumyan reports from Yerevan: "Hopes for Dialogue"]

[Text] Probably for the first time in recent weeks, the situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan inspires hope. What is this view based on?

According to a report from the operational headquarters at the republic emergency situation council, no shots were fired in the border area during the night of 6-7 February. A meeting has been held between first secretaries of the Krasnoselskiy Raykom [rayon committee] of the party in Armenia and the Kedabekskiy Raykom in Azerbaijan. It is planned to continue the dialogue. As a result of explanatory work among the population, a trend has emerged to surrender captured firearms.

Following the steps taken by the military command, preconditions have been created for unblocking the railroad which passes through the territory of the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

At the same time, alarming reports are coming in about the forced suspension of production operations at dozens of enterprises. The latest report states that work has come to a halt at the Yerevan tire plant. Even in January, when the tire workers spared no effort to keep going, the monthly plan was fullfilled only 16 percent. V. Petrosyan, the plant's chief engineer, has announced that the enterprise is threatened with running out of circulating capital and having to face grim fines. Alas, the tire plant is not the only enterprise which is in this position....

### Atmosphere Around Talks Viewed

*PM1202115590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p3*

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziyeminsh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Unpeaceful Images of a Peace Meeting"]

[Text] Riga—Reports from Riga on the meeting at the negotiating table between representatives of the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF] and the Armenian National Movement [ANM], mediated by members of the Baltic Council, which, as is well known, incorporates the Estonian People's Front, the Latvian People's Front, and the Lithuanian "Sajudis" movement, virtually made frontpage news in the mass media at the end of last week.

The first really serious attempt to get the two conflicting sides to the negotiating table in Riga appeared to be successful. A joint communique was adopted, which made the following point clear in particular: The sides agreed that any further escalation in the conflict is not in the fundamental interests of either of the Transcaucasian peoples. They categorically condemned acts of violence and adopted a decision on developing a mechanism of guarantees to prevent anything similar happening in the future. The Armenian side suggested including representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities living in Nagorno-Karabakh in future talks. The participants in the meeting unanimously condemned the practice of taking hostages and agreed to put an end to the violence and exchange exhaustive information by 15 February on all incidents where innocent inhabitants have been seized by armed persons. They decided to actively work for the release of all hostages by 1 March and establish permanent, reliable communications between the ANM and APF leadership by 10 February.

It must also be pointed out that the communique made the following proviso: These mutual commitments will be enforced only after the leading bodies of the APF and the ANM have discussed and approved them at their sessions. They may approve the document and they may not: It all depends on the unity of views within the leadership of these movements. This, in short, is the essence of the peace talks in Riga.

What are the practical improvements that we can expect from the decisions adopted in Riga if they are approved and put into effect by the appropriate leading bodies of the two Transcaucasus republics' popular movements? This question was raised more than once at the press center, but, unfortunately, the response was total uncertainty. This is understandable: The thorn of the tragic conflict in the Transcaucasus is the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, so it is, of course, impossible to reach a definitive settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict without touching on the question of the NKAO.

But one of the prior conditions of organizing the meeting in Riga as far as the "official representatives" of Azerbaijan were concerned was that the "territorial issue," i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh, be removed from the agenda, and so this topical question was not touched on during the political consultations held behind closed doors. Consequently, claims by a whole series of information agencies that "the meeting in Riga represents progress in the process of reaching a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Transcaucasus" do not inspire a great deal of optimism in me personally.

I find myself asking this question—as do other journalists too, incidentally—Just how valid is this meeting? After all, you must agree that it looks rather strange when such complex issues of state importance begin to be tackled by someone in circumvention of state structures of authority. That is the reason why one of the questions put to the members of the Baltic Council was this: Were there any consultations with Moscow prior to the meeting?

"No," came the reply. "The problems must be solved by the two peoples and two states without the 'leading center.' Strictly speaking, we must perform the role of absolutely impartial organizers and mediators."

"But perhaps the union authorities were informed of the meeting nevertheless?" the journalists continued to press them.

"Yes," came the reply. "Ilmars Bishers did inform the USSR Supreme Soviet of this and its reaction was positive. But this has no bearing on our meetings."

These journalists' questions were mainly answered by D. Ivans and V. Landsbergis.

This account of the talks in Riga would be incomplete if I failed to mention something else. During the trilateral consultations, journalists accredited to the press center were literally inundated with a mass of "sensational" information on the situation in and around the Transcaucasus, which was later, as I discovered for myself, splashed all over the newspapers and given blanket coverage on radio and television without any verification or clarification. "We are sure that the armed conflicts and violence in the Transcaucasus have been prompted by state policies designed to completely ignore nations' rights to self-determination and also the republics' national, religious, and ethnographic features," members of the Baltic Council indicated, for example, in their address. "This trampling of sovereign rights—moving troops into Baku—is a warning from Moscow to other union republics striving for greater independence," representatives of the APF echoed them. "There was no need to move troops into Baku on 20 January," members of the ANM Board said.

Other assessments and descriptions of the actions by Soviet Army units and subunits, which are now a stabilizing factor in the region, have been in roughly the same spirit.

It has been claimed, for example, that the introduction of the troops "was achieved using intolerably crude, direct methods, as a result of which many civilians were killed, mainly young people...." And the Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party Bureau felt it appropriate to publish the following information, citing the republic's Ministry of Health: Allegedly, on the night of 19-20 January 300 people were killed in Baku and more than 1,000 injured. This statement was made at a time when it was known for sure that 49 people had been buried in Nagornyy Park.

Everyone is now aware of the brutality which marked the actions of the pogromists in Baku. If a state of emergency had not been introduced, it would not have been the blood of tens of people spilled but the blood of thousands and tens of thousands.

I do not know whether it was chance or not, but an article in the Latvian People's Front newspaper ATMODA bearing a typical headline—"Who Is Preparing a Baltic Karabakh?"—coincided with the meeting in Riga. Once again, the hero was Colonel V. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy, who recently held a meeting with working people in Latvia's second largest city, Daugavpils. How does the article draw readers' attention? In it, separatist tactics are ascribed to the military deputy, sincerely anxious for the fate of the federation.

It is no accident that I am focusing on these details. As you can see from them, the peace talks in Riga are often discovered to have a far from peaceful face.

## Strike Continues in Transcaucasus Conflict

*LD0902200590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] From a USSR Foreign Ministry bulletin: In the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the situation is being watched by the forces of law and order and military units. No illegal acts of an interethnic nature have been reported. The strike continues. On the railways, 136 trains are idle—43 of which had been bound for Armenia. In Khachmaz Rayon, the Internal Affairs bodies have confiscated 100 hunting weapons from the population in just one day. In Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the situation is essentially unchanged. Strikes continue in Stepanakert and in Mardakert Rayon. The continuous-cycle enterprises are working. Strikes have ceased at some of the industrial enterprises of Martuninskiy Rayon; there are no strikes in the other rayons of the oblast.

In the Armenian SSR during the past 24 hours, four revolvers, one rifle, 15 hunting weapons, 400 anti-hail rockets, and two KamAZ trucks have been returned.

## Azerbaijan 'Refugees' Complain of Indifference

*LD0902150490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2122 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[From the Television News Service]

[Text] The refugee issue received a totally unexpected development today. Russian-speaking refugees from Azerbaijan held a press conference in Moscow. It was organized by the refugees' aid committee at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] voters and deputies club.

[Correspondent M. Sointsev] Those who spoke at the press conference said that here in Moscow, they are called panic-mongers and are being refused the status of refugees. Numerous instances were given of discriminatory or simply heartless attitudes toward the needs of people who have been obliged to leave Baku. Don't be surprised: In this report you're not going to see the faces of those taking part in and addressing the press conference. The fact is that all of these people are afraid—they are afraid, they say, of revenge. We still have relatives there, they say, and we are afraid for their fate as well as our own.

One of those who spoke stated that threats of violence against the Russian-speaking refugees in Moscow have already been made.

It was stated at the press conference that the total number of Russian-speaking refugees—that is how they describe themselves—amounts to more than 30,000 people at the present time.

Here is the point of view of one of the Baku refugees:

[Unidentified speaker] All the information which is being given out by the official media is absolutely false. I take full responsibility for saying so, because we are not being given any assistance. We should cooperate with the government and the RSFSR bodies, but they reject us in every way.

## TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments

### MVD Update 12 Feb

*LD1202171590 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—No inter-ethnic crimes have been reported in Azerbaijan and Armenia during the past 24 hours, a USSR Interior Ministry spokesman told TASS today.

According to the USSR Interior Ministry, law-enforcement agencies continue to take measures to normalise the situation and find those people who participated in pogroms and killings in Baku.

One hundred and twenty-five freight trains remain at a standstill on the Trancaucasian railway, 43 of which are bound for Armenia.

In Nagorno-Karabakh the situation has not changed. Traffic within the region is patrolled by army units as before. On February 11 five people were detained for violating the curfew.

In Armenia, people continue turning in stolen weapons. At the same time, a group of armed people stole explosive materials from the storage facilities of a Yerevan enterprise last night.

### Rail Traffic To Resume

*LD1202161290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1438 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] Baku, 12 Feb (Azerinform-TASS)—After a prolonged break, the through traffic of goods trains will open up along the entire length of the railway, from Baku to Yerevan. In connection with this, the leaderships of Azerbaijan and Armenia, public organizations, the USSR Ministry of Railways, and the military command have appealed to the citizens of both republics to assist the movement of the trains. The freight trains will be escorted by servicemen, who will have to thwart any actions obstructing traffic and will have to ensure the safety of the engine crews.

The republican Sunday papers carry a report on a Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau session, at which much attention was given to measures being taken by the republican organizational committee to normalize the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and restore the republic's sovereignty here. Efforts are being made to establish contacts between the Azerbaijani and Armenian population of the NKAO and for the return of Azerbaijani refugees. Contacts have become possible between the population of neighboring Armenian and Azerbaijani settlements, where treaties of mutual security are being drawn up and commissions for interethnic reconciliation are being formed.

also at the Central Committee Bureau session there was a discussion of questions concerning the republics' preparation for the transition to regional financial autonomy and self-financing and on drafting a treaty between union and republican governments on the economic autonomy and sovereignty of the Azerbaijani SSR.

At a conference of the procurators of the NKAO and Azerbaijan rayons adjacent to that autonomous oblast, it was announced that on the USSR Procurator General's decision, the Procurator's Office of all NKAO rayons were being subordinated to the Azerbaijani Republican Procurator's Office.

Internal Affairs Ministry troops in the NKAO continue checking passports and confiscating weapons and ammunition.

As the republican state committee for statistics has announced, in the past year direct production losses in connection with the destabilization of the sociopolitical situation and the strikes in the republic amounted to nearly R1,100 billion, including 210 million in the NKAO.

### Armored Train Set To Break Blockade

*LD1102120390 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Report by TASS special correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Yerevan, Armenia, February 11 TASS—"We are waiting for the order and are ready to fulfil it," Captain Mikhail Kuligin, commander of a unit of an armoured train sent to Transcaucasia from eastern Siberia to break a railway blockade and located not far from Yerevan, told reporters.

However, he expressed hope that the blockade of railways in Nakhichevan and other areas of Azerbaijan will be lifted as a result of negotiations and that no military interference will be needed.

Kuligin's well-armed unit comprises a locomotive capable of carrying several dozen freight cars. Its crew includes soldiers from central Russia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Soldier Marat Bigildinov from Kazakhstan, who is assistant engine-driver on the train, said that when the train was on its way to Armenia, train crew were warned about possible attacks from the local population.

But, he added, Armenians' attitude to the crew was "exceptionally favourable."

Akop Sarkisyan, stationmaster of the Masis railway station who was accompanying reporters, said more than 400 cars with cargoes for various regions of the country were stuck on railways. Several dozen cars with equipment and trucks were intended for Azerbaijan.

Last Friday, several trains were sent to Nakhichevan but they moved no further than the border station of Yeraskh: Nakhichevan railwaymen refused to receive them.

### Some Enterprises Working

*LD1002212990 Moscow TASS in English 1927 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS—By TASS special correspondents:

Although the situation in Baku, Soviet Azerbaijan, remains calm at first glance, tensions are still high. Speaking at a news conference on Friday [9 February] night the city's commandant Lieutenant General Vladimir Dubinyak described the situation as complicated, tense and contradictory.

The Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs continues to investigate crimes committed in January. 568 facts of housebreaking have been revealed. On February 9 extremists attacked a serviceman and seized a submachine gun with cartridges. He was wounded and hospitalized.

Fifty two people were detained for violating the curfew.

Unidentified persons have destroyed the property in a flat left by its Armenian owner. An investigation is under way.

In Nakhichevan most plants, factories, transport organisations and construction sites are standing idle for lack of material resources. The siege caused damage worth more than 20 million roubles to the republic's economy. But, the food and light industry enterprises, as well as local industries are working.

Reports from Gyandzhi say that despite difficulties with supplies, many industrial enterprises are still working. Public transport is operating. Municipal services are working and shops are open.

The situation with water supplies is becoming critical: The Akhsu-Gyandzha water pipeline blown up in the Khanlarsk region has not been restored.

The situation in Sumgait also remains these. The strike covered practically all industrial enterprises in the city. Those plants that have already resumed work are standing idle because of difficulties in electricity supplies.

Construction works at industrial enterprises have been stopped. On the whole, the situation in the city is calm and order is being observed.

Reports from Armenia say that communications between Getashen and Shaumyanovsk, two populated localities in Azerbaijan inhabitated mainly by Armenians, have been interrupted over the past several days.

The Armenian republic council for emergency situation said at its yesterday's meeting that the safety of civil aviation flights has not yet been ensured, while the above-mentioned districts are feeling an acute shortage of foods, industrial goods and medicaments. It is impossible to deliver seriously ill patients to clinics for medical aid.

The consequences of a railway blockade are being felt ever stronger in Armenia. Restoration works in the 1988 earthquake zone have been slowed down.

Taking into account the current situation, the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party and the republic's government passed a resolution on involving free able-bodied population in construction and restoration works in the earthquake zone, as well as in work in other industries of the national economy.

### Enterprise Situation Reported

*LD0902195490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1513 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Report by TASS correspondent Boris Zverev and Yuriy Soltys]

[Excerpts] Baku, 9 Feb—As before, everything unusual that takes place in the capital of Azerbaijan provokes suspicion in its citizens and creates the most incredible rumors. Still, even under the conditions of a state of emergency, life in Baku is taking its normal course. Nevertheless, the situation remains contradictory. According to the data of the republic's state Committee for Statistics, 34 percent of the industrial enterprises still do not function, and on the whole, in the republic, just a little more than half of them are working. And that data is far from the real state of things, since many come to their enterprises, but do not work. The Azerbaijani MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] press center has reported that there are still attempts at picketing large works, factories, and public transport depots. At enterprises, psychological brainwashing of the workers is constantly underway, from calls not to give up the strike to direct threats. [passage omitted]

During the past 24 hours the situation in the capital of Azerbaijan did not undergo significant changes. One hundred and fifteen people were detained; one of them for a committed crime. Last night, according to the city commandant's report, there were two units of firearms and one grenade confiscated.

The staff of the USSR and the republican MVD, as well as that of other law-enforcement bodies are continuing their work on bringing to light the facts of the pogroms on 13-16 January. As the Azerbaijani MVD press center has said, by today 545 cases of that kind have been revealed.

### MVD Views Situation 9 Feb

*LD0902141690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1233 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 9 Feb (TASS)—The situation in Azerbaijan is being monitored by forces of law and order and by military units. As was reported today at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, no infringements of the law on an interethnic basis have been registered in the republic during the past 24 hours.

Only 53.5 percent of Azerbaijan industrial enterprises have been working due to the continuing strike. On the Transcaucasian railway, 136 freight cars are standing idle—out of which 43 are destined for Armenia.

Fifty-one people were detained on the territory of the republic on Thursday for violating the curfew.

In connection with the memorial day, thousands of people came to the mountain park in Baku to lay flowers on the graves of the dead.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast strikes are continuing in the city of Stepanakert and in Mardakertskiy Rayon. Enterprises are working round the clock. The strike has ceased at some of the industrial enterprises of Martuninskiy Rayon.

According to data from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the situation in Armenia, where the voluntary surrender of weapons is continuing, is unchanged.

## Yerevan Radio Reviews Events in, Around Armenia

### Operational Staff Reviews Situation

*NC1102094790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] It was reported from the 10 February meeting of the operational staff of the republic's council on the special situation that Armenia has already begun sending foodstuffs and medicine to the blockaded Armenian-inhabited regions of Shaumyanovskiy and Getashen in Azerbaijan by military helicopter with the active assistance of military units. Helicopters belonging to the Armenian civil aviation department made two flights to these areas on 10 February.

The overall situation in Armenia (?improved) somewhat the previous day. According to figures released by the Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry, the situation was calm in the border regions last night. A certain level of tension remains only in Krasnoselskiy Rayon's Artsvashen village, which is under blockade.

The stabilization of the situation in the republic can be seen by the continuing return of stolen arms, amunition, and other military hardware. However, this process is not proceeding as quicky as desired. This is yet further proof that the republic's population is [words indistinct] calmly and with confidence, albeit. (?Warm clothes) stolen from the state committee for material-technical supply have also been returned.

The health services are working actively. The number of patients in Armenian clinics is decreasing steadily. The health authorities are doing everything possible to provide not only medicine but also quality medical services to the blockaded regions.

The population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was able to watch Armenian television for two and one-half hours on 9 February until the transmission ended abruptly. The causes of the break in transmission are being investigated.

According to information provided by the republic's Communications Ministry, certain central publications, including the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, whose dispatch to subscribers in Armenia was disrupted, will henceforth be published in Yerevan.

Within the framework of urgent measures to normalize the situation in the republic, the representatives of the state authority and the leaders of different supervisory boards were instructed to pay more frequent visits to the refugee settlement areas, become better acquainted with their needs, work to alleviate the difficulties of the people no matter how hard this may be under the extreme conditions facing the republic, and help them on the spot at their settlements. There are plans to hold a special meeting of the operational staff in the coming days devoted to refugee problems.

### Problems Remain Unsolved

*NC1002104590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] The operational staff of the republican council on the special situation held its regular session during which the participants' gravest concerns were expressed about the continued blockade on Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the Armenian-inhabited areas in Azerbaijan, Shaumyanskiy, and

Getashen. It was pointed out specifically that a particularly grave situation has been created in the NKAO and that even though flights are being carried out to Stepanakert, many problems nevertheless remain unsolved. There are administrative interruptions. There is a shortage of medicine, and medical services are insufficient. The Soviet Union's civil aviation ministry has not yet solved the problem of ensuring regular civil flights to these rayons, and military pilots are making the flights. The NKAO Armenian residents cannot receive Armenia's television and radio reports, despite the agreements reached with the participation of the USSR telecommunications ministry's representatives.

It was pointed out during the session that the tension in the republic's border areas is still under control. In various rayons Armenian villages are being fired upon. Last night Ordzhonikidze village in Krasnoselskiy Rayon was fired upon from Azerbaijan.

According to figures released by the health ministry, 20 of the wounded refugees who arrived in January from Azerbaijan have died. Treatment for 276 refugees is continuing.

The session pointed to the destabilizing effects that the transport blockade on Armenia, the NKAO, and the Armenian-inhabited areas in Azerbaijan have on the situation in the area. A report was submitted on the efforts that the republican leadership and the public organizations continue to exert in order to normalize the regional situation. Even though stolen arms are still being handed over in Armenia, the law-ensuring bodies and informal organizations were assigned to take decisive measures to accelerate this process.

### Rail Blockade Continues

*NC0902170190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] "The economic blockade of the republic is becoming more severe," said Aroyan, first deputy chief of the Yerevan branch of Transcaucasian Railroad. Following lengthy negotiations conducted by the unions of the USSR Communications Ministry and the responsible workers of our branch, an agreement was concluded on the exchange of trains. The director of the Azerbaijan railroads announced that train movement through Norashen is to be opened. One train of 40 freight cars was allowed through this junction on 7 February, the first and only train since the blockade started 29 days ago. One train carrying national economic goods to various parts of the country was dispatched into Azerbaijan on the same day. The drivers of a second train had to turn back after waiting for 14 hours. All our attempts to resume train movement through Norashen junction are being disregarded by the Azerbaijani side.

Only one train of 20 freight car entered through Idzhevan station on that same day. The Azerbaijani side blames the reduction in the number of commuting trains on the lack of available trains.

Thirty-one trains of 867 freight cars arrived through the Transcaucasian railways on 6-7 february. The freight included 340 tanks of fuel oil, 20 of diesel fuel, eight tanks of [word indistinct], 76 freight cars of grain, more than 50 of meat, sugar, and flour, as well as industrial goods, containers, and prefabricated houses for the disaster zone.

### Effects of Blockade Discussed

*NC1002122490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] It is now one month since 10 January when the Azerbaijan Railway leadership, instigated by the Popular Front, started the third economic blockade on Armenia in the past six months. Despite the measures taken by Soviet and republican bodies, the efforts to lift the blockade and to ensure unimpeded transport of cargo proved unsatisfactory. This was stated by (Feliks Melkonyan), first deputy secretary of the republican committee of people's control. The blockade inflicted great damage on our republic. Suffice it to say that during January, 473 trains with 18,333 freight cars did not arrive in the republic via the Azerbaijan railway. This means that the republic has not received tens of thousands of tons of foodstuff, petrol, gas oil, mazut, concrete-metal constructions, metal, and construction material as well as hundreds of houses which the residents in the quake-stricken areas so urgently need. It should be pointed out that more than 70 trains loaded with economic goods destined for Armenia have accumulated only in the Azerbaijan stations.

During January, the republic's industries delivered 120 million rubles-worth less than usual of products. Serious problems are being faced in the [word indistinct], machinery-building, electronic, (?construction), [word indistinct], chemical, and other industries. During the past month they did not receive more than 100,000 rubles worth of (?raw materials). A grave situation has been created in Leninakan, Kirovakan, Spitak, Stepanavan, and in other large quake-stricken areas where reconstruction and construction activities have stopped. Because of the shortage of raw materials, the construction of many projects has remained incomplete. Thanks to the Georgian rail station employees' efforts and (?tireless work), the republic received 317 trains with 7,900 freight cars in January. The republic's government is doing its best to ensure the that life is again made normal and [word indistinct] in the republic. The republic's workers have appealed to the USSR people's deputies to protest, on behalf of the entire Armenian people, during the USSR Supreme Soviet session against the illegal acts by the extremists and to demand that the great loss inflicted on Armenia's national economy by the blockade be compensated.

On February 8, 18 trains with 455 freight cars arrived in the republic via the Transcaucasus Railway. There are 120 tanks of mazut, 539 tanks of petrol, 199 tanks of diesel fuel, 70 freight cars of [word indistinct] and

(?wood), 299 houses, and 30 train cars of grain, flour, and sugar. On the same day two trains arrived from Norashen and Idzhevanskiy with 75 and 52 freight cars, respectively. The trains carried construction material and other cargo.

### Talks on Resuming Rail Traffic Viewed

*NC0602144690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Report by Ratib Grigoryan—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Grigoryan] Negotiations have taken place at the Megri and Karchavan stations on the reopening of the railway and the resumption of rail traffic between Azerbaijan and Armenia. [passage omitted]

Azerbaijanis from Baku, railway officials, and military and local leaders took part in the negotiations. After the negotiations concluded, I spoke to Grigor Arutyunyan, chairman of the [Megrinskiy] rayon soviet executive committee. Comrade Arutyunyan, can you briefly enumerate the results of the negotiations? The only true thing the Azerbaijani representative said was that the trains must resume operations, that nothing should prevent their movement, and that main routes must remain operational. What have you to say about this?

[Arutyunyan] We have held many such negotiations. Unfortunately, they are almost always unproductive because no final results are achieved. Even now I doubt their promises. Nevertheless, we could not refuse to attend the meeting and take the first step because this situation cannot continue. The population of our rayon is well aware of this. The claim that the people of Megri have blockaded themselves is not correct. The only issue that the people of Megri have raised is that since no trains are entering the republic—I am thinking of Yerevan—Nakhichevan in turn cannot receive anything. This is natural and understandable and I hope that our compatriots understand us correctly. Megri has blockaded no one.

[Grigoryan] Something must be done. If no trains are arriving in Armenia from their side, then it is necessary that, as a reciprocal measure, no trains should enter the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Megri.

[Arutyunyan] That is correct. That is what I said. You have also seen how they wanted to allow the movement of passenger trains through our rayon. We told them outright that such a thing would be a provocative move since our republic is receiving no goods for the national economy and our freight is pillaged inside Nakhichevan. I think that under these conditions no sensible leader would take responsibility for allowing passenger trains to enter and ensure their security. We told this to the soldiers present. They, too, had a similar view and in private talks they came to understand that the problem could only be solved if trains move simultaneously through Norashen, Nakhichevan, and Megri. This cannot be done unilaterally. During the September blockade we became convinced of this. For nearly 40 days the trains crossed our rayon into Nakhichevan, but did not reach the Armenian republic. Therefore, this time around, our people do not want to make concessions and they are acting correctly. All trains must move together.

[Grigoryan] Did the meeting produce any final results? What was decided?

[Arutyunyan] The final conclusion was that the trains should move. This time around I got the impression that the soldiers are determined about this and in coming days trains will move through Norashen, not, of course, because of good will on the part of the Azerbaijanis, but because of the application of force. I think that the trains will move.

[Grigoryan] So we have to wait and see, hoping that the trains will move. We will learn whether these negotiations have produced any results.

### Armored Detachment Arriving

*NC0602133890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 90*

["From the Military Commandant of Yerevan Garrison"—radio headline]

[Text] In accordance with the decision taken by the government, an armored detachment is arriving in Armenia in order to assist the troops in the protection of the USSR borders, to create favorable conditions for the restoration of the railways, which is required for the elimination of the consequences of the natural disaster, to resolve problems connected with the lifting of the blockade, to deploy personnel, and to resolve other problems.

The military commandant informs the population about the arrival of the armored detachment in order to foil various unfounded reports and rumours disseminated by certain individuals.

### Earthquake Restoration Work Noted

*NC0902161190 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Spitak, Leninakan, and Kirovakan were the cities hardest hit by the December earthquake. What has been done there in the last year? The construction plan for Spitak has been fulfilled by only three percent. The situation in Leninakan is far worse: Only 0.20 percent of the plan has been fulfilled. Only one building has been commissioned. None of the 12 schools envisaged by the plan has been completed. So far Spitak has no master plan and it is not yet known where the post office, international telephone center, bus station, and many other buildings will be sited.

The construction of the so-called Bulgarian city has begun in Kirovakan. Of the 300 single houses envisaged, only 100 are ready and they cannot be occupied because they lack electricity.

Leninakan, which was a major industrial center, lost nearly 85 percent of its industrial installations as a result of the earthquake, and none of them have been restored.

So far the rubble of collapsed buildings have not been removed from Spitak: 5 out of the total 8 million cubic meters of rubble are still inside the city.

The situation is deplorable at the construction sites in the disaster zone. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps it will be possible to reverse the situation this year.

## KGB Official on News Reporting

*NC1102100390 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[From the republican press review]

[Text] KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN has published an interview granted by Valeriy Badamyants, chairman of Armenian state committee for state security, to TASS and ARMENPRES correspondents.

Asked to evaluate the tragic events in Azerbaijan and Armenia, Valeriy Badamyants said: Unfortunately, you are making a mistake frequently committed by the news media when you attempt to equate the incidents taking place in the two neighboring republics. I am aware that according to the unwritten laws of the press, the republics' feelings should not be hurt and for that reason information should be carefully balanced. If information comes in about massacres in Baku, then something, such as the detention of an embezzler, will have to reported from Yerevan since such massacres do not happen here.

However, attempts to pass judgment on the situation without understading all the details results in a superficiality which is the same as ignorance. I categorically reject equating the Azerbaijani extremists' bloody crimes with the people's self-defense measures in Armenia. Although these measures might on occasion infringe on the laws, they are comprehensible from a moral point of view, underlined Valeriy Badamyants, chairman of Armenian state committee for state security.

## Armenian Minister Views Incidents

*NC1002124490 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Anatoliy Mkrtchyan, foreign affairs minister of the republic, answered questions from the KOMMUNIST correspondent on the incidents in Transcaucasia.

On Iranian and Turkish reaction to Azerbaijan's removing the state border, the minister pointed out: The essence of this is that Iran and Turkey reacted strongly only after the Soviet Army entered Baku. In the first days after the border was destroyed and the disorders began, the various news media lauded these acts by the fanatics, describing them as a victory scored by the Islamic revolution, the renaissance of the Soviet Muslims, and so on.

As for Tehran's official (?stand) on the Azerbaijan Popular Front's extremist acts and adventurism, this was decisively critical, and RESALAT wrote that Islam's international nature does not call for state borders to be destroyed and that when we say that Islam does not have borders, this does not mean that one can enter someone else's house.

Immediately after the troops arrived in Baku, anti-Soviet demonstrations took place in Turkey during which the Armenians were accused. It was said that the Armenians are to blame for the tension between the Popular Front and the army. Baseless accusations were also voiced by Turkish Foreign Minister Yilmaz.

## Supreme Soviet To Resume Session

*NC1002123290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] The Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet informs the Supreme Soviet deputies that the 11th session of the 11th convocation of the republic's Supreme Soviet will continue its work on 12 February at 1000 hours in the Shaumyan Hall [words indistinct].

## Baku Radio Carries Announcements of Events

### Military Commandant Comments

*NC1202092090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Notice issued by the military commandant of Baku City on 9 February]

[Text] The administrative organs maintained peace in the city yesterday. There were no reports of violations of public law or interethnic disputes. Through the efforts being made by the commandant's headquarters, the internal affairs organs continue to protect the people's security. Crimes committed in January are being brought to light and the confiscation of illegal weapons and military equipment is continuing.

A report that 16 houses were ransacked on 13 January is correct. A total of 545 houses are reported to have been ransacked and the pertinent authorities are continuing their investigation.

Military servicemen detained 12 individuals during the day. Another four individuals were detained for violating the state of emergency laws and 54 others were detained for violating the curfew. Six cars were impounded after their drivers committed gross violations of the rules on the movement of vehicles.

I would like to reiterate that my order of 6 February bans the movement of all vehicles in Baku which do not have registration plates. The movement of military vehicles which do not have identification numbers is also banned. Those who violate this rule will have their vehicles seized and they will be brought to account in accordance with the state of emergency laws.

Rumors are being spread in the city that law enforcement organs are preparing to commit a number of transgressions. These rumors confirm once again that many individuals wish to disrupt the peace. I assure you that no transgression has been observed and no preparations are being made for any.

Peace in Baku City depends on its residents.

Letters and appeals are coming in connection with the problems of the Russian-speaking people. Many citizens voice complaints in connection with the emigration of a number of families from Baku, which they describe as the outcome of provocations by those who are indifferent toward the future of the Azerbaijani people. Furthermore, they urge that these provocations be obstructed. We express deep gratitude for the letters and appeals. We also believe that they express the sincere wish of the majority of the citizens of Baku.
Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City

### Reports of 'Peaceful' Baku

*NC0902144090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
*0430 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Notice issued by the military commandant of Baku City]

[Text] Baku City was peaceful last night. The situation remained unchanged. No large-scale violation of public law has been recorded. The employees of the Internal Affairs Department continue to take measures to maintain the state of emergency regime.

Two individuals were detained for committing crimes, four for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree on the state of emergency, and 51 for violating the curfew.
Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City

### Strike Situation Continuing

*NC0802143390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
*1700 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] The situation is becoming more normal in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] after the declaration of a state of emergency in Azerbaijan. It has been reported that the Azerbaijan SSR's NKAO Organization Committee has taken up its work during the past few days. The committee members have visited a number of districts in Stepanakert and various rayons in the NKAO and put measures into effect that are intended to normalize the situation.

The Agdam-Shusha motorway and the roads connecting Fizuli with [name indistinct] and Mardakert with Mirbashir have been opened. In general, the oblast's links with all the rayons have been restored. The strike situation in the oblast's establishments is continuing. However, service establishments are working.

The situation in Shusha is very good. All the administrations are working. Harmonious agricultural work is being carried out. Maintenance of livestock through the winter is continuing in an organized way. Every possibility is being used to see the cattle through winter in a healthy state and to avoid a drop in production. Various rayons in our republic are assisting the establishments to remove difficulties which slow down work. Technical equipment is being repaired in preparation for the future work in the fields. The lands are being prepared for cultivation and chemical fertilizers are being acquired.

According to a report we received today, the movement of transportation vehicles between Shusha and Stepanakert and Shusha and Lachin has been restored.

### Lalchinskiy Rayon 'Improving'

*NC0902174790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
*1730 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Khanlar Mamedov, first secretary of the Lachinskiy Rayon party committee, has informed our correspondent that the situation in the rayon is good now. The unity of the people is gradually improving, and the former work rhythm is being restored.

Buses have started to operate on the Lachin-Shusha highways. The situation in the Lachinskiy Rayon towns, which border the neighboring republic, is also peaceful. The residents of Lachin have decided to erect a monument to honor the memory of the victims of the tragic incidents in January. They have also decided to name one of the streets after the victims.

### Kazakhskiy Rayon 'Very Tense'

*NC0902175590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
*1730 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Our correspondent established a link with Kazakhskiy Rayon this evening. Bakir (?Ilunov), first secretary of the Kazakhskiy Rayon party committee [raykom] said:

The situation has become very tense in the rayon during the past few days. Armed groups from the neighboring Noyemberyanskiy and Idzhevanskiy Rayons are attacking our rayon and creating fear. I believe that this state of affairs is linked with the gathering of bearded groups in the western sector as a result of the implementation of the passport regulations in Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, armed Armenians from [name indistinct] town killed one of the residents in our rayon and wounded another citizen. The wounded person is now receiving medical treatment. A group of individuals from Noyemberyan town harassed the workers employed in the poultry firm in Kemerly town and demanded that they join the firm.

I contacted the first secretary of the Noyemberyanskiy Raykom in connection with the matter. The first secretary of the neighboring rayon said that he was helpless in the struggle being waged against the instigators. Obviously, the armed groups pay attention to no one. I asked the commander of the military unit in our region to send troops to Kazakhskiy Rayon. We expect to receive reinforcements.

Meanwhile, a number of instigators in Khayranly town are aggravating the situation. The railroad workers of the Azerbaijan railroad network are taking the trains which cross through Kazakhskiy Rayon up to the Idzhevan railway station in Armenia. The transportation of freight is continuing. Meanwhile, we are trying to take every measure to maintain public order in the rayon.

### Sumgait City Called 'Peaceful'

*NC1202090390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Babarustamov, deputy chief of the Sumgait City Internal Affairs Department, has informed a Baku radio correspondent that Sumgait City is peaceful. Because of the operative measures that have been implemented, violations of public laws and criminal offenses have not been recorded in the city during the recent critical days. In view of the various rumors that our enemies have spread, the law enforcement organs of the city have channeled their main effort in obstructing possible interethnic incidents. They done their job well. They are aware that each and every incident in Sumgait will strengthen the enemies of the people of Azerbaijan, and will pave the way for tragedy.

Babarustamov also said: I believe that cautious legal work must be carried out to expose all those who are responsible for the tragic incidents and to penalize them as they deserve. Rushing to get results will not be in the interest of the general work.

In conclusion, on behalf of the employees of the law enforcement organs of Sumgait City, Babarustamov assured all of people that the employees of the internal affairs organs will spare nothing in exposing the criminals.

### Nakhichevan Feeling Blockade Effects

*NC0902174390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] An Azerinform correspondent has reported the following from Nakhichevan:

Complying with the appeal from the leaders of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Nakhichevan Oblast Party Committee Bureau, the workers of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] have resumed work. Large industrial and agricultural establishments, public transportation services, and educational institutions have begun to operate.

However, the results of the month-long blockade in all the domains of economic and social life are obvious. Fuel supplies, construction materials, and raw materials for industrial establishments are in short supply. The complete suspension of vehicle transport services because of the interruptions caused in railway transportation and in the supply of benzine by the continuing blockade in Armenia's Megrinskiy Rayon is worsening the situation.

Although a cease-fire agreement has been reached between the Popular Movement of Nakhichevan and the Armenian Pannational Movement, the border situation between the Nakhichevan ASSR and the Armenian SSR has become tense. Bearded and armed individuals have been seen in that region again and armed exchanges are heard at night.

Regardless of how complicated the situation may have become in the economic and social domains because of the blockade of the Megrinskiy section of the Azerbaijan railroad network, the political situation in the Nakhichevan ASSR is peaceful. The people are cautious and think about the existing state of affairs. They also approve the measures that are being taken to stabilize the situation.

### Arutyunyan's Plenum Address Condemned

*NC1202111590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Zeyyad Mamedov commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, I wish to give a number of views about the speech Arutunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, made during the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

One may ask: Why only Arutunyan? Let me first say that Arutunyan touched on matters related more to our republic rather than to Armenia and tried to explain and assess the situation in Azerbaijan from the point of view of his completely treacherous position. As such, he revealed his true self.

But let us ignore this for the time being and note that the points Arutunyan raised in the plenum may confuse anyone who is not aware of the situation.

Arutunyan said: We shall do everything to reduce tension and restore tranquility and national peace. We have dealt a serious blow to reconstruction by not properly assessing the incidents in Sumgait. The problem of the

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is not linked to Armenia's claim for land.

How naive does one have to be to believe such views? Was it not the ridiculous viewpoint of the (?Khirbalayans), (?Kaputisyans), Pogosyans, and (?Kharutunyans) that the destiny of reconstruction depends on how the NKAO problem is solved, that is, in favor of the Armenian side.

Arutunyan noted that the question of the NKAO was raised by the people of the NKAO. The problem is linked with the people's right to determine their future.

But what would have happened if, using this right, the Azerbaijanis, who lived in densely populated communes in Armenia prior to the incidents which are already common knowledge, tried legally to demand the union of Zangezur and (?Koydzhe) with Azerbaijan or if they demanded autonomy? The reply is clear: Oh! Do not allow the suffering Armenian people to lose their lands. [passage omitted]

Another point is: Arutunyan tried to explain that the arming of the Armenians was linked to incidents in Baku, Lenkoran, and Nakhichevan. This is strange. How can he explain the shipment of the most modern arms to the Armenian sectors of the NKAO and other parts of Azerbaijan prior to the latest incidents? Does he believe that an Armenian national army, which has been supplied with the arms sent by God knows whom, has not been established? Is Arutunyan unaware of the congress held by the Armenian Pan-national Movement in Yerevan and the treacherous plans of that organization? [passage omitted]

Furthermore, Arutunyan talked briefly about the so-called economic blockade against Armenia. However, he has forgotten that it was Armenia who first imposed an economic embargo. The Armenian side is to blame that the normal movement of the trains have not been restored. Perhaps Arutunyan is unaware that the tunnel near Armenia's Megrinskiy Rayon has been blocked with reinforced concrete.

It is strange that Arutunyan said all this after hearing the view Mikhail Gorbachev expressed in the CPSU Central Committee plenum to the effect that all the problems should be resolved more quickly with unconditional compliance with Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Dear listeners, I have expressed my views on a number of points Arutunyan raised in his address in the CPSU Central Committee plenum. I leave the rest to you. However, I am confident that when you read his speech you will realize his objective. He wishes to continue the treacherous struggle against the Azerbaijani people in one way or another.

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# Economic

## Soviet, Western Economists Discuss Ownership

*LD0902043290 Moscow TASS in English 1926 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—"The essence of the drive to overhaul the Soviet economy boils down to changing relations of ownership". This statement set the tenor to the discussion at a two-day meeting of economists and economic managers of the USSR and 11 West European countries opened here today.

The meeting is held at the initiative of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and also involves representatives of the workers' and social-democratic parties of industrialised countries.

"The state monopoly on all property was one of the principal miscalculations committed by the Soviet Union in the economic field, which adversely affected the development of the national economy," said academician Abel Aganbegyan, rector of the Academy of the National Economy.

"This led to the alienation of producers from the means of production, and the loss of economic incentives. The tendency toward sponging and stagnation emerged in the economy instead of competition.

"It is not fortuitous that the economic section of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee to the 28th Party Congress, which was approved at the party plenary meeting on Wednesday [7 February], aims at transition to the market economy based on the diversity of the forms of ownership—state, cooperative and individual, including the ownership of the means of production," Aganbegyan said.

The platform provides for creating stage-by-stage markets of consumer goods, means of production, scientific projects, and also measures to de-monopolise production, finances, trade and scientific activity.

Certainly, the transition period is very complex. Old methods of economic management are dying out and the new economic levers are not operating as yet. The Soviet Communist Party proceeds from the need to make this transitional period as short as possible.

At the same time, apprehensions are warranted that an overly-sharp swift to the market economy in conditions of disbalance in finances and the consumer market is fraught with serious upheavals both in the economic and social spheres, Soviet participants in the meeting pointed out.

In this regard, hope was voiced that the exchange of views with Western colleagues will help find optimum ways and terms of this transition.

The meeting will end on Friday.

## Revised Local Self-Management Draft Viewed

*904A0715 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*
*4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2*

[Article by G. Kovaleva and V. Lyubovnyy: "The Competence of the Local Soviet"]

[Text]**Among the most important documents of the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet one should note the approval of the first reading of the USSR draft law "On General Principles for Local Self-Management and Local Economy in the USSR." The draft has been brought up for nationwide discussion, which will not only make it possible to evaluate its strong and weak points and suggest ways of improving it, but will also serve as the main point of reference for the current election campaign.**

This document is more succinct than the first variant proposed at the spring session: Its size has been cut to one-third; it corresponds more precisely to the requirements of the legislation "On General Principles..."; and it is more closely coordinated with other draft laws considered by the USSR Supreme Soviet, particularly those such as "On USSR Property" and "On Land." Of principal importance are the points about including labor collectives in the system of local self-management; listing the income taxes from workers and employees that go into the local budgets; the introduction of a new practice for resolving disputed issues related to the activity of local soviets of people's deputies, and other provisions.

At the same time, in our view, the draft still needs serious work and augmentation. Above all it is necessary to answer the question: Can the draft become an "immediate regulatory" law, that is, can it be used directly in the activity of local soviets of people's deputies and other self-management organs? Or should it contain only the general positions required by the developers of the corresponding laws and executive regulations?

In certain cases the draft law contains fairly concrete norms (for example, the financial base for local self-management) and others are limited simply to presenting the conceptual approaches concerning a number of especially important items, for example, the authority of the local soviets, references are given to laws of the USSR and union and autonomous republics, which, in our viewpoint, practically takes away the core of the draft.

It would seem that the draft law as a unionwide law should contain provisions having the character of legal norms with respect to republic legislation for the key items. It should determine the minimum necessary rights and responsibilities (executive competence), without which self-management cannot be carried out at one territorial level or another.

The draft law contains practically no restrictions on functions and authority in the sphere of socioeconomic development or sources of financing among various territorial levels. One gets the impression that the legislator was working with some single abstract territorial unit. But, as we know, there are actually quite different administrative-territorial formations in operation today: autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts, krays, oblasts, rayons, cities, rayons within cities, villages of an urban type, towns, and territories that are united by rural soviets. Moreover, there are other territorial units that should have self-management but do not have an official status, for example, microrayons in cities. Is there any need to show that they differ significantly from one another mainly in terms of the role they play in satisfying the needs of their population and in the economic and social development of the union republic and the country as a whole?

Various functions of the oblasts, cities, rayons, and other territorial formations require reinforcing the corresponding authority in the law. And from our viewpoint this delimitation of rights and responsibilities should be determined precisely in a union law. This will make it possible to get away from unjustified concentration of power at the republic (union republic) and oblast (kray, ASSR [autonomous soviet socialist Republic]) levels. If the union law does not provide this kind of protection there arises a real danger of distortion of the proclaimed principles of local self-management. Incidentally, this is shown by previous experience when legislation on local soviets of people's deputies formally separated their levels (various laws were adopted concerning oblast, city, and rural soviets), while in reality their authority was not separated. In practice this nullified the rights of the lower levels of the soviets.

This idea has been widespread recently: It is legitimate only for such levels of self-management as the city and the rayon to exist and be given authority, and at higher territorial levels (oblast or kray) their independence is justified only in cases where they have been delegated part of the authority by cities or rayons.

At first glance this approach to the issue seems attractive; it is in the spirit of democratization of the society. But with more serious consideration it seems doubtful. The idea that each higher territorial unit is the simple sum of the lower levels (the administrative rayon is the sum of the rural soviets, the oblast—the sum of the rayons, and so forth) is wrong.

Let us recall the statement of K. Marx that the city is not simply the sum of houses but a kind of independent organism. Each territorial unit, of course, is not a mechanical compound of lower levels but a qualitatively different formation which is characterized by specific reproductive processes and its own tasks for the socioeconomic development of the territory. It far from always "shows through" at the lower levels and therefore cannot be delegated. For example, from the standpoint of the rayons it is impossible to intelligently determine the future transportation network of the oblast as a whole, the scope and direction of the production base, efficient location of its facilities throughout the territory, the optimal composition of enterprises for producing consumer goods, and so forth. In turn, many questions of the socioeconomic development of the oblasts cannot be effectively resolved if one proceeds solely from the "oblast" view; they require approaches from the level of a large economic region or union republic.

All this shows the need to delimit the authority of the soviets at various levels in the union law. And this authority should acquire concrete forms, based on local conditions, in republic legislation.

It is extremely important in the law not only to delimit authority but also to provide for an interconnection and integrity of the entire system of soviets of people's deputies. And this requires a clear reflection of the role of the soviets not only as the basic unit of state authority but also as the representative organ of state power which combines both local and statewide interests. The draft laws devote serious attention to the economic independence of the soviets but the approaches to exercising it need to be clarified.

Of course the enterprises and organizations that are involved should not be given local natural and labor resources free of charge. But payment for resources should be made in the amount of the real expenditures made by the given territory for their reproduction. If the local organs themselves are interested in their joint utilization they should have the right to sell the resources under special conditions. The second direction is linked to the granting by local soviets (or their organs) of the same paid general economic services, for example, of the production infrastructure, the construction base, and a number of interbranch productions. Until recently, almost every enterprise resolved these issues autonomously.

The active organizational activity of the local soviets and the unification of forces of various enterprises of the territory in order to create a unified production and social infrastructure, the rendering of aid to small enterprises in their technical retooling, and the joint production of products will make it possible not only to promptly resolve problems of comprehensive development of the territory, but will also produce a significant increase in local financial resources. The third direction of the activity of the soviets is also important: extensive development of the local economy, including cooperative and individual activity.

The draft practically sidestepped the question of strengthening the economic independence of the large group of soviets that do not have the minimum necessary means for exercising the authority conferred on them. Two other ways of solving the problem can be recommended (while simultaneously encouraging the creation of their own economic base): subsidies from the budgets of higher administrative-territorial units or the creation of special funds for regional development.

The section of the draft law on planning the economic and social development of the territory, both for the long-term and the current period, is in need of significant improvement. Without this the strengthening of the economic independence of local self-management loses its purposeful direction and will not be linked to the recognized needs of the territory in the overall system of the country's national economy. It would be expedient to determine how the territorial self-management unit, (and there are from four to five of them in the republics) the enterprises, and organizations coordinate their plans. Apparently this level could be the city or the administrative rayon.

We should also like to draw attention to the fact that the preamble gives an extremely expanded interpretation of the tasks of local self-management which "...is intended to provide for independent resolution by the population of the local population point, village, rayon within a city, city, rayon, oblast, kray, or national-administrative formations of all problems having to do with the development of the territory..." A different wording seems more precise—**the population of the territory of the soviet (or organs elected by them) independently resolves all problems of local significance and participates in the resolution of other problems affecting its interests on a given territory.**

The composition of the economic base of local self-management (Section II, Article 4) is also expanded too much. Including in it the property of all subjects conducting economic activity on the corresponding territory practically deprives the economic base of a level higher than the given territorial units (for example, union republics) and, from our viewpoint, opens up the way to local favoritism.

## Mishin on Changing Role of Trade Unions

*904F0077A Moscow TRUD in Russian*
*3 Feb 90 p 2*

[Interview with V.M. Mishin, AUCCTU secretary, member of the CPSU Central Committee, by TRUD correspondent V. Pisarchik: "From the Dictatorship of Power to the Dictatorship of Conscience"]

[Text] All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] Secretary V.M. Mishin, Candidate Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] People's Deputy in Sovetskiy Territorial Electoral District No. 48 in Moscow, responded to questions by a TRUD correspondent.

[Pisarchik] Viktor Maksimovich, you are one of the many representatives of the largest mass organization of workers in our country who are involved in the struggle for deputy mandates at the forthcoming elections to the republic and local organs of power. However, let us put it bluntly, you are not a "rank-and-file" candidate: You are an AUCCTU secretary and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. What is your view of your participation and that of the trade unions as a whole in the election campaign?

[Mishin] To begin with, I would like to clarify certain things. Having joined the pre-election struggle I indeed represent the trade unions but, perhaps, I still represent myself to a greater degree. Therefore, I would not necessarily equate my election success or defeat with those of the trade unions. My election platform, "Toward Renewed Socialism Through Social Consensus," though based on the election platform of the trade unions, in whose development I directly participated, does include some details which were not reflected in the Appeal of the Seventh AUCCTU Plenum to the Voters. These are specific problems of the RSFSR, Moscow, Sovetskiy Rayon; their labor collectives put their trust in me by naming me their candidate deputy.

As far as the overall participation of the trade unions and their representatives in the struggle for deputy mandates is concerned, this, as I see it, is one of the first steps in designing a renewed structure of mutual relations between the trade unions and the organs of people's power.

A society of humane democratic socialism which is being created through the efforts of the entire people, and on the road toward which the forthcoming elections are going to be exceptionally important, may only be built on the basis of a comprehensive consensus and the interest of all forces taking part in socialist renewal. This calls for creating in our country special structures of political accord with the help of which a productive social dialogue may be carried on in the environment of pluralism, and the necessary reconciliation of the interests of various social groups and categories of the population may be attained.

All of us now find ourselves in an absolutely new, previously unknown situation. A variety of subjects of real politics is a characteristic trait of it. The trade unions are one of the subjects, and a very specific one, with a complex internal structure. Given the current situation, the significance of the protective function of the trade unions increases immeasurably. At issue is the protection of the worker not only against technocratic designs in the economy but against everything that might be connected in one way or another with an assault on the standard of living, an infringement upon real rights, freedoms, and interests.

It is particularly important to prevent a repetition of what happened to the trade unions under the command-administrative system, that is, an almost direct fusion of the trade unions and the state.

[Pisarchik] However, it appears that all of this is not that simple. Many people, including functionaries of the trade union apparatus, activists of the new, perestroyka generation, are now calling on the trade unions to become an opposition to the state and the soviets.

[Mishin] I believe that the "laurels" of Herostratos do not become the trade unions under our circumstances. Looking for gaps in our state policy and assaulting them with the entire might of the trade union press and rallies attracting many thousands does not require great wisdom. It is much more difficult to open a businesslike dialogue and clearly delineate the spheres of influence and, consequently, responsibility for the success of perestroyka. To this end, it is important to have a representation of the trade unions in the soviets at all levels, including the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Organizations of women, veterans, young people, other organizations and movements should have the same representation in the soviets, as, of course, should the CPSU in its new capacity as the party of socialist renewal.

[Pisarchik] A reader from Tula, L. Kozyrev, writes: "Recently, it has become fashionable to criticize the trade unions for... having been the first to rise up and defend the rights and legitimate interests of workers. For example, prominent economists have accused the trade unions of 'inflaming passions' and 'turning back the clock.'" In the process, the position of the trade unions is intentionally distorted and is represented from the angle the orators require. For example, they created for the trade unions "the image of an enemy" of cooperatives. Can we consider such a response a naive misunderstanding?

[Mishin] It would be at the very least naive to view the trade unions, 140 million strong, as some monolith. As in any mass organization, there are conservatives, radicals, and a more or less stable center in the Soviet trade unions. Demanding that the trade unions become "unconditionally radical" means exacerbating economic and social instability still further. This is point one. Second, being that categorical is as undemocratic as the infamous "we unanimously approve." A sense of measure, balance, and perception of the real situation are necessary in all pursuits.

This is exactly how the AUCCTU aspires to act under the current most difficult conditions. The trade unions are already doing a lot of what can be done even now in order to improve the situation of the workers in a real rather than a populist-mythical fashion. Let me recall that the minimum level of retirement benefits was raised, prices for foodstuffs and necessities were stabilized, and the wages of a number of low-paid categories of workers were raised exactly at the insistence of the trade unions. This is not fiction, this is reality. If you will, this is the political line which the trade unions will follow.

Mutual relations between the trade unions and the cooperatives are a special issue. However, in this matter as well we have nothing to hide. The policy of the trade unions on this issue has been set forth in principle in a number of AUCCTU documents in the last months of last year. It was outlined in the most concise, concentrated form in the Appeal to the Members of the Trade Unions and All Citizens of the Country adopted on 4 December 1989 at the Seventh AUCCTU Plenum. A direct response to all the questions which have arisen in this reference is found in the chapter of the appeal which is addressed directly to the participants in the cooperative movement. Attempts to portray the trade unions as opponents of the cooperative members is a deliberate lie which benefits only those who are trying to turn the cooperatives into "laundry shops" for "laundering" dirty money. The trade unions are in favor of increasing the ranks of civilized cooperative members working for the benefit of the people, in favor of giving the members of the cooperatives economic rights and opportunities equal to those of the state enterprises.

[Pisarchik] Frequently, there are letters in the mail of the TRUD department of trade union activities whose content may be reduced to approximately the following idea: We see that "the top," the AUCCTU, is acting in a new manner. However, in our collective (rayon, oblast) everything is different: There is a "master" to whose drum everyone marches, including trade union functionaries.

[Mishin] I would not draw an overly distinct line between, as you put it, "the top" and "the grassroots" of the trade unions. If these deficiencies, which I am aware of not only from workers' letters but also from my direct communication with the "primary" organizations, exist at the level of lower echelons of the trade unions they are largely the fault of the leading trade union organs, including the AUCCTU. This is an alarming symptom of the fact that perestroyka in the field is proceeding slowly, at a rate incommensurate with the processes which are occurring in our society.

However, at present it is not enough to ascertain this phenomenon. It is important to determine its causes. As I see it, there are several of them. First, this is the adherence of trade union functionaries and activists to make stereotypes obsolete from the time of stagnation. The second cause is also rooted in the stagnant past and proceeds from a lack of faith in the ability of the local trade unions to change something for the better and get going. This lack of faith was instilled by years and decades of social passivity on the part of the trade unions, by obediently going along with the arbitrariness and dictates of the party apparatus and the administrative-economic organs. We may only get rid of this disease when we completely root out the administrative-command system and all of its recurrences.

This, however, is not all. At present, many informal leaders who are genuinely interested in perestroyka are becoming heads of primary trade union organizations. They have both organizational talent and the ardent desire to change our life for the better. However, these people very frequently lack knowledge and practical work experience under the new conditions. Such people have to be trained. Their involvement should be encouraged in every way possible. In this matter, the organs of the trade union press, trade union discussion clubs, and various other forms of live communication of the trade union cadres and the aktiv have a significant role to play.

[Pisarchik] You would agree that the personal example set by leaders representing the trade union movement at the national level is also important. Incidentally, as I see it, a paradoxical situation exists at present. A majority of those who now offer negative assessments of the steps taken by the AUCCTU and the oblast trade union councils in the newspapers, magazines, on the radio and TV, and from the podiums were in the limelight in the time of stagnation as well, they got their positions, orders, degrees, and titles. They now see the root cause of the new position of the trade unions in the desire of some trade union X's and Y's to hang on to their positions rather than in profound processes. The logic which emerges is peculiar: I do not doubt my right to be reformed, but I find the behavior of others suspect... You have been a part of the "elite" of the political nomenklatura of our state for many years now. How have you lived in the almost five years of perestroyka?

[Mishin] I would not get into an argument with the "opponents" of the kind you have referred to. Time will tell who stands for what, and it has been telling already.

At present, under the conditions of democracy and glasnost, a dictatorship of conscience is replacing a dictatorship of power. Opportunists and favorites of every stripe are unmasked very quickly. After all, the trade unions are closer to the working man than anyone else, and he has quite a nose for rascals.

Personally, I will say that I have never clung to my position no matter how "elite-nomenklatura" it has been. I have a good "civilian" profession and two diplomas, from an industrial vocational school and a construction institute. However, it has happened that almost all of my working life has been associated with the trade unions. Since my childhood, I have been taught to do two things—speak the truth and act in keeping with my conscience—because I come from a working-class family. I got in trouble because of this many times. I got in trouble in the years of stagnation when I got involved in a conflict over a matter of principle with the offspring of the powers that existed in Brezhnev's immediate entourage. They "let me have it" at almost the very outset of perestroyka when I dared to object to the then number two person in the party. At the time, he resolved cadre issues as if he were shelling cedar nuts. He considered both the trade unions and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] to be merely transmission belts... However, I do not resent him despite having been unable to complete a lot of what I started and conceived in the Komsomol. In the trade unions, I have felt that I am useful; I have met interesting people. There is no end of room for work here.

[Pisarchik] At the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, you proposed the creation of a Russian Communist Party within the structure of the CPSU. As is known, this proposal was not supported by a majority of the Central Committee members. Has your stand on this issue changed following this?

[Mishin] No, it has not. Our life convinces me still more that such a step is necessary. It would benefit both the party and the Russian Federation. To this day, the republic does not have its own full-fledged statehood, complete political, economic, and social structures. The struggle to create them is an important chapter of my election program.

Besides, in my capacity as an AUCCTU secretary I have been taking a practical part in developing a model of all-Russian trade union structures; the creation of which the Sixth AUCCTU Plenum has approved.

[Pisarchik] There are letters at the editorial office whose authors are interested to know how this endeavor is progressing and what it is going to be about—another office or something different, more in keeping with the spirit of the times?

[Mishin] It would be premature to state that the concept of the Rosprof [Russian Trade Union Council] has evolved into its final form. There are different approaches to this. For example, there are proposals to form the Russian Trade Union Council in the image and after the likeness of the AUCCTU or the currently operating republic trade union centers, that is, as yet another leading organ in the trade union hierarchy. Some comrades propose to update this model a little.

I happen to think that this should be **an entity new in principle for the Soviet trade unions—an essentially democratic entity, with a flexible structure, autonomous, and self-managing.**I would call it **“Federation of Professional Associations of the Workers of the RSFSR.”**Russian branch trade unions, regional and production trade union organizations of the workers of the RSFSR, all kinds of professional leagues and guilds could join it on the basis of the free will of their members. While retaining complete independence, all organizations, associations, and movements joining the Rosprof would receive, at their option, the status of full or associate members. The federation would be called upon to guarantee the defense of their comprehensive interests in mutually agreeable spheres.

I see the future Rosprof as an integral component of the trade unions of the USSR. All of its activities will be conducted on the basis of the all-union and republic constitutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles of the international trade union movement.

[Pisarchik] As you see it, to what degree are the current shortcomings in the operation of the trade unions due to the standard of scientific support for their operations which we can hardly consider high?

[Mishin] There is a very direct connection. At present, the situation in the trade unions is such that practice has outstripped theory. To this day, we do not have original scientific studies on the prospects for developing the trade union movement in the USSR. Actually, no systematic history of the national trade unions exists which would correspond to the current level of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, such a history could provide much food for thought. Only recently did we embark on a regular study of public opinion regarding particular steps of the trade unions.

I will admit frankly that, while I profoundly believe in the power of scientific knowledge, I do not quite trust many of our “theoreticians,” especially those who in the years of stagnation wrote and said one thing and are now trying to prove the opposite. However, so as not to become a notorious nihilist in the eyes of the intelligentsia, I would also admit that I am working with a small group of scientific consultants who combine substantial theoretical training with a profound knowledge of life. In principle, I believe that relations between the trade unions and the scientific community should be based on contractual principles. I attach much hope to the new generation of researchers which is entering the scientific world in the environment of perestroyka.

[Pisarchik] When we refer to the defense of the interests of workers we mean wages, leave, and so on. What if we put the trade unions and the spiritual interests of the people on the same plane? Is it possible and necessary for the trade unions to operate in this sphere?

[Mishin] Trivial as the words about man not living by bread alone are, they conceal a profound philosophical meaning. Beginning with the first years of Soviet power we have talked a lot about the significance of the spiritual sphere and on the whole have done a lot in this area. However, figuratively speaking, a tremendous effort by many people went down the drain. Only in the environment of perestroyka have we come close to understanding the profound factors which have slowed our cultural development, caused the recurrence of the lack of spirituality, and spawned still new manifestations of it. The absence of personal freedom, abridgment of elementary human rights, politization of artistic creativity which at times was driven to the absurd, and many other things which in the environment of Stalin's militarized and Brezhnev's bureaucratic socialism were considered natural, have come to contradict most sharply the very notion of spirituality.

Now we are entering a period of spiritual renaissance. At any rate, perestroyka creates real prerequisites for this. It would be an unpardonable mistake for the trade unions not to take advantage of this circumstance, all the more so because there is a good base: a chain of cultural and educational facilities, athletic facilities, and skilled cadres. However, I am now compelled to discuss things which are not too pleasant. Decentralization and the acquisition of financial independence are viewed by some trade union organs as an opportunity to save on culture and athletic activities. For example, is it proper that in some “centers of culture” children and teen-agers can only participate in circles and sections charging fees? The AUCCTU will wage a steadfast struggle against a commercial approach to culture and sports. We are counting on vigorous support from broad circles of the public and all trade union members in this endeavor.

[Pisarchik] Here is the final question. Viktor Maksimovich, I have known you for nine years. I have never seen you dejected or lost. How do you "take a hit," as athletes would put it, like this?

[Mishin] I am naturally optimistic. This is why I view perestroyka as a struggle, as a revolution for which we have to fight to the death. I am sure that we and our children will accomplish what our grandfathers and fathers have failed to accomplish—build humane and democratic socialism.

### Large Increase in Import of Consumer Goods Urged

*PM1202115490 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 08 Feb 90*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Nikolay Shmelev of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by news presenter Jon Snow in London on 8 February, from Channel Four "News"—recorded]

[Text] [Snow] Well, earlier this evening I spoke to Nikolay Shmelev, a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies and a leading radical economist at the influential U.S.A.-Canada Institute, and I asked him whether switching resources now from military to domestic production would help solve the Soviet Union's economic crisis.

[Shmelev] In the long term, of course—even in, so-say, in medium term, also okay—but I'm talking about months, not about years. And just now only to reduce drastically our military expenses, you need time for using those reductions and for using those personnel, military personnel in civil jobs... on civil jobs, and for using for those cars, and well, ammunitions. So, but I'm talking about the current economic crisis and in this case on cutting our military expenses: It cannot save us.

[Snow] And yet a lot of the political frustration in the country is economically based, isn't it?

[Shmelev] Yes, I agree with you. I don't see any real danger for our present political leadership or for Mr. Gorbachev, personally, from so-say political... so-say political side of our life, except maybe national problems; but, so I dare say that even our national problems can be kept under some kind of control. But I see real dangers for our... even for our political life from people in the street who have their limits of patience, and I think that quite radical steps must be undertaken now for somehow giving people the sign of real improvement in their life, of giving them something tangible for their money.

[Snow] Surely that's something that Western Europe and America—the Western World—could help with.

[Shmelev] Already more than a year I am advocating one very simple thing—and for me quite understandable from... simply from a common sense point of view: Is to increase temporarily, drastically, for at least two, three years, imports of consumer goods, and instead of thinking about how to confiscate money from people, to buy them back as cheap as it's possible and increase consumer commodities. Imports is the cheapest way of buying those money—excess money—back and afterwards to destroy them.

[Snow] Well, now, Mr. Bush, President Bush, has been talking today about his hopes to negotiate a new trade agreement with President Gorbachev at the next summit. Is that the kind of arena in which this might be assisted?

[Shmelev] It's quite... this agreement is quite okay; but only this agreement is not sufficient for us to overcome our present situation. I think that we need to borrow a little more money on world financial markets, to borrow on the assurance of something—maybe on the assurance of our gold reserves or something like that—but to borrow a little. And by international standards all our grievances, all our worries now, cost not too much money. My estimates are that we need to borrow for... strictly for emergency purposes, for emergency, only for spending them—I want to be quite frank in this—only for spending them on imports of consumer goods. We need somethng between $25 or 30 billion.

[Snow] Fill the shops with goods on the basis of what you can...

[Shmelev interrupts] Yes, to give...

[Snow) ...earn in the short term. But will that give you the breathing space you need, then, to get the economy into shape in three years' time?

[Shmelev] Breathing space, some real incentives. People are losing their belief, their faith in perestroyka: to give them something tangible as proof of our leadership intentions for the future.

## Scientific

### Successful 11 Feb 'Soyuz TM-9' Spacecraft Launch

#### Crew Chosen

*LD1002105990 Moscow TASS in English 1051 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Text] Baykonur February 10 TASS—Anatoliy Solovev and Aleksandr Balandin will be the crew to fly into space aboard the Soyuz-TM spaceship on Sunday on a flight to the orbital station Mir, a State Commission spokesman told journalists at a news conference today.

The new crew will take the place of Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov and will work in orbit for about six months.

Speakers at the news conference also pointed out that, for the first time in Soviet cosmonautics, incomes from the results of the flight are expected to exceed by far the spending on the spaceship's launch.

Up to 25 million rubles of net profit are expected to be obtained, mainly resultant of the utilization of a Kristall technological module.

The module is scheduled to be launched on March 30 and to dock with the orbital complex on April 7-8.

Today Solovev and Balandin will go to bed at 18.00, Moscow time. The crew will begin pre-launch procedures at 02.00 on February 11.

### Launch To Become Profitable

*LD1002211590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[Video report from Baykonur cosmodrome by correspondents Slipcheno and Pankratov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Unidentified correspondent] They [orbital station Mir] will receive the new module and by summer they should obtain about 100 kg of crystals and ultrapure proteins for vaccines and serums, and hundreds of photographic films for the cartographers.

The [news conference] statement by the Space Industry Minister Oleg Nikolayevich Shishkin, could be called sensational.

[Begin Shishkin recording] Your flight, the results of your flight, will for the first time bring to Earth, as it were, information and materials which will be worth much more than the cost of the launch and your work in space. In other words, you will begin to make a profit. [end recording]

[Unidentified correspondent] Experts estimate the cost of this expedition at about 80 million rubles, but 105 million's worth of production will be obtained in space: a profit of 25 million is expected. And that figure could rise considerably if terrestrial industry make good use of the cargo from space. The launch of the spaceship Soyuz TM-9 is scheduled for 11 February, at 0916 GMT Moscow Time. Central Television is planning a direct report on the First All-Union Program. [video shows the process of obtaining new crystals, the Kristal module, scene at Shishkin news conference, cosmonauts shown addressing it].

### Crew Replacement Schedule

*LD1102062490 Moscow TASS in English 0622 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 11 TASS—The spaceship Soyuz TM-9 was launched from Baykonur Cosmodrome at 09:16 [0616 GMT], Moscow time, today. Anatoliy Solovyev is mission commander and Aleksandr Balandin is flight engineer.

The crew are to dock the spaceship with the Soviet orbital complex Mir and then take the place of the crew of the fifth main expedition—Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov who have been working in orbit for the sixth month and who are expected to return to Earth on February 19.

### Moscow Radio Report

*LD1102093390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Summary] In a report from the flight control center, special correspondent Vladimir Bezyayev gave an account of the successful launch into orbit of the Soyuz TM-9.

"Everything went off successfully." The launch took place at 0916, and "at 0924 hours and 49 seconds the spacecraft separated from its carrier rocket and entered the orbit of an artificial earth satellite—an orbit with parameters close to the preset ones." Specifically the parameters of its orbit are 243 kms at the apogee and 198.7 kms at the perigee. Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin are feeling splendid.

On 13 February the Soyuz TM-9 craft is due to dock with the Mir complex between 0900 and 1000. Then the two crews are to spend about a week aboard the Mir complex, and the landing and return to earth of Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksand Serebrov are scheduled for 19 February.

### Chernobyl Radiation Exposure Data Bank Created

*90UN0819A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Interview with A.F. Tsyb, director of the Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, by S. Turanov, TASS correspondent (special for IZVESTIYA): "People of Chernobyl—Respond!"; date and place not specified]

[Text] From 29-31 January at the Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences (in the city of Obninsk), the All-Union Conference on Matters Dealing with the All-Union Distributive Register is taking place. Its data bank will contain radiation monitoring information on people subject to the effects of radiation as a result of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. Our TASS correspondent discusses the organization of this register and its basic functions with A.F. Tsyb, institute director and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

[Turanov] Anatoliy Fedorovich, practically speaking, what will the inclusion of radiation exposure and medical examination information in the register's data bank give people?

[Tsyb] Of and by itself, of course, this will cure no one. But it is impossible to have an objective concept of the nature and dynamics of the incidence of sickness cases, to conduct necessary medical-therapeutic measures, without an individual accounting of persons who have been exposed to the effects of the radiation. We must note that the All-Union Distributive Register (VRR) was established by the USSR Ministry of Health immediately after the accident—after all, clinical examination work and the information it would provide had to be initiated as soon as possible. This is a long-term register—designed to operate over decades. It will be used to constantly evaluate the health condition, not only of those whose names are registered, but also of their children and succeeding generations.

[Turanov] This is the first time a register of this size has been created here. It is significantly greater in volume than its famous Japanese counterpart...

[Tsyb] Yes, and this predetermined the complicated structure of the VRR. It is an automated system which encompasses practically all regions of the country and includes four levels of observation and registration: rayon, oblast, republic, and union. Clinical data traverses a multi-stage path: completion of initial documents in the central rayon hospitals (in city hospitals for the cities), transferring the information to magnetic tape, logic data control at republic-level computer and data-processing centers and, finally, at union level in our institute.

[Turanov] What volume of data is presently stored in the register?

[Tsyb] Currently we have received medical radiation-dose data for 531,000 people, of which 198,000 participated in the clean-up following the accident and 330,000 comprise those evacuated and living in territories under observation. With respect to distribution by union republic, information from the health ministries of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shows data for 100,000, 150,000, and 250,000 individuals, respectively. But this is still not complete information—that can be obtained only through the coordinated efforts of various departments, primarily the USSR Ministry of Health, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. We are referring primarily to people who participated in eliminating the aftereffects of the disaster, many of whom have dispersed to far-off corners of our country. Let me take this opportunity to appeal to them to verify their inclusion in the register of their local health institutions.

[Turanov] Is everything flowing smoothly, in your opinion, with respect to what must be done for more effective work on the register?

[Tsyb] This is being held back by an inadequate material-technical supply, primarily the lack of personal computers in the central rayon hospitals. A state program for eliminating the aftereffects of the Chernobyl disaster is currently being examined. I believe work concerning the register must be included in this, since the register is based on functioning over a many-year period and requires appropriate financing.

## Military

### Views of Military-Civil Forum on Danger of War

*PM1202110790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3*

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences, Colonel N. Karasev: "Dialogue Should Continue"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already described the independent public examination of the situation with regard to the danger of war and the activity of the USSR Armed Forces, conducted on the initiative and under the auspices of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN and a number of other organizations. I now have before me a remarkable document—the generalized findings of the analysis. So it is now possible to describe its work and results in detail.

This document is remarkable for two reasons which, I think, are interconnected. First, it is the product of the joint work of representatives of various departments, organizations, and institutions which previously met rarely but nevertheless carried on a verbal battle among themselves without listening to each other very well. It is common knowledge how keenly some civilian journalists and other representatives of the public have spoken out in recent years on problems of the Armed Forces' vital activity. In turn, many military men flatly disagreed with them, sometimes quite groundlessly citing a low level of competence in their opponents. But the sides were able to meet face to face in the expert group and during a direct dialogue were able to exchange opinions and try to reach common views or, at least, to bring those views closer together. Thus a common document was born.

However, the term "common" may be used only with some reservation. This is the second remarkable feature of the findings of the examination. The point is that the document represents a summary of all the main viewpoints of the participants in the discussion. Understandably, this democratic approach, putting it plainly, meant that there was bound to be a considerable diversity of views. For example, one chapter declares a need to depoliticize the Army and Navy while literally the very next chapter asserts: "The Army cannot be outside politics." I would immediately note that the latter viewpoint clearly predominated. Indeed, how can an instrument initially designed to achieve political aims be outside politics? Can the Army cease to be an element of the state, an implement of state power? Surely all that is political.

There are other variations in the final document. The question seems to be: What are we dealing with? With an eclectic assortment devoid of inner unity? I think that such an assertion would be highly superficial. Despite the diversity of opinions among the participants in the examination, they still managed to elaborate constructive proposals on the crucial problems on the agenda.

It is the general opinion of the study's participants that the starting point of all reflection on questions of Soviet defense building and the Armed Forces' activity is a precise assessment of the level of the war danger. In the mass media recently there has been much talk both of a naively romantic and a derogatory nature in the military department. Some authors are keen to share the good news: No one is thinking of attacking us. Others blame those military men who talk about the presence of a war danger for deliberately fueling fears so as to justify their social significance and necessity. Such assertions were also reflected in the examination. However, sober and scientifically validated approaches prevailed.

Generalizing the final reports of the expert groups, one can find a coincidence of views that there is still a real war danger for the USSR. However, the nature of that danger has now changed significantly.

On the one hand, under the influence of the spread of the ideas of the new political thinking and perestroyka in the USSR and of the changes in the East and central European countries, the all-European process has been stepped up considerably, a new impetus has been given to the disarmament talks, and a real nuclear weapons reduction has begun. As a result the direct military threat has diminished considerably.

On the other hand it was noted that, as long as the sides have large military potentials, the danger of war remains. The NATO countries, primarily the United States, are intensively developing qualitatively new types of armaments whose combat characteristics make them weapons of mass destruction. Many of these developments are taking place in conditions in which the USSR lags behind in a number of crucial spheres of scientific and technical progress. There is also definite concern at the uncertainty about the development of the military-political situation in Europe and also the dangerous character of the internal interethnic conflicts destabilizing the country's internal political situation.

On the basis of its assessment of the current war danger, the examination concluded that the presence in the USSR of a modern defense system for the country is inevitable and obligatory. In this respect the group of experts studying the problem "People and the Military Security of the State" expressed concern at the fact that the population's attitude to security questions generally and to the Army in particular has worsened. This is shown by the level of avoidance of military service, the actions of destructive elements and even of groups which oppose citizens' performance of their constitutional duty in defense of the fatherland, and the trend emerging in some of the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics toward abolishing certain forms of basic military training and military-patriotic education.

Generally speaking, in the treatment of specific elements of our state's modern defense system the personal opinions of the participants in the study diverged, and on individual aspects they were diametrically opposed. In principle, however, everyone agreed that in line with the new political thinking, our country's adoption of a purely defensive military doctrine and the implementation of economic reform, there is an urgent need for transformations in Soviet defense building, too. Furthermore, the expert study examined the comprehensive reform throughout the defense system as a whole—the mechanism of elaborating and adopting state military-political and military-economic decisions, the composition and functioning of military management, and the structure of the Armed Forces and ways of fully staffing them.

The package of proposals put forward in the expert report regarding the restructuring of the mechanism for drawing up and adopting state military-political and military-economic decisions includes the following: The creation of a legislative mechanism for long-term and current planning of Soviet defense building; the submission of an annual report by the minister of defense to the USSR Supreme Soviet justifying the request for appropriation of resources for military expenditure; the legal regulation of the use of military force outside national frontiers (for example, to ensure the security and protect the life of Soviet citizens, to combat terrorism, and so forth); and the drafting of a legislative procedure governing the provision of military assistance and the sale of weapons and technology abroad.

The restructuring of the composition and functions of the country's military management is, in my view, the weakest point of the study. On the other hand, as could have been foreseen, discussion of the structure of the USSR Armed Forces, the means of bringing them up to strength, and the idea of professionalizing the personnel occupied a central place. It is significant that, despite the pluralism of opinions among the members of the expert group and their affiliation to various organizations, departments, and social movements, not one of them treated this problem superficially in the way that the press sometimes has.

Moreover, it turned out that the members of the Citizens' Diplomacy peace association, which emerged in the course of the examination, work on the assumption that our country is not ready to switch to a professional army now or in the near future. Here it was proposed that the USSR Armed Forces be included within a system of continuous statewide education for citizens, regarding the Army as one of the basic sectors for developing the vocational and technical training system. This seems a fruitful idea.

However, the majority of the expert groups believed that in restructuring the system of Armed Forces manpower acquisition at a time of force reductions we should proceed on the basis of a need to substantially increase the degree of professionalization of all categories of servicemen by taking comprehensive account of the USSR's military-strategic position and political and other factors involved in the country's development. No one advocated an immediate and complete switch to a professional army. Instead it was said that there should be careful study of this problem and the implementation of the idea in stages in the light of the distinctive features of the branches of the Armed Forces while retaining on the whole a hybrid means of manpower acquisition for the Army and Navy—through the draft and volunteers.

These are a few of the questions examined by the independent public expert group. If its progress and results are assessed as a whole there are, I think, sufficient grounds for claiming that it will be of appreciable help to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Defense Ministry, and other interested institutions and departments in elaborating modern-day military policy. The analysis has made it possible to apprise the public of the central military apparatus' views on the problem of Soviet defense building and to establish businesslike, constructive contact between military and civilian specialists involved in strengthening the Soviet Union's national security. It is expedient, in my view, to continue holding these kinds of public events while widening the range of their participants.

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## Problems With Military Draft in Moldavia Noted

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[Editorial Report] Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian on 28 January on page one carries a 1,100-word report on an interview with V. Nazarov, military commissar for the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], to a SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA correspondent. The place and date of the interview are not specified.

Nazarov says: "Every year the call-up for real military service becomes increasingly more complex. Last autumn's call-up was no exception. We are having great difficulties in calling up the required number of people. As we all know, in accordance with a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, students in higher educational institutions are now no longer liable to be called up for real military service. Incidentally, by no means have all of those who are released early from the ranks of the Soviet Army under this decision continued their studies."

After commenting on other reasons for people avoiding being called up, Nazarov says: "We cannot fail to be concerned at the growing number of young men who go to all sorts of lengths to avoid being called up for military service. The militia have been helping us look for them for years now."

The situation is particulary bad in Sorokskiy, Kotovskiy, Leninskiy, and Sovetskiy Rayons in Kishinev and in the town of Tiraspol where dozens of people called up for military service are "on the run."

After listing individual draft dodgers, the report continues: "In this connection one cannot but be amazed at the position of workers at the Moldavian SSR Prosecutor's Office who on several occasions have refused to start criminal proceedings against people called up for military service and who persistently refuse to carry out their constitutional duty."